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“We moderns have a source of interest at our disposal, which no Greek or Roman was 
acquainted with, and which the patriotic interest does not nearly equal. This last, in general, is 
chiefly of importance for unripe nations; for the youth of the world. But we may excite a very 
different sort of interest if we represent each remarkable occurrence that happened to men as 
of importance to man.” (Schiller, 1824, p. 17). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
Abstract 
 
 
The ‘ever closer union’ motto of the 1957 Rome Treaty was indeed one of the most assertive 
‘superordinate goals’ in the history of the EU. Symbolic as it may sound, a formulation of this 
sort was in the aftermath of a war-stricken Europe intending to promote the initial cooperation 
between a number of formerly hostile states to a broader audience. For immigration issues, as 
part of a diverse range of policy areas in the Community’s course of action to that effect, the 
Schengen Treaties in the 1980s served well by abolishing the traditional border controls and 
setting about a deeper and wider ‘area of freedom, security and justice’. The 1997 Amsterdam 
Treaty was quite seminal in this latter respect. Accordingly, decision-making in immigration 
matters was to follow progressively supranationalist principles, with the competences of the 
Council to be going halves with the Parliament incrementally. Aside from a certain level of 
harmonisation in cross-border police and judicial affairs, nevertheless, the prevailing tendency 
in the EU Member States’ patterns of immigration policy-making has since then been more to 
the precedence of intergovernmentalism than to that of supranationalism. 
 
Perceiving this ‘back-pedalling’ to be a serious damper on the tenability of the Rome Treaty’s 
slogan in today’s far more crowded Union, this doctoral study aimed to investigate as its core 
research question the extent of ‘Europeanisation’ concerning the immigration policies of four 
EU members. The analysis of these cases, namely Germany, the UK, Greece and Italy, 
included as a matter of course their convergences/divergences in this policy field as well. The 
secondary question the study sought to answer by extension was in other words the 
similarities and differences between the selected cases’ national immigration policies. 
 
The main hypotheses to test within this framework concerned relevance of institutional 
strength and public attitudes. A twofold approach was followed to operationalise this quest. 
First, the selected cases’ historical backgrounds, institutional structures and patterns of 
immigration policy-making specifically with reference to the EU/Community law were 
treated with a qualitative textual analysis. The findings of this examination were then 
substantiated quantitatively by the Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) and the 
European Commission’s annual assessment reports, backed up occasionally with the help of 
recent Eurobarometer Surveys. 
 
v 
For a wider perspective of Europeanisation, the research was designed in compliance with the 
‘bottom-up’ model. Having employed this model against a historical/conceptual background -
where immigration, citizenship and multiculturalism constituted the three chief integral parts- 
and in light of data from the MIPEX and the EU Commission supplementing this framework, 
the study came to the conclusion that in the face of the relatively recent and rapidly expanding 
immigration flows, the institutional structures in Greece and Italy were not poised for 
effective management, which is why the two countries’ immigration policies had to undergo 
‘transformation’ vis-à-vis the EU norms/standards/regulations in this category. While 
transposition and implementation of the relevant EU texts ran on a certain level of scepticism 
in all selected cases –not least because of the negative public attitudes towards immigration- 
Germany’s supranational commitments turned out to be more considerable than in others. 
Despite the strong institutional structure it possessed like Germany, the UK appeared to be a 
typical case for ‘Euroscepticism’ here. In any event, compared to that in Greece or Italy, the 
extent of Europeanisation in the UK, as well as in Germany, amounted to ‘absorption’ at 
most, given the latter two cases’ low-to-moderate needs for policy-change and bigger 
regulatory capacities. Put differently, in the end, the immigration policies of Greece and Italy 
were throughout the selected period of analysis illustrative of a higher degree of 
Europeanisation than those of Germany and the UK. 
 
Keywords: Europeanisation, supranationalisation, migration, immigration, citizenship, 
multiculturalism, national policies, institutional framework, EU/Community law, third-
country nationals, non-EU nationals. 
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1 
Introduction 
 
 
Policy-making in home affairs is not a five-finger exercise. Of many complex variables 
defining the course of action to that effect, those concerning immigration are probably the 
most salient. From a European perspective, the rigours and challenges are rooted largely in 
the history of colonisation and industrialisation. Indeed, the legacy of this thorny past has for 
long been manifesting itself across a number of EU lands, with their immigrant populations 
originating almost entirely from former colonies and/or socially/economically/politically 
underdeveloped regions. 
 
Figure 1: Basic sources and routes of migration to Europe 
 
……. Maritime and/or ferry routes 
— — Air, land and/or maritime routes 
 
An aggregate of poor life standards, concerns about political persecution, aspirations for 
family reunion, better educational opportunities or job prospects have been pushing 
generations of people into France, the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands, to 
name a few, if not always at their discretion. The ‘magnet’ periphery in western/northern 
Europe expanded lately to the south, when a cluster of other EU Member States such as 
Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece began to draw migrants at a continually increasing rate, their 
quintessential ‘sending’ status notwithstanding. A browse through net migration patterns, 
2 
particularly over the latter half of the 20
th
 century, provides supportive evidence in this 
regard: 
 
Table 1: Post-WW II net migration in selected EU Member States (in thousands) 
Country 
Period of analysis 
1958-
1962 
1963-
1967 
1968-
1972 
1973-
1977 
1978-
1982 
1983-
1987 
1988-
1992 
1993-
1997 
1998-
2002 
Germany 1,075 1,122 802 200 290 1,891 323 834 937 
UK 143 -85 106 39 -97 99 205 499 968 
Austria 20 56 101 -28 30 92 275 24 213 
France 1,520 314 692 215 355 290 138 188 1,078 
Netherlands 12 55 179 181 80 134 220 154 145 
Sweden 80 131 19 89 30 135 156 58 142 
Spain -194 -146 97 77 -43 -68 319 796 2,829 
Portugal -548 -702 108 199 -67 -148 149 174 180 
Greece -145 -99 11 330 114 159 465 298 54 
Italy -232 -232 19 165 266 -10 153 224 1,853 
EC/EU total 1,454 195 2,234 1,499 779 2,180 4,265 2,639 8,578 
All values are approximate, i.e. rounded off to the nearest thousand. 
Based on World Bank (2014). 
 
This overview displays general population movements without giving hints at continuity, that 
is, whether or not these inflows had a temporary, transitional or permanent nature in the first 
place. Since arrival of ‘newcomers’ is problematised currently in almost all these lands for 
their lasting impacts, reference to long-term immigration trends is essential: 
 
Table 2: Recent long-term immigration trends in selected Member States (in thousands) 
Country Population 
Year of analysis 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Germany 82,002 769 780 707 662 681 682 346(b) 404 489 
UK 61,596 431 518 496 529 527 590(b) 567 590 566 
Austria 8,355 112 122 114 99 73(b) 74 69 70 82 
France 64,366 : : : 302(b) 294 297 297 307(b) 320 
Netherlands 16,486 105 94 92 101 117 144 123(b) 127 130 
Sweden 9,256 64 62 65 96 99 101 102 99 96 
Spain 45,828 672(b) 684 719 841 958 599(b) 393 361 371 
Portugal 10,627 72(p) 58(p) 49(p) 39(p) 46(p) 30(b) 32 28 20 
Greece 11,260 : : : : : : : 119 111 
Italy 60,045 470 445 326 298 558 535(p) 443(p) 459 386 
EU-27 499,433 : : : : : : 1,731(bdp) 1,811(bdp) 1,750(bdp) 
:= not available ; b= break in time series ; d= definition differs ; p= provisional 
All values are approximate, i.e. rounded off to the nearest thousand. 
Based on Eurostat Yearbook, 2013. 
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There is indeed research holding that most international migrants “fall somewhere in between, 
in the category of transitional…migrants who arrive on temporary visas and work permits 
with no intention to stay permanently” (Gill & Raiser, 2012, p. 333). The above-given figures 
seem to deny such arguments, though, suggesting instead that mere reference to transitional 
patterns cannot account for Europe’s net migration statistics alone. True, there may have been 
idiosyncracies depending on occasional breaks of flows to destination countries, yet, as it 
appears, the recent rise of non-national population in Europe has been characterised to a 
significant extent by long-term immigration. Besides old destinations in the north, which 
seemingly are still magnets for migrants, countries in the EU’s southern periphery have been 
attracting sizeable influxes –and these are not really of those coming for short-term stay- at 
steady rates. 
 
A thorough inquiry into the true nature of these trends requires keeping an eye on two main 
dimensions of immigration. The internal dimension, as it is generally understood in the EU 
context, stands for movement of EU citizens from one Member State to another. The external 
dimension on the other hand signifies arrival of third-country nationals (TCNs) from non-EU 
countries. Recent inquiries observing this distinction demonstrate that the growth of 
immigrant population in present-day Europe is moulded predominantly by the latter 
dimension, i.e immigration of non-EU nationals coming from without the EU: 
 
Table 3: Immigrant population in selected Member States as of 2012 
Countries 
Number of 
immigrants 
(1000) 
Foreign nationals 
Total 
Other Member State 
nationals 
Non-EU/TCN nationals 
(1000) % (1000) % (1000) % 
Germany 592 504 85 299 50 205 35 
UK 498 418 84 158 32 260 52 
Austria 92 83 91 52 57 31 34 
France 327 212 65 91 28 121 37 
Netherlands 125 83 67 51 41 32 26 
Sweden 103 82 80 25 25 57 55 
Spain 304 273 90 100 33 172 57 
Portugal 15 5 36 1 9 4 27 
Greece 110 68 61 25 23 43 39 
Italy 351 321 92 104 30 217 62 
EU-27 1,694 : : : : : : 
: - not given 
Not summing values are due to rounding and the category of ‘unknown citizenship’ which was not taken into consideration. 
All values are approximate, i.e. rounded off to the nearest thousand/percentage. 
Based on Eurostat Pocketbook, 2014. 
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More on this, a follow-up Eurostat publication concerning demographic trends in Europe 
revealed around 1.7 million long-term TCN immigrants who came from outside the Union in 
2011. The number of EU citizens moving likewise for long-term stay the same year (yet at the 
intra-EU level, i.e. from one Member State to another) was about 1.3 million (European 
Commission, 2013b). Accordingly, the highest rates of ‘non-nationals’ (including both other 
EU citizens and those from non-EU countries) were estimated in Luxemburg, Cyprus and 
Latvia: 
 
Figure 2: Population of non-nationals in Member States (in percentages) 
 
(1): provisional 
Source: European Commission (2013a). 
 
In absolute terms, however, Germany stood out with its more than 4.6 million non-EU 
citizens (ca. 5.7% of its entire population) on top of all Member States, followed by Italy with 
some 3.4 million non-EU nationals (ca. 5.5% of its population). Other eye-catching statistics 
came from Spain which hosted around 3.2 million non-EU nationals (some 6.9% of its 
population), France with 2.5 million (around 3.8% of its population) and the UK with 
approximately 2.4 million TCN size (ca. 3.9% of its total population). Although the number 
of non-EU nationals in Greece was estimated to be under 1 million, such a quantity was 
relative to the entire population quite high, for it amounted approximately to 7.3% and 
outstripped thereby those of the foregoing Member States. 
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0.1 Statement of the problem 
Europe’s popularity as a route of migration has long been comparable to that of North 
America
1
 and there are strong signs that it will remain to be the case in the medium to long 
run. Nonetheless, the issue of immigration has been for the former hardly a “part and parcel 
of…collective memory” (Lucassen, 2005, p. 13). In the absence of a ‘lieu de mémoire’as 
such, public attitudes towards immigration have in most European countries been generally 
ill-disposed with a high degree of ambivalence (Boswell, 2005). Indeed, at present, for this 
reason or another, immigration conjures up in the mind of an average EU citizen rather a 
chain of problems to be curbed than opportunities to be seized, so much so that it may at times 
suggest more serious an issue than for instance education, foreign affairs, defence or even 
terrorism does: 
 
Figure 3: Perception of immigration as a problem in the EU (27) 
 
What do you think are the two most important issues facing your country at the moment? 
 
Based on Standard Eurobarometer (EB) 73. 
 
Further to that, when asked to choose from two main levels of policy-making in this context –
that is to say, whether treatment of immigration matters should be managed primarily by 
supranational authorities or national decion-makers- EU citizens appear to go for the former: 
 
                                                     
1
 To 2004 OECD statistics, net immigration in Europe stood just below that of the US, with an average 3 to 3,1 
rate of immigrants out of 1000 inhabitants in total. 
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Figure 4: Preference for decision-making level in the EU Member States (in percentages) 
 
For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the national government, or made jointly 
within the European Union? 
 
Based on Standard EB 73. 
 
Considering long-standing commitments to a border-free internal market across EU lands, one 
could argue that immigration management would here be more favourable if it held a 
predominantly supranational character. The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty was in this sense quite 
expressive, insofar as a firm commitment was here made to move decision-making over 
national immigration policies to the EU domain. Managing immigration issues under 
Community competence as a key component of the Justice and Home Affairs would 
accordingly promote policy harmonisation across Member States. Nonetheless, the hitherto 
communitarisation attempts have not quite paid off in this respect (Ette & Faist, 2007, p. 13). 
 
Against this rather fruitless background, on the face of it, this doctoral study set out to 
undertake a comparative analysis across Germany, the UK, Italy and Greece and shed light on 
the extent of ‘Europeanisation’ and convergences/divergences as far as their national 
immigration policies were concerned. 
 
0.2 Case selection 
Selection of these cases was non-random. Aside from the fact that Germany, the United 
Kingdom, and Italy belonged to a cluster of Member States hosting currently the highest 
populations of an estimated 35 million non-EU nationals in Europe today, the Greek case 
featured as one of the fastest growing immigrant destinations in the EU, as demonstrated 
recently by the OECD (2011b) and International Organisation for Migration (2013). 
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For all similarities in this sense, however, these cases might appear to be somewhat uneven in 
consideration of their unique national discourses vis-à-vis economic, political or institutional 
parameters. As many studies focusing on contemporary immigration in Europe revealed it, 
countries in the north were for instance capable of managing more effective control systems 
than those in the south (Finotelli & Sciortino, 2009). One must nonetheless admit that a 
perfect match in case selection applies to hardly any research endeavor, irrespective of the 
area it investigates. Structural differences between Germany, the UK, Greece and Italy were 
on that account not regarded as research handicaps doing harm to the validity/reliability of 
this study. They could on the contrary be of major service to reducing research bias, if any, to 
a certain extent. 
 
Obviously, further, all these four countries represented the rather ‘older’ segment of Member 
States (the ‘newer’ being the last 12 EU accession countries). Such a preference was in all 
fairness based on the undersupply of empirical data concerning the latter in literature, 
regardless of the seemingly growing immigrant quotas they might be featuring in recent 
times. 
 
0.3 Research model, questions and hypotheses 
Research design for harmonisation of national policies in the EU has traditionally been 
informed by what in scholarship is commonly referred to as ‘Europeanisation’, drawing 
roughly from institutionalist assumptions that the main factor generating policy changes at the 
Member State level is its ‘misfit’ with the EU-level (Green-Cowles, Caporaso & Risse, 2001). 
Two main vantage points appear to count on this theoretical understanding. The ‘top-down’ 
outlook as the leadoff perspective in the field assumes that it is mainly the policy-making 
mechanism at the EU-level that has a decisive role in the policy changes/adaptations at the 
national/domestic level. The research design as seen from the ‘bottom-up’ angle holds the 
opposite point of departure. Rather than “starting from European policies (or politics) as 
independent variable and tracking down the consequences for domestic actors, policies, and 
politics, it starts and finishes at the level of domestic actor” (Radaelli, 2004, p. 4). 
 
To enjoy a wide angle as it may require, this study opted for the latter line of thinking. The 
research model designed in accordance did not give credence to a vertical/uni-directional top-
down understanding which generally premises that the adaptational pressures upon 
domestic/national policy changes have primarily an EU-origin. It aligned instead with the 
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bottom-up perspective which had a capacity to apprehend Europeanisation as a policy-making 
process starting first from the domestic/national origins to be then following both horizontal 
(policy-making tracks of other Member States and/or non-EU countries) and vertical (those 
ascending/descending to/from the EU-level) causal mechanisms. 
 
Based on this research model, the study set out to investigate as its main research question the 
extent of Europeanisation in terms of the EU Member States’ national immigration policies. 
This query had indeed capacity for asking a second research question inquiring about the 
way(s) in which these policies converge with/diverge from one another: 
 
1. To what extent are the EU Member States’ national immigration policies 
‘Europeanised’? 
2. In what ways are the EU Member States’ national immigration policies similar 
to/different from one another? 
 
In making judgments about the extent of Europeanisation on target, a four-outcome model 
was consulted as a benchmark (Börzel, 1999; Green-Cowles, Caporaso & Risse, 2001; 
Héritier & Knill, 2001; Radaelli, 2003). The situation indicating no considerable policy 
change in the national domain amounted accordingly to ‘inertia’. For ‘retrenchment’ to take 
place, the major condition was a negative trend by which policies in the area of immigration 
became eventually less ‘European’. ‘Absorption’ on the other side suggested that the change 
in question was ‘positive’, far-reaching and came broadly as a policy response to the EU’s 
adaptational pressure. ‘Transformation’, finally, was to mark more profound positive changes. 
Here national policy structures were taken to have seen replacement from head to toe, in 
conformity with the EU’s norms/standards within the area of immigration.2 
 
The chief hypothesis underlying the research questions considered briefly that the strength of 
a Member State’s institutional framework concerning the area of immigration and the extent 
of Europeanisation in this context had a negative correlation. That is to say: 
 
1. The weaker the institutional framework of immigration policies in a Member 
State, the bigger the amount of EU’s adaptational pressures upon Member States in 
this field. 
 
                                                     
2
 A lengthier account of this differentiation is available in ‘Phases of Europeanisation’ as part of Chapter 3. 
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Another hypothesis which served to highlight a further dimension in research scope argued 
that the perceived concerns and attitudes with respect to immigrants in host societies were 
significantly decisive for the extent of and/or resistance against Europeanisation: 
 
2. The more the public concerns holding that ‘newcomers’ do not fit in with the host 
society, the lower the extent of Europeanisation as far as Member States’ 
immigration policies are concerned. 
 
To test these hypotheses, a twofold procedure was operationalised. The first line of action 
here was that of textual analysis, employed far and wide from data collection to assessment so 
as to explore and delineate the selected cases’ historical backgrounds, institutional structures 
and patterns of immigration/integration policy-making specifically in reference to the 
EU/Community law. Then, to substantiate these findings in statistical terms, a second line of 
action was brought into play in the form of numerical analysis. This undertaking concerned a 
series of quantitative data obtained from three main sources. 
 
The first source of quantitative data was derived from the Migration Integration Policy Index 
(MIPEX), as managed by the non-profit Migration Policy Group and under the auspices of the 
European Commission. The core MIPEX data comprising 148 policy indicators
3
 were 
formulated through a rich platform of scholarly contributions with the aim to benchmark the 
current immigration policies across 31 countries, a big majority of which were EU members. 
The second source of quantitative data comprised the EU Commission’s regular reports, 
released annually on the basis of the selected cases’ breach of EU law regarding immigration 
matters. This cross-check covered implementation of 28 binding legal texts (of directives and 
regulations) falling in three chief immigration areas: labour/legal immigration, 
irregular/illegal immigration and asylum-seeking issues. Finally, the third host of quantitative 
data included the Commission’s Eurobarometer Surveys. These were chiefly in the form of 
Standard Eurobarometer opinion polls (the others being Special, Flash and Qualitative), which 
were carried out over around 1000 face-to-face interviews amongst the citizens of the selected 
cases. 
 
While the method of research inquiry adopted in this framework was fundamentally 
qualitative -for it was at the end of the day primarily self-perceptions of textual interpretations 
rather than ‘numerical signs’ to be decisive in making conclusive judgments about the 
                                                     
3
 Attached in Appendix 2 under ‘MIPEX Policy Indicators (2010)’. 
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selected cases’ Europeanisation of immigration policies- the research consulted inevitably a 
series of quantitative methods -though rather indirectly by means of interviews, survey reports 
and opinion polls as provided by the MIPEX, the European Commission’ law-monitoring and 
DG (Directorate General) services, respectively- to provide depth and richness to its 
investigation. 
 
The use of quantitative data as a supplement was certainly meant to help reduce 
methodological complexity to a minimum. Still, a core issue to mention to that effect was the 
difficulty in identifying the net impact of the EU on national policy changes, i.e. separating 
the EU’s influence from that of other sources elsewhere (Keohane & Milner, 1996). To cope 
with this challenge to a certain extent, the study turned to the bottom-up research model 
alongside methodological techniques like backward-mapping (Elmore, 1979) to take into 
account further sources of change other than the EU’s adaptational pressure as well as 
process-tracing (Bennett & George, 1997) with the expectation that a cohesive order would by 
this means be established amongst all relevant findings acquired in the end. The research 
involved against this background a comparative policy analysis whose independent variable 
was in brief terms the ‘goodness of fit’, adding up to the EU norms/standards to be observed 
in terms of immigration matters. The main dependent variable comprised on the other side the 
policy changes/responses the EU Member States appeared to hold in this context. 
 
0.4 Definitions 
The central theme of this research is needless to say Europeanisation. While understood 
generally as harmonisation of national policy-making on the basis of EU norms/standards, it 
is hard to find a definition used congruently in scholarship when referring to Europeanisation. 
This divergence stems largely from varying perceptions as to national/domestic policy 
changes and their interaction with supranational dynamics. With that in mind, the study used 
 
Processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalization of formal and 
informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and 
shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy 
process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and sub-national) 
discourse, political structures and public policies (Radaelli 2003, p. 30) 
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as a base with the proviso that the processes/dynamics mentioned herein should take their 
final form chiefly under the heel of national policy-making. A comprehensive treatment of 
this issue was provided in Chapter 2 as part of the conceptual framework. 
 
With its research confines limited entirely to the EU context, the key migration terms in the 
study were principally based on the EU Commission’s terminological databank. Accordingly, 
immigration referred to “the action by which a person establishes his/her usual residence in 
the territory of an EU State for a period that is, or is expected to be, of at least 12 months, 
having previously been resident in another EU State or a non-EU country”. This entry is 
indeed an extract from Appendix 1, where a mini glossary of basic terms is presented in 
relation to the research field.
4
 
 
0.5 Delimitations 
Intended by immigration as the core theme in the study was almost always the extra-EU 
dimension. Put in other words, the research scope overlooked mobility of EU citizens between 
Member States to treat instead that of third-country nationals from without the borders of the 
Union (into the Member States) as the main focus. The research questions concerning 
Europeanisation and convergences/divergences of national immigration policies demanded in 
that sense investigation of the selected cases in terms of their third-country nationals. 
 
The selected time-frame included in broad terms the post-World War II period in which 
patterns of immigration across Europe showed frequent symptoms of change. A central 
weight was laid here on the process following the Amsterdam Treaty’s entry into force (in 
1999) whereby Member States’ immigration policies became officially tied to the Community 
Method.
5
 For experimental analysis, that said, the chief emphasis was on the 2004-2012 
period. This last arrangement was attached essentially with the breadth of empirical works 
fostering this study, i.e. those obtained from the MIPEX, the EU Commission’s law 
monitoring system and the Eurobarometer surveys/opinion polls, whose stocks of data were in 
circulation essentially as of 2004. 
 
                                                     
4
 Major references used for this purpose are the e-libraries/e-resources of the European Commission, the 
International Labour Organisation and the United Nations’ Department of Economic and Social Affairs. 
5
 To create ‘an area for freedom, security and justice’, the Treaty of Amsterdam introduced a new title (Title IV 
of the EC Treaty) relating to ‘visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to free movement of 
persons’, whereby competences in this area were shifted from the third to the first pillar. 
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References feeding these queries were made up of primary and secondary sources ranging 
from online materials to published/unpublished books, theses, interviews and other works of 
academic value, which were all available in hard or electronic copies and were retrievable 
through library catalogues and databases. 
 
0.6 Research outline 
There are five main chapters in the study. The introductory chapter presenting an overview of 
the research is followed by Chapter 1, which provides the methodological grounds for the 
research philosophy, methodology, data collection/analysis and finally research strategy. 
Chapter 2 lays out the conceptual framework on the basis of immigration, citizenship and 
multiculturalism, the latter two being the most immediate research areas to the former, as 
perceived by the study. The theoretical framework introduced in Chapter 3 includes initially a 
set of salient models in EU Studies to pave the way in the end for Europeanisation as the 
research’s theoretical basis. The legal framework in Chapter 4 makes room for the core legal 
texts Member States consult at the EU level in reference to immigration matters. 
 
As the study’s chief empirical unit, Chapter 5 investigates at the outset a set of key players 
guiding into the present day immigration agenda in Germany, the UK, Greece and Italy. This 
inquiry is essentially based on immigration histories, institutional structures, principal actors 
involved in immigration management as well as national immigration laws and policies, with 
special emphasis on transposition and implementation of the EU law. Following that, the 
research moves on to deliver data from the MIPEX according to the seven main dimensions of 
immigration by which national policies concerning third-country nationals are brought under 
scrutiny: labour markets, family reunion, educational standards, political participation, long-
term residence, access to nationality and anti-discrimination measures. This inquiry is then 
reinforced by analysis of infringements the four selected EU members have so far committed 
in reference to the EU law. Selected for this purpose are 28 EU directives and regulations 
whose substances cover the three main areas of immigration: labour/legal immigration, 
irregular/illegal immigration and asylum issues. 
 
Finally, in the concluding chapter, the study reviews its findings to offer explicit 
answers/comments regarding the research questions and hypotheses posed/formulated at the 
very outset, before it ultimately makes a last word for future research in the field. 
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Chapter 1 Methodology 
 
 
This chapter delineates the methodological underpinnings of the study. There is to this end 
first a presentation of the research philosophy, then the research design and methods, which in 
the last part yield to issues concerning data collection and analysis. 
 
1.1 Research philosophy 
The guiding philosophy behind this work resonates closely with critical realism. The most 
compelling grounds for this association spring from post-positivist principles in social 
sciences. Two main traditions are linked with these principles. To social constructivism, the 
very nature of social sciences is not apt to undertake scientific research. At odds with this 
position on the other side is critical realism, which holds that “knowledge is fallible and thus 
open to revision and replacement through empirical research” (Cruickshank, 2011, p. 4). 
 
To critical realist ontology, ‘reality’ can by no means be reduced to a limited number of 
individual observations (Bhaskar, 1975, 1986; Archer, 2007). Its ‘critical’ bit accentuates the 
weak character of social knowledge to see to the fundamental question of whether or not 
social reality is exogenous to human consciousness (Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2000) 
around two variants: ‘reality within’ and ‘reality without’ human comprehension. Although it 
does not split radically from social constructionism, which essentially cites from relativism to 
contend that knowledge is basically an extension to discursive power relations, critical realism 
refuses to detach itself categorically from positivism, while being polemical about it, to 
maintain that it is to a certain extent possible to constitute a positive development of 
knowledge (Iosifides, 2011). To find a compromise between positivists and relativists, critical 
realists seek to help reconstruct social phenomena by blending the positivist quest for reality -
specifically through their emphasis on causal links- with a rather moderate interpretivist 
treatment taking reality as a social construction. Put differently, while adhering to the 
underlying premises of realism, critical realists are informed to a significant degree by 
idealism insofar as its conceptual schemes are adaptable for reality. What’s more, being “a 
contemporary form of idealism” (Cruickshank, 2003, p. 47), critical realism does not conform 
to traditional dualisms like positivist-interpretivist divide but brings together quantitative and 
qualitative methods by freeing the former from its positivist restraints and the latter from its 
relativist bias. 
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For migration research, the most obvious and outstanding virtue of critical realism is such 
“critical methodological pluralism” (Danermark et al., 2002, p. 150), as it borrows from both 
qualitative and quantitative models to detach the social world from the natural one. Given an 
obvious need for interdisciplinarity in migration research, a pluralistic approach favouring a 
well-balanced relationship between agency and structure (Psillos, 2007) becomes more than 
an option. The capacity critical realism holds in taking stock of  immigrants at the micro-level 
and bringing that together with organisational/institutional structures at the macro-level offers 
two main variants of causation in social events: horizontal/linear and vertical/non-linear 
(Archer, 1998). The key method to choose between these two variants is called ‘retroduction’ 
(Bhaskar, 1986, p. 11). It is a backward process assigning a circular reasoning in data 
collection, regardless of the type of investigation. This ongoing/circular process lasts until a 
robust formation of knowledge is achieved to understand, explain and stimulate the 
phenomenon (Bhaskar, 1986). 
 
Critical realists explain reality by way of causal analysis. They are yet informed about 
possible risks of deviation in this respect (Miles & Huberman, 1994). While believing firmly 
that the course of social reality could in fact be determined by a delicate relationship between 
structure and agency, the researcher, to critical realists, is at no times detached from the social 
phenomena, for the link between ‘the knower’ and ‘the knowledge’ holds at all times an 
inseparable nature. On validity questions, critical realism offers an in-depth exploration of the 
social systems as they “are always open and usually complex and messy. Unlike some of the 
natural sciences, we cannot isolate out these components and examine them under controlled 
conditions” (Sayer, 2000, p. 19). From this perspective, an object with a diverse character is a 
matter of question only when social scientists rely on interactions between abstractions. A 
primary task of the researcher is then to track down concepts taking up new meanings, 
becoming part of the public discourse and changing social life in the end. Identifying the 
nexus of these discourses would help see that there are always limits to valid or meaningful 
argumentation (Waever, 2005). 
 
The epistemological ground of the study is leveled against this background with hermeneutic 
phenomenology. This disposition is indeed not coincidental as the study aligns itself largely 
with the subjectivist strand of social thought. As a branch of phenomenology looking up to 
close links between ‘the knowledge’ and ‘the knower’ and for this reason necessitating 
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individual consciousness (Johnson & Christensen, 2007), hermeneutic phenomenology is 
commonly associated with the ontology of dasein, which Heidegger (1927; 1962) offers to 
explain the interdependence between ‘the self’ and the social world.6 Rating these insights 
highly, the study acknowledges analysis of “a text from the perspective of the person who 
penned it” (Bryman, 2001, pp. 382-383). Seen from this perspective, social phenomena are to 
be taken on all occasions as capable of connecting with the researcher, not as remote entities.
7
 
 
Subjective research, as hermeneutical phenomenology prescribes it, demands that the 
researcher take up a proactive position. This active role offers surely advantages for 
alternative ways of thinking; however, it also holds risks of ‘value’ bias. One way to stay 
clear off such dangers is adopting the ‘triangulation’ method, which encourages use of more 
than one research technique, seeing that the nature of social phenomena is best permeable 
when approached from a variety of angles (Pickard, 2007). 
 
1.2 Research design 
Aligning with critical realism without giving up on constructivist principles entirely has direct 
implications for the research design. As formerly argued, the research philosophy underlying 
this work renders it inappropriate to take a positivist stance amongst others in consideration of 
the policy-oriented issues at its core, which call for an eventual use of subjective assessment. 
Despite presumptions about comparative studies communicating in many instances to the 
positivist logic (Hopkin, 2002, p. 266), this gives in fact very little room for contextual 
relativity (Yin, 1994), which is how it becomes an intrinsic quality for this research. 
 
Research design in European Studies traditionally draws on a number of ‘trade-offs’ including 
 
‘cause of effects’ versus ‘effects of causes’ approach; concept formation versus 
measurement; complex notions of causation (including multiple-conjunctural 
causation) versus singular linear causation; omitted variables bias versus multi-
collinearity…; time as a qualitative factor in politics versus time as quantity of years; 
                                                     
6
 Like phenomenology, the roots of which go back to Heidegger’s mentor Husserl, hermeneutic phenomenology 
draws from the worldly life and human’s everyday experiences. Of several sources of disagreement between the 
two, it was mainly Husserl’s appreciation of the material life Heidegger sought to challenge with his thesis of 
‘dasein’ or ‘in-der-Welt-sein’. This notion was for Heidegger a way to assign meanings onto material lives. 
While Husserl regarded humans as ‘knowers’ in the first place, Heidegger considered them to be capable of 
‘doing things’ in this world to the extent of their capacity (Jones, 1975). 
7
 This proposition was held by Ricoeur, Gadamer, Giorgi and van Manen who amongst others stressed that 
understanding social phenomena requires coming to grips with the socio-cultural/historical contexts they are 
constructed in (Ray, 1994). 
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and mechanism-oriented research versus variable-oriented analysis (Exadaktylos & 
Radaelli, 2009, p. 512). 
 
 
Choosing one of the six approaches outlined here has obviously to do with the type of causal 
analysis at hand. And yet, when the research matter is affiliated with Europeanisation, a 
further trade-off comes into play under a ‘top-down versus bottom-up approach’ (Exadaktylos 
& Radaelli, 2009, p. 514). To the top-down understanding, the causal analysis starts with 
supranational dynamics at the EU-level. The vertical flow here is believed to crop up 
irrespective of other possible co-actors which could also potentially change the degree of 
fit/misfit between the national and supranational levels (Caporaso, 2001). For critics of the 
top-down argument, the launch of the EMU (European Monetary Union) case is quite telling. 
While the EMU’s foundation appears at first to be an outcome of supranational decision-
making diffusing into Member States’ fiscal policies incrementally, the likelihood that it 
could alternatively stem from neo-liberal policies at the global level would be overlooked, if 
seen purely from the top-down perspective. And with such a ‘linear’ form of causation, as the 
criticism goes, research would be ridden with serious fallacies and weaknesses (Saurugger, 
2007). 
 
Starting from the domestic level on the basis of “actors, ideas, problems, rules styles and 
outcomes…at time zero”, the bottom-up model on the other hand “process-traces the system 
over the years and identifies the critical junctures or turning points – for example, when major 
ideational change takes place, or the constellation of dominant actors is altered” (Exadaktylos 
& Radaelli, 2009, p. 510). To measure EU-specific variables, the researcher, to this model, 
can use a backward-mapping technique (Elmore, 1979) in moving from the domestic level all 
the way ‘up’ by controlling time-related causal chains which are of significant empirical value 
for domestic change. Added to that, the bottom-up approach takes into account other possible 
players beyond the national and/or supranational domains. In comparing the EU’s telecom 
and electricity policies with those of other countries, Levi-Faur (2004) concludes for instance 
that policy change in this sector comes largely as part of global dynamics. In that sense, 
awareness of a complex network of discourses and causal sequences which are capable of 
dominating the process of Europeanisation “is probably the only guarantee, if any (cf. 
Haverland, 2005), of due consideration of the European factor as one of several alternative 
explanations” (Vink & Graziano, 2007, p. 10). This argumentation stresses essentially the 
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need to extend the vertical and/or horizontal outlooks to an integrated view whereby policy-
making at the national level could be seen as an outcome of domestic, supranational and 
international processes simultaneously. 
 
1.3 Research method, questions, hypotheses and measurement 
As for the method according to which the research matter would be investigated, the guiding 
principle was to follow a procedure capable of providing easy access to “meaning, process 
and context” (Devine, 2002, p. 199). It appeared this condition was to be fulfilled most 
fittingly by way of the qualitative method. To the quantitative praxis, as the other familiar 
tradition to which research design is traditionally carried out, the researcher follows from a 
positivist rationale with the assumption that ‘reality’ can only be achieved through a series of 
methodical observations and experiments (Marsh & Stoker, 1995). Yet, given that it is 
‘transferable’ conclusions (Punch, 1998) which was eventually intended by the completion of 
this study, a better fit for its research design demanded a qualitative framework, for it spares 
more room for diversity (Devine, 1995). Such an aspiration did however not necessarily 
involve a categorical denial of quantitative tools. To test/verify the social phenomenon in 
question more compellingly, resting on for instance more than one research method (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1994, p.110), the study adopted further the ‘triangulation’ method. 
 
Selection of the qualitative research method was intended to serve for investigation of two 
research questions, i.e. the extent of Europeanisation as far as the EU Member States’ national 
immigration policies were concerned as well as similarities/differences between them in the 
same context. The end results to that effect were taken to be falling in one of the four major 
outcomes of Europeanisation: ‘inertia’, ‘retrenchment’, ‘absorption’ or ‘transformation’ 
(Börzel, 1999; Green-Cowles, Caporaso & Risse, 2001; Héritier & Knill, 2001; Radaelli, 
2003). Accordingly, conditions corresponding to no observable policy changes in the national 
domain would translate into inertia. Symptoms of retrenchment would be drawn from 
‘negative’ changes in light of immigration policies which became progressively less 
‘European’. In the event that this trend was ‘positive’, in other words, if the policy changes 
were observed to have aligned with the basic terms/conditions of Europeanisation, the 
inference would be that it was either absorption or transformation which occurred as a final 
outcome. While absorption would suggest that the degree of adaptation to the EU’s 
institutional framework was of considerable value, transformation was to mark a far more 
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manifest outcome, so much so that national policy structures became thereby subject to 
comprehensive changes under the sway of the ‘European’ institutional framework. 
 
Two main hypotheses were proposed to be explanatory for the investigation of research 
questions. The first one conjectured that there should be a negative correlation between the 
strength of a Member State’s institutional framework and the extent of Europeanisation in the 
area of immigration. The second hypothesis established a further correlation between public 
attitudes towards immigration and the extent of Europeanisation. Accordingly, the more 
negative the public concerns about immigrants in a Member State were, the more marginal the 
degree of Europeanisation would be a matter of question on this matter. A twofold method 
was followed to test these hypotheses. To explore historical backgrounds, institutional 
structures and policy-making patterns, the chief method to serve as a template was textual 
analysis. Then, to support findings in accordance statistically, a second method was put to use 
in the form of numerical analysis. Three main sources were consulted for quantitative data 
here. 
 
The first source for quantitative data was the Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX). 
This was indeed an assessment tool generated and propagated by the EU-supported and non-
profit Migration Policy Group on the basis of a total of 148 indicators. These so-called ‘policy 
indicators’ (attached in Appendix 2) were formulated by a wide platform of scholars to 
benchmark the current immigration policies across 31 countries (many of which were part of 
the EU). The second source of quantitative data included the EU Commission’s annual 
assessment reports on the selected cases violation of the EU law (in immigration matters). 
Examined here were 28 EU directives and regulations according to labour/legal immigration, 
irregular/illegal immigration and asylum-seeking issues, as the three chief areas of 
immigration. And finally, the last source of quantitative data covered a number of (Standard) 
Eurobarometer Surveys which were conducted over around 1000 face-to-face interviews 
amongst EU Member State citizens. 
 
While the research made supplementary use of quantitative methods, by reference to 
interviews, survey reports and opinion polls as provided by the MIPEX and the European 
Commission, to provide depth and richness to its investigation, one needs to remember that 
the method of research inquiry in this framework was essentially qualitative and it was, for 
this reason, rather textual interpretations than ‘numerical signs’ to function as the key markers 
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for the investigated research matter. Enjoying qualitative and quantitative reasoning 
simultaneously helps no doubt reduce methodological complexity to a minimum. Yet, a main 
concern to mention here, which in fact applies to any study tackling Europeanisation as a 
research theme, was the challenges of singling out the net impact of the EU on the policy 
changes in Member States, in other words, whether or not the EU’s influence was entirely 
separable from that of other sources (Keohane & Milner, 1996). To cope with this difficulty to 
a certain degree, the study adopted the bottom-up research model, alongside backward-
mapping (Elmore, 1979) in search of lower/further sources of change other than the EU’s 
adaptational pressure, as well as process-tracing (Bennett & George, 1997) to put these roots 
of change in a sequential order. 
 
The cross-country analysis carried out in the research was an illustration of the case study 
method. Two sets of cases were chosen to this end. The first set comprised Germany and the 
UK, as two of the most established immigration destinations in Europe, according to the 
OECD statistics released lately (2011b). Added to these, a second set of cases was brought 
into use by way of Italy and Greece, in view of recent immigration patterns in the EU which 
seemed to extend over the southern periphery as well. To this comparative policy analysis, the 
independent variable was ‘goodness of fit’, i.e. the degree of compatibility between national 
policies/institutions and those of the EU, as far as immigration was concerned. The main 
dependent variable on the other side comprised the policy changes/responses the EU Member 
States appeared to hold in this context. 
 
As already imparted, convergences/divergences between national immigration policies were 
explored here additionally through quantitative methods. Of particular relevance in this 
category were survey inquiries, provided for this research by the Migration Integration Policy 
Index (MIPEX) in the form of secondary data. 
 
1.4 Data collection and analysis 
The most common data collection techniques employed characteristically as part of 
qualitative methods are “(a) participating in the setting, (b) observing directly, (c) 
interviewing in depth, and (d) analysing documents and material culture” (Marshall & 
Rossman, 2006, p. 97). Given the large research scope its case selection demanded as opposed 
to the narrow resources and logistics held in the beginning to get this study underway, it 
would have yet been unfeasible to choose from one of the first three options in particular, no 
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matter how much they meant for the originality and cogency of the research. In the end, under 
existing circumstances, the remaining document/material culture analysis appeared to be the 
only viable choice here. 
 
Limiting analysis of cases to four immigration lands, two from the old destinations in the 
north (as Germany and the UK) and two from the new in the south (Greece and Italy), is 
indeed illustrative of purposive sampling
8
 and small-N approach
9
. While selection of cases 
could have well been expanded through other significant cases (such as France or Spain, 
where concentrations of third-country nationals rank today similarly at the top in Europe), it 
was believed that the original decision would be adequate to investigate the subject matter 
thoroughly, needless to say to the extent of their representativeness for the split between 
Europe’s ‘north’ (or ‘west’) and ‘south’. As it were, this divide is in literature often perceived 
to represent varying levels of institutional development in terms of the concerning countries’ 
historical, socio-political and economic backgrounds (Finotelli & Sciortino, 2009). 
 
Data in the form of primary sources were consulted insofar as they had connections to the 
institutional backgrounds of the selected cases. Common references to this end were the 
national laws/acts, the EC/EU Treaties, the Council’s and the European Parliament’s legal 
texts including Directives, Regulations and Decisions as well as the Commission’s 
Communications. The bulk of secondary sources was comprised of publications from 
independent/non-profit organisations (for which the MIPEX was the primary source) and 
other academic entries most of which were registered in the Social Sciences Citation Index. 
 
1.5 Research limitations 
A major limitation for the undertaking of this work was the poor background of empirical 
findings. With its established theoretical principles, Europeanisation is today considered to 
offer a firm basis of research (Featherstone, 2003; Börzel, 2005), unlike a period of 
ontological uncertainty when it was regarded little more than an ‘attention directing device’ 
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 The qualitative approach consults chiefly “purposive sampling…to collect the data - mainly, data relating to 
people's judgment, preferences, priorities, and/or perceptions about a subject - and analyses it usually through 
sociological or anthropological research techniques” whereas the quantitative approach is known to use “random 
sample surveys and structured interviews to collect the data - mainly, quantifiable data - and analyses it using 
statistical techniques” (Carvalho & White, 1997, p. 1). 
9
 Although the small-N approach might be criticised for its oversimplification of cases, there is actually no risk 
of bias as long as a deliberate negligence of a particular case makes no direct implications to the research 
findings (Dion, 1998). 
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(Olsen, 2002). Yet, its handling as part of the immigration context has been very rare, 
regardless of the fact that the latter was reportedly the EU’s fastest developing policy field in 
the post-Amsterdam period (Monar, 2006). And even if there have been studies traversing the 
scope of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), these were not necessarily of primary relevance to 
immigration in the first place (Kohler-Koch & Rittberger, 2006, p. 32). 
 
Another area capable of raising similar reliability/validity questions is the generous use of 
secondary sources in this research. To be fair, this issue would actually be applicable to any 
research endeavor if it had ambitions to carry out a thorough and impartial investigation. After 
all, even for primary sources, there would almost always be second thoughts as to whether or 
not they were to have a ‘soft’/‘hard’ nature (Moravcsik, 1998, as cited in Lieshout, Segers & 
van der Vleuten, 2004). In this sense, using parliamentary records or even legal documents 
might be misleading for reasons of their possibly distorted viewpoints, which is why they are 
in fact ‘soft’ by nature. In contrast, “internal government reports, contemporary records of 
confidential deliberations among key decision-makers…lengthy interviews with numerous 
policy makers” belong to the ‘hard’ category, constituting a far more reliable set of sources 
for research inquiry (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 82). Nonetheless, regardless of this reminder, it is 
important to bear in mind that this study set out by no means to pursue a positivist 
understanding of reliability. Of more weight here was rather ‘rigorous subjectivity’, 
‘transparency’ and ‘triangulation’, all informed by “critical elements and wringing plausible 
interpretations…something one can pursue without becoming obsessed with finding the right 
or ultimate answer, the correct version, the Truth” (Wolcott, 1994, pp. 366-367). 
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Chapter 2 Conceptual framework 
 
 
To map out the conceptual boundaries of immigration is not an easy task. It becomes even 
more so given the limited space in this work. Of many issues which may be closely affiliated 
with the research scope, two themes are picked out to dwell on in this chapter (aside from the 
leading part reserved for immigration as the central theme of the study). With its social, 
economic and political subtexts slanting widely towards immigration, citizenship crops up 
indeed to make the most adjacent connections to immigration. Added to that, as the 
legal/political weight of citizenship may shade topical concerns like ‘diversity’, 
multiculturalism is given here space as a third conceptual area, with the specific aim to bridge 
the first two themes in cultural terms. 
 
 
2.1 Immigration 
2.1.1 Historical and theoretical backdrop 
Migration is an issue as old as the fig leaf. Driven by personal motivations, struggles to make 
a better living or live up to social, political and/or ideological preferences, generations of 
people have been on the move -whether individually or in groups, for a short interval or long- 
relentlessly. For all that chase in the lengthy history of migration, a relatively recent turning 
point is the advent of the nation-state. Indeed, understanding migration as a broader concept 
of immigration and emigration to describe the process of people’s short or long term 
movement “within or across the borders of a state regardless of the form and driving forces 
lying behind”10 takes as an origin essentially the construction of the nation-state. Arrival in a 
new land has been since then liable to border formalities, the regulation of which rests 
primarily upon national citizenship rights and possession of passports. Informed by this frame 
of reference, immigration research has adopted to date for the most part the “nation-state point 
of view of spatial mobility, because it is (still) the dominant conventional view of the world” 
(Favell, 2007, p. 271). 
 
The earliest theoretical approaches to immigration were based on economic models. A 
seminal work amongst these is Ravenstein’s (1889) Laws of Migration (Daugherty & 
Kammeyer, 1995). Accordingly, it is almost always material interests that drive people away 
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 European Commission, Home Affairs, e-Library, Glossary. 
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from their usual places of residence. Indeed, such ‘push and pull’ factors in pursuit of more 
affluent conditions came to structure investigation of most notably the early-20
th
 century 
migratory movements from Europe to the United States, Canada and Australia (Lewis, 1954; 
Ranis & Fei, 1961; Sjaastad, 1962; Lee, 1966; Todaro, 1969; Frank, 1966; Harris & Todaro, 
1970; Wallerstein, 1974, 1980; Piore, 1979; Todaro & Maruszko, 1987; Borjas, 1990; Massey 
et al., 1993). Central to most of these studies are subjects who “move from country A to 
country B and either settle for good (i.e., become ‘immigrants’) or move back home after 
reaching their economic objectives (i.e., become ‘sojourners’)” (Guarnizo, Portes & Haller, 
2003, p. 1215). 
 
Following economic models, studies from different disciplinary areas made contributions by 
centering on other aspects of migration. Sociological models looked for instance into the role 
of group dynamics and social structures on the basis of race, ethnicities and religion and their 
connection to ‘assimilation’ (Thomas & Zaniecki, 1918; Park & Burgess, 1921; Warner & 
Srole, 1945; Gordon, 1964; Alba, 1985; Alba & Nee, 1997; Faist, 2000). The field of vision 
these perspectives offered was then made larger by historical and geographical surveys which 
were taking into account the role of time and space in the first place (Stewart, 1941; Zipf, 
1946; Isard, 1960; Wilson, 1981), while anthropological studies took as a goal to tackle 
chiefly kinship and marriage systems (Gonzalez, 1961; Graves & Graves, 1974; Kearney & 
Nagengast, 1989; Wilson, 1994). 
 
The entry of political science into the scene was quite late, indeed just about a couple of 
decades ago, when a number of theoretical approaches emerged to have investigated the links 
between national sovereignty and migration (Hammar, 1985; Carens, 1987; Castles & Kosak, 
1985; Freeman, 1995; Young 1996; Barbieri, 1998; Money, 1997; 1999; Hollifield, 2000; 
Meyers, 2000; Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2000; Zarembka, 2004; Bose, 2006). To be fair, majority 
of these analyses were built upon other disciplinary contributions, economics and sociology in 
the first place. While some underlined modes of production and participation, others 
compared traditional and post-modernist views of the nation-state, sovereignty and 
citizenship, and still others moved from the core institutions defining the liberal state to 
emphasize the role of interest groups and power distribution behind the making of 
immigration policies: 
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Immigration from an IR (International Relations) perspective was guided initially by the Cold 
War security discourse on foreign policy-making and diplomatic relations. A most relevant 
case in this sense was the handling of diplomatic relations between Cuba and the USA at the 
time, which played a critical role in shaping “the timing, size and social character” of the big 
migration waves almost always from the former to the latter (Mitchell, 1989, p. 682). The 
perception of external security threat in this period was typically military-induced, whereby 
immigrants added up hardly to a point of order for security debates by themselves as they 
appear to be doing today. 
 
As of the 1970s, a series of world-wide developments including the political crisis in South-
East Asia, the rise of military regimes in South America and the global oil crisis together with 
the ensuing economic setback marked the onset of a new period when flows of people from 
outside the territorial borders were causing great anxiety in host societies. A far more 
provoking development in this context was the end of the Cold War with which an increasing 
number of refugees fleeing from civil wars in Africa, the Balkans and the former Yugoslavia 
aroused further public concerns in target destinations, where immigrants held more and more 
a tarnished image, recalling at times even that of terrorists (Buzan, Waever & De Wilde, 
1998; Meyers, 2000). Despite arguments against immigration as a separate security-agenda 
item, for this could risk an all-encompassing understanding of security (Walt, 1991), the 
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terrorist attacks in the early 2000s
11
 aggravated the already tarnished perception of 
immigration. 
 
An additional factor to consider in this thread was the latest EU enlargement which prompted 
reconsideration of immigration policies particularly in a number of economically better-off 
EU Member States. Linking integration issues which trod further on the heels of new 
accession states to the security and terrorism discourses, the heads of a few established 
immigration countries in Western Europe officially declared that the immigration/integration 
policies they had been pursuing since the 1980s failed to produce desired outcomes (Weaver, 
2010). 
 
2.1.2 Immigration in European context 
Diverse as they may be, factors behind mass immigration in post-World War II Europe fall 
into two main and partly related patterns: economic/industrial interests and colonial legacies. 
The first two decades following the war saw inflows driven fundamentally by temporary guest 
worker schemes. In response to excessive labour demands, countries like Austria, Germany 
and Sweden designed and implemented a series of recruitment plans up to the early 1970s, 
attracting millions of newcomers, including returnees of ethnic origin who had previously 
been displaced by the war (Bauer, Lofstrom & Zimmermann, 2000). While labour shortages 
caused by booming economies applied also to France, the UK, the Netherlands or Belgium, 
which similarly turned to recruitment policies, the bulk of newcomers here originated from 
former colonies and in most cases were exempt from entry restrictions. 
 
At the outset, most of these lands were well-prepared to provide essential resources for their 
immigrants. Yet, as economic prospects showed signs of downturn, most notably following 
the oil crisis in the early 1970s, the recruitment programmes in many lands were suspended. 
The ensuing period saw not only a change in the composition of immigrant population, for a 
considerable number returned to their countries of origin, but also in the ways immigration 
was viewed in host societies. Studies checking into public attitudes have come to indicate in 
various occasions that senses of antagonism towards immigrants have long been on the rise, 
regardless of where they are (Crawley, 2005). 
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 These are commonly known as the ‘9/11’ events, caused by the airliner attacks against the World Trade 
Organisation and Pentagon in the USA, and the train bombings in London and Madrid in the ensuing period. 
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Spurred by socio-economic factors emerging dramatically in the last quarter of the 20th 
century, mainly as a consequence of the post-industrial changes across European societies 
(Betz & Immerfall, 1998), perceptions of immigrants as a threat to the host society became 
much greater in magnitude. A Eurobarometer survey conducted in the late 1990s revealed 
high levels of xenophobia in Member States, with more than 30% of the interviewees 
regarding themselves explicitly as racist. To the question of whether or not their country 
“benefits from the presence of immigrants from non-European Union countries”, for instance, 
48% thought it would “be better off” in the absence of immigrants (in comparison to the 1988 
survey’s 40%), while 12% believed their presence “makes no difference” (EB 47.1, 1997). 
 
Public opinions featuring negative perceptions of immigration indeed called for a collective 
response amongst Member States. The earliest Member State cooperation on immigration 
matters took place as part of the global economic context in the 1970s and was largely based 
on an intergovernmental understanding. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty confirmed this means of 
cooperation by introducing the legal groundwork to the Community law and attaching it to 
Justice and Home Affairs (the so-called ‘third pillar’). The ensuing Treaty of Amsterdam 
appeared to change this pattern by providing the Community with far-reaching supranational 
competences as far as immigration and asylum policies were concerned. The nearest Tampere 
Summit set out to undertake a series of multi-annual working programmes in order to fulfill 
the provisions and mandates decided at Amsterdam. Three such programmes have since then 
been put into force: the Tampere, Hague and Stockholm Programmes.
12
 Regardless of the far-
reaching action plans invested in these political and legal instruments, it appears today the 
joint handling of immigration could not go beyond intergovernmental decision-making. This 
verdict follows largely from Member States’ deep-seated second thoughts when it comes to 
relinquishing power over ‘sensitive’ matters like immigration and foreign policy. 
 
Regardless of this backdrop, the boundaries of a supranational level immigration policy have 
materialised in three core areas: labour migration, irregular migration and asylum matters. 
 
2.1.2.1 Labour migration 
Labour migration in EU terms is understood generally as the movement of persons from one 
state to another for the purpose of employment. The assumption concerning TCNs here is that 
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 Chapter 4 as the legal framework of the study provides more space for these. 
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they enter a Member State through recognised and authorised channels to work and live there 
in compliance with its national laws.
13
 Reference to labour migration amounts in this sense 
almost always to legal migration.While the type of mobility here has a central role in fostering 
economic development in the long run and in coping with the EU’s current demographic 
challenges, the Commission’s proposals were often challenged by the Council on the grounds 
that each Member State had its own labour market needs (to be translated into their national 
laws).
14
 There is in literature plenty of work addressing this reasoning. Studies focusing for 
instance on the UK, France and Germany appear to underscore tough competition so as to 
attract skilled labour from one another (Guellec & Cervantes, 2001; Wyckoff & Schaaper, 
2005). 
 
This ‘race for talent’ (Shachar, 2006) is in fact not restricted to the European level. It was 
already mentioned in a number of official occasions like the Lisbon Strategy or the Hague 
Council where the EU lands were called to reconsider their competition strategies in order 
that they could lure more skilled labour than their rivals like Japan or the USA 
(Papademetriou & O’Neil, 2004). More on that, an EC Communication15 noted that varying 
terms and conditions applicable to the TCNs’ entry, work and/or residence across the Member 
States would not serve for the overall interests of the Union. In this context, the 2004 Council 
in Brussels came up as part of the Hague Programme with a host of ‘admission procedures’ 
for labour immigrants
16
, the regulation of which would be belonging to Member States 
individually. 
 
This strategy inspired in essence the EU’s Global Approach to Migration which as a new 
impetus to its external migration policy rhymed well with the formerly launched policy 
instruments such as the European Neighbourhood Policy. Adopted in late 2005 in the face of 
mass influxes of people seeking to cross into the Schengen Zone
17, the EU’s Global Approach 
to Migration put its initial weight on migratory issues within the context of EU-Africa 
relations. The center of focus shifted in time towards the EU’s south-eastern and eastern 
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 European Commission, Home Affairs, e-Library, Glossary. 
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 Some states seek to expand this scope further beyond their national borders so that the nationals could get 
ahold of further opportunities than what they readily find at the domestic labour markets. 
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 COM (2003) 336 final (not published in the Official Journal) on immigration, integration and employment. 
16
 The Hague Programme (13.12.2004) Council 16054 [2004] 10. 
17
 In late 2005, hundreds of African migrants stormed to Morocco’s borders with the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta 
and Melilla (BBC News Africa, ‘Africans Die in Spanish Enclave’, 29 September 2005). 
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borders.
18
 In late 2007, the EU’s security agenda was expanded with a new emphasis on the 
promotion of democracy and the rule of law, calling on the treatment of all migration and 
asylum issues in one frame.
19
 Or else, as it was voiced in the recently transposed Blue Card 
Directive, skilled labour would be scared away from Europe to other destinations.
20
 
 
Another policy strategy by way of which the EU sought to bring this comprehensive approach 
into life was the import of labour via short-term/seasonal working. Signing mobility 
partnerships with third countries has so far been common practice within this framework.
21
 In 
the absence of a clearly established legal basis yet purely dependent on the coordination skills 
of the EU, these mobility partnerships had however rather poor prospects. Seen in particular 
from the perspectives of third countries, the launch of such policy initiatives made serious 
implications for their labour markets. As it became clear with the Blue Card Directive, 
provisions concerning labour immigration catered essentially to the interests of business 
communities in destination countries, which in the countries of origin would amount to loss of 
human capital. With that in mind, the Commission projected later a ‘win-win’ offer in the 
form of for instance tax allowances to the countries of origin
22
 which could help minimize the 
negative effects of brain drain. Added to that were assurances that an eventual circular 
migration would in the long run provide positive effects for third countries by way of 
remittances or extension of knowledge and experiences gathered in destination countries to 
the economic, social and political advantages of countries of origin. What’s more, perhaps 
more importantly, the EU immigration law was making references to circular migration –but 
not mobility partnerships- as a gesture to consent TCNs’ exemption from all legal actions, if 
they decided to return to their home lands at some point.
23
 
 
The EU texts adopted under the heading of labour immigration so far are to a certain extent 
made up of short residence issues regarding students, pupils, unremunerated 
trainers/volunteers, scientific researchers and highly qualified workers. Yet, the largest part of 
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policy guidelines governing the extent of cooperation in this area are those regulating matters 
of integration, family reunion, long-term residence status and fair-treatment.
24
 
 
2.1.2.1.1 Integration 
A traditional understanding of integration suggests a one-way form of accommodation, 
known commonly as ‘assimilation’, whereby immigrants copy the norms and standards of the 
host societies with the aim to become similar to them (Entzinger & Biezeveld, 2003; Penninx 
& Martiniello, 2004). However, experience in a number of old Member States revealed that 
most TCNs had on that score opposite thoughts. Success in integration was to them not 
entirely dependent on themselves but instead on the opportunities the state would make 
available to all (Robinson & Reeve, 2006). 
 
Indeed, following a Communication
25
 and a Council document (14615/04), the Commission 
underlined in 2005 that integration referred to a “two-way process of mutual accommodation 
by all immigrants and residents of Member States”.26 Following a series of policy initiatives 
such as the 2007 European Fund for the Integration of TCNs, the 2008 European Pact on 
Immigration and Asylum and EU Integration Ministers’ informal meetings at Potsdam and 
Vichy in 2007 and 2008 to discuss the reinforcement of integration policies, the 2009 
Stockholm Programme
27
 reiterated the role of ‘mutual interaction’ in integration matters to 
argue that success in this policy area was “the key to maximising the benefits of 
immigration”. The 2009 Lisbon Treaty made nevertheless little room for integration matters. 
Article 79(4) TFEU states that the EU “may establish measures to provide incentives and 
support for the action of Member States with a view to promoting the integration of third-
country nationals residing legally in their territories, excluding any harmonisation of the laws 
and regulations of the Member States”. The inference to be made here is that there were from 
the perspective of Lisbon no legislative prospects for supranationalisation of integration 
legislation. 
 
The EU’s current integration framework holds three main components: a normative structure, 
exchange of information and funding for integration projects (Collett, 2008). The first leg is 
characterised by two main legal instruments: the Directives on Racial Equality and 
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Employment Equality -aiming to eliminate discrimination in relation to gender, age and race- 
and the Common Basic Principles on Integration adopted in 2004 “to underpin a coherent 
framework on integration of third-country nationals”.28 The second leg of information 
exchange uses a number of policy instruments in keeping with the Open Method of 
Coordination (OMC). These are National Contact Points on Integration which meet up 
regularly to identify the best practices amongst Member States, handbooks and annual reports 
published from 2004 onwards, a European Integration Portal and a Forum to discuss and share 
related issues with all stakeholders across the EU and a shared platform of Social Protection 
and Inclusion Policies whereby Member States could efficiently emulate best policies on key 
social issues according to their agenda. The third component of the EU’s integration 
framework concerns resources of funding: the Integration Fund targeting the newly arrived 
TCNs, the European Social Fund as part of a wider General Programme of Solidarity and 
Management of Migration Flows (for the prevention of social exclusion, promotion of equal 
opportunities and active participation in labour markets) and finally the Progress programme 
concerning funding of areas relating to employment, discrimination and diversity (Collett, 
2008). 
 
Though not bound by a supranational ordinance, there has in recent times been a rising trend 
towards language and civic tests within the broad context of integration. A twofold purpose is 
served through these integration tests. Accordingly, non-EU nationals become liable to a 
range of criteria including entry clearances, long-term residence permits, entitlement to family 
reunion and naturalisation, as decided by countries of destination. Added to that, integration 
tests serve also for immigrant selection. While most traditional immigration countries in 
Europe might have previously implemented similar policies as part of the requirement for 
TCNs’ naturalisation process, the new understanding aims to formalise them country-wide 
(not merely at the regional level as before) and where applicable to apply them (for instance 
language tests) prior to newcomers’ arrival, i.e. in the country of origin, already. 
 
2.1.2.1.2 Family reunion 
The Commission defines family reunion/reunification (considering the Directive 2003/86/EC) 
as “the entry of non-EU national’s family members into and residence in a Member State by 
residing lawfully in that Member State in order to preserve the family unit, whether the family 
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relationship arose before or after the resident's entry”. Six Member States currently demand 
integration tests within the context of family reunion. This practice began in 2006 with the 
Netherlands, followed later on by France, Germany, Denmark, the UK and Austria in turn. 
The forms of the tests and levels of language proficiency required are in each of these 
countries different. The integration test of the Netherlands includes an oral interview and a 
society language test to be applied in the country of origin. The French version demands an 
additional written language test. Should these standards prove unsatisfactory, the applicant is 
asked to sign an integration contract pledging he/she will later attend a course designed for 
that purpose. The requirements in Germany and Austria are similar to those in France but 
exclude civic knowledge tests. The UK’s chief requirement in that is an oral test to be applied 
in the country of origin. And finally, the Danish requirements are oral language and society 
tests which are held after newcomers’ arrival. Except from Denmark, where the level of 
language proficiency cannot be below A2 level, all other five Member States demand A1 for 
family reunion applications. 
 
With the exception of Denmark, all these Member States appear to require integration tests at 
a stage when applicants have not yet left their countries of origin. The same countries, except 
for the Netherlands this time, exempt refugees and the mentally disabled from these tests 
(Strik et al., 2010). Sanctions for failing the tests differ from one Member State to the other. 
While the Netherlands, Germany, the UK and Austria grant in such cases no entry clearance 
for the applicant, France delays family reunification for the same reason up to two months. 
However, if an applicant fails to meet relevant terms and conditions upon signing the French 
integration contract, the social benefits provided by the state could be terminated, renewal of 
residence permits declined, leading to expulsion from France in the end (Carrera, 2009, p. 
332). 
 
2.1.2.1.3 Long-term residence 
The definition of long-term residence status in Member States is laid down by Council 
Directive 2003/109/EC.
29
 According to Article 4(1), granting long-term residence to a TCN 
suggests providing him/her with legal residence upon his/her legal and continuous residence 
“within its territory for five years immediately prior to the submission of the relevant 
application”. For its acquisition, Article 5(1) assigns Member States to check evidence for 
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(a) stable and regular resources which are sufficient to maintain himself/herself and 
the members of his/her family, without recourse to the social assistance system of the 
Member State concerned. Member States shall evaluate these resources by reference to 
their nature and regularity and may take into account the level of minimum wages and 
pensions prior to the application for long-term resident status; 
(b) sickness insurance in respect of all risks normally covered for his/her own 
nationals in the Member State concerned. 
 
Additionally, as Article 5(2) points out, this person may be required “to comply with 
integration conditions, in accordance with national law”. If, however, there is a concern about 
“public policy or public security”, depending on its “severity or type of offence […] or the 
danger that emanates from the person concerned” as well as “duration of residence and… 
existence of links with the country of residence”, the Member State in concern reserves the 
right to deny application for long-term status (Article 6(1)). 
 
Of particular notice in this context is the distribution of TCNs enjoying long-term status in 
Europe. About eighty percent of such people live in three Member States, i.e. Estonia, 
Austria, and Czech Republic. The number of people who have to date been able to acquire 
this status in Germany and France constitute less than one percent of the total sum.
30
 These 
percentages were confirmed at the 2010 Ministerial Conference on Integration referring to 
barriers before TCNs’ access to long-term residence and calling upon incorporation of TCNs’ 
“integration issues in a comprehensive way in all relevant policy fields.”31 
 
Currently, fourteen Member States require integration tests as a condition for issuing long-
term residence permits: Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, 
Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania and the UK. While the 
language tests are essential for long-term residence permits in all these lands, the type of tests 
(oral or written) and proficiency levels required may be different. The language levels vary 
from A1 (the Czech Republic and France) and A2 (Austria, Latvia and the Netherlands) to B1 
(Denmark, Estonia, Germany and the UK). Meanwhile, Denmark makes an exception by 
offering an option to choose between B1 level Danish and A2 Danish plus B1 level English.
32
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For civic tests, new Member States such as the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 
and Romania do not impose special requirements for the purpose of long- term residence 
permits. On the other side are a number of old EU members with long immigration histories 
like the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany and the UK who require for long-
term residence permits not only a minimum level of civic knowledge and/or language 
proficiency but also attendance to orientation courses.
33
 
 
2.1.2.1.4 Fair treatment of third-country nationals 
A closely relevant matter that occupies a central place within the context of labour 
immigration is TCNs’ fair treatment. The issue came indeed as part of a commitment at the 
1999 Tampere Council to provide non-nationals holding legal residence with rights and 
obligations comparable to those of Member State nationals. Accordingly, non-nationals with 
legal long-term status would have similar residence, education and employment rights (to 
those enjoyed by nationals) as well as obligations which were defined by the laws of the 
Member State they lived in. Such nationals, as the Tampere Council added further, could also 
enjoy at their discretion “the opportunity to obtain the nationality of the Member State in 
which they are resident.”34 It was to this end stressed that Member States needed to take all 
relevant measures against racism, discrimination and xenophobia for instance by learning 
from the best practices amongst themselves and cooperating with the Council of Europe and 
the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia. The Commission was asked for 
this purpose to submit a proposal on the implementation of Article 13 of the EC Treaty.
35
 
More on that, the Council requested that Member States consider the economic and 
demographic developments both across the Union and in the countries of origin and 
harmonise their national laws in relation to the conditions and characteristics of TCNs they 
hosted. Put differently, emphasis was laid here not only on Member States’ reception 
capacities but also on historical and cultural links with sending countries. 
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 With Amsterdam Treaty, the new Article 13 EC Treaty expanded the scope of Article 12 (formerly Article 6) 
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The 2004 Brussels Council reaffirmed these commitments within the framework of Common 
Basic Principles on Integration and noted: “if immigrants are to be allowed to participate fully 
within the host society, they must be treated equally and fairly and be protected from 
discrimination.”36 A more recent reference to this issue was made in the 2009 Stockholm 
Programme which saw fair treatment as part of the EU’s ‘proactive’ arrangements for 
immigrants and their rights. Like its predecessors, Tampere and the Hague, the Stockholm 
Programme emphasised the need for the EU to guarantee fair treatment of TCNs with legal 
residence. As formerly declared at Tampere and the Hague, the issue of fair treatment was 
attached to a ‘vigorous’ integration policy to ensure “rights and obligations comparable to 
those of citizens of the Union. This should remain an objective of a common immigration 
policy and should be implemented as soon as possible, and no later than 2014”.37 And finally, 
according to Article 79(1) TFEU (ex Article 63(3) and (4) TEC) of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, 
the construction of a common immigration policy would ensure “at all stages, the efficient 
management of migration flows, fair treatment of third-country nationals residing legally in 
Member States, and the prevention of, and enhanced measures to combat, illegal immigration 
and trafficking in human beings.”38 
 
The only supranational legal measure affecting the fair treatment category in this context is 
the Council Directive on TCNs’ long-term residence (2003/109/EC). Laying out the necessary 
conditions for conferring and withdrawing the status for long-term residence, the Directive 
clarifies the basic rights non-EU nationals hold in this context, one of which is their fair 
treatment in host societies. 
 
2.1.2.2 Irregular migration 
To International Labour Organisation (ILO), irregular migration is “movement of a person to 
a new place of residence or transit using irregular or illegal means, without valid documents 
or carrying false documents”39. For the EU, the Directive 2008/115/EC defines an irregular 
migrant as “a non-EU national present on the territory of a Schengen State who does not 
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fulfil, or no longer fulfils the conditions of entry as set out in the Schengen Borders Code 
(Regulation 562/2006), or other conditions of entry, stay or residence in an EU State.”40 
 
To most recent statistics, the average number of people entering the EU zone each year by 
illegal or irregular means is more than half a million (European Commission, 2009; European 
Commission, 2011b). The EU’s legal documents treating this issue in a binding way include a 
crowded set of directives and regulations.
41
 To combat irregular channels of immigration, the 
Tampere and Hague Programmes initiated a soft-law instrument putting emphasis on 
partnership with the countries and regions of origin and transit. The Presidency Conclusions 
of the Tampere Council noted for instance that the EU was in need of “a comprehensive 
approach to migration addressing political, human rights and development issues in countries 
and regions of origin and transit”. This approach aimed essentially at “combating poverty, 
improving living conditions and job opportunities, preventing conflicts and consolidating 
democratic states and ensuring respect for human rights, in particular rights of minorities, 
women and children”. By the same token, the Hague Programme pointed out that an efficient 
management of migration flows involved “greater cooperation with third countries in all 
fields” 42 which required the EU to support third countries with “existing Community Funds 
where appropriate, in their efforts to improve their capacity for migration management” so 
that they could amongst others “build border control capacity…and tackle the problem of 
return”.  
 
Despite this common agenda, the EU’s priorities in taking action against irregular 
immigration were not uniform. Following Kosovo events which provoked mass influxes of 
displaced persons, the Tampere Council made in that respect special reference to asylum-
seeking as voiced earlier with the 1990 Dublin Convention.
43
 The Hague Programme 
extended the coverage area to illegal immigration particularly in consideration of the EU’s 
expansion of borders with the latest enlargement. At the Hague, one of the ten priority areas 
was developing an ‘integrated management of the Union’s external borders’ which actually 
would serve for the purposes of free movement of persons (as stimulated by Schengen’s 
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removal of internal border controls). Besides its emphasis on a common visa policy (which 
would operate through a joint visa information system and a European consular service to be 
developed in future), the Hague Programme saw to the establishment of the FRONTEX and 
the introduction of a biometric system to monitor TCNs’ arrival/departure more efficiently. 
To the same end in this framework, the EU would also start sea-patrolling across the 
Mediterranean. 
 
To provide financial coverage for these commitments specifically in the Schengen Area, the 
Council adopted a Decision in 2007 establishing the External Borders Fund (EBF) for 2007-
2013 period, with a total €1820 million budget as part of the general programme “solidarity 
and management of migration flows.”44 With that, there would now be more space for the 
EU’s general dialogue with the main sending/transit countries in Africa and Eastern Europe. 
While the EU aimed by this means to develop initiatives for a joint administration of 
surveillance and patrolling in the short run, the plan for the long-term was to help create jobs 
by way of development aids in these countries and make migration a less attractive option. 
Considering a series of political transformation waves sweeping across North Africa since the 
end of 2010, the Commission’s latest Communication on ‘dialogue for migration, mobility 
and security with the southern Mediterranean countries’ for instance reported that “The EU 
stands ready to continue supporting all its Southern neighbours who are willing to commit to 
democracy, human rights, good governance and rule of law, and to enter into Partnerships 
with those countries to achieve concrete progress for the people.”45 
 
On the issue of human trafficking, the Tampere Council had previously voiced its 
determination to deal with economic exploitation of migrants at its source. To this end, a 
common policy framework would have to be developed in relation to visas and false 
documents, “including closer co-operation between EU consulates in third countries and, 
where necessary, the establishment of common EU visa issuing offices.”46 To impose 
sanctions against human traffickers, a set of legislative measures with an emphasis on the 
fragility of children and women would need to be introduced. For cooperation in the area of 
border control, and all applicant states wishing to share responsibility were invited to work 
closely with Europol and Member States by way of a number of policy instruments like 
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technology transfer and exchange programmes to be applied particularly within the scope of 
maritime affairs. 
 
Much in the same vein, to ensure a sustainable policy approach in addressing the problem of 
illegal migration, the EU developed a policy of voluntary return with respect to the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. For reasons of limited Member State capacity, cooperation in this area 
was by this way being taken beyond the EU to involve sending and transit countries within 
the decision-making process. Following the 1999 Tampere Council which called for 
“assistance to countries of origin and transit to be developed in order to promote voluntary 
return”, the 2000 Nice and 2001 Laeken Summits made further references to the prevention of 
illegal migration. 
 
With the recent rise of ‘unfounded’ claims for asylum in mind, a number of commitments 
were made to introduce amongst others the 2003 Reception Conditions Directive ‘laying 
down minimum standards for the reception of asylum-seekers’47, the 2003 Dublin Regulation 
(Dublin II) assigning one single Member State to be accountable for processing asylum 
application
48
, the 2005 Asylum Procedures Directive
49
 urging Member States to give priority 
to the asylum procedure and the European Refugee Fund which would provide financial 
resources for the common asylum policy. As a further step in this framework, the Regulation 
‘establishing a programme for financial and technical assistance to third countries in the areas 
of migration and asylum’50 was adopted. The main aim the EU held by this means was “to 
give specific and complementary financial and technical aid to third countries in order to 
support their efforts to improve the management of migratory flows in all their dimensions.”51 
 
As the EU Member States changed their national laws in pursuit of stricter measures for 
asylum, the issue of ‘voluntary return’ became gradually a controlling instrument. The Hague 
programme for instance stressed that 
 
Migrants who do not or no longer have the right to stay legally in the EU must return 
on a voluntary or, if necessary, compulsory basis. The European Council calls for the 
establishment of an effective removal and repatriation policy based on common 
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standards for persons to be returned in a humane manner and with full respect for 
their human rights and dignity.
52
 
 
Another major policy developed in fighting against illegal immigration includes Readmission 
Agreements. With Amsterdam’s transfer of competences to the Community Method, the 
Commission became in charge of negotiating these agreements with the sending and transit 
countries on behalf of the Union.
53
 While the Council was not willing to lose the upper hand 
at this point and moved to take them as a means to the facilitation of forced removals (as well 
as the use of the Return Fund), negotiations on that score were characterised by the EU’s 
commitments to human rights, as proclaimed for instance under the 1951 Geneva Convention. 
In this context, extradition/expulsion of an immigrant regardless of the illegal status (s)he may 
hold would not be readily authorised so long as there were risks of death penalty, torture or 
any other inhumane conditions in the country of origin. 
 
To sum up, the EU’s policies concerning illegal immigration and human trafficking have so 
far served for three major goals. These are combatting problems at their sources, making 
illegal immigration as less attractive as it may get and returning immigrants with illegal status 
to their countries of origin (or transit countries). 
 
2.1.2.3 Asylum 
According to European Migration Network (EMN), which works as part of the Commission’s 
DG Home Affairs, asylum suggests a “form of protection given by a State, on its territory, 
based on the principle of non-refoulement and internationally or nationally recognised refugee 
rights (e.g. access to employment, social welfare and health care)” (European Migration 
Network, 2012a). In more precise terms, this protection is granted to someone (asylum 
seeker) “who is unable or unwilling to seek protection in his/her country of citizenship and/or 
residence, in particular, for fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” (European Migration Network, 
2012a). 
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While perception of asylum on the basis of non-refoulement
54
 could be tracked down to 
Ancient Greece and the Roman Empire (Lavenex, 1999), its formalisation followed largely 
from the massive refugee problem of the 1930s, which was caused essentially by 
Nazism/Fascism at the time. Although the purchase of these ideologies ceased to a minimum 
in the post-War era, the ensuing hostile climate of the Cold War urged the UN to establish an 
agency, i.e. UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), which would be 
committed to providing humanitarian support for displaced and stateless persons. Soon after 
its establishment, the UNHCR made a major move to institutionalize a world-wide asylum 
system by ushering into the adoption of the Status of Refugees as part of the Geneva 
Convention in 1951. 
 
The scope of asylum-seeking in the EU case applies only to non-EU nationals and stateless 
persons. To Council Directive 2003/9/EC, any such person is regarded as an asylum seeker 
unless (s)he asks for a different type of protection. There is however a string attached to this 
clause noting that the final decision concerning his/her application is to be taken at a later 
time.
55
 There are in Member States a number of legal arrangements concerning this status. A 
most important one aside from national laws is the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union which enshrines a wide array of social, economic and political rights not 
only for EU citizens but also for TCNs in Member States. While the drafting and 
proclamation of the Charter date back to 2000, it did not have a significant legal effect until 
becoming a part of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. According to Article 18 of the Charter, “The right 
to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules of the Geneva Convention and 
Protocol relating to the status of refugees and in accordance with the Treaty on European 
Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union”. In essence, this provision 
hinted at other legal instruments such as the Geneva Convention and EC/EU Treaties upon 
which the legal content of the Charter was actually built. 
 
The competences granted to the Community over asylum matters were previously defined 
under Article 63(1) and (2) EC Treaty. Accordingly, the Council would adopt 
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1. measures on asylum, in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 
and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees and other 
relevant treaties, within the following areas: 
(a) criteria and mechanisms for determining which Member State is responsible for 
considering an application for asylum submitted by a national of a third-country in 
one of the Member States; 
(b) minimum standards on the reception of asylum-seekers in Member States; 
(c) minimum standards with respect to the qualification of nationals of third 
countries as refugees; 
(d) minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting or withdrawing 
refugee status; 
2. measures on refugees and displaced persons within the following areas: 
(a) minimum standards for giving temporary protection to displaced persons from 
thirdcountries who cannot return to their country of origin and for persons who 
otherwise need international protection; 
(b) promoting a balance of effort between Member States in receiving and bearing 
the consequences of receiving refugees and displaced persons 
 
 
As it seemed, the EU legislation concerning asylum was here limited largely to setting 
‘minimum standards’, which made no direct implications for adopting an overarching asylum 
system for the entire Union. A commitment to this latter end came with the 1999 Tampere 
Council where a ‘Common European Asylum System’ was envisaged in quest of expanding 
the ‘minimum’ coverage of protection for asylum-seekers. With Regulation 343/2003, in 
consequence, the Dublin Convention was replaced with ‘Dublin II’ setting rules on the 
procedures and responsibilities applying to the undertaking of asylum application in Member 
States. A series of directives and regulations were adopted in this period. These were most 
importantly Council Directives 2001/55/EC
56
, 2003/9/EC
57
, 2004/83/EC
58
 and 2005/85/EC
59
 
as well as Regulations (EC) 343/2003
60
 and (EC) 439/2010
61
. 
 
The primary EU law defining the current state of asylum issues in the EU is the Treaty of 
Lisbon. According to Article 78(1) TFEU 
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The Union shall develop a common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection and 
temporary protection with a view to offering appropriate status to any third-
country national requiring international protection and ensuring compliance with 
the principle of non-refoulement. This policy must be in accordance with the 
Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating 
to the status of refugees, and other relevant treaties. 
 
2.2 Citizenship  
Citizenship at its very core serves as “the basic building block of political power. It conflates 
the right to reside and move about within a given territory and the obligation to defend these 
very same rights” (Mitra, 2012, p. 1). Although this understanding is not new to fuel academic 
debates, it is very much so when it comes to policy-making in the EU (Zapata-Barrero, 2009). 
Since the foundation of the EU, many Member States have gradually aligned with citizenship-
based policy approaches, with the hope to relieve amongst others immigration-guided social 
and political tensions. 
 
It goes without saying that immigration is today fairly instrumental to structure/give impetus 
to the EU’s growth in economic terms. This was underscored in many policy documents from 
the ‘Lisbon Strategy’ to ‘Europe 2020’ within the context of securing “a prosperous, fair and 
environmentally sustainable future for all citizens.”62 While labour import serves significantly 
for this purpose, particularly in view of the well-known ageing population and pension costs 
across Member States
63
, policy plans for citizenship has provided minimal space for 
‘newcomers’. As Bosniak (2008) puts it, this omission is informed largely by concerns about 
a coherent and unified political community, which in the absence of formal distinction 
between citizens and aliens could be at risk of termination. 
 
Discussing citizenship in a broader spectrum, on the basis of global disparities in educational, 
social or economic opportunities, Shachar (2009, p.21) highlights in The Birthright Lottery 
that a great majority of the people living in severe poverty conditions are citizens of countries 
in Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. Bringing this together with arguments on a 
supranational framework of citizenship in Europe, Joppke (2010b) asks: “If citizenship in the 
comfort zone matters more than ever, why this nervous attempt, especially in Europe, to 
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upgrade something the priceless worth of which is beyond doubt?” (p. 13). At stake here are 
obviously the implications of newcomers for nationality norms/regulations in host societies. 
 
Pfetsch (2012) compares in this context the concerning ‘legal modalities’ of Germany, Spain, 
France and United Kingdom. While almost all these Member States were formerly quite open 
to welcoming foreigners, the regulations and laws adopted in recent years became highly 
restrictive in view of the changing values, historical, economic or demographic conditions 
(Pfetsch, 2012, pp. 123-126). The recent ratification of nationality/citizenship laws in these 
countries, particularly with respect to EU texts such as 2004/38/EC
64
, demonstrates an 
obvious disposition towards differentiation as much as harmonisation of immigration. 
Following from this observation, one could today argue that citizenship across EU lands is 
closely related to the concept of exclusion for it suggests almost always dividing lines 
between the ‘hosts’ and ‘aliens’. 
 
In fact, the issue of exclusion concerns fundamentally “the substance of citizenship (what 
citizenship is)…its domain or location (where citizenship takes place), and…the class of 
citizenship’s subjects (who is a citizen)” (Bosniak, 2008, p. 17). Scholars treat these fairly 
overlapping criteria often within the framework of political membership (Walzer, 1989) and 
common society (Barbalet, 1988; Held, 1995). This treatment becomes however quite 
complicated in the absence of agreement on where the weight should be laid. While some 
scholars contend that citizenship should be suggesting on top of everything legal links 
“between individual and polity; for others, it signifies active engagement in the life of the 
community. For some, it is largely a matter of individual justice, while for others still, it 
implicates pressing questions of collective identity” (Bosniak, 2000, p. 455). To sort these 
varying interpretations, Kymlicka & Norman (1994) offer classification under ‘citizenship-as-
rights’, ‘citizenship-as-activity’, and ‘citizenship-as-identity’. At its core, this categorisation 
reflects the main dimensions of citizenship: legal status/acquisition of rights, political 
participation and identity (Cohen, 1999; Carens, 2000; Kymlicka & Norman, 2000). 
 
2.2.1 Citizenship as legal status 
It would be fair to argue that no discussion on citizenship would today be meaningful in the 
absence of a legal framework. As it is most commonly acknowledged, “a citizen is someone 
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who possesses rights…denied in a legally stratified or segmented society to non-citizens and 
in all societies to resident aliens and foreigners” (Heater, 2004, p. 252). Bauböck (1994) 
names this provision ‘nominal citizenship’ whereby the state grants legal status to individuals 
by presenting a collection of rights in return for a set of obligations (for instance tax payment) 
they are bound to meet. 
 
A chief contribution made to the study of citizenship on the basis of rights came from 
Marshall (1950) who designed a theoretical model in light of industrialisation and 
democratisation. Accordingly, the whole story starts with the industrialisation process which 
gradually led to the rise and expansion of ‘civil rights’ such as property protection or freedom 
of conscience. These civil rights formed in time the basis of democracy and political rights 
including the right to vote or freedom of speech, paving all the way to the emergence of 
‘social rights’, for instance access to welfare state funds or the right to establish labour unions. 
While Marshall’s proposal is key to bringing together the ‘republican’ and ‘liberal’ 
interpretations of citizenship, the launch of welfare state model rendered it lately somewhat 
ineffective. With that, the political rights turned to hold in most liberal democracies no more a 
prerequisite value for social rights.
65
 
 
Besides Marshall’s sociological understanding of citizenship, contributions came in more 
recent times from political theorists such as Judith Shklar (1991) and Rogers Smith (1998), 
who sought to explain the ‘rights’ dimension in the face of citizenship’s exclusionary nature. 
For Shklar, in particular, citizenship refers to societal ‘standing’ which often works on a 
subordination logic denying the officially declared equal rights for individuals. Though 
inspired by differing national backgrounds and disciplines –the English history for Marshall’s 
sociological model as opposed to the American national context for Shklar’s political 
approach- Marshall and Shklar appeared to share a liberal-democratic perspective to address 
“the full and equal enjoyment by individuals of formal recognition and rights” (Bosniak, 
2000, p. 465). 
 
The locus of citizenship was until the second half of the 20
th
 century widely regarded as the 
nation-state. While nation-states have hardly ever lost control over the distribution of rights, 
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the post-World War II era saw the progressive rise of a human rights regime claiming an 
alternative source of rights. So much so that, the gradual transcendence of nation-states’ 
jurisdiction encouraged some to come to the conclusion that for social rights including 
welfare benefits, health coverage or education, citizenship has lost its significance, at least for 
the EU (Sassen, 1996), where a new overarching model was already launched under the 
banner of ‘European citizenship’. Soysal (1994) attributes this new notion to the recent rise of 
post-nationalism, which was informed largely by universal human rights. Further to the 
human rights discourse which cast doubts on the supremacy of the nation-state model, 
immigration and globalisation made significant implications most notably for sovereignty, 
territory and citizenry (Sassen, 2006; Benhabib, 2007). 
 
The immigration bit of this argument meets the issue of democratic rights in Western liberal 
states. Benhabib (2001) for instance argues that these states exhibit a ‘paradox of democratic 
legitimacy’ by limiting citizenship to nationals despite the universal discourse of human rights 
and democracy. The issue of democratic legitimacy is in fact reminiscent of Rawls (1971) 
who with his ‘differential principle’ (arguing for a ‘primordial’ type of equality/the ‘original 
position’) suggests that inequalities are acceptable as long as they serve for the interests of 
‘the least disadvantaged’ in the society (p. 83). The question this formulation poses relates 
indeed very much to where immigrants are positioned in the social hierarchy of host societies. 
 
Rawls’ Westphalian perception of citizenship has found criticism specifically in ‘post-
nationalist’ discourses. Inspired by the political and social implications of globalisation and a 
number of groundbreaking projections like European citizenship, post-nationalism has come 
to offer a new understanding of citizenship whereby the rights that have traditionally been 
conferred onto citizens could now be accessible to non-citizens (Bauböck, 1994). In 
accordance, the role of the nation-states in deciding who should be regarded as members of a 
collective community is to be replaced with universal values such as human rights defining 
who deserves being part of that community. The idea addresses essentially a sort of 
‘cosmopolitan democracy’ (Held, 1995) seeking to resolve the tension between human rights 
and legitimacy issues on the grounds of a catch-all conceptual paradigm. Fitting to this 
perspective is Kant’s oft-revisited concept of ‘cosmopolitan citizenship’ and a world-wide 
legal order (Falk, 1995; Linklater, 1998) both of which have a fundamental purpose to 
transfer the balance of weight from national to international law (Habermas, 2006). Evidence 
comes here from the European Court of Human Rights and International Courts and Tribunals 
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which –with their supremacy over national codes of law- have for long been treating their 
subjects as cosmopolitan citizens in the first place. 
 
Habermas (1987; 1992) has also presented a set of universal norms onto Rawls’ conception of 
societal justice. Through a concept of ‘constitutional patriotism’ on the basis of Sternberger’s 
(1990) ‘Verfassungspatriotismus’, a shared sense of values has here been vouched brushing 
aside common histories or ethnic origins, as it is the case in ‘Rawlsian’ perception of justice. 
Accordingly, immigrants’ major duty in a democratic constitutional state is no more than “the 
willingness to enter into the political culture of their new homeland, without having to give up 
the cultural form of life of their origins by doing so” (Habermas, 1994, p. 139). This is 
actually indicative of an all-embracing conception of citizenship seeking ways to escape 
“from the danger of segmentation—from the exclusion of alien subcultures and from a 
separatist disintegration into unrelated subcultures” (Habermas, 1994, p. 139). 
 
The growth of interest in cosmopolitan citizenship has offered significant implications for 
immigration. It has promised in particular to enlarge the rights which were formerly truncated 
by the Westphalian system through ‘translocal’ or ‘transnational’ communities (Basch, 
Schiller & Blanc, 1993; Appadurai, 1996; Mandaville, 1999) so as to make sure immigrants 
could offset geographical distances between sending and receiving countries by for instance 
social and cultural means (Guarnizo & Smith, 1998). Such arguments have however prompted 
a split in scholarship between two wings of authors: those of ‘control’ vs. scholars commited 
to ‘morality’ (Bloemraad, 2000, p. 18). 
 
To the ‘control’ wing, Brubaker’s (1992) thesis regarding citizenship as “a powerful 
instrument of social closure” (p. 23) justifies criticising those who condemn “the nation-state 
to the dustbin of history” (p. 189). As state sovereignty is still central to the international 
system (Schuck, 1998), it is accordingly “far too early to dismiss the relevance of the nation-
state and national citizenship” (Howard, 2006, p. 445). This objection rests largely on the 
observation that third-country nationals continue to face far-reaching restrictions (of rights 
and benefits) in the host societies they are part of. The familiar ‘citizen vs. non-citizen’ divide 
persists, above all, in political rights like voting and running for office. This is also the case 
for local elections in many EU lands, let alone national suffrage, during which non-citizens 
are denied voting rights irrespective of their permanent residence or long-time working status 
(Aleinikof & Klusmeyer, 2002; Bauböck, 2006; Groenendijk, 2008). Added to that, non-
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citizens are in many lands still stripped of social rights such as welfare programmes which 
nationals could enjoy (Dell’Olio, 2005). Further, employers in public sectors across a number 
of Member States still select workers on the basis of their national citizenship (Mouritsen, 
2009). 
 
As for the ‘morality’ aspect of the debate, the issue at stake relates largely to the normative 
limits of state sovereignty. Contrary to those like Hailbronner (1989; 2000; 2006) who 
defends that citizenship is in essence a political decision of the states which for this reason 
could not be used as a policy-making tool on the basis of moral grounds, others like Carens 
(1989; 2005) argue that no matter how much legal freedom they possess, states do not have a 
similar moral freedom at their disposal to deprive immigrants of the rights that the nationals 
enjoy. This is not least because the former are already active “members of the state through 
their life and work in a country” (Bloemraad, 2000, p. 19). 
 
Despite the fact that sixteen Member States currently allow local voting rights for non-citizens 
at varying levels, the type of rights that appears to be limited by citizenship still relates to 
political life. There is increasing pressure to extend political rights to non-citizens considering 
their contribution to states’ economies, be that through labour or in the form of taxes. Some 
like Cesarini & Fullbrook (1996, p. 214) remember in this context as far back as the Magna 
Carta’s ‘no taxation without representation’ principle which was vowing to ensure ‘fairness’ 
and ‘return’ in reference to basic rights (as cited in Bloemraad, 2000). Although immigrants 
have here a number of options to influence policy-making by way of for instance engagement 
with trade unions (Vranken, 1990; Penninx & Roosblad, 2000; Wrench, 2004), such 
alternative means have so far been far from offering effective tools due to absence of far-
reaching voting rights at the national level. 
 
2.2.1.1 Naturalisation 
The very idea of citizenship concerns keeping individuals within the political boundaries of a 
state apparatus. As the size of immigrants rose all around in time, this calculation became 
challenged by questions particularly on the legal relationship between nationals and 
newcomers. A most practical solution to such challenges could be acquisition of the host 
country’s citizenship through naturalisation. However, cross-national analyses indicate 
varying applications in this context. A common reference used in scholarship in this 
connection is Brubaker’s (1990) comparative study which came to underscore discrepancies 
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in conceptualising citizenship between the leading countries of the EU. While for instance 
French citizenship accorded with the jus soli principle prescribing birthplace as the primary 
point of reference and reflecting therewith an understanding of territorial community for 
whom nationhood was “state-centered, universalist, and assimilationist, constituted by 
political unity but expressed through the pursuit of cultural unity”, the German version hinged 
on the principle of jus sanguinis regulating acquisition of citizenship rights according to the 
community of descent (or the basis of nationhood), which essentially was “ethnoculturalist 
and Volk-centered” (Williams, 1995, p.146).66 
 
There are currently 22 Member States requiring applicants for citizenship to be examined by 
way of integration tests, as a major condition for naturalisation.
67
 For the language component 
of these tests, Denmark demands the highest proficiency level -with a score of B2- which is 
followed by Finland, Germany and Latvia asking for B1 to that effect. Apart from Bulgaria, 
the Czech Republic, Finland, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland and Slovenia, all other countries in 
this cluster demand as a condition for citizenship a satisfactory test result concerning 
‘knowledge of the society’. Some countries like Austria, Greece, Romania and Slovakia do 
not specify clear-cut benchmarks but instead require a ‘basic’, ‘sufficient’, ‘good’ or ‘general’ 
level of language/civic knowledge, respectively. In any case, these integration tests are in 
most Member States obligatory and constitute the final stage of the integration process 
(Groenendijk, 2004; Besselink, 2009). 
 
If seen as “sanction-oriented” (Kostakopoulou, 2010, p. 8), such requirements make the 
impression of a unidirectional practice (Bagameri, 2011, p. 3) denying the Commission’s 
emphasis on a two-way process of integration.
68
 At this point, Carrera et al. (2011) refer to the 
“legally binding nature of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights” suggesting it could be an 
                                                     
66
 Germany changed its traditional perspective in 2000 by switching to a conditional form of jus soli. Similar to 
models for instance in Ireland and the UK, acquisition of citizenship here became dependent largely on parents’ 
legal status or length of residence permit. In Belgium, France, the Netherlands or Spain, on the other side, 
citizenship is acquired on the condition that minimum one parent was born in the country. One could in this 
context also refer to the practices in Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and the UK, where 
citizenship is not acquired automatically at birth but is granted at the discretion of parents or at the age of 
majority (Bauböck, 2008, p. 7.). This picture appears to be somewhat in disparity with that in traditional 
immigration countries like the US, Canada and Australia, where citizenship by descent works solely for the 
children of expatriates. 
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 These are currently Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, and the UK. 
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 COM (2003) 336. 
48 
effective tool to ensure socio-economic rights applicable “to ‘everyone’ (and not to nationals 
of the EU member states only)” (p. 7). 
 
Theoretically speaking, naturalisation is a process through which a non-national becomes a 
full member of a national community by acquiring the citizenship of the nation-state in 
concern. While this transformation holds in its essence a legal purpose, some argue that there 
is actually nothing ‘natural’ about it (Goodman, 2010, p. 3). In accordance, while 
naturalisation starts with the application of a person hoping to qualify for the intended state’s 
citizenship, the outcome of this process is open and by no means taken for granted, as it is for 
instance in the case of the ex lege procedure where the applicant does not have to make an 
application but is by birth, marriage or upon becoming an adult automatically ‘naturalised’ 
(OECD, 2011a, p. 25). 
 
While the status of dual citizenship may emerge as a recipe to sort out such concerns, there is 
no consensus about it. Despite the fact that traditional immigration lands like the USA and 
Canada formulated such arrangements to meet the demands of their multiculturalist societies 
(Spiro, 2010), there is tendency amongst the EU Member States to buck the trend and change 
national laws to deter dual citizenship. Following a civic reform introducing a complementary 
use of jus sanguinis with jus soli recently, Germany for instance allows now holding one 
passport (except for cases relating to other EU Member State citizens). In a similar vein, 
France requires at present its would-be citizens to sign a charter called Charte de Drois et des 
Devoirs du Citoyen Francais as a verification of their consent, suggesting the civic rights 
gained therewith would be taken away if they happened to claim an additional citizenship on 
French soil.
69
 More on that, although dual citizenship is legally acknowledged in the 
Netherlands, the Dutch government has recently proposed a new law with the aim to 
introduce certain limitations within the context of integration (Bevelander & Veenman (2006, 
p. 5). 
 
Indeed, such procedures have for some time been a key component of the EU Member States’ 
integration policies to make financial cuts and lower the social burden of integrating TCNs to 
their societies (Guild, Groenendijk & Carrera, 2009). To some, what appears to lie 
additionally behind these policy initiatives is the will to make selections amongst third-
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 France TV Info, ‘Une charte de droits et de devoirs pour devenir français’. 15 November 2011. 
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country nationals and keep the number of new incomers at a minimum (Joppke, 2007). It is 
for instance officially declared in Austria that the number of applications for naturalisation 
could be reduced by this means (Perchinig, 2010). Official statements in Member States like 
Denmark, Finland, Greece and Germany argue at this point that those with immigration 
backgrounds would in this way be not only familiarised with the major values and norms in 
the societies but also become far more self-supporting (de Groot, Kuipers & Weber, 2009; 
Fagerlund & Brander, 2010; Christopoulos, 2010). Nevertheless, given that these persons 
adopt through naturalisation both national and European forms of citizenship, a number of 
economically better-off Member States such as France and Germany have voiced their 
concerns for they would probably become the final destinations -via ‘burden sharing’- should 
other EU Member States carry on providing easier access to citizenship than themselves 
(Lahav & Guiraudon, 2006). 
 
2.2.2 Citizenship as political participation 
While it becomes clear against this backdrop that legal status is integral to the political 
culture, it may fall short in defining citizenship alone. As a most traditional means to being 
part of the political community, political practice -as it is understood in the Western world- 
dates back to more than two thousand years ago. Historical surveys into citizenship begin 
commonly with the Ancient Greek states where participation in political life was reduced to 
citizens only. What Aristotle declared in The Politics –as one of the first treatises on 
citizenship- through “the man who is a citizen in a democracy is often not one in an 
oligarchy” (McKeon, 1941, pp. 1274b-1275a) was indeed indicative of citizens’ role for a 
self-governing society at the time. Nonetheless, one should remember that freedom and 
equality amongst citizens in early Athens did not secure their participation in state affairs 
because the latter was arranged first and foremost on the basis of wealth and/or social status. 
 
Regardless of its handicaps, the Athenian model of governance found broad purchase during 
the heyday of the Roman Empire. This was a time when a new conception of legal status, as 
St. Augustine of Hippo formulated it, outdid the political one to make a twofold definition of 
citizenship: one belonging to the earthly ‘City of Man’ and the other exclusive to the celestial 
‘City of God’ (Arthur, 2008). Accordingly, the ultimate goal of individuals was 
denouncement of materialistic ambitions during their residence in the earthly cities of Rome, 
Babylon or alike for entitlement to future citizenship in the heavenly world (Perreau-Saussine, 
2009). As it were, the early Roman approach to citizenship was the individual’s warrant to 
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enjoy the temporary protection of rulers for whom participation was important to the extent it 
served for the ultimate purpose of a celestial form of citizenship. In this sense, the Athenian 
understanding of “the citizen as a political being” changed into the Roman perception of “the 
citizen as a legal being, existing in a world of persons, actions and things regulated by law” 
(Pocock, 1995, p. 34). When, however, the Roman Empire fell into the feudal lordships of 
medieval ages, citizenship’s participatory role lost its significance. Machiavelli’s Discourses 
on Livy came out towards the end of this period calling on search for a new ‘self-rule’ 
participation mechanism without, all the same, abandoning loyalty to the political community 
(Paul, Miller & Paul, 2006). 
 
In a post-Reformation world following long religious struggles at the heart of Europe, a new 
political system prevailed as a response to the changing relationship between the rulers and 
the ruled. With the foundation of parliamentary sovereignty, the substance of citizenship 
began to extend political membership to a larger societal segment. Locke’s The Second 
Treatise of Government voiced this inclusion by tying individual liberties to collective 
sovereignty. In that, Locke was actually not critical of concession to monarchy, but was 
campaigning for individual rights at a minimum level of participation. Rousseau criticised this 
conception of citoyens (citizens) later in his modern treatise, On the Social Contract, where he 
argued that citizenship was not only about obtaining legal status but instead “a way of life that 
required commitment to the common good and active participation in public affairs” (Dagger, 
1997, p. 99), as for instance it was the case in Ancient Athens. Rousseau’s classical 
republican criticism of the Lockean account of citizenship was also a challenge to the 
theoretical premises of Hobbes, Montesquieu, Hume and Smith, who sowed the seeds of 
liberalism in political theory by emphasising private ownership and community responsibility, 
provided it is for ‘the good of the state’. 
 
In The Philosophy of Right, considered besides On the Social Contract the other important 
modern treatise on citizenship, Hegel argued that citizenship in the modern state cannot 
simply hold an unwavering commitment to civic virtues as in antiquity (Soeharno, 2009). The 
role of legitimacy, as the argument went, had to be emphasised for a rightful membership in 
the modern liberal state. While the theoretical premises of this liberal viewpoint appeared to 
deny the republican tradition, there was room for civic virtues. A similar perspective was held 
by a number of nineteenth-century liberals such as Tocqueville and Mill who were committed 
to improving the civic principles of liberalism by way of ‘effective’ government control 
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(Keohane, 2002). In the end, both the republican and liberal traditions of citizenship sought to 
assign a self-governing role to citizens, albeit with varying degrees, binding them together by 
loyalty and affiliation. 
 
Despite a much longer history at its roots, citizenship as political practice is linked 
predominantly to the rise of the nation-state. The more popular sovereignty individuals 
achieved through the nation-state, the firmer grip they got ahold of as to public affairs. They 
became by this means holders of “passive and active membership”, which the nation-state 
topped up “with universalistic rights and obligations at a specified level of equality” (Janoski 
& Gran, 2002, p.13). The passive rights of sharing a legal system and active rights of political 
participation made way for membership to the state as a political organisation. Central to this 
understanding was the French Revolution’s ‘fraternity-equality’ formulation, suggesting equal 
treatment to all on the basis of their attachment to the state. This vision did however not 
embrace non-nationals for they were not yet allowed to enjoy the rights nationals did. From 
this perspective, the nation-state had an exclusionary function in detaching ‘hosts’ from 
‘aliens’. 
 
In more recent times, civic republicanism and participatory democracy made a comeback to 
stress the participation of citizens in political life. Following most prominently Hannah 
Arendt who argued “politics is something that needs a worldly location and can only happen 
in a public space, then if one is not present in such a space one is simply not engaged in 
politics” (qtd. in Canovan, 1974, p. 635), a number of contributors in the second half of the 
20
th
 century like Pateman (1970), Held (1987), Beiner (1992), Mouffe (1992) and Sandel 
(1996) stressed the role of political participation for its encouragement of civil relations and 
solidarity amongst citizens. In fact, following J.S. Mills, several liberals including T.H. Green 
and L.T. Hobhouse also underscored the role of political participation in democracy. By 
contrast, republicans and participatory democrats subscribed rather to normative values. 
Beiner (1992) for instance puts it quite explicitly by regarding citizenship as “active 
membership in a political community where the very fact of such membership empowers 
those included in it to contribute to the shaping of a shared collective destiny” (p. 105). 
 
Next to their renewed emphasis on ‘collectivity’, addressing in particular the political 
community of the territorial nation-state (Walzer, 1992), an increasing number of dissenting 
voices, informed by the republican ideals to bring community members together or 
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transnational forms of political organisation to be taking place at multiple levels (Smith, 
1994), rose to invoke alternatives such as ‘local’ forms of citizenship at the urban level 
(Magnusson, 1990, 2000; Isin, 2000). This latter line of thinking was indeed largely informed 
by the proliferation of transnational political movements such as grassroots activities, NGOs 
and human rights regimes, which longed for a global hold of citizenship (Falk, 1995). Such 
formulations were however disputed on the grounds that “citizenship can only be 
meaningfully practised within a distinct institutional context, that of the political community -
a formal, organised, territorially-based community with some degree of sovereign self-
governance” (Bosniak, 2000, p. 475, emphasis original). As there existed, accordingly, no 
established global polity, the likelihood of citizenship beyond the nation-state would be one of 
a fiction. In response to this state-oriented reflection on citizenship, a number of arguments 
were advanced to argue that the practice of citizenship were now exceeding the traditional 
norms, with their effects becoming visible for instance in the area of social movements 
(Bartlett, 2007), economy (Sennett, 2003), workplace (Lawrence, 2004) or in the family 
(Lister, 2001; Hindman, 2007). 
 
It seemed in the end a new area of scholarship began to focus on a transnational form of civil 
society and its links with citizenship (Sassen, 2009, p. 236). Central to their interest was the 
new political organisation which was characterised by recent social, economic and political 
developments exceeding nation-states, ranging from the environmental context to that of 
human rights, and more specifically to the rights concerning workers or women (Guarnizo & 
Smith, 1998; Bonilla et al., 1998; Skevic, 2005; Merry, 2006). 
 
2.2.3 Citizenship as identity 
 
Well me for example I do feel like being in between…I feel as neither nor a 
foreigner…or or well I don’t know…sometimes when I am among Austrian 
girls…then I do feel like a foreigner…whereas I am not a I don’t know I am not a 
pure foreigner I was only born here…and that is why I only know life as it is 
here…and I do not know what it’s like over there that is why when I go there I feel 
myself somehow different. (Krzyzanowski & Wodak, 2007, p.1). 
 
Being “endemic to the human condition” (Rosamond, 1997, p. 98), identity serves as the 
affective template for citizenship. It is ‘felt’ in all aspects of life, making an impression that 
the functions of citizenship in leading to societal organisation are actually based on identity in 
the first place. For common ties and membership in a political polity, however, such a 
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replacement does not always work. In essence, identity is about recognising feelings of 
attachment between individuals, whereas citizenship concerns attachment to a polity. It is in 
this sense through citizenship identity becomes a political concept (Delanty, 1996). 
 
For a vast array of themes falling in its scope, in other words, identity is probably the least 
straightforward of all citizenship dimensions. Its conceptualisation covers a broad spectrum 
including personality, gender, social memberships, group characteristics, prejudices, 
intergroup conflicts, nationality or even cosmos (Bosniak, 2000). Yet, while these concepts 
may in all their relevance tell something about ‘identity’, they surely suggest different things. 
This point, that is, the fact that the very nature of ‘identity’ is fluid and unsettled finds 
widespread recognition in social science research. What Locke imparted in An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding more than three centuries ago under ‘Idea of identity 
suited to the idea it is applied to’ (Nidditch, 1975, p. 203) was an early reference to its 
semantic ambiguity, which in modern times became gradually a substitute for ‘difference’ 
(Crosby, 1992) and a source of many theoretical insights for the analysis of race, ethnicity, 
nationality, gender, sexuality and culture (Taylor, 1989; Balibar & Wallerstein, 1991; 
Connolly, 1991; Kymlicka, 1995; Miller, 1995). Research in Comparative Politics has for 
instance come to tie it predominantly to nationalism and ethnic conflicts (Gellner, 1983; 
Giddens, 1984; Hobsbawm, 1990; Billig, 1995; Calhoun, 1997). The major focus of 
International Relations has often been the identity of states providing material for 
constructivist critiques of (neo-) realism and (neo-) liberalism (Kratochwil & Ruggie, 1986; 
Wendt, 1992; Katzenstein, 1996; Checkel, 1998). And with a familiar problematique at its 
very heart, EU Studies dedicate ample space to the issue of ‘collective identity’ in Europe 
(Inglehart, 1970; Duchesne & Frognier, 1995; Kohli, 2000; Wintle, 2000; Risse, 2001; 
Castells, 2002; Bruter, 2003; Delanty, 2003; Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009). 
 
When all these various disciplinary foci are brought together, identity “tends to mean too 
much (when understood in a strong sense), too little (when understood in a weak sense), or 
nothing at all (because of its sheer ambiguity)” (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000, p. 1). For that 
reason, Simon (2004) reminds at this point that “the search for the essence of identity as a 
‘thing’, say, in the form of a physiological or hard-wired mental structure would then be a 
futile effort” (p. 3). Since such an endeavour will probably end up with an ‘analytic fiction’, 
what remains for the social scientist is rather “viewing identities as mediators between the 
inputs we receive from the social world and our subsequent interactions with that world” 
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(McKinlay & McVittie, 2011, p. 6). This complexity stems from the affective quality of 
identity, which comes from internal abstractions in the form of emotions or senses of 
belonging. A fairly simple ‘who am I?’ self-query is in this connection capable of inflaming 
the ‘self-other’ conceptual divide when reformulated as ‘am I who you are?’. As this dialectic 
makes affective elements inconceivable if detached from the exterior of the ‘self’ concept, the 
subject of identity becomes a principal concern for psychology and sociology. 
 
Placing human behaviour at the center of his inquiry, one can approach identity issues from 
two main angles. The first and rather ‘self-oriented’ one offers views largely in psychological 
terms to focus on the complexity of internal processes at the personal level. The sociological 
premises the second approach draws from on the other side promises to extend this reach 
beyond personal/self aspects. 
 
Inspired by discourses considering identity as a dynamic and inter-subjective construct 
(Lacan, 1977), psychological approaches have dedicated themselves to the introduction of 
foundational terms like ‘identity searching’, ‘identity crisis’, ‘self-concept’ and ‘self-esteem’. 
The distinction Erikson (1950) makes between the ‘ego identity’ (representing the sense of 
‘continuity’ a person’s core being signifies) and the ‘group identity’ (marking the sense of 
‘discontinuity’ the same person holds due to a multitude of social roles he/she is engaged in 
throughout a lifetime) corroborates this undertaking. Unlike psychologists, sociologists have 
associated identities with differentiated/complex social structures. To illustrate, contrary to 
Tajfel and Turner, who in their psychological models known as social identity theory (SIT) 
and the self-categorization theory (SCT) focus respectively on individuals’ socio-cognitive 
processes, Stryker (1989) ignores in his sociological approach the role of internal processes 
such as ‘cognition’ or ‘personality’ to establish a straight link between individuals and groups 
in terms of social experiences (Kelleher & Leavey, 2004). Inspired by Hogg, Terry & White 
(1995), sociologists Stets & Burke (2000) highlight on the other hand commonalities between 
the two disciplinary perspectives and call for an integrated approach. The main argument put 
forth here is that all identities benefit from the same logic of ‘self-verification process’ (which 
concerns affirmation of self-meanings in relevant contexts), regardless of the fact that they 
rest upon different bases of persons or groups. 
 
The explanatory frameworks drawn from psychology and sociology denote in the end two 
basic types of identity. There is on one side personal identity emphasising uniqueness of the 
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individual. Underscored on the other side is the same individual’s membership to a group 
through social identity. As an individual is normally identified with a multitude of social 
memberships, reference to social identity comes usually in a plural form, i.e. ‘social 
identities’. It is nevertheless possible to come across a third type of identity in literature as in 
the form of ‘collective identity’ which, based on the former two variants, makes a difference 
with the sense of agency it fosters amongst individuals. What comes as a consequence of this 
collective agency is generally thought to include a comparative “shared sense of ‘one-ness’ or 
‘we-ness’ anchored in real or imagined shared attributes and experiences” vis-à-vis ‘others’ 
(Snow, 2001, p. 2). In rough terms, it is indeed this embedded ‘collective action’ in 
citizenship that brings the identity component to the fore, in coming to terms amongst others 
with diversity and belonging issues. 
 
Studies tackling identity issues within the context of citizenship have recently been on the rise 
(Soysal, 2000; Kymlicka, 2002; Krzyzanowski & Wodak, 2007; Delanty, Jones & Wodak, 
2007). Despite various thoughts emerging here as to how citizenship rights should be 
distributed, there is consensus on what matters to immigrants’ identity in the first place. As it 
were, these are most importantly the formal citizenship the state confers on ‘newcomers’, the 
time spent and experiences accumulated in the host country and the extent of harmony 
between the new and the old cultures. 
 
A most debated ‘differentiated citizenship’ in this context concerning whether rights should 
be equally shared between minority and majority groups (Young, 1989; 1990) is indeed 
informed by arguments suggesting it is actually social and civic rights that would lead to 
optimal cohesion in a political community (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994; 2000). Bearing in 
mind that such a multiculturalist reading has the potential to challenge the traditional 
understanding of citizenship –that identification with the state through a sense of 
compatriotism would be adequate to generate an overarching collective identity at the national 
level- a further school of thoughts came to argue that the nation-state is no more “the only 
game in town as far as translocal loyalties are concerned” (Appedurai, 1996, p. 165). There is 
in this context a burgeoning literature of transnational civil society (Keane, 1988; Cohen, 
1995; Ehrenberg, 1999; Halperin & Laxer, 2003) inspired largely by recent developments 
within the context of economic globalisation as well as environmental concerns which called 
for urgent cooperation across national borders. It seemed, the main impulse for these readers 
of ‘transnational identities’ (Cohen, 1995) was a shared identity fostering in the foreground a 
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‘transnational corporate culture’ (Falk, 1995). To bring people together around this identity, 
there was need for a type of global citizenship, to be established perhaps most convincingly 
on humanitarian grounds (Wingenbach, 1998). 
 
To be fair, trends in these scholarly thoughts correlate highly with global immigration moves 
(Benmayor & Skotnes, 1994; Urry, 2000; Geddes, 2000; 2003; Joppke, 1999; 2005; 2010a; 
2010b) and interest in transnationalism (Portes, 1996; Westwood & Phizacklea, 2001; 
Vertovec, 2004). The best known transnational form of citizenship is of no doubt the one 
designed exclusively for EU citizens. While the case of European citizenship is based on the 
basic components of national citizenships, a fundamental question rises here to question 
cross-border ties bringing Europeans together. It becomes in this sense crucial to look first 
into its links to a shared collective identity in Europe, i.e. ‘European identity’. 
 
2.2.3.1 European identity 
The official launch of European identity dates back to the Cold War days, when the then 
European Community was short of a far-reaching political image in the international scene. 
At the 1973 Copenhagen Summit, the then nine Member States of the EC decided to draw up 
a document to this end with the expectation that it would define their relations with the rest of 
the world more explicitly.
70
 Indeed, this scheme paid off soon across a number of intra-
community documents such as the 1976 Tindemans Report where proposals on a common 
foreign policy, defence collaboration and economic and monetary union were all offered in 
the name of e pluribus unum, suggesting ‘a European people’ (Kostakopoulou, 2001). 
 
The elites were fairly convinced that the societal links amongst peoples of Europe would by 
this means be effectively reinforced (Lehmkuhl, 2001; Cerutti & Lucarelli, 2008). This frame 
of mind was preserved at the 1984 Fontainebleau Summit which called further upon the 
Adonnino Committee to create a ‘Europe of citizens’. The most immediate outcome in this 
thread was adoption of the European Community flag, anthem and an EC passport as well as 
establishment of ‘Europe Day’ seeking “to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among 
the people of Europe.”71 The 1985 Schengen I Agreement, the promotion of town-twinning 
schemes in 1989, the introduction of European citizenship, consular cooperation in third 
countries, an EU ombudsman, the 1993 Maastricht Treaty’s ‘European’ perspective of 
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education and ‘youth’ exchange programmes all followed suit to establish feelings of 
solidarity amongst the citizens of the EC/EU. With commitments “to instil some ‘European 
consciousness among the peoples of Europe” (Shore, 2000, pp. 221-22), these political moves 
constituted evidently the basis of a ‘Europeanisation’ process which sought to transfer the 
economic benefits of the integration project into the political sphere. 
 
While many had faith during this period in the existence of an overarching identity for 
Europeans (Inglehart, 1970; Commission of the European Communities, 1985), or at least a 
capacity for it (Bloom, 1990; Smith, 1991, 1992), it was hard to put that conviction to an 
empirical test. The difficulty here lies particularly in measuring people’s genuine feelings 
which to Potter & Wetherell (1987) draw copiously on discursive strategies (as cited in 
Cinnirella, 1997, p. 21). In this sense, although one could appear to express favourable 
thoughts about the EU, these impressions might be misleading in coming to grips with a 
genuine attachment to the EU, for an overarching identity necessitates ferreting out feelings of 
belonging deep down. 
 
Regardless of this empirical difficulty, research has made copious attempts to get to the 
substance of European identity. There appear three main paths followed to this end. First, an 
initial concern was to look into its existence or absence (Smith, 1991; Duchesne & Frognier, 
1995; Eriksen, 2002; Breakwell, 2004; Meinhof, 2004). Based on the assumption that it was 
not an illusion, a second wave took to formulate its defining features (Risse, 2003; Herrmann 
& Brewer, 2004; Castano, 2004; Grundy & Jamieson, 2007). And finally, a third host of 
scholarship became committed to exploring the future prospects of a collective identity for 
Europe (Habermas, 2001; Nicolaidis, 2004; Rogowski & Turner, 2006). A thorough analysis 
of these various perspectives revealed a list of attributes characterising ‘Europeanness’. 
Accordingly, being a ‘European’ must be about sharing a geographical entity recognised 
officially as Europe; a common history together with a linguistic and cultural heritage in this 
geographical space; a religious heritage of Christianity as well as principles and values like 
tolerance, pluralism, democracy, human rights, rule of law and fundamental freedoms. Since a 
broad consensus over these characteristics was far from being in sight, nevertheless, a further 
perspective emerged to point out later on that it was in fact diversity -not uniformity- that 
marked the distinguishing quality of being ‘European’ (Delanty & Rumford, 2005). 
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To help reduce the ‘conceptual overstretch’ of European identity, Walkenhorst (2009, pp. 7-8) 
offered analysis on the basis of ‘historical-cultural identity’, ‘political-legal identity’, ‘social 
identity’, ‘international identity’ and ‘post-identity commonness’. From a historical-cultural 
perspective, European identity would represent a shared European past as perceived in terms 
of common values and cultural origins. The political-legal identity viewpoint was actually a 
constructive recipe to sidestep primordialist outlooks (as the former historical-cultural 
understanding was suggesting) through political participation, democratic representation, 
principles of legitimacy and the status of citizenship. For social identity, the issue at stake was 
the need to bring forward an overarching collective identity in Europe, an image similar to 
that of ‘people’s Europe’. Next, if understood as a type of international identity, to 
Walkenhorst (2009), European identity would sink into its weakest form, conveying only just 
a collective image in the international arena. And finally, the post-identity commonness 
perspective was a reflection of post-modernist/post-nationalist theories seeking to bypass the 
vicious debate between primordialists/essentialists and constructivists to open up a broader 
space of universalism in embracing identity beyond the national level. 
 
Regardless of the fact that these various perceptions provide useful insights in keeping up 
with a collective identity for Europe, there have been doubts concerning whether or not this is 
an urgent matter vis-à-vis the already existing collection of feelings at the national and sub-
national levels. A number of sociological roadmaps have already been raised in this context. 
Should political communities be treated as cultural products or ‘societal communities’ in 
relation to their members’ collective experiences (Parsons, 1967), an overarching identity for 
Europe becomes a necessary instrument. Yet, if such communities can be created through the 
interplay between system-related factors (Luhmann, 1994) or are made up of individuals’ 
strategic choices, as seen by some rational choice theories
72
, European identity comes as a 
redundant or counter-productive formulation (Hardin, 1995). In this sense, unless the EU is in 
need of an “extensive and far-reaching solidaristic behaviour from its peoples, [a] full-fledged 
collective identity is hardly needed” (Armingeon, 1999, p. 236). 
 
Indeed, the challenges of ensuring whether or not a collective identity at the European level 
would function as a ‘gap-filler’ or a ‘missing link’ stems at a deeper level from a dilemma: 
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studying European identity from within or from without. If studied from without, Europe is 
generally sighted in terms of its similarities and differences vis-à-vis ‘others’, i.e. its 
economic and political contenders elsewhere in the world. The reason why this aspect is 
debatable rests on normative grounds. On one side, it is obvious that making a distinction 
between Europeans and non-Europeans is unavoidable or else “identity vanishes into 
diffusiveness” (Cerutti, 2008, p. 6). Yet, on the other side, basing European identity on a ‘we-
they’ or ‘us-them’ divide might provoke antagonism amongst residents in a society, recalling 
in a way Huntington’s (1993) ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis.73 The other major source of 
difficulty with European identity, if studied from within, concerns its status in relation to 
national identities. Reducing European identity by this way to shared memories would 
however not necessarily make a positive impression when considered in view of the history of 
Europe, as this would evoke a countless number of wars and tragedies on its soil. The recent 
proposal of an alternative model around ‘political identity’ (Fuchs, 2000; Habermas, 2001; 
Cerutti, 2003; Meyer, 2004 -as cited in Fuchs, 2011, p. 39) is informed very much by this past 
to bring the least disputable aspect of European identity to the fore: a shared political culture 
informed by universal values such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law. 
 
Habermas (1998) for instance offered in this context ‘constitutional patriotism’, to be capable 
of serving as a catalyst for convergence around a collective ‘we-feeling’ and working in 
tandem with ‘deliberative democracy’. Despite this analytical attempt to reconcile 
‘particularist’ principles with those of universalism, there was in fact, allegedly, nothing 
original about ‘Europeanness’ for such qualities could be applicable to many other corners of 
the world as well. What’s more, such an offer might perhaps appeal to its original context, i.e. 
Germany, which formerly was a ‘half nation’ with an acutely ‘compromised’ form of 
nationality “on account of its Nazi past. But…other countries do not have a comparably 
difficult past, and therefore are better served by forms of liberal nationalism” (Müller, 2007, 
p. 5). Indeed, this latter scepticism about a possible European public sphere stems mainly 
from communitarian thoughts arguing on the basis of a so-called ‘no demos’ thesis (Gerhards, 
1993; Grimm, 1995; Kielmansegg, 1996; Weiler, 1997, 1999) that a European-level of 
democracy is difficult to achieve so long as a perfect harmony between European masses is 
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out of sight. Habermas’ position would amount in this sense to “an oxymoron: as it is seen as 
simultaneously an attempt to bridge the universalism of basic rights and the particularity of a 
community of allegiance and identification” (Fossum, 2007, p. 4). In the end, a constitution 
for the EU would be “uneasily poised between a defence of universal values that is too ‘thin’ 
to mobilize people’s allegiance and loyalty, and a reconstruction of European values that may 
become too ‘thick’ in the way in which Europeans use it as form of identification” 
(Castiglione, 2009, p. 44). 
 
As covered earlier, the socio-psychological insights into identity, suggested for instance by 
the SIT (social identity theory), imply that a far-reaching group membership like European 
identity counts as only just one of the social identities Europeans appear to “borrow from their 
membership in social groups” (Castano & Yzerbyt, 1997, p. 2). While multiple social 
identities are informed essentially by the principle of ‘sharedness’, there are factors 
suggesting differentiation as well. With its similar conception of membership to more than 
one social group, the self-categorisation theory (SCT) of Turner (1978) suggests in a similar 
vein a multiplicity of identities of which categorisation at different levels of inclusion is 
capable of generating the ranking of one identity over the others. This does however not 
suggest that identification with one’s nation takes place at the expense of others. Accordingly, 
if self-categorisations are secured at more than one level, national and European identities 
could be established in a mutually inclusive relationship (Guetzkow, 1955). 
 
All in all, complementarity of national identity and European identity is largely a question of 
how identity is defined in the first place. If identities are taken to be fluid and ever-changing 
by character, European and national identities could be seen to follow a dynamic process of 
defining each other. Should, however, European identity be defined alongside essentialist 
approaches, there is little chance for uniformity, for a mere set of primordial features like 
cultural and linguistic similarities would roughly provoke putting one identity ahead of the 
rest, as if to excel or supersede them. 
 
2.2.3.2 European citizenship 
Compared to European identity, the notion of European citizenship appears to have gained a 
much wider purchase so far. Maastricht’s commitment “to strengthen the protection of the 
rights and interests of its Member States through the introduction of a citizenship of the 
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Union”74, according to which “Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall 
be a citizen of the Union”75, have the rights to move and reside freely within Member State 
territories
76
; vote and stand as a candidate here during local and EP elections
77
; enjoy 
diplomatic protection in third countries
78
; petition the European Parliament and apply to the 
Ombudsman
79
 which would all be monitored by the Commission to be reporting to the 
European Parliament, the Council and the Economic and Social Committee on a regular basis, 
i.e. every three years
80
 presented an overarching group membership for Member State 
citizens. Such an ambitious commitment was indeed recalling that of ‘European identity’, 
which formerly came to introduce with no less ambition construction of Euro-symbols like a 
Union flag, anthem and passport, the start of the European Parliament elections by direct 
universal suffrage, a new institution under the European Ombudsman and access to 
representation at any Member State’s diplomatic mission abroad. 
 
For all these, however, a string attached by way of Article 8(1) EC Treaty to the Amsterdam 
Treaty through “Citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national 
citizenship”81 was manifesting how sensitive Member States were about the national tenets of 
citizenship. From this perspective, one could well argue that the main highlight of Maastricht 
was actually not that it introduced a supranational form of citizenship but the commitments it 
made to create an economic and monetary union.
82
 Provoking scepticism in this context was 
amongst others the Edinburgh Summit which convened the same year as Maastricht with 
hardly an agenda item referring to European citizenship (Martiniello, 1995, p. 39). True, the 
introduction of a single monetary policy backed up by a single currency, i.e. the ECU 
(European Currency Unit) as the then ‘Euro’, was a remarkable progress for the European 
integration. However, the impression that an equally important supranational form of 
citizenship remained in Euro’s shade was capable of raising doubts about the credibility of 
this fairly assertive project (of European citizenship). 
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To be fair, European citizenship was not really a political objective in its own right as it was 
first and foremost the national domain to determine who could earn this title. Since the actual 
locus of political power was remaining therewith still in Member States (Hall, 1995), it would 
be reasonable to state that there was a subordinate relationship between the two citizenships, 
recalling Turner’s (1990) placement of citizenship along ‘top-down’ vs. ‘bottom-up’ and 
‘passive’ vs. ‘active’ axes of distinction. From this viewpoint, European citizenship appears to 
fit rather to a passive or top-down model for it emerged as a compromise between the 
institutions of the EU and Member States but not as a consequence of “some kind of 
mobilization of the grassroots citizens of Europe” (Bryant, 1991, as cited in Martiniello, 1995, 
p. 42). Much in the same way, Delanty (1997) views European citizenship as “a second order 
citizenship…defining Europe by reference to the non-Europeans” (pp. 296-297). This quality 
runs parallel to that of European identity which was introduced similarly in reference to the 
nation-state model as well as “an essentialist conception of political communities (nations) 
coterminous with and grounded in homogeneous and spatially contiguous cultural 
communities” (Painter, 2002, p. 101). 
 
Meanwhile, a nation-state guided construction of European citizenship did in fact not align 
well with contemporary cultural and political theories for these had already shifted their focus 
onto issues like transnationalism, plurality of identities or multiculturalism (Mouffe, 1993; 
Kymlicka, 1994; Benhabib, 1996, 2002; Isin & Wood, 1999; Delanty, 2000; May, 2002, 
2010). Taking European citizenship as a corollary to national sovereignty only would in this 
sense mean turning a blind eye to for instance the impacts of globalisation which have long 
been signalising that a state-centered citizenship and demos became increasingly dependent 
upon sub-national and supranational identities (Shaw, 1997). This projection indeed amounts 
to a post-national understanding of membership (in the form of multiple citizenships) 
maintaining that the nation-state is no longer the only legitimate form of polity to identify 
with (Soysal, 1994). 
 
What remained as an unresolved issue here was how to build a European demos independent 
from the traditional method of nation-building. As formerly mentioned, Habermas’ 
‘constitutional patriotism’ favouring a ‘European Constitution’ in coordination with a 
deliberative model of democracy found criticism not only for its alleged ignorance of the fact 
that some countries were already at ease with a liberal form of nationalism (Müller, 2007) but 
also for overstating a European public sphere with no demos at sight (Gerhards, 1993; Grimm, 
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1995). In this context, Weiler (1997) suggested conceptualising “European Demos and 
citizenship as part of a polity with multiple political Demoi to which its members belong 
simultaneously…in what may be called ‘concentric circles’” (p. 119). Central to this 
formulation was consideration of European citizenship as the expression of a particular 
identity or an ‘ethos of Europe’ (Weiler, 1995, p. 337). Nonetheless, this proposal was also 
disputed for a number of reasons. Shore (2004) for instance found it “deeply flawed” because 
it was “too abstract and rationalistic in inspiration” and “peculiarly elitist, sterile and soulless” 
which had “a curious romanticism attached to the idea of ‘transnational’, ‘deterritorialized’ 
and ‘hybrid’ identities” (pp. 35-37). The only aspect this rather harsh criticism spared was the 
separation of nationality from citizenship, which suggested commonly that the links to 
democracy can be established through citizenship, not nationality. 
 
To sum up, the overall impression of a supranational form of citizenship is that it rings 
different bells to different thoughts. From an essentialist vantage point, most notably, the 
construction of European citizenship does not put enough weight on the role of ethnicities, 
languages or traditions. Those subscribing to constructivism reassure however that European 
citizenship is still in the making, just as the EU’s competences in pursuit of a political 
community are (Giesen & Eder, 2001; Trenz & Eder, 2004; Fossum & Schlesinger, 2007). 
Accordingly, if Europeans need a strong foothold for an all-embracing identity to this end, 
they need to make sure that such an identity is “no longer conceived as a higher order of 
reality than politics or something that ‘underlies’ politics” (Eder, 2001, p. 238). 
 
2.3 Multiculturalism 
A main undercurrent of the contemporary immigration debate in Europe is without a doubt 
multiculturalism. As a far-reaching concept often used in the context of cultural diversity 
concerning gender, class, race or ethnicity by ideological or political means (Willett, 1998), 
multiculturalism took off in the late 1960s at an official level in Canada, where it became 
gradually part of the government’s policy strategy to address ethno-cultural plurality.83 
Regardless of its functional use, however, it is today to some a ‘floating signifier’ (Gunew, 
2004, p. 28) with many different interpretations (Taylor, 1994; Kymlicka, 1995; Kincheloe & 
Steinberg, 1997) depending on the historical context it is placed in. A number of factors like 
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national political culture or colonial legacy make for example multiculturalism in Canada and 
the USA (characterised largely by Québécois nationalism and the race discourse, respectively) 
differ from that in the European context, which is informed to a great extent by the colonial 
past of traditional immigration countries like Britain, the Netherlands and France as well as 
post-immigration experiences of “‘old’ hosts that did not consider themselves as such (for 
example, Germany)” and new routes like Italy, Spain and Greece which, despite 
acknowledgement at the (political) elite level, “find it even harder to adopt a multicultural 
approach” (Triandafyllidou, Modood & Zapata-Barrero, 2006, p. 1). 
 
For all that, the term multiculturalism was not a buzzword until recently. Following early 
debates and policy developments on multicultural implications of citizenship, which the EU’s 
Maastricht Treaty prompted further with its introduction of European citizenship, the 
unprecedented 9/11 terrorism discourse brought issues concerning multiculturalism quickly to 
the foreground. A primary consequence of this recent discourse in Europe was disorientation 
of European citizenship, “increasingly linking a religion (Islam) with violence and anti-
Western values” (Triandafyllidou, Modood & Zapata-Barrero, 2006). Migration agenda 
became incrementally anchored to that of security in major EU Member States which for 
some time had already been grappling with the thorny issue of integrating their minorities. 
During a Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party meeting in 2010, Chancellor Angela 
Merkel announced in this context that Germany’s attempts to establish a multicultural society 
“utterly failed”.84 In a short while, at a security conference in Munich, her British counterpart 
David Cameron criticised ‘state-sponsored’ multiculturalist policies and underscored the need 
for a stronger identity for the UK to prevent people from resorting to extremism.
85
 Like 
Merkel and Cameron, the then French President Nicolas Sarkozy also declared the failure of 
multiculturalist policies by blaming them for being far more oriented to the identity of 
newcomers than that of France. 
 
Such proclamations resonated seemingly for the most part in economically better-off Western 
European lands
86, where it became clear that the costs of ‘ethnocultural pluralism’, which 
were traditionally attributed to newcomers’ lack of civic integration to the host societies 
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(Joppke, 2007), would not readily disappear (Levy, 2000). Informed by rising levels of 
cultural and ethnic diversity which came as a consequence of “increased migration since the 
mid-1980s, and the prospect of yet more immigration as new states join the European Union” 
(Diez Medrano, 2009, p. 84), the critical voices heard at the highest state level were in this 
sense the culmination of reactions to the political handling of multiculturalism, which proved 
fruitful for neither minority nor majority groups.
87
 The perceived differences between these 
two groups pushed on the other side to a power struggle whereby the former yearned for 
acquisition of the same economic, social and political rights as enjoyed by the latter. 
 
The theoretical basis of multiculturalism is characterised to a great extent by identity politics 
(Scott, 1992). As the forerunner in this field, Will Kymlicka based his liberal theory 
essentially on John Rawls’ perception of wealth and distributive justice. Tackling perceptions 
of ‘inequality’ as felt by minorities, Kymlicka (1995, p. 4) argued in Liberalism, Community, 
and Culture and Multicultural Citizenship that post-war liberal theory was in need of 
furthering the human rights discourse, which alone cannot resolve chronic problems 
concerning languages, rights to education and cultural integration. The assumption that the 
state could secure basic individual rights (and protect ethnic identities) by distancing itself 
with ‘benign neglect’ (Glazer & Moynihan, 1975) was to Kymlicka (1995) purely 
hypothetical and for this reason required a supplement of ‘minority rights’ where the 
emphasis had to be on the “principles of individual liberty, democracy, and social justice” (p. 
6). Three types of ‘group-differentiated’ rights were offered in this context: ‘self-government 
rights’, ‘polyethnic rights’, and ‘special representation rights’. Through ‘self-government 
rights’, minority groups were to get ahold of a shield of territorial jurisdiction which would 
promise them greater political autonomy. Since this projection did not include the entirety of 
immigrant minorities, a second set of ‘polyethnic rights’ was formulated as a means to 
safeguarding languages and cultural practices applicable to immigrants. And finally, ‘special 
representation rights’ would ensure active participation and representation for all minority 
groups in the state’s political system. To this specific end, Kymlicka (1995) detached here 
national minorities (indigenous groups) from ethnic ones (immigrants).
88
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An important issue to clarify at this point is the way(s) in which ‘societal’ cultures are of 
relevance to national cultures. Given that common values, memories and institutions are in a 
nation-state connected through a shared set of social practices, one might interpret the two 
forms of culture as variants of the same conception. This presumption is however more far-
fetched than it sounds considering national minorities’ split from ethnic minorities like 
immigrants who generally are thought to leave their societal cultures back in their countries of 
origin. While Kymlicka’s ‘special representation rights’ allowed national minorities to keep to 
their specific cultures and immigrants and embrace their cultural particularities via 
‘polyethnic rights’, minority groups were here also promised protection against illiberal 
practices from within, for example in the form of abusing freedom and equality amongst their 
own group members. A distinction was therefore made in this specific context between 
‘internal restrictions’ and ‘external protections’: 
 
The first kind is intended to protect the group from the destabilising impact of 
internal dissent (e.g., the decision of individual members not to follow traditional 
practices or customs), whereas the second is intended to protect the group from the 
impact of external decisions (e.g., the economic or political decisions of the larger 
society) (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 35). 
 
Kymlicka’s liberalist guidance constituted obviously the “clearest starting point in 
Anglophone political theories of multiculturalism” (Modood, 2007, p. 21). That said, the 
theoretical perspective Charles Taylor put forth appeared to be competitive on the grounds 
that Kymlicka’s liberalist formulation was too individual oriented and promised little room 
for culture. Stressing that the individual agency would not be meaningful in the absence of 
social and cultural identities, Taylor (1994) argued in his renowned essay ‘The Politics of 
Recognition’ that minorities suffered largely because they were denied ‘political recognition’ 
(which was granted to majorities). Although liberalism was claiming to treat all individuals as 
equal citizens, accordingly, “what many cultural groups” were in need of was not recognition 
“of their sameness, but of their distinctness” (Kukathas, 2004, p. 255). For that, Taylor (1994) 
believed such a view of liberalism could in its most favourable interpretation offer only a 
short term solution to minorities’ cultural survival. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
preserve their ethnic identities and traditions but holding no “legitimate claim to self-government” (Kukathas, 
2004, p. 252). 
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Taylor’s ‘recognition’ argument suggesting that minorities are imprisoned within “a confining 
or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves” (1994, p. 25) could not escape criticism, 
either. To ‘critical multiculturalists’, for instance, it was short of “positionality, in which 
people are defined not in terms of fixed identities, but by their location within shifting 
networks of relationships, which can be analysed and changed” (Maher & Tetreault, 1994, p. 
164). Informed by social construction of identities, the ‘positionality’ argument highlighted 
‘change’ in societal roles, which Taylor allegedly did not take into account in his ‘politics of 
difference’ thesis. Be that as it may, the underlying tenets of ‘politics of difference’ were 
adopted by many theorists (Young, 1990; Tully, 1995, 2003; Devaux, 2000; Baumeister, 
2000). Questioning the conception of ‘the common good’, Young (1990) for instance argued 
for political representation on the basis of ‘a heterogeneous public’. The main concern here 
was “participatory structures in which actual people, with their geographical, ethnic, gender 
and occupational differences, assert their perspectives on social issues within institutions that 
encourage the representation of their distinct voices” (Young, 1990, p. 116). In light of efforts 
seeking to create a homogeneous public, a notion of ‘group-differentiated citizenship’ was 
introduced here for the interests of ‘oppressed’ groups, highlighting the rights these could 
further enjoy vis-à-vis those of the ‘privileged’. 
 
The debate on the liberalist roots of multiculturalism, as prompted by Kymlicka and Taylor, 
inspired a wide range of models. Propositions such as ‘difference multiculturalism’ (Turner, 
1993), ‘insurgent multiculturalism’ (Giroux, 1994) and ‘critical multiculturalism’ (Chicago 
Cultural Studies Group, 1994) were grouped by Delanty (2003) in the form of ‘traditional’, 
‘modern’ and ‘post-modern’ categories. Accordingly, traditional multiculturalism is 
characterised by ‘monoculturalism’ (based on denial of cultural diversity, which for instance 
Japanese citizenship appears to have endorsed by equating ethnicity with nationality), 
‘republican multiculturalism’ (which as in the French case seems like a ‘culture blind’ model 
making no official recognition of cultural diversity), ‘pillarisation’ (illustrated formerly by the 
educational system in the Netherlands in line with Protestant and Catholic denominations) and 
‘liberal multiculturalism’ (inspired by the ‘melting pot’ model in the USA). The category of 
modern multiculturalism comprises on the other hand three sub-divisions: ‘communitarian 
multiculturalism’ (as posited through Taylor’s politics of recognition, which may be 
applicable to India, Ireland, Canada or Belgium), a ‘liberal communitarian’ version (for 
instance, the ‘salad bowl’ model offered by Habermas (1998), Parekh (2000) or Touraine 
(2000), based on the colonial history of Britain and the Commonwealth) and 
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‘interculturalism’ (through Watson’s (2000) model regarding cultural difference as a ‘positive 
virtue’ in light of cultural awareness, tolerance and knowledge of other cultures). And finally, 
post-multiculturalism gathers three more versions including ‘radical multiculturalism’ (the 
main form of which applies to contemporary USA, where the former liberal ‘melting model’ 
fits to the frame of race rather than ethnicity), critical multiculturalism (underscoring being 
‘different’ as in the case of disadvantaged groups) and ‘transnational multiculturalism’ 
(informed most notably by globalisation). 
 
2.3.1 Criticism of multiculturalism 
Regardless of these diverse perspectives offering what a multiculturalist society should 
principally be made up of, a growing wave of recent thoughts came to deny almost all 
scenarios attached with multiculturalism. While it is not easy to identify the exact roots of 
these antagonistic dispositions, a most suspected source is the ‘9/11 events’ which rose to link 
the subject matter largely to the terrorism discourse (McGhee, 2008). The major point 
addressed alongside this line of criticism was multiculturalism’s promise of ‘multiple 
loyalties’ about which some had for long been sceptical about because it would almost always 
jeopardise attachment to the nation-state (Schlesinger, 1998; Huntington, 2004). Despite 
reassurances maintaining that it was actually lack of minority rights that disintegrated ‘the 
bonds of civic solidarity’ (Kymlicka, 2002), those sensitive to national identity were fearing 
“that without a primary loyalty to the nation-state, the civic, political, and even moral 
community of a country” would gradually dissolve into obscurity with “problems ranging 
from limited democratic engagement to a lack of interest in the policies of redistribution” 
(Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul, 2008, p. 160). 
 
A most leading critical outlook came in this vein from the feminist wing which discredited 
multiculturalism’s claims of “respect for all cultural traditions”, for they were not taking into 
account “all cultural traditions” (Pollitt, 1999, p. 27). It was in this sense not realistic to 
conceive of a state adopting multiculturalist policies at risk of ‘recognising’ those who deny 
the rights of their own group members, for instance women’s right to education (Okin, 
1998).
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 This criticism was shared by liberal egalitarians arguing that multiculturalism did not 
at all align well with liberal principles and for this reason could not be adopted as a public 
policy (Barry, 2001). Despite its commitments to cultural pluralism, multiculturalism, as the 
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 A specific issue here is the financial support the state provides for religious education. Feminist critics argue 
against such fundings in the context of right to culture for these generally serve for the sole benefit of ‘boys’ 
(Okin, 1999). 
69 
criticism went, was in fact ignoring the distinction of public and private spheres -which is a 
central component of liberalism- because it saw no harm in allowing room for groups capable 
of intruding upon others’ rights during their power quest for public and/or private spheres. 
 
Moving on, cosmopolitan critics also argued against a monolithic understanding of culture. 
To them, an unceasing process of societal interaction in a globalised world introduced “bits of 
cultures… into our lives in different sources” (Waldron, 1992, p. 110) but not necessarily 
claimed “purity of the impure” or the “immutability of the historical” (Benhabib, 2002, p. 11). 
In that case, the “multiculturalist resistance to seeing cultures as internally riven and 
contested” would be little more than carrying over “visions to selves” (Benhabib, 2002, p. 
16). Mitigation or restoration of uneven power relations necessitated to this train of thoughts a 
form of ‘politics of equality’ within the framework of a ‘different but equal’ logic (Mahajan, 
2002). States from this perspective had to “acknowledge rather than ignore cultural 
particularities” (Gutmann, 1994, p. 5). And if there were cultures committed to principles 
other than those offered by liberalism, a narrow interpretation of ‘recognition’ was to be 
avoided or else it would end up producing only limited diversity (Tomasi, 1995; Parekh, 
2000; Deveaux, 2000). A typical example given at this link was the case of indigenous 
peoples who despite their non-liberal practices could still be worthy of respect in terms of 
their societal organisations (Spinner-Halev, 2006, p. 549). 
 
It seems against a background of such critical outlooks rounding off cultures/groups alike 
would risk major differences/inequalities they hold intrinsically, for instance in the form of 
‘internal minorities’ or ‘minorities within minorities’ (Eisenberg & Spinner-Halev, 2004). 
This would, put differently, amount “to an overly narrow focus on ‘identity’ as singular—as if 
one’s cultural membership were unmediated by other social factors such as gender, sexual 
orientation, age, marital status and the like” (Shachar, 2001, p. 30). In any case, considering 
particularly ‘politics of recognition’ and ‘politics of equality’, one could argue that the 
likelihood for a shared platform of cultural plurality is contingent upon how successful a 
country’s integration policy is. Accordingly, success in the integration of immigrant 
minorities rests on skillful management of immigration policies for which a common 
language and culture should come in the first place. While immigrants may be at a 
disadvantageous position in this picture, the situation is first and foremost illustrative of ‘civic 
consciousness’ (Taylor, 2011). 
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2.3.2 Integration, participation and assimilation 
As already mentioned, multiculturalism in Europe was until recently not a focal point of 
political interest. A number of developments such as the 
 
rise of nationalism in Eastern Europe after the fall of the BerlinWall in 1989, the 
attraction of communitarian thinking in the 1980s, the increased political activism of 
religious conservatives in the 1980s in the USA, and the increase in Muslim 
immigrants to Western Europe in the 1970s and afterwards…all brought about an 
enlarged interest in the role that groups play in theory and practice (Spinner-Halev, 
2004, p. 546). 
 
When this course of events became further clouded in the early 2000s with the ‘9/11 events’ 
in the USA (followed by bomb attacks in Spain and Britain), multiculturalism was declared at 
many fronts to be a ‘fiasco’, with immigrants’ failure to integrate into their host societies, as 
the primary wrongdoer (Joppke, 2004). Of a number of urgent actions taken in this context 
was recourse to civic integration courses and tests which some countries like the Netherlands 
decided to apply in the very country of origin. Given the complexity of its application, the 
new understanding of integration went apparently out of the ordinary to make it an admission 
requirement for immigration (De Heer, 2004). Further to that, new legislations have been 
introduced for instance in France, banning ‘ostentatious’ religious clothing and symbols like 
the Sikh turban, Muslim hijab, Jewish kippas and Christian crosses.
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 Much in a similar vein 
other EU Member States like the UK banned polygamy, female circumcision or arranged 
marriages, as practiced by some of their immigrants, in consideration of the rising voices of 
dissent in public circles (Phillips & Saharso, 2008), while a German court ruled quite recently 
that young boys’ circumcision for religious reasons -carried out traditionally by Jewish and 
Muslim communities- equalled ‘bodily harm’ and had to be declared illegal.91 
 
These revisionary acts have indeed come into being under the guidance of not only political 
parties but also alongside academic, journalistic and public discourses. It came out, in 
accordance, the road to integration demanded participation in a host country’s societal, 
economic and political systems. In this new immigration context, while immigrants opting 
willingly for integration could, as former British PM Tony Blair addressed, be happily 
welcome providing “they have internalised prevailing ‘values’”, others perceived to be 
rejecting “liberal democratic norms…are to be excluded through the revocation of their rights 
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 BBC News Europe, `German Court rules circumcision is ‘bodily harm’, 26 June 2012. 
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to citizenship and legal residency and, in extreme cases, their detention, denaturalisation and 
deportation” (Triadafilopoulos, 2011, p. 862). 
 
With its quest for social cohesion and political participation of minority groups via 
citizenship, the issue of integration is without doubt an integral part of multiculturalism 
theories. This basic premise is however open to debate considering that participation through 
contribution to economic activities, access to educational institutions or residential resources 
would not always suffice for integration because a certain degree of involvement would take 
place even without a reward of legal citizenship status or legal residence (Leitner & Ehrkamp, 
2003). This is indeed where the question of assimilation comes into play. 
 
The rise of assimilation as a significant political instrument is closely related to the 
‘exhaustion’ of a ‘state-sponsored’ multiculturalism discourse. On one side, multiculturalism 
demands ‘recognition’ of diversity so that “the qualities of out-groups are not 
stigmatized…but rather reconstitute the notion of civil competence within the public sphere” 
(Mitchell, 2004, p. 642). What assimilation necessitates on the other side is the opposite: it 
requires the reinforcement of “public/private split by separating out ‘difference’ and 
relegating it to the private sphere” (Mitchell, 2004, p. 642). Nevertheless, as some argue, a 
‘backlash’ against multiculturalism and a switch to civic integration -be that through 
assimilation or otherwise- does not necessarily suggest exclusion on the basis of ethnicities 
but instead a new understanding of citizenship as a reward for an ‘adequate’ degree of 
integration (Bauböck, 2006, 2008). 
 
Propagating a discourse underlining the failure of multiculturalism, “state policies of 
assimilationism and exclusion represent a return to a recuperative national project that seeks 
to (re)locate a universalist notion of civil society firmly within the bounded contours of the 
nation state” (Mitchell, 2004, p. 645). In so being, assimilation policies might be regarded as 
“historically the first and sociologically the most ‘natural’ response to the contradiction 
between public civility and private particularity” (Alexander, 2006, p. 422). This perception 
receives however the same criticism as multiculturalism, in particular from non-liberal critics, 
because immigrants or minorities would by this means be urged to pick up on liberalist 
principles. As Joppke & Morawska (2003) for instance point out, pressure to acquire host 
societies’ languages and liberalist values may be an indication of the assimilation discourse. 
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Accordingly, those who fail to resist this pressure are labeled as individuals opting out from 
participation in civic life, which is why they allegedly deserve social exclusion.  
 
2.4 Review 
A central theme of this study is immigration whose conceptual boundaries are determined 
largely by citizenship. Following the Westphalian state system which installed national 
citizenship as a core component of international relations, migration became an issue resting 
upon progressively restrictive formalities including amongst others authorisation of official 
documents like passports, visas and working permits. Political research on immigration has 
against this background almost always taken as a base the nation-state vantage point. A 
multidisciplinary span enriched this enterprise. Research models affiliated with economic, 
sociological, historical, anthropological and political principles gave way to a wide spectrum 
of outcomes by offering various points of emphasis, most notably material incentives, social 
structures, spatial elements, family induced motivations and state interests, as far as the 
interplay between immigration and national citizenship is concerned. 
 
Three interrelated components are of primary relevance for this conceptualisation: legal 
status, political participation and identity. Legal status is often located ahead of political 
participation and identity as the scope of the latter two is generally thought to be guided by 
the former’s emphasis on ‘rights’. That said, mere dependence on rights is bound to remain 
ineffective in cases when contribution/involvement of individuals in the political system as 
well as their affective quality are neglected at a broader scale. Yet, no matter how much 
attachment to the state through emotional bonds matters for a voluntary participation in the 
political community, the very nature of identity holds capacity for being problematic, 
irrespective of the copious interdisciplinary approaches dedicated to that cause. 
 
Another major theme the study conceives of as central to its research theme is 
multiculturalism. Conceptualised generally within the context of citizenship, multiculturalism 
was first brought into use in the 1960s by the Canadian government as part of its internal 
political strategy to come to terms with ethno-cultural plurality. Regardless of its functional 
use, however, the recent rise of critical voices declining multiculturalism in state, public and 
academic domains indicates how convoluted citizenship has become in the face of 
immigration policies. While it could be a remedy for the flaws of multiculturalism (Schierup, 
Hansen & Castles, 2006), an upsurge in “resident noncitizens as well as nonresident, or 
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external citizens” (Barry, 2006, p. 17) brought about a new conception of ‘transnationalised’ 
citizenship, which came to make a wide array of implications. The introduction of European 
citizenship with the 1992 Maastricht Treaty had in this context a significant value particularly 
for the connection it established between territoriality and citizenship. While citizenship was 
traditionally anchored with the legal status as introduced by the nation-state, the advent of 
European citizenship offered a different viewpoint, in particular with its alternative sight on 
‘national membership’ and sovereignty. This formulation was however taken by many with a 
pinch of salt seeing that the ‘gate-keeping’ role was still firmly belonging to the nation-state.92 
And if “the traditional, classical vocabulary of the citizenship” should still be elementary to 
the EU version, “its very introduction into the discourse of European integration is 
problematic” (Weiler, 1999, p. 327). As there appeared in this sense no overarching European 
demos, attachment to the Union on the basis of a new formulation of citizenship was far from 
being realistic (Weiler, 1995). At stake here was obviously a short-sighted European political 
identity which appeared to give the supranational form of citizenship not much room to 
survive. As Mouffe (1992) notes 
 
if Europe is not to be defined exclusively in terms of economic agreements and 
reduced to a common market, the definition of a common political identity must be at 
the head of the agenda and this requires addressing the question of citizenship. 
European citizenship cannot be understood solely in terms of a legal status and set of 
rights, important as these are (p. 8). 
 
Seen from this perspective, the subject of European citizenship plays a critical role in testing 
citizenship beyond the conceptual boundaries of the nation-state. Nevertheless, this 
argumentation is disputed on the grounds that citizenship cannot be a legal issue about 
“existing social groups of quasi-primordial nature in order to convert them into a political 
entity” but instead “a concept of social stratiﬁcation from which the consciousness of 
belonging together” or differentiation between in- and out-groups “largely ensues” (Besson & 
Utzinger, 2008, p. 188). From this perspective, the argument that European citizenship cannot 
survive in the absence of a European demos is not plausible because “the status of citizenship 
and the identity of the demos are functionally linked through a process of mutual 
reproduction” (Besson & Utzinger, 2008, p. 188). Regardless of a given set of rights, 
citizenship includes in this regard being part of a political entity on the basis of democracy or 
what Bellamy (2001) refers to in more profound terms as ‘the right to have rights’. 
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“citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship”. 
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The discussion of who to include within (and who to exclude from) the stretch of citizenship, 
rests, as far as the above-mentioned mutual relationship is concerned, very much on social 
cohesion/civic integration. Still, the recent rise of terrorism discourse made this issue more 
precarious than it always was. Multiculturalism as a thematic element across scholarly debates 
was prior to ‘9/11’ placed largely within the context of human rights/universalism. Yet, it 
appears, the issue has for some time been linked for the most part to national identity, as a 
result of which the former promise of ‘multiple loyalties’ is now declared ‘null and void’. 
 
The entire backcloth presented through citizenship and multiculturalism so far is essentially 
informed by three competing schools of political thought. As first, the liberal understanding of 
citizenship connotes largely to legal status by which members of a political entity are granted 
social, political and civil rights in return for which they are bound with a number of 
obligations. Seen from this perspective, citizenship is in the first place “a matter of 
entitlement” rather than “political participation or civic commitment” (Bellamy, Castiglione 
& Shaw, 2006, p. 9). Despite different lenses they consult to come to terms with cultural 
plurality, liberalists see multiculturalism largely as a means to accommodating and protecting 
diversity “to promote liberal values such as equality, autonomy, toleration or equal respect. 
Thus, although it may well allow a degree of cultural preservation or protectionism, that isn’t 
the central aim or telos of this approach” (Ivison, 2010, p. 3). 
 
Then, for the republican citizenship, ‘rights’ are backed up typically by political participation. 
Based on models retrieved from Ancient Greece which restricted participation to citizens but 
not ‘subjects’, republicans demand stronger commitments from individuals, through 
commitment to civic and political life, at the very least. Conceptualisation of the ‘nation’ 
requires in this sense further than “the basis of descent, a shared tradition and a common 
language” to include more of ‘praxis’ and exercise of civil rights actively (Habermas, 1992). 
 
Last, to communitarians, citizenship brings people together within a political community on 
the basis of shared norms and values. Membership of citizens is here characterised through 
moral qualities like loyalty and solidarity binding community members to one another 
(Martiniello, 2000). Contrary to liberals and republicans who look alike by subscribing to 
universalist principles in orientation, communitarians credit a protective logic allowing for 
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‘recognition’ of minority groups like immigrants provided that the latter would concede the 
majority groups’ cultural privileges (Ivison, 2010). 
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Chapter 3 Theoretical framework 
 
 
The EU’s raison d'être as a political actor is often met with scepticism in scholarship. 
Cooperation in the early stages between Member States (the so called ‘European Political 
Cooperation’) was reportedly shallow and lame. Amidst polemics over the ‘normative’ role 
attached distinctively in international terms (Duchene, 1973; Manners, 2002), the EU’s 
growing institutional structure at the internal level led gradually to “the creation and 
dissemination of a range of new databases, the scope for systematic testing and falsiﬁcation of 
theories” bringing about in the end “an increasingly promising arena for the practice of 
‘normal science’” (Pollack, 2005, p. 379). This chapter will begin with a preface to this new 
field which in literature is filed as theory in EU Studies. The main aim intended here is to 
locate Europeanisation in this broad framework before it is subsequently presented as the 
main theory of the research. 
 
3.1 Theory in EU Studies 
To be sure, social sciences abound with theories, paradigms, approaches or schools of 
thinking which scholars turn to one way or another to reify research challenges. Featuring 
alongside this diversity is a long standing rivalry initiated from one perspective for what is 
supposedly not explained, formulated or accomplished from those of the rest. This issue, put 
differently, the fact that a theory’s supremacy relates closely to its competitive strength over 
the others has been informative also for EU Studies. Nonetheless, though fairly prolific, this 
relatively young area is a derivative of International Relations (IR) and has to date not been 
impressive enough to reassure its own agenda or at least anything further than what the latter 
or Comparative Politics already said (Hollis & Smith, 1990). 
 
The IR theory is generally known to have risen upon a long legacy of ‘bloody conflicts’ to 
give insights into how further outbreaks of war could be prevented. To change the world for 
the better, both liberalists and realists had faith in the give-and-take between theory and 
practice, while the realist agenda rather filtered it “by trying to understand as dispassionately 
as possible the constraints on realising the vision which the ‘utopians’ had been too anxious to 
embrace” (Burchill et al., 2005, p. 9). In fact, up to the post-War era when the European 
integration took a start with its sui generis configuration, it was the realist paradigm which 
found more audience in the IR field. Commitments made by EC/EU have since then been 
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analysed in many ways over a series of grand-, middle- and small-range theories (Nugent, 
2003). The forerunner in the first cluster was neo-functionalism which captured scholarly 
attention with its liberalist ‘spill-over’ motto. To neo-functionalists, the safety valve of a war-
free Europe was a system of mutual interests -as their predecessors, functionalists, had 
similarly formulated (Mitrany, 1943)- which, if states could take advantage of it collectively, 
had the potential to let integration in one sector expand into others through a ‘spill-over’ 
process (Haas, 1958; Lindberg, 1963). The heyday of neo-functionalism coincided with 
Deutsch’s ‘transactionalism’93 which as a theoretical contribution maintained that the 
horizontal relations across Member States could one way or another release a ‘sense of 
community’ (Deutsch et al., 1967). A certain shift of ‘loyalties’ for a supranational rule would 
however not guarantee unconditional commitment to the European ideals (Lerner & Gorden, 
1969). 
 
Indeed, the ‘empty chair’ crisis94 of the 1960s cast a shadow over the neo-functionalist 
arguments which were soon declared ‘obsolete’ by the founder Haas himself (Schmitter, 
2004) as if to submit itself clearly to Hoffmann’s (1964) ‘intergovernmentalism’. Classified in 
literature as ‘classical intergovernmentalism’, this second grand theory also found criticism 
because it appeared to explain nothing but why Member States would not really volunteer for 
further integration. This issue was later filed down by Moravcsik (1993, 1998) under ‘liberal 
intergovernmentalism’ to highlight not merely the deceleration of the integration in the 1960s 
but also the EU’s historic achievements up to the 1986 Single European Act (SEA). In any 
case, the ‘comeback’ of realism (hence neo-realism) was by this means declaring the nation-
state once again as the core unit of the international system “in spite of all the remonstrations 
to the contrary” (Hoffman, 1966, p. 895). 
 
The early 1990s saw a transformation in the EU-guided research bringing about its own 
research agenda with multiple perspectives (Pollack, 2005). The EU began to appear 
thereafter as a system of ‘governance without government’ further beyond an international 
organisation (Majone, 1994). As the macro exposure of grand-theories could not shoot the 
details of this new EU picture, a number of meso-level/middle-range theories rose to put 
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 The ‘empty chair’ crisis of 1966 came as the culmination of France’s boycott series of the Council’s meetings 
upon failure to receive veto rights for its ‘highly significant’ national interests. This was indeed a blow to 
paralyse the Community method and therewith supranationalisation of the integration process. 
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emphasis on the EU’s capacity to govern ‘effectively and democratically’ (Scharpf, 1999; 
Schmitter, 2000). The leading multi-level governance (MLG) approach (Marks, 1993; 
Jachtenfuchs, 1995; Majone, 1996; Kohler-Koch & Eising, 1999 and Kohler-Koch & 
Rittberger, 2006) argued in this cluster that the EU became a system of governance marked by 
“a unique set of multi-level, non-hierarchical and regulatory institutions, and a hybrid mix of 
state and non-state actors” (Hix, 1998, p. 39). Perceiving the EU as a complex decision-
making system with multiple actors (the state being only one of them), MLG theorists focused 
primarily on the weakening of the state which could, as they claimed, no more be defined as a 
sovereign actor but a body of rules or formal institutions (Marks et al., 1996). 
 
As another meso-level approach the main tenets of which were in fact reminiscent of MLG, 
the policy network approach (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992; Peterson, 1992) conceived across 
governmental and non-governmental networks of “actors, each of which has an interest, or 
‘stake’ in a given…policy sector and the capacity to help determine policy success or failure” 
(Peterson & Bomberg, 1999, p. 8). Separating these networks as ‘horizontal and vertical’ 
(Heinelt & Smith, 1996), ‘open issue and closed policy’ (Peters, 1998), ‘dyadic and triadic’ 
(Ansell, Parsons & Darden, 1997) and ‘generalised and task specific’ (Marks & Hooghe, 
2004), policy network theorists aimed to show the ways in which structure and agency 
conflicted each other. 
 
Further theoretical approaches the meso-level cluster comprises besides the MLG and policy 
network analyses are rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism and 
sociological institutionalism which altogether are classified in literature under ‘new 
institutionalisms’ (Hall & Taylor, 1996). With a commitment to relocate institutions back into 
the heart of politics and society (Radaelli, 2003, 2004), these analytical approaches dwelled 
principally on “particular slices of the EU polity” (Rosamond, 2000, p. 126), through various 
lenses, such as the ‘calculus approach’ of rational choice institutionalists focusing specifically 
on the consequences of national preferences (Hall & Taylor, 1996), the temporal emphasis of 
historical institutionalists underlining the ‘path dependent’ character of institutional 
arrangement (Thelen, 1999) and the ‘cultural approach’ of sociological institutionalists 
explaining the link between institutions and agents in reference to the ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ (March & Olsen, 1998). Added to these, a more recent formulation came in 
this category via discursive institutionalism (Schmidt, 2000, 2002; Schmidt & Radaelli, 
2004), which emerged as a synthetic approach bringing the older ‘new institutionalisms’ 
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together. To do that, discursive institutionalism referred to ideational factors to underscore the 
role of discursive interaction across institutional networks (Schmidt & Radaelli, 2004). 
 
With its ‘logic of appropriateness’ and emphasis on social norms, like sociological 
institutionalism (Katzenstein, 1996, p. 5), social constructivism aligned also with the second 
wave of theoretical approaches. That said, what made social constructivism different from the 
rest in this group was the weight it put on the ‘finality’ of the EU (Wiener & Diez, 2004). In 
so doing, social constructivists were especially critical of the rationalist school for they 
seemed to dwell too much on material interests rather than key attributes of European 
integration such as cultural richness and ideational factors. Nonetheless, it is important to 
underline here that there was no uniform structure applicable to the ontological basis of social 
constructivism.
95
 
 
A further theoretical approach which represented the ‘normative’ school of thoughts amongst 
the meso-level theories was characterised by Habermas’ (1996) social theory of ‘deliberative 
democracy’ (Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009). Pointing to an inclusive political framework at a 
universal level (rather than an economic one), theorists subscribing to deliberative democracy 
(Eriksen, 2006; Pensky, 2008) asserted that a constitution for the EU could gather Member 
State citizens around a shared European goal. Those searching for a supranational identity on 
the basis of the EU’s ‘normative power’ (Manners, 2002) could also be associated with this 
group.
96
 
 
Despite their different focal points, the roots of all these perspectives -be they of MLG, policy 
network analysis, various forms of institutionalism, social constructivism or deliberative 
democracy- could be tracked down to the end of the 1970s when ‘policy-making’ at the EU-
level became central to scholarly interest (Wallace, Wallace & Webb, 1977). In contrast to 
neo-functionalists and intergovernmentalists who perceived the European integration as a 
dependent variable, theorists in this latter generation focused collectively on the EU’s 
complex institutional structure. Viewing the EU foremost as an aggregate of policies and 
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the rationalist position, for they for instance do not reject “science or causal explanation: their quarrel with 
mainstream theories is ontological, not epistemological. The last point is key, for it suggests that constructivism 
has the potential to bridge the still vast divide separating the majority of IR theorists from postmodernists” (p. 
327). 
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 The emphasis laid on ‘identity’ was in essence characterised by the ‘social’ character of institutions which in 
the EU case had already been developing since their establishment in the 1950s (Christiansen, Jørgensen & 
Wiener, 2001). 
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politics at national and supranational levels (Jachtenfuchs, 2001, p. 250) and highlighting 
implications of identity formation for the European integration (Chryssochoou, 2000), this 
line of arguments came to extract gradually an independent variable from the European 
integration. It is indeed against the background of this ‘governance/normative turn’ that 
‘Europeanisation’ could be best illustrated, as a theoretical approach drawing largely on 
policy diffusion across the EU’s complex institutional network with a certain extent of 
supranationalisation as its independent variable. 
 
3.2 Europeanisation 
3.2.1 Defining Europeanisation 
Research on European integration has for some time been engrossed first and foremost in the 
EU’s domestic impacts. Cutting across a wide range of policy areas, this undertaking is 
associated essentially with a new research field by the name of ‘Europeanisation’. Despite the 
obvious rise of research interest for it “or perhaps even because of it”, attempts to define this 
new field remain all the same somewhat poor and confusing (Mair, 2004, p. 338). The 
hitherto recourse to its conceptualisation in an array of policy fields from trade, commerce 
and environment to external affairs provokes its “faddish use” in various contexts which 
might “easily obscure its substantive meanings” (Featherstone, 2003, p. 3). While 
Europeanisation in a narrow sense suggests “a response to the policies of the European Union 
(EU)” its scope “is broad, stretching across existing member states and applicant states, as the 
EU's weight across the continent grows” (Featherstone, 2003, pp. 3-4). This coverage might at 
times extend beyond reference to the EU and embrace for instance the cultural influence of 
former European colonial powers away from their current territorial boundaries. 
 
Although a shared definition did not come into being for long (Olsen, 2002; 2003), 
Europeanisation suggests at present to political scientists “the direct and indirect processes 
between EU member states and between the EU and individual member states, through which 
actors, policies and institutions influence each other structurally, ideologically and 
procedurally” (Palmowski, 2011, p. 636). An initial definition attempt came from Andersen & 
Eliassen (1993) who through ‘Europeification’ referred to a certain degree of power share 
between the EU and national governments. Ladrech (1994) furthered this interpretation to 
include “an incremental process re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree 
that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organisational logic of national 
politics and policy-making” (p. 69). In a similar vein, Radaelli (2000, p. 4) mentioned a host 
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of processes whereby the EU action at social, economic and political levels become 
“incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public 
policies”. Börzel’s (1999) former reference as a “process by which domestic policy areas 
become increasingly subject to European policy-making” (p. 574) indeed drew from the same 
reasoning. 
 
The contribution of Risse, Green-Cowles & Caporaso (2001) sought to address the distinctly 
European structures which “formalize interactions among the actors, and of policy networks 
specialising in the creation of authoritative European rules” (p. 4) and the functionalist roots 
of European integration (Haas, 1958). This perspective was indeed denying that of Bulmer & 
Burch (2000) who in underscoring the multiplicity of policy-making factors argued that 
“European integration is not just ‘out there’ as some kind of independent variable” (p. 9). 
These explanatory attempts were expanded later to include 
 
Processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalization of formal and 
informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and 
shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy 
process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and sub-national) 
discourse, political structures and public policies (Radaelli 2003, p. 30). 
 
Indeed, Radaelli’s broad definition appeared to give substance to the multifaceted nature of 
Europeanisation, which Dyson & Goetz (2002, p. 2) had previously pointed out: 
 
It is sometimes used narrowly to refer to implementation of EU legislation or more 
broadly to capture policy transfer and learning within the EU. It is sometimes used to 
identify the shift of national policy paradigms and instruments to the EU-level. 
(Other)…times it is used in a narrower way to refer to its effects at the domestic 
level…or in a more expansive way to include effects on discourse and identities as 
well as structures and policies at the domestic level (qtd. in Howell, 2002, p. 6). 
 
A wide range of perceptions like these could however risk overrrating the ‘shadow of 
hierarchy’ as in the case of Member States (Börzel, 2010) or the ‘shadow of conditionality’ 
for accession states (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005), which would “screen out other 
domestic causes” in conceptualising Europeanisation (Bulmer & Burch, 2005, p. 864). This 
warning is indeed informed by research findings regarding the rather neglected dimension of 
Europeanisation, i.e. its influence in faraway regions. Jetschke & Murray (2012) argued on 
this score that the EU Treaties played an inspirational role in the construction of the 2008 
82 
ASEAN Charter. Such evidence does not necessarily suggest that the signatories of the 
Charter became by this means somewhat Europeanised, yet similar arguments apply in fact 
theoretically to supranationalisation/Europeanisation of other states. For EU Member State 
candidates, to illustrate, accession to the EU involves by all means a certain extent of 
institutional adaptation. It would however be erroneous to argue that the EU is here the only 
source of change leading to domestic reforms (Noutcheva & Düzgit, 2012). 
 
3.2.2 Scope of Europeanisation 
The hitherto attempts to understand Europeanisation have addressed three main prerequisites 
for its conceptualisation: capacity of states to accommodate to the EU’s institutional 
framework; acquisition of norms and values attached to Europe such as democracy, rule of 
law or human rights; and identification with the historical past of Europe. The first imperative 
concerning institutional adaptation falls in essence within the research scope of political 
science where scholars’ attention is generally drawn by the analysis of national/subnational 
actors. The latter two conditions relating to norms/values together with identity/belonging 
seem to reflect for the most part sociological, psychological and anthropological undertakings. 
 
With a backdrop of insights into the confines of the EC/EU (Green-Cowles, Caporaso & 
Risse, 2001) and approaches questioning the limits of supranationalisation (Flockhart, 2010), 
these undertakings have so far postulated two dimensions of Europeanisation. As Börzel & 
Risse (2003) observe, it has been mainly the ‘policy’ dimension that captured scholars’ 
interest in the first place. Aside from several studies focusing on the EU domain (Goetz & 
Hix, 2001), the second dimension of ‘politics’ has not found much purchase. Schmidt (2008) 
attributes this ‘escape’ essentially to the weak image of EU-level politics. In the case of 
immigration for instance, most studies can be catalogued under ‘policy’, with their general 
tendency to look into labour, refugee/asylum, family reunification and irregular aspects. 
 
The four main conditions by which domestic institutional change is brought about are taken to 
be ‘domestic incentives’, ‘degrees of (limited) statehood’, ‘democracy vs. autocracy’ and 
‘power asymmetries’ (Börzel & Risse, 2012, pp. 11-14). The first scope condition of domestic 
incentives is essentially a description of whether or not domestic actors’ move to initiate EU-
guided reforms at home is at their own discretion. As research has come to demonstrate in the 
case of accession candidates (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004; 2005), Europeanisation is 
informed here to a great extent by the ‘conditionality principle’. This tool operates like a code 
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of conduct within the broader context of ‘liberal reform coalitions’ whereby the EU aspires 
for overhauling corrupt or authoritarian regimes by offering them opportunity to consolidate 
their power via approval of EU requirements (Börzel & Pamuk, 2012). For that, ‘the logic of 
appropriateness’ is conveyed through ‘norm entrepreneurs’ for the simple purpose of ‘doing 
the right thing to do’ (Börzel & Risse, 2007). Such domestic incentives are not necessarily 
limited to the EU’s immediate sphere of influence. As Börzel & Risse (2012) maintains, 
processes of ‘emulation’ are applicable to all places as long as policy adaptation fits the 
interests of domestic actors (p. 11). 
 
The second scope condition concerning degrees of (limited) statehood has to do with states’ 
capacity in policy-making, which by definition suggests discontinuance for domestic change. 
While it is difficult to show at length how diffusion mechanisms are influenced, a number of 
actors including business circles may push states significantly into domestic reforms. This is 
particularly the case for states with fragile institutional structures. Considering a certain 
degree of ‘normative’ character involved here, which in fact applies to all states seeking to 
increase their legitimacy, one can argue that there is always a potential to “induce domestic 
and regional actors to adopt EU institutional solutions” (Börzel & Risse, 2012, p. 12). 
 
Democracy vs. autocracy as the third scope condition concerns in essence states’ eagerness 
for domestic change via democracy. This is indeed a significant issue in view of the costs of 
adaptation for EU requirements, which for democratic states with market economies are far 
lower than they are for authoritarian states. From this perspective, aligning with the EU 
standards would be a cost-effective option for the latter. However, as pressure from civil 
societies in authoritarian states is almost always at a minimum, the EU’s influence upon 
domestic change in these countries is often limited. It is possible to claim all the same “that 
regime type is not a dichotomous variable, but there are degrees of democracy and autocracy” 
(Börzel & Risse, 2012, p. 12). This argument is supported by research on the EU-induced 
institutional change in countries with varying democratisation levels (Van Hüllen, 2012; 
Noutcheva & Düzgit, 2012; Spendzharova & Vachudova, 2012; Börzel & Pamuk, 2012). 
 
Power asymmetries, as the last scope condition for domestic change, relates essentially to 
differences between the EU and target states in terms of their material/ideational resources. 
For countries with great economic and political resources, exerting pressure for 
accommodation to the EU standards has so far proved to be highly demanding. Indeed, there 
84 
is in Europe hardly a country which could even out the EU’s capabilities with symmetrical 
arrangements. Seen from this angle, it would obviously be to the interest of the EU’s 
neighbourhood to establish close ties with the Union. Nonetheless, this scope condition 
suggests a lower value for, say, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) 
into which the EU’s sphere of influence does not stretch wide enough (Jetschke & Murray, 
2012). Such economic and political power balance may even take a discursive meaning 
(Barnett & Duvall, 2005), as in the cases of China and some Latin American states like 
Venezuela or Cuba, which in many occasions have come to challenge the EU’s discourses on 
democracy and human rights. It would in this sense be fair to conclude that the more the EU is 
“able to exert direct influence and adaptational pressure for institutional change, the greater 
the material power asymmetries in its favour” (Börzel & Risse, 2012, p. 14). 
 
3.2.3 Models for Europeanisation 
The initially launched ‘top-down’/‘downloading’ model in Europeanisation research follows 
broadly from the premise that institutional adaptation at the national level sources chiefly 
from norms/regulations designed at the EU (Risse, Green-Cowles & Caporaso, 2001). A 
major determinant to this effect is the ‘goodness of fit’, suggesting there exists a certain 
degree of (in)compatibility between the national and supranational institutional frameworks 
(Börzel & Risse, 2003). Other than that, institutional adaptation is also contingent upon an 
intrinsic form of motivation characterised by a range of what is termed as ‘mediating factors’, 
‘veto points’ or ‘facilitating factors’, which are all capable of animating or intimidating states’ 
decisions vis-à-vis supranational guidelines (Héritier & Knill, 2001). 
 
Challenging this top-down perception, a follow-up model holds that one could indeed come to 
terms with the basic patterns of EU-level policy-making by starting first and foremost at the 
Member State level. As the launch of the Common Agricultural Policy and the establishment 
of the Monetary Union formerly manifested,
97
 it is accordingly highly likely that Member 
States seek to maximise their interests at each turn, as part of their grand strategies. To this 
‘bottom-up’ understanding (Börzel, 2002; Radaelli & Pasquier, 2007), states seek to reduce 
the burden of downloading supranational guidelines by transposing their agenda into the 
supranational sphere. Based to a certain extent on the rational-choice understanding, which 
regards the EU as little more than a means to the advancement of national interests (Laffan & 
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 These initiatives were in fact serving for the long term strategic plans of France and Germany (Börzel & Risse, 
2003). 
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Stubb, 2003), the bottom-up model considers Europeanisation to be a process whereby 
Member States are in search of exporting their own policy goals to the EU, at every 
opportunity they seize (Bulmer & Burch, 1998). 
 
Put in brief, the bottom-up understanding of Europeanisation (as launched to be an alternative 
to the top-down model) tracks down the origin of policy adaptation to its domestic roots. Still, 
one needs to remember that this perception rests not only on a vertical reasoning but also on a 
horizontal one, i.e. a ‘sideways’ form of interaction with other states, whether EU members or 
not, which could eventually push domestic systems to undergo a process of change 
collectively (Radaelli, 2000). A sample governance tool which supports this thesis is the Open 
Method of Coordination (OMC). As a mode of governance aiming at ‘best practices’ amongst 
the EU Member States, the OMC essentially intends to help share mutual experiences, 
bringing about eventually a broader platform of ‘learning’ process.98 Here, the degree of 
learning and implementation of best practices depend on the exchange of cultural, social and 
political exercises which presumably have the capacity to generate policy convergence 
between Member States and the institutions of the EU (Quaglia et al., 2007). 
 
With this in mind, it is possible to argue that the eventual policy adaptation at the national 
level is in fact an aggregate of multiple levels of interaction: 
 
Figure 6: Causal interaction in Europeanisation 
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 Radaelli (2003, p. 52) distinguishes here between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ types of learning. While the former 
involves actors’ readjustment to remain close to their original positions, ‘thick learning’ occurs when actors 
make radical strategic changes. 
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Accordingly, policy-making starting in a national setting at one time is subject to 
supranational and/or international influences concurrently, promoting in the end 
renewal/reproduction of policy adaptation at another time. 
 
3.2.4 Mechanisms of Europeanisation 
Intrinsic in these two basic models of Europeanisation are a number of mechanisms, which 
can be classified into ‘physical or legal coercion’, ‘utility calculations’, ‘socialisation’ and 
‘persuasion’ (Börzel & Risse, 2012). The first mechanism of physical or legal coercion looks 
over how readily states accommodate to the EU’s ‘external’ influence (Holzinger, Knill & 
Sommerer, 2007). While the EU does not typically exercise ‘coercion’ in its third party 
engagements, one might recall the ‘conditionality principle’ throughout the accession talks 
with candidate states, for instance, insofar as it invokes a restrictive logic when the question is 
one of replacing the legal order in these countries. Such a potential does however not 
necessarily suggest the use of ‘force’ in its traditional meaning. Being an accession candidate 
requires by definition a series of conditions to be met for the ultimate membership to the 
Union, the most important of which is probably law enforcement. Seen in this sense, a certain 
degree of coercion is actually an intrinsic quality of diffusion prescribing that Member States 
comply with the norms and legal requirements as assigned by the EU’s supranational 
framework. 
 
The second mechanism of utility calculations concerns the sizing up of states vis-à-vis the 
technical/financial aids offered by other states or international actors. The EU makes use of 
these aid packages commonly as part of its conditionality and ‘capacity-building’ schemes to 
get its institutional model adapted in candidate and neighbourhood countries (Vachudova, 
2005; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005; Börzel, Pamuk & Stahn, 2008) with hints of 
economic prosperity or environmental protection in return (Sedelmeier, 2012; Spendzharova 
& Vachudova, 2012; Börzel & Pamuk, 2012; Noutcheva & Düzgit, 2012). That being the 
case, a negative assessment of such incentives in that their costs would probably outweigh the 
potential benefits might urge rearrangement of national strategies in the end. One can on that 
account argue that “the more the EU itself is interested in market access to other regions”, the 
less it is likely for utility calculations as an “influence mechanism to matter” (Börzel & Risse, 
2012, p. 7). 
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The third mechanism of socialisation (March & Olsen, 1998) functions very much in line with 
‘the logic of appropriateness’. In accordance, states do not necessarily seek to maximise their 
self-interests in the first place but instead aim to meet a host of basic social requirements 
(Johnston, 2007) informed by complex learning processes such as ‘habitualisation’ or ‘talking 
the talk’. To this understanding, the EU is a big ‘socialisation agency’ (Checkel, 2005) or a 
‘teacher of norms’ (Finnemore, 1993) for Member States, accession candidates and 
neighbourhood countries. Needless to say, the size of the EU as a role-model depends largely 
on the concerning state’s willingness to embrace its regulations/norms such as liberal 
democracy (Van Hüllen, 2012; Börzel & Pamuk, 2012). 
 
The fourth mechanism of persuasion is comparable to ‘the logic of arguing’, whereby actors 
aim “to persuade each other about the validity claims inherent in any causal or normative 
statement” (Börzel & Risse, 2012, p. 8). The EU applies this tool specifically in its relations 
with a candidate, neighbourhood or any other third-country as part of its external relations. 
Similar to socialisation, the EU consults persuasion regularly alongside its ‘conditionality’ 
strategy to induce accession candidates into adopting its institutional or normative validity 
and appropriateness (Kelley, 2004). While this strategy is also important in geographically 
far-away countries, it is usually the EU’s ‘communicative skills’ for the promotion of 
European norms -human rights, democracy and the rule of law, most notably- that appears to 
be the chief policy instrument the EU uses in expanding its sphere of influence into these 
countries (Lenz, 2012; Jetschke & Murray, 2012). 
 
3.2.5 Phases of Europeanisation 
Leaving their varying points of emphasis aside, one could track down all these formulations 
(of Europeanisation mechanisms) to economic integration models, for instance that of Pinder 
(1968) where a common framework for policy coordination is achievable either through 
positive/voluntary cooperation or a negative one with some sort of coercion involved in it 
(Rosenbaum, 2003). Depending on the level of misfit between the national and supranational 
levels, the consequent degree of domestic change is accordingly observable in three states, 
‘absorption’, ‘accommodation’, and ‘transformation’, (Börzel & Risse, 2003). The absorption 
state refers here to a minimum need for alignment with the EU’s institutional framework. For 
accommodation, a sizeable measure of institutional adaptation is needful. As the highest state 
of domestic change, transformation relates to a thorough replacement of existing policy 
structures on the basis of supranational guidelines. 
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Table 4: Configuration of domestic change 
Phases Characteristics Degrees 
Absorption no substantial policy adaptation low 
Accommodation sizable policy adaptation  moderate 
Transformation paradigmatic policy adaptation  high 
Based on Börzel & Risse (2003, p. 69-70). 
 
The four outcomes presented in the same vein formerly by way of ‘retrenchment’, ‘inertia’, 
‘absorption’ and ‘transformation’ (Börzel, 1999; Green-Cowles, Caporaso & Risse, 2001; 
Héritier & Knill, 2001) follow from the very same logic indeed. Here, the direction of 
domestic policy change hinges on inertia, denoting a situation of no observable domestic 
change. Retrenchment stands for a negative trend suggesting policies have receded from 
becoming ‘European’ in the end. Absorption on the other hand is indicative of a considerable 
degree of positive change towards the EU’s institutional framework. And finally, 
transformation marks paradigmatic positive changes replacing domestic policy structures 
from head to toe. 
 
Figure 7: Direction of domestic change 
 
Based on Radaelli (2003, p. 35).  
 
3.2.6 Europeanisation and other research areas 
3.2.6.1 Europeanisation, EU integration and globalisation 
First off, there has been in scholarship a clear tendency to cut Europeanisation and EU 
integration from the same cloth, so to say, and speak of their eventual convergence. Such 
perceptions are indeed based on the two fields’ ontological dispositions which are commonly 
engaged with description of structural changes in Europe “variously affecting actors and 
institutions, ideas and interests” (Featherstone, 2003, p. 3). Yet, as Risse, Green-Cowles & 
Caporaso (2001) argue, Europeanisation boasts a process which is far more inclusive than that 
of European integration. 
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For Europeanisation, the main talk of the town was in the beginning its ‘substance’ in relation 
to concepts like internationalisation or globalisation. Such a comparison drew essentially from 
the increasingly ‘nested’ policy-making structures at national and international levels, or the 
‘new modes of governance’, suggesting signs of harmonisation between the EU and Member 
States could be evocative of globalisation (Gourevitch, 1978). Conceptualised in rough terms 
as the removal of boundaries most notably in the face of expanding international organisations 
such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organisation 
(Held & McGrew, 2002), globalisation was for Europeanisation seemingly a major source of 
guidance given that the latter is similarly inspired by a dynamic institutional network as 
demanded by the EU’s integration process (Wallace, 2000a). This projection is however 
denied by some like Risse, Green-Cowles & Caporaso (2001) on the grounds that it is poor in 
holding ‘something exclusive’ to Europe/the EU. 
 
While acknowledging its role “as a conduit for global forces”, Schmidt (2002) believes that 
Europeanisation is in fact a sort of buttress against such forces “opening member states to 
international competition in the capital and product markets” but at the same time securing 
their ‘EU exclusive’ interests amongst others “through monetary integration and the Single 
Market” (p. 14). Accordingly, with its far-reaching regulations and commitments to a shared 
political project, the institutional structure of the EU outdoes other international/regional 
economic authorities. 
 
As for links between regionalisation and globalisation, several scholarly thoughts have come 
to stress the virtues of liberal democracy or ‘embedded liberalism’ (Ruggie, 1983; 1996) as 
the normative framework of Europeanisation is commonly known to hold when referring to 
institution building beyond the national level. Despite their consensus on the merits of 
liberalism, scholars in this group hold different predispositions. The neo-liberalist students of 
Hayek (1976) and Kegan & Ohmae (1990) have for instance a pro-globalisation position, 
whereas subscribers to liberal internationalism like Hinsley (1986) favour regionalisation 
instead. Conceding to the primacy of liberal democracy as a governance model, some like 
Held et al. (1999) meanwhile bid for a ‘better working’ globalisation via ‘cosmopolitan 
democracy’. When seen in light of the cosmopolitan nature of regional organisations like the 
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EU (Habermas, 1998), Europeanisation could to this understanding be promoted on the 
condition that it serves for a benign form of globalisation.
99
 
 
Granted that there is in literature much faith in liberal values in establishing links between 
Europeanisation and its liberal roots, one needs to take into account also ‘protectionists’ who 
essentially argue for strengthening state competences so that threats guided by liberal 
democracy against national-sovereignty could be effectively driven away (Leftwich, 2000). 
To this reasoning, regional organisations like the EU would be desirable as long as they 
would defer to the powers of the state. Some critics on the other hand frown upon the EU’s 
operational capacity for being subservient to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) and imposing therewith rigid practices such as welfare 
cutbacks or deregulation of labour markets (Scharpf, 2002). With its attachment to Western 
standards, Europeanisation is from this perspective little more than a facilitator of 
globalisation (Rosamond, 1999). An alternative working system to draw from this argument is 
a new governance model based on the principles of equality, self-governance and direct 
democracy (Falk, 1995; Callinicos, 2000). Europeanisation could in this sense be a ‘filter’ for 
further liberalisation/’Americanization’ (Leibfried, 2000) or function as an ‘antidote’ to 
globalisation offsetting for instance the latter’s detriments to social justice (Graziano, 2003). 
 
By and large, it would in the end be fair to argue that both Europeanisation and globalisation 
enjoy the same “continuum of policy-making that spreads from the country, through the 
European arena, to the global level” (Wallace, 2000b, p. 7). Despite idiosyncracies and 
eccentricities to bear in mind here, one could draw parallels between supranationalisation of 
Member State policies and globalisation movements for they appear to follow from the same 
systemic principles such as free market rules, (Western) liberal democracy or liberalization. 
 
3.2.6.2 Europeanisation and transnational diffusion 
There is against this backdrop tendency to place Europeanisation within the larger framework 
of transnational diffusion research (Holzinger, Knill & Sommerer, 2007; Simmons, Dobbin & 
Garrett, 2008; Gilardi, 2012). As a matter of fact, the basic features and conditions of 
Europeanisation are not in denial of those specific to transnational diffusion at all, which on 
the contrary would be quite instrumental in shedding light upon the EU’s domestic impacts 
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 The perceived threat of globalisation can be observed in literature through concomitant use of terms like 
‘harnessed’, ‘tamed’, ‘humanized’ and ‘managed’ (Jacoby & Meunier, 2010). 
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(Börzel & Risse, 2012). Given that Europeanisation is a “special instance of policy and 
institutional diffusion” and diffusion “a process through which ideas, normative standards, 
or…policies and institutions spread across time and space”, research in both areas can serve to 
iron out the creases of for instance the ‘top-down’ perspective (Börzel & Risse, 2012, p. 5). 
 
Accordingly, both areas of research set their sights on three ‘logics of social action’. Based on 
an instrumental type of rationality, ‘the logic of consequences’ addresses the self-interested 
drive of actors who are all ‘utility maximisers’. Then again, ‘the logic of appropriateness’ 
argues for a normative type of rationality stressing that actors follow rules to ‘do the right 
thing’ for the overall purpose of integrating into a community. And finally, ‘the logic of 
arguing’ points out with some ‘communicative’ rationality that actors’ primary goal is to 
persuade each other on the basis of a set of norms and arguments they could substantiate in 
depth (Habermas, 1981; Risse, 2000). 
 
On could in fact reduce these ‘logics of social action’ to ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ types of 
diffusion (Börzel & Risse, 2012). Scholarship in Europeanisation has so far tended to quote 
from direct diffusion according to which the balance of influence between the supranational 
and national domains tilts in favour of the former. For the indirect type of diffusion on the 
other hand, ‘emulation’, as one may also refer to it, the direction of influence stems from the 
national side. Accordingly, when states are after the right ‘way of doing things’ (the logic of 
appropriateness) or ‘best practices’ (the logic of consequences), they could simply download a 
sample institutional model from within, which prompts no urgency to subscribe to a 
supranational model dictated by the EU. 
 
3.2.7 Review of literature 
Given these qualities attributed widely to Europeanisation, it seems scholarship has already 
done away with its post-ontological underpinnings (Caporaso, 1996 -as cited in Featherstone, 
2003), irrespective of the difficulty to locate links between structure and agency. Besides 
scholarly works tackling its nature, mechanisms and consequences (Olsen, 2002; Radaelli, 
2003; Börzel & Risse, 2003; Lenschow, 2005; Caporaso, 2007), there is abundance of 
research studying the issue of domestic change as far as actors, institutions and ways of doing 
things are concerned (Ladrech, 2005; Bulmer & Radaelli, 2005; Börzel, 2005). Added to these 
are recent analyses whose major emphases appear to be on the EU’s impact both within the 
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framework of enlargement and beyond the European context (Sedelmeier, 2006; 
Schimmelfennig, 2007 -as cited in Exadaktylos & Radaelli, 2009, p. 508). 
 
A SSCI (Social Sciences Citation Index) scan over the last twenty years reveals an increase of 
this research interest (Featherstone, 2003, pp. 5-6):  
 
Table 5: SSCI entries on Europeanisation (1981-2001) 
Years Number of entries 
1981-88 3 
1989 2 
1990 1 
1991 4 
1992 2 
1993 9 
1994 8 
1995 3 
1996 5 
1997 6 
1998 7 
1999 20 
2000 24 
2001 22 
Total 116 
Source: Featherstone (2003, p. 5). 
 
Most of these analyses have sought to give publicity to the historical, transnational-cultural, 
institutional and policy-based outcomes of Europeanisation. From a historical perspective, 
Europeanisation appears to serve as a means to promoting the EU’s institutional structure and 
‘way of life’ across Europe’s geographical boundaries, for instance by way of colonisation 
(Olsen, 2003). Accordingly, former imperial powers such as France, Spain, Portugal, the 
Netherlands and Britain have distributed their national values under the guise of European 
civilisation. The main focal point of transnational-cultural accounts of Europeanisation is its 
understanding on the basis of ideas, identities or cultural norms exchanged between countries 
with respect to political culture (Pamir, 1994), cultural assimilation (Soysal, 1994) or 
citizenship (Joppke, 1995). Next, there is research tying Europeanisation to EU membership 
to observe the ways in which EU accession influences political parties (Ladrech, 1994; 
Holden, 1999; Cole, 2001), non-governmental actors like trade unions (Turner, 1996) or 
public administration (Wessels, 1998; Jørgensen, 1999; Bulmer & Burch, 2001). A final area 
of Europeanisation research relates to the EU membership’s policy-based outcomes. Here, the 
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main concern is the EU’s regulatory capacity to produce domestic change in different sectors 
such as employment and social policy (Doogan, 1992), environment (Nilson, 1993; Jordan, 
1998), agriculture (Rothstein et al., 1999) and foreign policy (Wallace, 1994; Knutsen, 1996; 
Agh, 1999; Featherstone, 2000). 
 
A more up-to-date scan of the SSCI database covering a ten-year period of research in the 
same context (between 2002 and the second half of 2012) delivers as many as 702 hits: 
 
Table 6: SSCI entries on Europeanisation (2002-2012) 
Year Number of entries 
2002 34 
2003 21 
2004 47 
2005 60 
2006 51 
2007 54 
2008 87 
2009 110 
2010 100 
2011 95 
2012 (first half) 43 
Total 702 
Based on Social Sciences Citation Index, Thomson Reuters, 2012. 
 
Of these publications, the first three thematic categories fall in the disciplinary fields of 
Political Science (286 entries), Public Administration (144) and International Relations (67) 
with respect to their given entry titles in database. A detailed configuration of these 
contributions is as follows: 
 
Table 7: SSCI entries on Europeanisation according to disciplinary areas (first five) 
Disciplinary fields Number of entries Percentages 
Political Science 286 41% 
Public Administration 144 21% 
International Relations 67 10% 
Other areas 497 28% 
Total 702 100% 
Percentages are rounded off to the nearest value. 
Based on Social Sciences Citation Index, Thomson Reuters, 2012. 
 
While research entries up to 2005 appear to relate to Europeanisation per se (Knill & 
Lehmkuhl, 2002; Fligstein & Merand, 2002; Börzel, 2002b; Featherstone, 2003; Eder, 2004) 
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or its implications for the old EU members (Knodt, 2002; Roederer-Rynning, 2002; Irondelle, 
2003; Gualini, 2003; Geyer, 2003; Sotiropoulos, 2004; Economides, 2005), a great number of 
more recent contributions concern chiefly the latest accession states (Gorton, Löwe & Selei, 
2005; Baun et al., 2006; Hille & Knill, 2006; Gasior-Niemiec & Glinski, 2007; Krasovec & 
Lajh, 2008; Lewis, 2008; Spirova, 2008; Andreou & Bache, 2010; Bache, 2010; Debus, 
Müller & Obert, 2011; Spendzharova & Vachudova, 2012; Tanasoiu, 2012), accession 
candidates (Fink-Hafner, 2008; Oguzlu & Ozpek, 2008; Vujovic & Komar, 2008; Ulusoy, 
2008; Onis & Yilmaz, 2009; Bache & Tomsic, 2010; Muftuler-Bac & Gursoy, 2010; 
Noutcheva & Düzgit, 2012) and the neighbourhood countries (Gabanyi, 2005; Melnykovska 
& Schweickert, 2008; Barbé, 2009; Gänzle & Muentel, 2011; Petrov & Kalinichenko, 2011; 
Börzel & Pamuk, 2012). 
 
As for research on Europeanisation of national immigration policies, scholarship on that 
matter does not have an old history. The newly growing interest in this policy area relates 
very much to the fairly recent abolition of the EU’s third pillar of Justice and Home Affairs. 
Following the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, the area of immigration policies moved into the 
jurisdiction of the Community method, known formerly as the first pillar. There is in 
scholarship a twofold perception of this relocation. While some view a high degree of 
supranationalisation in there (Thielemann, 2002), others find it only marginal (Vink, 2002; 
Geddes, 2003). To Ette & Faist (2007), this divided picture could be attributed to the overly 
descriptive quality of research in this policy area which allows for “only few insights about 
the underlying driving forces of the European impact on its member states” (p. 10). 
 
Regardless, there has been a growing number of studies with their main focus on the extent of 
Europeanisation in Member States’ national immigration policies, such as those of Germany 
(Tomei, 2001; Ette & Kreienbrink, 2007; Prumm & Alscher, 2007), the UK (Geddes, 2005; 
Ette & Gerdes, 2007; Bache, 2008), the Netherlands (Vink, 2001, 2002, 2005), Spain (Fauser, 
2007) or Greece, Cyprus and Malta (Ladi, 2011). For comparative analyses with theoretical 
emphasis, contributions from Thielemann (2002), Lavenex & Ucarer (2002), Geddes (2003) 
and Grabbe (2005) are of particular notice. It appears however these analyses have often 
tended to put weight on security aspects, dwelling most typically on asylum-seeking, yet 
reserving little space for other central themes like irregular immigration, labour immigration 
or family unification. Further, most studies were carried out to compare supranationalisation 
of immigration policies amongst either newest Member States like those from Central and 
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Eastern Europe (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005) or old Members such as the UK, Italy 
and Germany (Mastenbroek, 2005) but not in the form of cross-country analyses between the 
two clusters (Ette & Faist, 2007, p. 13). 
 
3.3 Analysis 
Academic scholarship has no apparent consensus in conceptualising ‘domestic change’. 
Regardless of the rising number of studies dedicated to that end, the substance attached with 
Europeanisation has in these works been incurring “the risk of ‘conceptual stretching’” 
(Radaelli, 2003, p. 27). And without a firm basis of empirical work,
100
 theoretical approaches 
introduced in this framework are apt to remain overcast. 
 
Put in a nutshell, there are two models often consulted to describe the ways in which 
Europeanisation ‘occurs’. A leading top-down approach overlooks the national context as a 
primary source of domestic policy change. From this ‘downloading’ viewpoint, in other 
words, the strategic choices of Member States which might be ruling over the EU norms and 
regulations in the background appear to deserve little attention. In the context of migration, 
for instance, the fact that the interior ministers of Member States formerly took advantage of 
various Council meetings to sidestep the challenges they encountered in their national 
parliamentary sessions (Guiraudon, 2000) is to the top-down understanding of 
Europeanisation hardly a telling matter. The following bottom-up model however pays 
homage to this last point. What comes fundamental in accordance is the design of “a politics 
of Europeanisation rather than a Europeanisation of policy” (Geddes, 2007, p. 55), suggesting 
the EU action is transferable to Member States as long as it poses no major challenges against 
domestic agenda. In this sense, the introduction of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) as the 
third pillar of the Maastricht Treaty could be interpreted as a precautionary ‘national interest-
driven’ move to control the intensity of immigration, regardless of the fact that people’s 
mobility was an elementary component of the European integration. Despite the follow-up 
Amsterdam Treaty’s achievement in annexing JHA matters to the Community pillar through 
an ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’, the introduction of derogations to the EU’s last 
enlargement restricting people’s mobility in eight of the ten new Member States (where 
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migratory outflows were thought to be most likely) could then be viewed as a backstage 
manoeuvre, casting shadows upon any supranationalisation attempt whatsoever. 
 
It is possible to argue in light of key policy factors that the bottom-up understanding of 
Europeanisation emerges to be more eclectic, accounting for a myriad of pathways whereby 
norms/values might be diffused into national institutional structures. Bringing a further 
dimension into the limelight from the same perspective is for instance an additional 
‘sideways’ approach to Europeanisation, in terms of the horizontal influence of one Member 
State upon the other or a similar type of interaction between Member States and non-EU 
countries. From this perspective, states’ learning from one another plays in domestic policy-
making as significant a role as accentuated alongside vertical impacts. In the foreign policy 
framework, arguments tying Europeanisation of France’s foreign affairs largely with those of 
its German counterpart (Wong, 2007) come as a reflection of this latter approach. 
 
It is against this background (of a more comprehensive and inclusive perspective) this study 
decided to adopt the bottom-up understanding as its research model of Europeanisation. Such 
an integrative approach, as it is widely believed here, could to a large extent serve well as a 
solution to the ‘equifinality’ problem (Müller & de Flers, 2009) observed typically in the 
separation of dependent and independent variables. 
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Chapter 4 Legal framework 
 
 
To present insights into the supranational legal framework which has for some time been 
acting upon Member States’ national immigration policies in various degrees, this chapter 
reviews the EU’s chief legal texts concerning immigration. Of many such texts which are of 
first order of importance in this scope, two main sets stand in the foreground. On one hand are 
treaties, directives and regulations, as the primary and secondary law instruments, which have 
direct and indirect effects on Member States’ national legal orders.101 There are on the other 
side opinions, resolutions, recommendations or guidelines developed by the EU for policy 
actions which despite a certain degree of legal value do not have binding effects. These two 
sources of legal texts are in literature commonly known as the EU’s hard and soft law 
measures. 
 
4.1 Hard law 
4.1.1 EC/EUTreaties 
The EU’s policy-making in the area of immigration has a history defined by national 
sensitivities. A hard evidence for that is the belated incorporation of TCNs (third-country 
nationals) into the EU legal order, only with the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam. Amsterdam was 
indeed a turning point for a possible common immigration policy ahead. With its entry into 
force in 1999, decision-making on immigration was removed from the third pillar’s inter-
governmental structure
102
 and extended to the Community Method. According to Article 
67(1) EC Treaty, the Council could now make unanimous decisions (upon the Commission’s 
proposal or a Member State’s initiative and consulting the European Parliament) only for 
another five years. Then again, as emphasised in the second paragraph, its competences in 
relation to immigration and asylum would “be governed by the co-decision procedure 
established in Article 251 EC Treaty and qualified majority vote”. While this proclamation (of 
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the unanimity voting rule’s imminent removal) appeared to end the hitherto sway of 
intergovernmentalism, Article 63(3) EC stated that the Council would continue regulating 
immigration policy on issues concerning 
 
(a) conditions of entry and residence, and standards on procedures for the issue by 
Member States of long-term visas and residence permits, including those for the 
purpose of family reunion; 
(b) illegal immigration and illegal residence, including repatriation of illegal 
residents 
 
In 2004, the Council extended the scope of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) to the removal 
of internal border controls on persons, application of standards for internal border checks and 
a maximum three-month long freedom of movement for TCNs within the European Union 
(Article 62(1)). QMV became in this way applicable to cooperation amongst Member States 
on matters of asylum-seeking, illegal immigration as well as repatriation of illegal immigrants 
(Article 63(2b) and Article 63(3b)). However, areas which were often perceived to have a 
direct connection to Member States’ justice and security policies (such as legal immigration) 
would continue to be part of the third pillar (Title VI of the TEU). 
 
Marking the third pillar’s differentiation from the first pillar’s ‘Community Method’, Article 
29 TEU demanded that the former should continue to drop competences relating to 
immigration in the hands of Ministers of Interior and/or Justice “to provide citizens with a 
high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice by developing closer 
cooperation between police forces, customs authorities and other competent authorities in the 
member states”. An obviously intergovernmentalist understanding in this way was inducing, 
however, a disparaging effect on the EU’s supranational image (Balzacq & Carrera, 2006, p. 
4). 
 
The most recent legal arrangements concerning supranational immigration policies
103
 are 
traceable to the 2009 Lisbon Treaty (‘Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union’, 
TFEU). Having abolished most importantly the hitherto three-pillar administrative structure
104
 
by extending the former third pillar policy areas further to the co-decision procedure (now 
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called the ‘Ordinary Legislative Procedure’) and QMV,105 Lisbon sought indeed to provide a 
de jure character for Amsterdam. To this end, it also replaced the formulation of Title IV EC 
Treaty to gather all issues concerning immigration under Title V TFEU, or as it was now 
called the ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ (AFSJ). Here, in Chapter 1 (General 
Provisions), Article 67(1) and (2) (formerly Article 61 EC and Article 29 TEU) read 
 
1. The Union shall constitute an area of freedom, security and justice with respect for 
fundamental rights and the different legal systems and traditions of the Member 
States. 
2. It shall ensure the absence of internal border controls for persons and shall frame a 
common policy on asylum, immigration and external border control, based on 
solidarity between Member States, which is fair towards third-country nationals. For 
the purpose of this Title, stateless persons shall be treated as third-country nationals. 
 
Articles 77, 78, 79 and 80 in Chapter 2 (‘Policies on border checks, asylum and immigration’) 
dealt with these issues far more comprehensively. Commitments to common inmmigration 
policy were made through Article 79(1) (formerly Article 63(3) and Article (4) EC) which 
declared 
 
The Union shall develop a common immigration policy aimed at ensuring, at all 
stages, the efficient management of migration flows, fair treatment of third-country 
nationals residing legally in Member States, and the prevention of, and enhanced 
measures to combat, illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings. 
 
To demonstrate the institutional setup for these goals, Article 79(2) maintained that the 
European Parliament and the Council would be adopting measures in relation to 
 
(a) the conditions of entry and residence, and standards on the issue by Member 
States of long-term visas and residence permits, including those for the purpose of 
family reunification; 
(b) the definition of the rights of third-country nationals residing legally in a Member 
State, including the conditions governing freedom of movement and of residence in 
other Member States; 
(c) illegal immigration and unauthorised residence, including removal and 
repatriation of persons residing without authorisation; 
(d) combating trafficking in persons, in particular women and children. 
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Initially, these paragraphs gave the impression that Lisbon was for the area of immigration far 
more revolutionary than Amsterdam. Nevertheless, such thoughts were actually being 
dismayed by Article 79 (5) TFEU which noted 
 
This Article shall not affect the right of member states to determine volumes of 
admission of third-country nationals coming from third countries to their territory in 
order to seek work, whether employed or self employed. 
 
Regardless of this word of caution, the Treaty of Lisbon introduced a remarkable change into 
the ECJ’s sphere of influence. With Lisbon, the AFSJ (formerly JHA, Justice and Home 
Affairs) came under the purview of the ECJ and so could the Court now rule on all cases 
except for those crossing into Member States’ domestic legal provisions or judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation (Article 276 TFEU). Other than this, to 
ease the restrictions of Amsterdam Treaty on the ECJ’s jurisdiction over asylum and 
immigration policy, the new Article 267 TFEU (formerly Article 177 EC Treaty and Article 
234 EC Treaty) enabled for instance all Member State courts and tribunals to work closely 
with the ECJ on asylum, immigration and civil law questions.
106
 What’s more, to introduce 
“an integrated management system for external borders,”107 Amsterdam’s ‘minimum 
standards’ were replaced at Lisbon with ‘uniform standards’108 with which the EU could now 
develop ‘common policies’ for all individuals. For legal TCNs, the EU laws were reinforced 
through a set of conditions defining basic terms of working, moving or residing in Member 
States. 
 
While it is at this stage fairly premature to hypothesise in relation to these legal adjustments, 
one could argue that Lisbon’s impressions for the EU’s decision-making procedures have 
been fairly promising. To say the least, the Commission may now start at its discretion the 
standard co-decision procedure for directives and regulations on immigration, insofar as there 
is reference to it in the TFEU. 
                                                     
106
 Article 267 TFEU states: “The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning: 
a) the interpretation of the Treaties; b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or 
agencies of the Union. Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that court 
or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request 
the Court to give a ruling thereon. Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal 
of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal 
shall bring the matter before the Court. If such a question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of 
a Member State with regard to a person in custody, the Court of Justice of the European Union shall act with the 
minimum of delay”. 
107
 Article 77 TFEU. 
108
 Article 63 TFEU. 
101 
 
4.1.2 Directives and Regulations 
The objectives formulated in the EC/EU Treaties have so far been achieved through a number 
of legal acts which differ from one another on the basis of their binding and non-binding legal 
effects. The binding legal instruments are regulations (to be applied in their entirety across all 
Member States), decisions (which are applicable directly to what/whom they are addressed) 
and directives (the application of which depends on its conversion by Member States’ into 
their own legal systems). There are on the other side also legal acts which the EU issues in a 
non-binding fashion such as recommendations (suggesting courses of action without 
earmarking legal consequences) and opinions (imposing no legal obligations). 
 
The supranational legal context regulating the field of immigration in a binding way rests 
essentially upon a set of directives and regulations which can be categorised by reference to 
their effect on the three main areas of immigration: labour/legal immigration, irregular/illegal 
immigration and asylum-seeking issues. There are in the area of legal immigration six main 
binding documents. These are Council Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family 
reunification, Council Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country nationals 
who are long-term residents, Council Directive 2004/114/EC on conditions of third-country 
nationals’ admission for the purposes of studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated training or 
voluntary services, Council Directive 2005/71/EC on a specific procedure for admitting third-
country nationals for the purposes of scientific research, Council Directive 2009/50/EC (the 
Blue Cards Directive) on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for 
the purposes of highly qualified employment and the Regulation (EC) 1030/2002 amended by 
Regulation (EC) 380/2008 defining uniform format for residence permits. 
 
The number of binding EU texts concerning irregular/illegal immigration is by far the biggest. 
There are sixteen key directives and regulations here. On the directive side are Council 
Directive 2001/40/EC concerning the mutual recognition of decisions on the expulsion of 
third-country nationals, Council Directive 2001/51/EC supplementing the provisions of 
Article 26 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985, 
Council Directive 2002/90/EC defining the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and 
residence, Council Directive 2004/81/EC on the residence permit issued to third-country 
nationals who are victims of trafficking in human beings or who have been the subject of an 
action to facilitate illegal immigration, who cooperate with the competent authorities, Council 
102 
Directive 2004/82/EC (the Carriers Liability Directive) on the obligation of carriers to 
communicate passenger data, Council Directive 2008/114/EC on the identification and 
designation of European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve 
their protection, Council Directive 2008/115/EC (the Return Directive) of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on common standards and procedures in Member States for 
returning illegally staying third-country nationals, Council Directive 2009/52/EC (the 
Employers’ Sanctions Directive) providing minimum standards on sanctions and measures 
against employers of illegally staying third-country nationals, Directive 2011/36/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on preventing and combating trafficking in human 
beings and protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA. 
 
The regulations issued in this field so far are Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 establishing a 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of 
the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX), Regulation (EC) 2725/2000 
concerning the establishment of ‘EURODAC’ for the comparison of fingerprints for the 
effective application of the Dublin Convention, Regulation (EC) 539/2001 listing the third 
countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders 
and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, Regulation (EC) 2252/2004 on 
standards for security features and biometrics in passports and travel documents issued by 
Member States amended by Regulation (EC) 444/2009, Regulation (EC) 562/2006 amended 
by Regulation (EC) 265/2010 concerning the movement of persons with long-stay visas, 
Regulation (EC) 1931/2006 laying down rules on local border traffic at the external land 
borders of the Member State amended by Regulation (EU) 1342/2011 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) 767/2008 concerning the Visa 
Information System and the exchange of data between Member States on short-stay visas 
amended by Regulation (EC) 810/2009. 
 
And finally, for the area of asylum-seeking, the six most notable binding EU documents are 
Council Directive 2001/55/EC on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the 
event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts 
between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof, 
Council Directive 2003/9/EC (the Reception Conditions Directive) on laying down minimum 
standards for the reception of asylum-seekers, Council Directive 2004/83/EC on minimum 
standards for the qualification and status of third-country nationals or stateless persons as 
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refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the 
protection granted, Council Directive 2005/85/EC on minimum standards on procedures in 
Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, Regulation (EC) 343/2003 
defining criteria and mechanisms on the determination of the Member State responsible in 
asylum applications and Regulation (EC) 439/2010 establishing a European Asylum Support 
Office. 
 
4.2 Soft law 
4.2.1 Open Method of Coordination 
A major reference commonly made in scholarship on the Open Method of Coordination 
(OMC) is the 2000 Lisbon Strategy for which the heads of the EU Member States set as a 
goal at the time for the next decade “to become the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more 
and better jobs and greater social cohesion” (European Council, 2000, §5). This strategic goal 
was to be facilitated by identifying and adopting the best policy practices amongst Member 
States, which they were advised to perform by subscription to a ‘peer reviewing’ procedure 
called Open Method of Coordination. 
 
While it was with the 2000 Lisbon Strategy that the OMC became operative at the national 
level, its origins date back to the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. Despite many novelties which 
Maastricht came to introduce -the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was probably the 
most memorable amongst them- several countries voiced their concerns to that effect. While 
Danish voters for instance did not approve of the new supranational arrangements and 
declined the draft Treaty at a referendum, those in France gave the go only by a narrow 
margin (Schäffer, 2004, p. 8). There was in Germany not a similar crisis of consent; however, 
the Constitutional Court’s position on the Treaty was not entirely clear. In any case, 
Maastricht started a convergence process on the basis of a number of criteria required for 
accession to the EMU (De la Porte, Pochet & Room, 2001). To fulfill these standards, 
Member State governments were not urged with a top-down course of action but instead were 
asked to develop methods of their own which would at the end of each year be reviewed by 
way of assessment reports. Regardless of Maastricht’s agenda guided by the EMU, the 
Summits at Copenhagen (1993) and Essen (1994) set in motion the White Paper (the so called 
‘Delors plan’) and a host of non-binding objectives to deal with the problem of 
unemployment and social cohesion. To avoid more Commission involvement in national 
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policy-making, as Maastricht rose to do, which at that stage would obviously jeopardise the 
formerly granted ‘permissive consensus’ to supranationalisation, a soft law apparatus was 
considered more appropriate. For this purpose, the EC Directorate-General (DG) for 
Economic and Financial Affairs along with DG for Employment & Social Affairs would be 
monitoring and reporting each year on the achievement of the 1994 Essen Council’s 
objectives. 
 
These two sets of mechanisms, one linked to Maastricht’s commitment to the EMU and the 
other to that of Essen, which collectively featured “common objectives, national 
implementation and surveillance by the Commission and member states” were indeed 
constituting the basis of the OMC (Schäfer, 2004, p. 8). The process launched therewith 
paved the way to the 2000 Lisbon Council which introduced the OMC’s ‘benchmarking’ 
qualities as 
 
1. fixing guidelines (common objectives) for the Union combined with specific 
timetables for achieving the goals with the member states set in the short, medium 
and long terms; 
2. establishing, where appropriate, quantitative and qualitative indicators and 
benchmarks (common indicators) against “the best in the world”, tailored to the 
needs of different member states and sectors as a means of comparing “best 
practice”; 
3. translating these European guidelines into national and regional policies by setting 
specific targets and adopting measures, taking into account their differences; the 
translation of the common objectives into national policy plans provided by the 
member states to the European Commission in the form of National Action Plans 
(NAPs).
109
 
 
Intended originally with social inclusion and employment concerns in mind, the OMC’s 
sphere of influence was with the Treaty of Amsterdam extended to immigration-related 
issues. Observing the need for coordination in this context, the Commission issued in 2001 a 
Communication.
110
 The role of the OMC here was support for the legislative process by 
encouraging collective action between national policies. To this end, the Commission was to 
work for the establishment of ‘European guidelines’ by launching political initiatives as far as 
immigration was concerned. Adding up to the Commission’s role, the Council would 
accordingly be bringing about a series of multi-annual guidelines which Member States could 
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use in keeping with a timetable for their ‘National Action Plans’. This course of action would 
then be subject to a monitoring process whereby policy changes, if needed, would be put into 
place on a yearly basis. Meanwhile, to help facilitate the legislative procedure, the European 
Commission would draw out ‘Synthesis Reports’ to highlight problem areas and possible 
solutions (Caviedes, 2004; Velluti, 2007). 
 
4.2.2 Monitoring programmes: from Tampere to Stockholm 
To coordinate management across Amsterdam’s AFSJ, into which immigration issues were 
now integrated, the EU decided to launch a series of five-year working programmes. The 
layout of the underlying ‘roadmap’ procedure -as these programmes were meant to monitor- 
has to date been (re)designed in three different occasions: at Tampere, the Hague and 
Stockholm Councils. First, the 1999 Tampere Summit called for the development of a 
common European immigration policy based on “partnership with countries of origin; a 
common asylum system; fair treatment for third-country nationals; and management of 
migration ﬂows.”111 As part of the Amsterdam Treaty, the AFSJ was at the Tampere Council 
given precedence over other policy issues and put on top of the Union’s political agenda to be 
run on a timetable. Accordingly, the Commission would draw up a scoreboard to review the 
progress in AFSJ every six months.
112
 
 
The directives the EU adopted in the course of the Tampere Programme (1999-2004) included 
those on family reunification (European Council Directive 2003/86/EC), long-term residence 
(European Council Directive 2003/109/EC), studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated training 
or voluntary service (European Council Directive 2004/114/EC) and finally scientific research 
(European Council Directive 2005/71/EC). Although the European Commission initially 
made a proposal ‘on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the 
purpose of paid employment and self-employed economic activities’113, the Council declined 
it arguing that there was compromise for neither single entry permits nor rights for migrants 
between Member States. 
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Following the Tampere Council, the 2001 Summit at Laeken
114
 called for an Action Plan on 
illegal immigration and trafficking of human beings in the EU, which was adopted later at the 
2002 Seville Council.
115
 Much in the same vein, the Commission proposed in 2005 the 
Common Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals (COM 2005/389). As 
Tampere’s follow-up, the 2004 Hague Programme identified for the next five years (2005-
2009) four important priority areas: defining a balanced approach to migration, developing 
integrated management of the Union’s external borders, setting up a common asylum policy 
and maximising the positive impact of immigration. For “a more effective, joint approach to 
cross-border problems such as illegal migration, trafficking in and smuggling of human 
beings, terrorism and organised crime, as well as the prevention thereof”116, the Hague 
Programme called special attention to fundamental freedoms and rights. The level of 
achievement was here to be measured through a mid-term ‘scoreboard’ evaluation, as was 
employed at Tampere. 
 
Conforming to the needs of the Hague, the Commission adopted a Green Paper in early 2005 
‘on an EU approach to managing economic migration’. The main aim here was to establish a 
forum between the Member States, the EU institutions and civil society on how to regulate the 
entry and residence of TCNs seeking employment within the Community legislative 
framework. The contents of the Green Paper were in fact reminiscent of the key points 
addressed alongside the (declined) directive proposal in 2001, as far as the rights of third-
country workers and the Community principle were concerned. Drawing on the Green Paper, 
the Commission presented a policy plan on legal migration
117
 for the 2006-2009 period. As a 
roadmap for legal migration, which would provisionally replace the withdrawn directive, this 
policy plan sought essentially to cope with economic and demographic challenges, putting 
more weight on immigration. Another area which was equally emphasised here related to the 
link between migration and development. Drawing on the 2002 Communication, which was 
the Commission’s first move to establish links between the two policy areas, the Commission 
released in 2005 a further Communication underscoring the link between economic and social 
development. 
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Two directives were adopted during the course of the Hague: the Return Directive 
(2008/115/EC), ‘on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning 
illegally staying third-country nationals’118, and the Blue Card Directive (2009/50/EC), ‘on 
the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly 
qualified employment.’119 With fewer legal acts it passed in comparison to Tampere, the 
Hague Programme was in essence preoccupied with monitoring the implementation of the 
former directives. A supervision of this kind was for instance the Commission’s report120 on 
the directive concerning family reunification (2003/86/EC). The transposition of this directive 
was according to the report satisfactory, with the exception of its implementation in a few 
Member States which happened to slow down visa procedures even in the case of family 
members whose entry applications were already accepted. 
 
With the end of the Hague Programme, a new EU agenda was put in place at the 2009 
Stockholm Summit. As the third in the series to stay in use until the end of 2014, the 
Stockholm Programme identified its chief priority areas as labour migration, illegal migration, 
migration and development, integration, rights of third-country nationals together with asylum 
issues.
121
 In so doing, Stockholm appeared to dwell more on the external dimension of 
migration compared to its predecessors. In reference to the EU’s Global Approach to 
Migration,
122
 it addressed the role of working closely with the third countries for which 
coordination between Europol, Eurojust, the Fundamental Rights Agency, FRONTEX and 
civil law was highly significant. Of several concrete goals added to the agenda items in this 
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context, a most important one was the construction of the Common European Asylum System 
(CEAS) by 2012.
123
 
 
4.2.3 European Pact on Asylum and Immigration 
Apart from the three working Programmes of Tampere, the Hague and Stockholm, a number 
of political initiatives have recently been undertaken on migration management. Declaring 
“its conviction that migration issues are an integral part of the EU’s external relations”, the 
Council under the 2008 French Presidency stressed that the 2005 Global Approach to 
Migration could “make sense only within a close partnership between the countries of origin, 
transit and destination.”124 To be able to control illegal immigration, as the argument went, 
there was need for organisation of a more comprehensive legal migration framework. In an 
attempt to make the achievements of Tampere and the Hague Programmes sustainable (for 
instance harmonisation of border policies, endorsement of a common visa policy, definition of 
terms concerning labour immigration and commitments to controlling illegal immigration by 
establishing the FRONTEX), the Council announced in the end that it was time to adopt the 
European Pact on Immigration and Asylum 
 
in a spirit of mutual responsibility and solidarity between Member States and of 
partnership with third countries, to give a new impetus to the definition of a common 
immigration and asylum policy that will take account of both the collective interest 
of the European Union and the specific needs of each Member State.
125
 
 
This was indeed not a legally binding political initiative. The Council sought to make its 
structure by this means more relevant to the upcoming Stockholm Programme, ensuring: “The 
programme that will be the successor of the Hague Programme in 2010 will, in particular, 
enable the Pact to be transposed further into practical actions”. 
 
Considering the needs of national labour markets, most notably, the European Pact on 
Immigration and Asylum proposed a few important recommendations. To some, nonetheless, 
the method it followed to do so made the impression of an initiative overstating the EU’s 
intergovernmental mode of governance vis-à-vis national migration policies (Carrera & Guild, 
2008, p. 8). To illustrate, when referring to legal migration, the Pact opted for using 
‘immigration choisie’ (selective immigration), which in France was at the time a highly 
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 The Stockholm Programme’s course of action was stilling running at the time this thesis was being written. 
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 Council of the European Union, Draft of the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, September 2008. 
125
 Council of the European Union, Draft of the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, September 2008. 
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debatable way of reference used in the context of immigration due to the implications it made 
to the varying political interests between the state and those with TCN origins. Yet, as 
indicated in the Presidency Conclusions of Tampere, such a policy-making approach was not 
limited to “the exclusive preserve of the Union’s own citizens. Its very existence acts as a 
draw to many others world-wide who cannot enjoy the freedom Union citizens take for 
granted”126. Seen from this perspective, while the Pact was praising Tampere’s achievement 
of supranationalisation in many areas, it was denying on the other side the Union’s broader 
aim to achieve ‘an open and secure European Union’, where ‘openness’ was indicative also of 
fair treatment. 
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 Presidency Conclusions, the Tampere European Council. 
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Chapter 5 Analysis of cases 
 
 
This chapter provides empirical material for the study. The research model used to look into 
the similarities/differences and analyse the extent of Europeanisation across the EU Member 
States’ immigration policies is the eclectic bottom-up approach, which intrinsically embraces 
also the top-down understanding, as formerly argued. The bottom-up reading starts 
accordingly with a general survey into the selected countries’ immigration histories, 
institutional structures, principal actors involved in immigration management as well as 
national immigration laws and policies. Aside from refererences to a series of Eurobarometer 
opinion polls, the cross-examination here exploits two main sources of empirical analysis: the 
MIPEX (Migration Integration Policy Index) and the EU Commission’s annual reports 
concerning immigration. While the MIPEX data are meant to view further from the 
‘uploading’ vantage point, an inquiry into Member State policies by reference to 
implementation of the EU law (on the basis of the EU Commission’s annual reports) is 
believed to convey chiefly a ‘downloading’ reading of Europeanisation. The time span 
stretching in broad terms over ten years to that end rests on indeed the bulk of these two sets 
of data which are accessible for the most part from 2004 onwards. 
 
5.1 Country profiles 
5.1.1 Germany
127
 
 
Table 8: Basic migration statistics 
Net migration (2009) -13,000 
TCN immigration (2008)  237,901 
Largest third countries of origin (2008) Turkey, Serbia and Montenegro, Iraq 
TCN population (2009) 4,655,215 
TCN as part of population (2009)  5.70% 
Foreign born as part of population (2009)  8.80% 
Permits delivered for family (2009) 54,139 
Permits delivered for work (2009)  16,667 
Permits delivered for study (2009) 31,345 
Permits delivered for humanitarian reasons (2008) 37,500 
TCN employment rate (2009, change since 2006)  48.00%; +3.5% 
National employment rate (2009, change since 2006) 70.90%; +3.4% 
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 ‘Germany’ here is taken to represent its present-day political status, that is, following re-unification of the 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland and Deutsche Demokratische Republik in October 1990. 
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TCN unemployment rate (2009, change since 2006) 18.30%; -5% 
National unemployment rate (2009, change since 2006) 7.50%; -2.3% 
Nationality acquisitions (2008, change since 2005) 94,470; -22,771 
Source: MIPEX III (2011). 
 
To recent statistics, Germany is one of the leading EU Member States whose foreign 
population stock amounts to just under ten percent: 
 
Table 9: Stocks of foreign population in Germany 
of total population 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
in thousands 7,319 7,336 7,335 6,717 6,756 6,751 6,745 6,728 6,695 6,754 6,931 
in percentages  8.9 8.9 8.9 8.1 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.3 8.5 
All thousands are rounded off to the nearest value. 
Source: OECD (2011b) 
 
An overview of the EU history demonstrates Germany as a Musterknabe (Prümm & Alscher, 
2007, p. 73). From early days on, it sought indeed to sustain a leading position in the EC/EU 
by customizing/promoting the founding layouts of the European integration. This agenda-
setting role has however also been challenged by moments of hesitation. Since the 
Amsterdam Treaty, governance at the national and subnational levels manifested signs of 
foot-dragging, blocking further integration attempts in the area of immigration. 
 
Such wavering steps in incorporating relevant supranational legislation into the domestic law 
could to a large extent be attributed to the slumping public attitudes towards a progressively 
growing size of immigrants in the country. An opinion poll checking into citizenship and 
senses of belonging in the early 2000s indicated that 59% of the Germans considered 
immigrants to be making no contribution worthy of mention to their country (Special 
Eurobarometer 60.1, 2004). Perhaps more importantly, almost half of the interviewees (49%) 
saw the latter as a ‘threat’ to their way of life: 
 
Table 10: German citizens regarding immigrants as a threat to their way of life (in percentages) 
Responses (options) Germany EU 15 
Totally agree 12 16 
Tend to agree 27 26 
Tend to disagree 34 30 
Totally disagree 15 18 
Don’t know 12 10 
Source: Special Eurobarometer Wave 60.1. 
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Leaving this aside assuming that a diverse range of social, economic or political conditions 
may have been in play to change German perceptions of immigration, as elsewhere in Europe, 
one could argue that the norms and conventions of the EU have in broad terms presented no 
major challenges for Germany. To be fair, seen within the post-WW II global context, the 
country’s earliest supranational commitments like the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) and the European Economic Community have often been informed by its willingness 
to integrate into the West. Spurred domestically by a pro-integrationist voice amongst the 
elites, Germany, together with France, played more often than not a cardinal role in the 
European integration process. As of the 1990s, nevertheless, the governments -particularly in 
the Länder- appeared to voice their concerns about loss of ‘subsidiarity’ on a number of 
issues, if competencies were to be transferred further to the supranational level (Hellmann et 
al., 2005). While a pro-integrationist mindset was still preserved, it was alongside this 
perception that the federal governments came to deny the country had become one of 
immigration already, irrespective of the statistics indicating that the massive waves of 
immigration it had been attracting in the post-war period were quite steady. Put more 
precisely, the balance of net migration reached between 1950 and 1993 to more than 12 
million amounting to “80% of the population growth. The new microcensus of 2005 indicated 
that 15 million out of 82 million inhabitants have a migratory background, that means are 
either born abroad or are descendants of parents of whom at least one is not born in Germany” 
(Kolb, 2008, p. 2). 
 
The abandonment of this denial in the 1990s (that Germany is not a land of immigration) 
brought about the main objectives of present day German migration policy. These are the 
traditional policy of minimising unwanted immigration characterised by refugees, asylum-
seekers or undocumented immigrants and the relatively newer competition policy of attracting 
highly skilled labour. The ﬁrst objective was indeed applicable also to the EU-level, yet the 
second one “remains attached to the nationstate, as the German position is to maintain labour 
migration as a ﬁeld of exclusively national competence” (Prümm & Alscher, 2007, p. 74). For 
this latter position, the legislative role of the Bundesrat, as the representative body of the 
German Länder at the federal level, has a significant value.
128
 Regardless of the consensus-
oriented German politics informed largely by interest groups, the binding effect of laws in 
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 The German legislature has a bicameral structure of the Bundestag, as the federal parliament elected by the 
people, and the Bundesrat, made up of members appointed by the Länder. 
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cases of direct influence on the Länder’s interests necessitates the joint approval of the 
parliament’s both chambers, i.e. the Bundesrat and Bundestag. 
 
5.1.1.1 Institutional structure 
According to the Basic Law, the executive and legislative powers in Germany 
(Bundesrepublik Deutschland) are shared between the Federation (Bund) and the Federal 
States (Länder or Bundesländer), each of which has its own government, parliament and 
constitution. Sharing the Federation’s law-making authority, the Länder hold principally the 
right to legislate on their own as long as the issue in concern is not conferred directly to the 
federal dimension. There are in this connection several policy areas which are up to 
legislation between the two levels concurrently, others being subject to the Federation’s 
exclusive power. Should the Federation enact a law on issues where federal regulation is 
“necessary in the national interest” (German Basic Law, Art. 72 (2)), the Länder cannot act 
alone. This power share between Berlin and sixteen Federal State capitals is further expanded 
through municipal administrations amongst others when it comes to migration and asylum 
issues, making up altogether a three-legged executive layout (Rudzio, 2006, p. 319). 
 
The judiciary power in Germany is regulated by the Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz, GVG (Courts 
Constitution Act). Aside from the Federal Constitutional Court, there are accordingly five 
main court types: ordinary courts such as the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice), 
which is responsible for most civil cases and criminal matters; courts of administrative law 
such as Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative Court); courts in charge of tax law 
like Bundesfinanzhof (Federal Court of Finance); courts accountable for labour law, for 
instance, Bundesarbeitsgericht (Federal Court of Labour); courts of social law like 
Bundessozialgericht (Federal Social Court) and constitutional law courts whose primary duty 
is to monitor the review and interpretation of the Constitution (Basic Law). 
Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) occupies the highest rank in this 
category (Böckenförde, Wiesner & Nora, 2006). 
 
The centralised and unitary nature of the federal system orders that many sensitive issues 
including migration and asylum be treated at more than one level.
129
 The veto power the 
federal states hold conjures up in this regard their key position for the interplay between 
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 The legislation handled purely at the Länder level relates in this context to science, education and police 
matters. 
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horizontal and vertical levels of cooperation (Schmidt-M.G., 2003). Delegates representing 
the federal state governments constitute the Bundesrat as a second chamber which deliberates 
upon federal bills endorsed by the Parliament (German Bundestag), with the right to ratify 
them in cases of administrative interest for the Länder. For appeal laws (concerning all other 
cases), the Bundestag’s word has an absolute value. 
 
5.1.1.2 Actors involved in immigration management 
While immigration management is essentially up to the Länder’s initiative –residence permits 
and passports are for instance liable to Ausländerbehörden (Foreigners Authorities of the 
Federal States)- issues concerning integration were transferred with the 2005 Immigration Act 
to the federal government’s jurisdiction. Certain policy areas such as accommodation of 
asylum-seekers are however subject to the federal states, which need to cooperate with the 
federal police or law enforcement offices in cases where deportation of a foreigner is 
imminent. Decisions concerning asylum applications and refugee status are initiated by the 
Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. Entitlement to political asylum became, after the 
Immigration Act’s entry into force in 2005, subject to the sole authority of the Federal 
Minister of the Interior. 
 
Responsibility over immigration and asylum matters is divided typically between the 
executive and operational levels (Schneider, 2009, pp. 17-21). The key institutions at the 
executive level are Bundesministerium des Innern, BMI (Federal Ministry of the Interior), 
which is accountable for not only the formulation of migration and integration policies at the 
federal level but also technical and legal supervision of how relevant issues are to be 
administered by federal offices, and Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales, BMAS 
(Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs), which provides legal service for foreigners’ 
accession to the labour market, including their integration by way of language courses and a 
consultation network named ‘Integration through Qualification’. There are additionally 
several other important government-based units like the Diplomatic Missions of the 
Auswärtiges Amt (Federal Foreign Office), issuing in accordance with the Residence Act’s 
Section 71(2) all visa and passport issues abroad; Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für 
Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration (Federal Government Commissioner for Migration, 
Refugees and Integration), providing consultancy and supportive legislation service for the 
Federal Government (according to the Residence Act’s Sections 92, 93 and 94) and 
Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Aussiedlerfragen und nationale Minderheiten in 
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Deutschland (Federal Government Commissioner for Issues on Repatriates and National 
Minorities in Germany), which is in charge of the Federal Government’s Spätaussiedler 
(ethnic German immigrants) affairs. 
 
At the operational level, on the other side, the main actors are Bundesamt für Migration und 
Flüchtlinge, BAMF (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees), which as part of the Federal 
Ministry of the Interior accounts for carrying out all asylum related proceedings, including 
management of the Ausländerzentralregister (Central Aliens Register) and implementation of 
the EU’s operational tasks, funding programmes, integration courses as well as several 
international agreements such as the Dublin II Regulation, the 1951 United Nations 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the European Convention on Human 
Rights; Bundesverwaltungsamt, BVA (Federal Office of Administration), which organises the 
entry and admission of Spätaussiedler and registers data into the Central Aliens Register and 
Schengen Information System (SIS); Bundespolizei, BPol (Federal Police), conducting as part 
of the Federal Ministry of the Interior all air, water and land operations for the prevention of 
illegal entries of all sorts, from human trafficking to smuggling, both inland and at the 
borders; Police Forces of the Federal States (Landespolizei), which is in charge of controlling 
foreign nationals in Bundesländer for public order and safety and in case of unlawfulness 
their removal within 30 to 50 kilometres to the border zone in cooperation with the BPol; 
Foreigners Authorities of the Federal States (Ausländerbehörden), which according to the 
Residence Act’s Section 71(1) lays out most of the measures for passport and residence 
permits, Bundeskriminalamt, BKA (Federal Criminal Police Office), which provides 
assistance to the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees by working out asylum-seekers’ 
fingerprints through AFIS (Automatic Fingerprint Identification System) as well as analysing 
and reporting data through the EU’s EURODAC and BPol’s INPOL systems and 
Bundesagentur für Arbeit, BA (Federal Employment Agency), which approves, denies or 
cancels foreign nationals’ employment in accordance with the Residence Act’s sections 39-41 
(Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 2009). 
 
Application of third-country nationals for citizenship is up to the local Ausländerbehörden 
depending on a number of prerequisites. Accordingly, naturalisation process starts by 
submitting a form of request in person, having completed 16 years of age; for those under 16, 
application must be made by parents (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 2011). 
Eligibility for naturalisation requires having legal residence in Germany for minimum eight 
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years; completing an integration course (qualification requires seven years); declaring 
allegiance to the German constitution and having adequate command of the German language 
(Nationality Act 2000, Section 10(1)). Upon investigation by the BPol as well as institutions 
like the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, the final decision-maker is the 
Federal Ministry of the Interior. 
 
There are other than these official departments a number of non-governmental institutions, 
interest groups or stakeholders that also take part –though rather indirectly- in the 
management of immigration issues. The most notable amongst these are the United Nations’ 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Pro-Asyl, the autonomous refugee councils of 
the Länder, International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and numerous Ausländerbeiräte 
(advisory boards of foreigners) working in cooperation with the city councils. 
 
5.1.1.3 National immigration laws and policies in historical perspective 
The major influx of mass immigration in German history dates back to the onset of the 
Gastarbeiter recruitment in the 1950s. As Vogel & Cyrus (2000, p. 11) observes, however, 
the historical backdrop was indeed characterised right after the end of World War II, when big 
numbers of ethnic Germans started to return from different corners around Europe. There 
came alongside this inflow also those from the new German Democratic Republic, whose size 
amounted altogether to some 12 million until the rise of the Berlin Wall in 1961. 
 
Table 11: Post-war immigration to Germany 
Period Feature 
1945-1961 Aussiedler/ethnic German immigrant influxes 
1961-1973 Gastarbeiter recruitment programme 
1973-1989 family unification 
1989-2000 the new naturalisation law 
2000- … divided immigration policy 
Source: Vogel & Cyrus (2000, p. 11). 
 
The first Aliens Law concerning immigration issues in Germany came into force in 1965, 
following the decision to launch a wholesale recruitment of foreign workers, which continued 
with intervals until 1973. Before the Aliens Law, it was a host of administrative guidelines 
and ruling cases issued by courts that regulated alien matters in Germany. The Gastarbeiter 
phase which lasted in rough terms from the building of the Berlin Wall to the global oil crisis 
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in 1973
130
 was initiated at the discretion of a large platform of employers, labour unions and 
official governing bodies, which collectively agreed to import labour from a number of 
countries mostly from the south of Europe.
131
 Enormous as the flow of foreign labour may 
have been in time, the recruitment programme was actually designed to work on a temporary 
basis. And yet, despite the Anwerbestopp (the end of recruitment) in the early 1970s, one third 
of these workers –an estimate about two million, according to the Federal Department of 
Statistics (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1999)- decided to stay in Germany. 
 
The ensuing period of immigration (1973-1989) was marked by the arrival of the family 
members -of those staying to continue employment- whose residence rights were secured by 
the Grundgesetz (the German Basic Law).
132
 With the new waves of EU enlargement and a 
series of programmes initiated until 1984 to encourage the return of Gastarbeiter, the core 
issue causing a main concern at the state level was integration of immigrants into the host 
society. As the country confronted in time more inflows than was initially planned, a draft law 
was made to (re)codify rights of entry and residence. Following this so called Aliens Act 
which came into force in 1991, immigrants were given a statutory right to naturalisation, 
which after a long process became attached with German citizenship as a legal right and was 
codified into the ‘Law on Foreigners and Aliens’. As a consequence, naturalisation became 
restricted with twenty-three years of age initially on the condition of residence with a 
minimum length of eight years, six years of formal school attendance and lack of conviction 
of serious crimes. For those above the age limit, the main requirement was residence in 
Germany for minimum fifteen years (without being charged with petty offences and enjoying 
any type of state-sponsored social assistance). 
 
An important legal source to consider in the context of family reunification is the German 
Basic Law, grounded essentially upon universal human rights (including the international law 
concerning the rights of refugees). With its Constitution tied firmly to the principle of 
‘dignity’133, treatment of asylum matters in Germany has often proved fairly liberal, so much 
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 While the German authorities initially attempted to reduce the number of a new flow of foreign workers by 
increasing the recruitment fee from DM 300 to DM 1,000, the oil crisis in the Arabian Peninsula urged the end 
of the recruitment programme (Gonzalez-Ferrer, 2007, p. 13). 
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 The initial agreement made with Italy in 1955 was followed by those signed later on with Spain and Greece 
(1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and Yugoslavia (1968), as the domestic 
economy showed signs of labour shortages in the post-WW II period. 
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 Article 6 (1) of the Basic Law reads: “Marriage and the family shall enjoy the special protection of the state”. 
133
 Inspired by the Kantian maxim, ‘[a]ct so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of 
another, always as an end and never as a means only’, the Grundgesetz is anchored to the “architectonic value of 
118 
so that it was in many occasions the main reason why the state could not deny asylum-
seekers, even if there might be a general tendency to do so (Joppke, 1999). For this reason or 
another, there were between 1980 and 1989 around 700,000 asylum-seekers in Germany: 
 
Table 12: Asylum applications, 1980-1989 
Land 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Germany 107,818 49,391 37,423 19,737 35,278 73,832 99,649 57,379 103,076 121,318 
EC/EU 
total 
149,037 129,709 93,026 70,579 97,837 157,280 189,538 166,780 215,250 283,421 
Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Geneva, 2001. 
 
The number of these applications surged throughout the 1990s to two millions, chiefly as a 
consequence of the post-Cold War liberation movements: 
 
Table 13: Asylum applications, 1990-1999 
Land 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Germany 193,063 256,112 438,191 359,401 127,210 166,951 149,193 151,700 143,429 138,319 
EC/EU 
total 
402,027 492,391 673,947 549,696 301,693 307,629 260,423 290,570 340,430 414,444 
Source: UNHCR (2001). 
 
About half of some three million people who sought for German asylum in the 1980s and 90s 
were granted the right to have it. Indeed, the collapse of the Iron Curtain and the Berlin Wall 
in 1989 made direct implications at this point. Large numbers of immigrants swarmed to the 
then Federal Republic of Germany claiming right to accommodation and financial coverage. 
A massive influx of not only Eastern and ethnic Germans from the former communist block 
(as restrictions in this context became largely nullified in the early 1990s), but also of asylum-
seekers from elsewhere had a stirring effect in the host society. To cope with further pressure 
following the German unification in the mid-1990s, Eastern Germans were denied the right to 
accommodation in the formerly Western territory, while a de facto quota (followed later on by 
a number of legislative restrictions) was imposed upon ethnic German immigration.
134
 Added 
to that, several legislative and administrative measures were taken to make the asylum 
procedure more demanding. The souring figures urged the governing CDU/CSU (Christian 
                                                                                                                                                                      
human dignity”, suggesting “each person is valuable per se as an end in himself, which government and fellow 
citizens must give due respect” (Eberle, 2008, pp. 3-4; bracket original). 
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 When the National Socialist rule ended, millions of Germans living away from the German territory were 
granted the right to acquire citizenship by the Grundgesetz on the condition of settlement (defined essentially by 
the Federal Displacement and Refugee Act). While a marginal number of Germans could enjoy this right over 
the Cold War period, the early 1990s saw a dramatic rise to that effect. In response, the 1990 Ethnic Germans 
Reception Act and the 1993 Law to Settle the Results of the War redefined ethnic citizenship to deny it for 
instance to those born after 1993 (Vogel & Cyrus, 2000, p. 12). 
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Social Union) and FDP (Free Democratic Party) coalition as well as the opposing SPD (Social 
Democratic Party) to come up in 1992 with a new policy paradigm collectively. To this 
‘asylum compromise’, Article 6 of the Basic Law saw a fundamental change to grant the right 
to asylum-seekers, provided they would not cross into Germany via ‘safe third countries’ 
(Giesler & Wasser, 1993).
135
 The Constitutional Court’s conﬁrmation of this amendment in 
1996 gave the green light to keep immigration ﬂows under control, which soon became an 
official policy paradigm. In accordance, issuing of residence permits to foreigners became 
extremely limited to cases of most notably “seasonal workers, contingency workers, Jewish 
migrants from the former Soviet Union – and above all in the case of family reuniﬁcation” 
(Prümm & Alscher, 2007, p. 76). 
 
In 1999, the German Basic Law saw amendments making room for more flexible 
requirements, the most important of which was expansion of citizenship by way of the jus soli 
principle to be working in tandem with the jus sanguinis.
136
 Following this change, a proposal 
was made in 2000 to put a points-based system in use for highly skilled foreigners, designed 
in fact specifically for the sector concerning information technology. A maximum five-year 
long visa status, as planned with the points-based system became however unappealing with 
the crisis impacting the IT industry soon. Similar efforts in quest of ‘brain gain’ were made in 
2001 when a draft bill was initiated in order to manage and restrict immigration, regulate the 
stay of foreigners and integrate non-EU citizens more effectively.
137
 In accordance, the 
existing legislation on foreigners (Ausländerrecht) was to be improved in favour of non-EU 
immigrants, to bring the ethno-cultural understanding of immigration policy to an end. For 
this purpose, a series of changes allowing for less bureaucracy during visa processes were put 
in place. These attempts became however inconclusive upon rejection by the oppositional 
CDU & CSU block, thanks to their majority seat in the Bundesrat.
138
 To be fair, this 
resistance was backed up with a wide-reaching public support alongside the rising 
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 The ‘safe third-country’ rule regulates the conditions under which a refugee can be declined at the intended 
country’s external borders or sent back to the sending countries by route of which (s)he has arrived in the 
destination country. The principle enables states on the other side to deny a refugee’s asylum demand pointing at 
the sending country’s protection of human rights in agreeable terms (European Parliament, 2000). 
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 With that, one could become entitled to German citizenship as long as (minimum) one of the parents had an 
unlimited residence permit (unbefristete Aufenthaltserlaubnis) for at least three years, an unlimited right to 
residence (Aufenthaltsberechtigung) or a legal permanent residence in Germany for minimum eight years. 
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 Draft legislation: Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen SPD und BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN. Entwurf eines 
Gesetzes zur Steuerung und Begrenzung der Zuwanderung und zur Regelung des Aufenthalts und der Integration 
von Unionsbürgern und Ausländern (Zuwanderungsgesetz). 
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 The bill was declined despite the independent commission (chaired by CDU MP Rita Süssmuth) propped up 
by a large platform of trade unions, local governments and high-level delegates from employers’ associations. 
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unemployment figures at the time, spurred amongst others by the ‘9/11 attacks’ which 
provoked EU-wide concerns about foreigners as a potential threat to public security. That 
said, in 2004, the draft bill managed to pass in the Parliament after long negotiations. 
 
Despite a certain degree of compromise made by the opposition, the 2005 Immigration Act 
did not include the entirety of what was previously envisioned. Of particular importance here 
was the 1973 recruitment ban which remained in effect
139
 instead of the formerly espoused 
points-based system concerning the selection of highly skilled foreign workers. Permanent 
residence for third-country researchers was also disposed of from the originally intended draft 
coverage. There were nevertheless a number of radical changes introduced with the new law. 
A most notable one was the additional one-year visa extension provided for foreign students 
in case they would wish to stay in Germany upon graduation from a (German) university for 
employment purposes. Added to that was a permanent residence permit granted to high-
profile non-EU scientists, managers as well as self-employed individuals investing minimum 
one million Euros in their business and creating at least ten new jobs upon a three-year 
residence permit. Meanwhile, asylum-seekers with validated applications became with the 
new law entitled to a three-year long provisional residence permit. Should the conditions in 
the beginning continue to apply, accordingly, the temporary status would turn into an 
unlimited one.
140
 What’s more, foreigners who suffered non-state or gender-specific 
persecution in their countries of origin could now enjoy refugee status. Those fitting to this 
profile were previously (based on the 1951 Geneva Convention) subject to a temporary 
suspension of deportation, for reasons of non-refoulement in their country of origin. With the 
Immigration Act’s entry into force, they could, as in the case of asylum applicants, receive an 
unlimited residence permit following a probation period of three years (which would also 
provide access to the labour market).
141
 
 
On interior security matters, those charged with terrorist activities or ‘provoking hatred’ in 
public became subject to restriction of freedom, should deportation be out of the question.
142
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 Exceptions were issued by a further decree enabling the application of recruitment to certain professions such 
as IT specialists, nurses and seasonal agricultural workers. 
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 Currently, such asylum applicants are offered unlimited residence permits with no probation period. 
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 While this issue is currently regulated under the 2008 Asylum Procedure Act, its legal basis is the 1997 
Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz (the Asylum Benefits Act), which sought support for asylum-seekers and other 
foreigners with no permanent residence. The Residence Act, as part of the Immigration Act, offers in this context 
further support on for instance matters relating to residence permits and subsidiary protection. 
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 Due to its potential to violate the German Constitution, extension to administrative detention (as demanded by 
the CDU/CSU opposition) was not adopted. 
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Last but not least, the Residence Act (of the 2005 Immigration Act) brought forward language 
and integration classes which are compulsory for non-EU immigrants.
143
 Failure of attendance 
to these classes could cost them loss of certain social benefits and/or non-renewal of their 
residence permits. All schooling expenses within the framework of integration of immigrants 
would be met by the federal government.
144
 
 
Following the 2007 Richtlinienumsetzungsgesetz, which transferred eleven EU directives into 
the national law
145
, the German Immigration Act underwent a series of key changes. 
Amendments relating to the German asylum and refugee law were characterised by the 
implementation of the Qualification and Procedure Directives (the Council Directive 
2004/83/EC and the Council Directive 2005/85/EC, respectively) as of January 2009 and the 
Arbeitsmigrationssteuerungsgesetz (Labour Migration Control Act)
146
, which began to allow 
access to the labour market for designated migrant groups. 
 
Besides federal acts that are subject to the consent of the Parliament and the Bundesrat, there 
are certain ordinances decreed by the Federal Government/Minister in charge and confirmed 
in most cases by the Bundesrat, to be contributing to the regulation of employment, residence 
and integration of third-country nationals and asylum-seekers: the Residence Ordinance, the 
Employment Ordinance, the Employment Procedure Ordinance, the Ordinance on Integration 
Courses and the Ordinance on Determining Asylum Competences (Schneider, 2009, p. 16). 
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 Besides provisions introduced by the 2005 Residence Act, the entry of non-EU nationals intending short-term 
stay is essentially regulated by the Schengen Convention. 
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 Such courses were at the time applicable to the (Spät-) Aussiedler, i.e. ethnic German immigrants from 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 
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 These were Council Directive 2002/90/ EC on the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence; 
Council Directive 2003/86/EC concerning the right to family reunification; the Council Directive 2003/110/EC 
concerning assistance in cases of transit for the purposes of removal by air; the Council Directive 2003/109/EC 
on the status of long-term resident Third-Country Nationals; the EP and Council (joint) Directive 2004/38/EC 
concerning the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the Member States; the Council Directive 2004/81/EC concerning the residence permit issued to 
Third-Country Nationals who are victims of trafficking in human beings or who have been the subject of an 
action to facilitate illegal immigration, who cooperate with the competent authorities; the Council Directive 
2003/9/EC on minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers; the Council Directive 2004/83/EC 
concerning minimum standards for the qualification and status of Third-Country Nationals or stateless persons as 
refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted; the 
Council Directive 2004/114/EC concerning the conditions of admission of Third-Country Nationals for the 
purposes of studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated training or voluntary service; the Council Directive 
2005/71/EC concerning a specific procedure for admitting Third-Country Nationals for the purposes of scientific 
research and finally, the Council Directive 2005/85/EC concerning minimum standards on procedures in 
Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status. 
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 Act to Control the Immigration of Highly Skilled Foreigners qualifying for the Labour Market and to amend 
further regulations of the Resident Law of 20 December 2008, Federal Law Gazette I, 24 December 2008. 
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When the transitional period suspending labour migration from the Central and Eastern 
European Countries expired in 2011, workers from these Member States were granted 
unrestricted access to the labour markets in Germany. Shortly after this, the government 
adopted the ‘Concept for Securing the Skilled Labour Base’ so as to encourage skilled labour, 
in light of the declining working-age population.
147
 Accordingly, a list of demanded jobs on 
the domestic labour markets was to be specified by the Federal Employment Agency twice a 
year. The pre-2009 minimum salary to be paid to highly skilled TCNs was however lowered. 
To keep domestic labour intact, a new law called Berufsqualifikationsfeststellungsgesetz, 
BQFG (the Professional Qualifications Assessment Act) on the assessment of TCNs’ 
professional qualifications came into force in 2012. While nationality became with this 
‘Recognition Act’ no more a relevant condition for job applications, foreign qualifications 
were now to be evaluated to the extent they would make preferable options vis-à-vis those of 
the German citizens (OECD, International Migration Outlook, 2012). 
 
5.1.1.4 Citizenship and naturalisation policies in Germany 
TCNs’ access to German citizenship was for a lengthy period of the twentieth century 
restrictive. Following an official view of naturalisation as an exceptional practice rather than 
as part of the legal order even for the latter generations of immigrants, the last decade saw 
considerable liberalisation movements bringing about today’s pro-naturalisation policy 
(Williams, 2010, p. 14). This development came along with a discursive change whereby 
Germany’s denial of being an immigration country up to the 2000s was abandoned at the state 
level, promising ease of TCNs’ naturalisation process. 
 
Despite scepticism about the effects of the Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz (StAG), which entered 
into force as of 1 January 2000, the past decade witnessed remarkable changes in legislative 
and administrative practices giving clear signals that the temporary understanding of 
immigration was taking to a permanent form (Green, 2004). In retrospect, the ethnic-based 
perception of citizenship in the post-war period was in this sense an official strategy against 
that of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), i.e. 1967 Staatsbürgerschaftsgesetz der 
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik. To circumvent the GDR’s official framework which 
granted citizenship to the nationals of other communist states such as Vietnam (alongside the 
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 BMAS, Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales (Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs) Action 
Programme of the Federal Government (2008): Labour Migration's Contribution to Securing the Skilled Labour 
Base in Germany. 
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repatriation agreements), the Federal Republic’s jus sanguinis would serve as a safety valve. 
Nonetheless, with the end of the Cold War and the re-unification of Germany, the ethnicity-
based citizenship appeared to be a loophole attracting large waves of immigration to 
Germany. While it became clear that German ancestry was no more a deterrent measure, 
debates in relation to German national identity became widespread in light of pressure from 
the second- and third-generation of immigrants, who despite their birth and education in the 
country were still not naturalised, as there was no room for jus soli citizenship in the German 
law until the legislative reform in 1999. 
 
Informed to a large extent also by the pressure of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which came to play an increasingly 
important judiciary role in the late 20th century Europe, the 2000 Nationality Act introduced 
three major sets of changes to citizenship coverage (Howard, 2006). The first set comprised 
reduction of length of stay for residency from 15 to 8 years (on the condition of a valid 
residence permit, lack of criminal convictions, gainful employment and willingness to 
dispense with former citizenship), an oath of loyalty for the ‘free and democratic order of the 
Constitution’ and language tests administered at the Länder level. The second package of 
changes on citizenship brought forward, as defined by Article 4 of the new law, the extension 
of the jus sanguinis principle with that of the jus soli. Accordingly, children born in Germany 
could now enjoy automatic entitlement to German citizenship on the condition of an eight-
year long residence permit or a three-year long unlimited residence permit to be declared by 
one of the parents. That said, the jus soli practice did not really include the entirety of TCNs, 
as it demanded a record of unbroken paid-employment with no dependence on German 
State’s welfare benefits. And finally, the third component of the 2000 Nationality Act as far as 
naturalisation was concerned included the Optionsmodell which regulated basic terms and 
conditions applying to dual citizenship. Accordingly, children receiving German citizenship 
through the jus soli procedure were allowed to hold dual citizenship until adulthood, provided 
that they would make a choice between the two citizenships before reaching 18 years of 
age.
148
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 At the time this dissertation was being written, the new coalition government was close to a deal which would 
extend dual citizenship to Germany-born TCN children and naturalised Germans. 
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5.1.2 The United Kingdom
149
 
 
Table 14: Basic migration statistics  
Net migration (2009) 182,000 
Foreign-born immigration flow (2007) 237,000 
Largest third countries of origin (2008) India, USA, Pakistan 
TCN population (2008) 2,406,000 
TCN as part of population (2008) 3.90% 
Foreign-born as part of population (2008)  6.60% 
Permits delivered for family (2009) 121,280 
Permits delivered for work (2009) 116,670 
Permits delivered for study (2009) 268,525 
Permits delivered for humanitarian reasons (2009) 6,602 
TCN employment rate (2009, change since 2006) 57.40%; -2% 
National employment rate (2009, change since 2006) 69.90%; -1.7% 
TCN unemployment rate (2009, change since 2006) 11.20%; +1.5% 
National unemployment rate (2009, change since 2006) 7.60%; +2.2% 
Nationality acquisitions (2008, change since 2005) 129,260; -32,495 
Source: MIPEX III. 
 
Seeing into its recent foreign population stocks over the last decade, one can observe a steady 
increase in the UK’s immigration density: 
 
Table 15: Stocks of foreign population in the UK 
of total population 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
in thousands 2,587 2,584 2,742 2,857 3,035 3,392 3,824 4,186 4,348 4,524 4,785 
in percentages  4.4 4.4 4.6 4.8 5.1 5.7 6.4 6.9 7.1 7.4 7.7 
All thousands are rounded off to the nearest value. 
Source: OECD (2011b). 
 
While this trend applies in fact to many other immigration lands in Europe, a significant 
factor to bear in mind for the British case is the country’s nearly two century-long colonial 
rule overseas. The strong links it retained over the entire 20
th
 century with the Old and New 
Commonwealth countries
150
, which formerly were under its imperial rule, resulted in rising 
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 Intended with the United Kingdom is what the official name of the country reads: the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland. For practical purposes, however, there will be occasional use of ‘British’ and 
‘Britain’ in reference to the entire country. 
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 These two groups of fifty-four independent states make up altogether the Commonwealth. While the Old 
Commonwealth consists of the pre-1945 dominions (which gained independence before 1945), namely 
Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Canada founded together with the UK the British Commonwealth 
(which later took the name the Commonwealth). The others making up the New Commonwealth are the 
remaining forty-nine Asian and African countries which gained their independence in the 1960s and 1970s. To 
125 
flows of immigrants from them, particularly as of the end of World War II. In recent times, of 
the 1995-2004 period for instance, the net international migration to/from the UK by 
nationality was calculated as follows: 
 
Table 16: Net migration to/from the UK (in thousands) 
Period 
All 
nationals 
British 
nationals 
non-
British 
nationals 
EU 
nationals 
Commonwealth 
nationals 
(old and new) 
Other 
foreign 
nationals 
1995 75 -52 127 23 56 48 
1996 54 -62 116 29 47 41 
1997 47 -60 107 18 50 38 
1998 139 -23 162 33 72 57 
1999 163 -23 186 8 80 98 
2000 163 -57 220 6 101 113 
2001 172 -53 225 11 101 113 
2002 153 -91 245 11 101 133 
2003 151 -85 236 14 107 115 
2004 223 -120 342 74 164 104 
All values are approximate, i.e. rounded off to the nearest thousand. 
Source: UK Government Home Office (2004). Command Paper 6690. 
 
Accordingly, of around two million migrants who came to the UK between 1995 and 2004, 
some 880,000 originated from the Old and New Commonwealth countries, about 227,000 
from other Member States and ca. 860,000 from non-EU countries (other than Old/New 
Commonwealth). Given some 630,000 British nationals who moved overseas in this period, 
the net migration amounted to 1.3 million in approximate figures. 
 
To be fair, it was economic demands that gave rise to the arrival of newcomers (from former 
colonies in the first place). Yet, as the size of inflows reached a peak in the 1960s, a 
protectionist mindset grew gradually in public, with rising levels of xenophobia and 
antagonism towards immigrants. This tendency appears fairly intact today, as shown by recent 
surveys demonstrating more than half of the interviewees with extremely conservative 
attitudes, so much so that they consider immigrants to be a threat to their way of life: 
 
Table 17: British citizens regarding immigrants as a threat to their way of life (in percentages) 
Responses (options) UK EU 15 
Totally agree 28 16 
Tend to agree 26 26 
Tend to disagree 24 30 
Totally disagree 13 18 
Don’t know 9 10 
Source: Special Eurobarometer Wave 60.1 
                                                                                                                                                                      
qualify for membership (of the Commonwealth), this latter group was required to recognise that the Crown is 
‘the symbol’ and chair of the association. 
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One needs to mention in this context a central issue that made earlier British immigration 
policy somewhat distinctive, which in rough terms could be described as the weak role of 
‘client politics’. Contrary to many countries in Europe where non-political actors such as 
interest groups, NGOs and courts exert considerable pressure against a backdrop of economic 
trends or international human rights, politics of immigration has for most of British history 
been characterised predominantly by the ruling executive (Ette & Gerdes, 2007). A secondary 
feature of this traditional pattern stands out most notably in the form of an utterly 
discriminatory immigration policy, which in the early 1970s “selected white over 
nonwhite…and wealthy…over poor ones” (Messina, 2007, p. 235). 
 
Much in a similar vein, regarding policies in relation to the supranational goals of the EU, the 
UK comes to mind as a fairly ‘selective’ land. A tendency to associate this attribute with some 
“Anglo-Saxon exceptionalism” (Ette & Gerdes, 2007, p. 93) indeed takes the foundation of 
the European Communities as a reference point, when the UK declined to take part in the then 
European Coal and Steel Community and the ensuing 1956 Rome Treaty. Following two 
unsuccessful attempts in 1963 and 1967, it managed to accede to the EC as a member state in 
1973. Yet, even many years after its membership to the EC/EU, the UK was still charged with 
“failure to find a point of equilibrium in European policy in terms of either politics or 
relationships with other member states” (Wallace, 1997, p. 677). While this puzzle loosened 
up to a certain extent towards the end of the 1990s, the UK was for many still a country 
failing to grasp its “advantages of membership…relationship with the other leading member 
states, and…the direction that it would like the European Union to take” (Allen, 2005, p. 
120). 
 
Following its decision to stay outside the Schengen Agreement in the 1980s, the UK carried 
on with its traditional indifference to supranationalisation moves in the 1990s. To illustrate, 
most importantly, it opted out from the Amsterdam Treaty’s Title IV on visas, asylum and 
immigration. True, the aftermath of Amsterdam saw signs of changes (for instance, during the 
2002 Seville European Council, the UK worked with the hosting Spain closely to come up 
with an effective anti-discrimination directive on illegal immigration); however, patterns 
marking some kind of ‘standoffishness’ were still in place when it came to harmonisation at 
the EU-level. 
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5.1.2.1 Institutional structure 
The United Kingdom has a Westminster-based unitary government system working to the 
principles of parliamentary democracy and holding responsibilities devolved to the Scottish 
Government in Edinburgh, the Welsh Assembly Government in Cardiff and the Northern 
Ireland Executive in Belfast. There are in accordance with this semi-autonomous governing 
structure three main legal systems: the English law applying in England and Wales, the Scots 
law in Scotland and Northern Ireland law in Northern Ireland. The judiciary of the UK is not 
constituted by a single body but instead separate legal systems in these regions. The broader 
jurisdiction belongs to Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, the Special Immigration 
Appeals Commission, Employment Tribunals and Employment Appeal Tribunal (UK 
Government Cabinet Office, National Archives, 2007). Although the UK Parliament and 
Government at Westminster are responsible for all ‘reserved’ matters for Scotland and 
Northern Ireland, such as local government, justice, agriculture, education and health, and all 
‘non-transferred’ matters for Wales, like public expenditure, law and order, they do not deal 
with issues concerning for instance tax collection or police services devolved generally to the 
Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales and Northern Ireland Assembly (UK 
Government, Cabinet Office, National Archives, 2010). 
 
The political system involves representation of local constituencies in the House of Commons 
through election of parliament members and a government. The three main political parties 
that came to rule throughout most of British political life are the Labour Party, the 
Conservatives (Tories) and the Liberal Democrats. There is further to the elected House of 
Commons also the House of Lords, which makes up the unelected chamber of the Parliament. 
Choosing ministers from both chambers, the Prime Minister seeks to rule the government 
activity with the aid of the non-partisan UK Civil Service. For each policy area, there are 
Parliamentary Select Committees which lobby for their constituencies and/or certain interest 
groups. 
 
The chief government department in charge of immigration (and asylum) policy is the Home 
Office led by the Home Secretary (representing the Home Department) who works in 
collaboration with a Minister of State to structure government policy in accordance with the 
ideological commitments of the party in power (voiced often as ‘manifestos’). The branch of 
the Home Office that regulates non-British citizens’ all bureaucratic formalities -as far as their 
entry and stay in the UK is concerned- is the UK Border Agency (UKBA). The UKBA is in 
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this sense a shadow agency of the Home Office responsible for the prevention of illegal 
immigration and maintenance of controls at borders (entry ports).
151
 According to the 2007 
UK Borders Act, the border control is carried out largely by the UKBA’s Immigration 
Officers rather than direct police involvement. Working in cooperation with the UKBA, a 
number of separately elected Local Councillors are in charge of immigration matters. 
 
The current legal framework pertaining to immigration is based on the 1971 Immigration Act, 
which underwent a series of amendments through the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act, the 
2002 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act, the 2004 Asylum and Immigration Act, the 
2006 Immigration and Nationality Act, the 2007 UK Borders Act and finally 2009 Borders, 
Citizenship and Immigration Act. Besides a host of statutory instruments making up 
secondary legislation together with the EU-sourced regulations and directives, a rich reservoir 
of case law is ordered by the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal and Special Immigration 
Appeals Commission to govern the complex network of immigration policy-making and 
practice in the UK. 
 
5.1.2.2 Actors involved in immigration management 
According to the 1971 Immigration Act,
152
 rules concerning immigration matters are 
generally characterised by the Home Secretary following approval of both chambers of the 
Parliament. Added to that, the Home Secretary is entitled to exert his/her sole initiative in 
certain individual cases, bearing in mind the courts’ supervision may cause restrictions in 
practice. Other than the Home Secretary, the State Secretary for borders and immigration is 
the other top-rank bureaucrat responsible for the UKBA at the ministry level. Employed by 
the UKBA and appointed by the State Secretary, Immigration Officers are entitled to the 
examination of entry clearances besides their monitoring duties like arresting those in case of 
breach of law. As part of the UKBA, the Entry Clearance Officers (ECOs) working at Visa 
Services of British Missions are at the helm of granting visas.
153
 In cases where cooperation 
with a neighbouring country is required, the controlling activity is performed at the 
concerning foreign port. 
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 It brings together the tasks carried out previously (before 2008) by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s 
UK Visa Services, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and the Border and Immigration Agency. 
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 The relevant sections are 1(4) and 3(2). 
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 One needs to make sure at this point that arrival and entry are under British law not regarded as the same 
concepts. If a case is a ‘leave to enter’, it is usually the Immigration Officer at the UK port of entry who grants 
the visa. 
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Administration of asylum issues belonged previously to the National Asylum Support Service 
(NASS) which worked as part of the former Immigration and Nationality Directorate (IND). 
Despite continuing reference to NASS across the Home Office, it was actually disbanded in 
2006 transferring its functions to numerous UKBA units such as the Casework Resolution 
Directorate (CRD), which is in charge of handling old cases, and the office of the New 
Asylum Model (NAM), which processes asylum claims. Asylum applications are made to 
Immigration Officers either while or after crossing into the UK territory. On entry, asylum-
seekers are required to apply for ‘leave to enter’ the UK in return for which they are either 
detained during the course of application or granted temporary admission. 
 
For statutory instruments, the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (AIT), being an executive 
agency as part of the Ministry of Justice, hears to adjudicate cases appealed by the Secretary 
of State in a ‘fast-track procedure’. A Chief Inspector is in charge of monitoring the AIT’s 
deeds. The appeals governed by the AIT concern the decision of granting leave to enter or 
remain. For claims of unfair denial of support, the First-tier Tribunal (formerly knowns as the 
Asylum Support Tribunal) is responsible. For detention purposes, a number of non-official 
security firms are authorised by the UK Border Agency. These firms cooperate with 
airline/carrier companies which are officially required to contribute to the security process by 
checking visas and passports. 
 
Aside from these main actors, there are also a number of international stakeholders which 
have fundamental roles in immigration management. Two such leading organisations are the 
UNHCR, i.e. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (which working in close 
cooperation with the UK Government is in charge of protecting the rights of refugees and 
improving asylum conditions) and the IOM, International Organisation for Migration, which 
also works closely with the British government to advise on matters relating to asylum-
seekers’ voluntary return to their country of origin. 
 
Other key non-governmental organisations that contribute to the making and application of 
immigration policy are the International Centre for Migration Policy Development, Chatham 
House and the Refugee Council. As far as legal advice to asylum-seekers is concerned, 
several charity organisations such as the Refugee Legal Centre, the Immigration Law 
Practitioners’ Association, the Immigration Advisory Service and Asylum Aid have 
fundamental duties. Besides government units which provide statistical and other relevant 
130 
knowledge database like the Home Office’s Research Development Statistics Directorate 
(which works as part of the UKBA), and the Analysis, Research and Knowledge Management 
Directorate, there are also research centers which make publications on immigration and 
asylum issues like the Refugee Study Centre and Information Centre about Asylum and 
Refugees as well as academic units such as the University of Oxford’s Centre on Migration, 
Policy and Society (COMPAS) and the University of Sussex’s Centre for Migration Research. 
 
5.1.2.3 National immigration laws and policies in historical perspective 
The historical turn in making the United Kingdom a country of immigration dates back to the 
post-war period when large waves of immigrants from former colonies began to come for 
labour purposes. This large-scale move was backed up by entry and citizenship priorities 
specific to the Commonwealth citizens, who in the post-war period were not labeled 
straightforward as ‘aliens’, for their accession to the UK was subject to entry clearance. This 
was indeed a response to British labour shortages at the time, which was well-received by a 
large-scale supply up to the early 1960s, when such labour demands took a twist to fall and 
public opposition to immigration rose considerably. 
 
While the predominantly Conservative-led governments sought in this era to attract foreign 
labour for the purpose of restoring Britain’s war-stricken infrastructure, a fundamental drive 
lying behind was the UK’s ‘superpower image’ which by reinforcing links with the newly 
independent ex-colonies (mostly of Commonwealth nations) could be revitalised to a certain 
extent. Supported by a citizenship regime
154
 which was in favour of further inflows until the 
1960s, migration remained usually in reasonable margins, as proportional to labour market 
needs. The succeeding Labour government did not fully back immigrant import when it most 
importantly passed the 1968 Commonwealth Immigrant Act, which introduced under the 
guise of ‘partiality’ a racialised division between Commonwealth citizens (Sales, 2007). With 
this Act, the Commonwealth citizens were stripped of the right to free movement (to the UK) 
with the exception of those born in the country or with British passports (Herlitz, 2005). 
 
The replacement of the Labour government by the Conservatives in 1970 was informed 
largely by the latter’s election campaign promising to carry out reforms in the immigration 
law and terminate the ongoing immigration waves in particular from the New Commonwealth 
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 According to the 1948 British Nationality Act (BNA), nationals of the former colonies were entitled to British 
citizenship and entry rights even if they were officially treated as permanent residents in these lands. 
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(Hampshire, 2005). With specific provisions to make changes to that effect, a new act was 
enshrined into the UK law in 1971. The 1971 Immigration Act imposed restrictions regarding 
family reunification as well. To the 1982 House of Commons archives, the number of the 
Commonwealth immigrants fell between 1971 and 1980 from an estimate 126,000 to 87,000 
(Herlitz, 2005, p. 18). Interestingly, the entry into force of the new Act in 1973 synchronised 
with the UK’s accession to the EC, making way for the communitarisation of the British 
labour markets, providing EEC citizens with free movement, as envisaged by the provisions 
of the 1957 Rome Treaty, yet lifting on the other side the same privileges granted formerly to 
the Commonwealth citizens. Upon new concerns at the labour market, the Thatcher 
government launched the 1981 British Nationality Act to bring forward a new understanding 
of British citizenship. As of 1983, accordingly, the old citizenship status of ‘the Citizens of 
the United Kingdom and Commonwealth’ was replaced with ‘the Citizens of the United 
Kingdom and Others’. Much in the same vein, the jus soli principle enabling automatic 
citizenship to UK born children (which was in force since the 1914 British Nationality Act) 
turned to the jus sanguinis “to maintain the alien status of generations of immigrant families 
born in the host country” (Schain, 2008, p. 12). 
 
Concerns about rising numbers of asylum-seekers
155
 and refugees gave way to a new 
Immigration Act in 1988 and with that visa controls for nationals of India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nigeria and Ghana (as part of the Commonwealth). While the higher 
rates in the 1990s stemmed essentially from family reunification and settlement, a national 
policy on asylum/refugee matters was at the time still out of sight.
156
 To this end, the 
Conservative government introduced in 1996 the Asylum and Immigration Act to stop the 
growing influxes.
157
 The new Act put into use additional provisions from the 1993 Asylum 
and Immigration Appeals Act, such as restriction of social benefits and abolition of the right 
to permanent accommodation for refugees. To raise efficiency in a number of areas from 
economic migration to border control, the subsequent Labour government took measures like 
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 The area of asylum was not a major concern in the 1971 Immigration Act. This was possibly because the 
average annual entry of asylum applications until the 1990s remained around a relatively low number of 10,000 
(in comparison to many other leading immigration countries). As the figures came to rise to 70,000s in 1991, a 
full body of legislation was worked out on asylum issues, paving the way through the 1993 and 1996 Asylum 
and Immigration Appeals Act for the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act, which all introduced new procedures 
on cases of appeal, conditions of support and enforcement. Despite surging numbers (of 100,000s) in the early 
2000s, claims for asylum started to fall in the second half to some 30,000 at most (UK Home Office, 2009). 
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 The perception of the immigrants by the host society as competitors for social services and rare jobs peaked 
in this period. 
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 Meanwhile, the 1951 Geneva Convention was incorporated partially into the Immigration Rules. 
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lowering incentives for labour import and doing away with welfare benefits for asylum-
seekers. Further to the establishment of the NASS (National Asylum Support System), to be 
in charge of a stricter control of asylum applications, the police officers became authorised to 
detain and arrest asylum-seekers in cases when their applications had no valid grounds. 
 
While the 1951 Geneva Convention (on the status of refugees) was not entirely transferred 
into the British law, there were references to it for instance in the 1993 and 1996 Asylum and 
Immigration Appeals Act, the 2002 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, the 2004 
Asylum and Immigration Act, the 2006 Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act and the 
2006 Regulations (concerning the cases of refugees and persons in need of humanitarian 
protection) together with the Immigration Rules. Cases falling into the area of human rights 
were supported by the introduction of the 1998 Human Rights Act. With that, treatment of 
migrants became recognised as a subject of the ECHR (European Convention on Human 
Rights).
158
 
 
The number of foreign workers contributing to UK labour force coupled in recent times. As 
part of national schemes to enforce more influential policy measures in this context, the 
British Parliament passed in 2007 the UK Borders Act. Through this one of the two chief 
legislation documents concerning immigration in present day UK (the other being the 2009 
Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act), the UKBA’s authority was expanded to help 
combat illegal labour by for instance allowing for automatic deportation of foreigners in case 
of imprisonment for more than one year or criminal offences such as drug dealing, rape and 
manslaughter. Besides several quasi-police powers provided for immigration officers during 
search, entry and increased detention under an ‘e-borders’ programme (introducing further 
use of technological methods such as biometric identity cards), the new act also made room 
for a points-based system to encourage skilled labour import.
159
 
 
Following the 2008 Immigration and Citizenship Bill designed to overhaul and simplify the 
immigration law, the 2009 Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act was adopted as the 
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 Incorporation of the Human Rights Act into the UK law suggested that asylum claims be now made under the 
ECHR’s Article 3 concerning actions against degrading treatment like torture. According to the 1993 Asylum 
and Immigration Appeals Act, which covered the cases of refugees in Sections 1 and 2, immigration rules could 
not stand in contradiction with the Geneva Convention. 
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 This was a five-tier points-based system designed to make the long immigration process simpler by enforcing 
single application to replace all schemes concerning entry clearance and work permit. The so-called five tiers 
were the highly skilled (tier one), skilled with job offer (tier two), low skilled (tier three), students (tier four) and 
temporary workers/youth mobility (tier five). 
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second chief document of contemporary immigration legislation. Accordingly, immigration 
officers became entitled to perform revenue and customs duties in border issues, leaving the 
department of HMRC (Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs) to take care of internal revenue 
and customs affairs. Other than these, the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act brought 
in also new citizenship rules. Tying foreign nationals’ eligibility for naturalisation to an eight- 
or five-year (in cases of marriage) permanent residence, the Act introduced the ‘probationary 
citizenship leave’ as a new temporary ‘leave to remain’ category with which immigrants 
would provisionally be denied access to labour markets and welfare benefits. What’s more, 
the new Act assigned the Secretary of State a duty ‘to safeguard and promote’ the welfare of 
children. Here, automatic British nationality was granted to UK born children provided one of 
the parents was a Commonwealth citizen or a foreign BAF (British Armed Forces) member. 
 
Although citizenship provisions in the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act were to 
come into force as of July 2011, the newly elected coalition government did not opt to go 
ahead with the scheme declaring its wish to reduce the number of immigrants from third 
countries. The new Home Secretary launched to this end reform plans to bring in a type of 
immigration quota.
160
 As of April 2012, following this move, a number of changes were 
introduced to the Immigration Rules under the points-based system (tiers 1, 2, 4 and 5). In 
effect, access to student visa regulations, for instance, became tighter than before.
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5.1.2.4 Citizenship and naturalisation policies 
Third-country nationals’ access to British citizenship was until recent times far more liberal 
than it is at present. As of the early 2000s, a broadly conservative frame of mind came to 
introduce further restrictive changes to naturalisation, following the progressive rise of 
immigrants and asylum-seekers.
162
 While a counter-immigration attitude during the 
parliamentary discussions of the 2002 Nationality, Asylum and Immigration Law was largely 
specific to the Conservative Party, the debates concerning the 2006 Immigration, Asylum and 
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 While the Home Office sought to make fundamental changes to the student visa system after detecting 
‘widespread abuse’ in the points-based system’s Tier 4, there were also intentions to curb non-EU rooted 
economic migration by revising Tiers 1 and 2 as well as plans to reform the routes to family reunification. 
161
 For those applying for student visas or degree programmes in the UK, for instance, the required English 
proficiency score went up from a minimum B1 intermediate level of English (according to the Common 
European Framework of Reference for Languages, CEFR) to B2 upper intermediate level. To the coalition 
government's compromise package, there would with such changes be reportedly more than 25% fall on the 
number of foreign students coming to Britain each year (Travis, 2011). 
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 As a matter of fact, such discourses were formerly part of the UK’s post-war immigration policy as well, most 
notably under the Conservative Governments in the early 1970s. 
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Nationality and the 2009 Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Laws indicated a surge of 
anti-immigration rhetoric at a greater platform (UK Parliament, 2005a: c. 275; 2009b: c. 190, 
193, 207; 2009e: 1172). In consequence, requirements in the naturalisation context became far 
more demanding in a ‘firm-but-fair system’ (UK Parliament, 2009b, c. 174; 2009e, c. 1130-
1131). 
 
Given its long colonial/post-colonial relations with the Commonwealth countries, the UK has 
often been quite diffident in developing “a free-standing citizenship policy” (Williams, 2010, 
p. 10). Granting naturalisation today on the basis of marriage, registration of minor children 
according to a parent’s nationality or residence permits given to refugees and highly skilled 
TCN workers is from this perspective quite reasonable (Danzelman, 2009). More on that, 
informed by a number of external factors such as the 2001 airliner attacks in the USA and the 
2005 London bombings, the UK came to adopt a far stricter outlook to language and 
integration regulations in recent times. 
 
Current application of third-country nationals for citizenship in the UK starts by contacting 
the UK Border Agency. The initial step involves showing in person provided the applicant has 
completed 18 years of age (UK Border Agency, 2012). Eligibility for naturalisation requires 
having a ‘sound mind’, ‘good character’, ‘lawful residence’ (of five years, in normal 
circumstances, or three years in the case of being ‘married or in a civil partnership with a 
British citizen’), adequate knowledge of English, Welsh or Scottish Gaelic as well as ‘life in 
the UK’ and intention for a predominantly UK-based residence. Following the enquiry 
procedure, which may possibly include the applicant’s interview by the police or any other 
state official, the Home Office declares its final decision on the naturalisation process. 
 
5.1.3 Greece 
 
Table 18: Basic migration statistics 
Net migration (2009) 27,000 
TCN immigration (2008) 49,035 
Largest third countries of origin (2008) Albania, Ukraine, Georgia 
Third-country nationals population (2009) 767,919 
TCN as part of population (2009) 6.80% 
Foreign-born as part of population (2009) 8.30% 
Permits delivered for family (2009) 22,637 
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Permits delivered for work (2009) 16,383 
Permits delivered for study (2009) 1,489 
Permits delivered for humanitarian reasons (2009) 1,275 
TCN employment rate (2009, change since 2006) 66.60%; -1.3% 
National employment rate (2009, change since 2006) 61.20%; +0.2% 
TCN unemployment rate (2009, change since 2006) 10.30%; +2.3% 
National unemployment rate (2009, change since 2006) 9.50%; +0.6% 
Nationality acquisitions (2008, change since 2004) 16,920; 15,024 
Source: MIPEX III. 
 
Immigration is not a long-established policy field in Greece. As the country was until recent 
times rather a ‘sending’ one, the introduction of a comprehensive policy area on immigration 
matters does not date back to more than a couple of decades ago. To the latest statistics, that 
said, stocks of foreign population in Greece have been on the rise: 
 
Table 19: Stocks of foreign population in Greece 
of total 
population 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
in thousands 356 437 473 533 553 570 643 734 840 810 757 
in percentages  3.2 4.0 4.3 4.8 5.0 5.1 5.7 6.5 7.4 7.2 6.7 
All thousands are rounded off to the nearest value. 
Source: OECD (2011b). 
 
Indeed, with the fall of the Iron Curtain, large numbers of immigrants from the Balkans as 
well as some former Soviet states took to the destination of many politically and economically 
well-off (mainly EU) countries, one of which was Greece. The Greek share from this mobility 
was in rough terms some 630,000 people marking a gigantic rise from an estimate 167,000 
foreign residents up to around 797,000 (Kasimis & Kassimi, 2004). Judging by around 
10,250,000 Greek population in 1991 and 10,950,000 in 2001 (according to the 1991 and 
2001 censuses, respectively), one can argue that the percentage of foreign nationals residing 
in Greece amounted in time to just under 10 percent of the entire Greek population,
163
 which 
indeed marks the highest rise of immigration amongst the EU lands in this period 
(Avramopoulou et al., 2005, p. 2). The results of the latest 2011 census revealed that the 
population of Greece turned to 10,787,690, a figure marking about 1.6% fall in comparison to 
that of 2001.
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 According to the 2011 OECD Report on International Migration Trends, 57% of this entire immigrant profile 
was constituted by Albanian citizens. 
164
 To the Hellenic Statistical Authority, the methodology followed during the 2011 census was in line with the 
new EU regulation, to make a difference from the earlier ones for the first time. Counted here was the de facto 
population, i.e. those with permanent residences and who are available during the census, rather than those who 
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In retrospect, the migrant flows to Greece were of a larger scale. Some 1.4 million people 
from the Balkans/Turkey and about 350,000 others from mainly Turkey and Egypt came here 
with the end of the Balkan Wars and in the period after the Second World War (Gropas & 
Triandafyllidou, 2007, p. 141). For that, however, the unfavourable political and economic 
conditions up to the 1980s urged a growing number of nationals to leave the country, most 
notably for countries like the USA, the UK, Germany and Australia. 
 
Current immigration profile in Greece is characterised mainly by low-skilled foreign workers, 
who kept coming in big waves regardless of the overwhelming red-tape requirements. The 
growth of Greek labour market demands was obviously a major reason behind these flows. 
And it was for the main actors of economy here, who were chiefly small- and medium-sized 
family businesses, common practice to search for cheap labour, albeit with some 40% loss 
this would suggest for the GDP (Gropas & Triandafyllidou, 2005, pp. 11-12). 
 
A further factor to consider in the entire Greek immigration context is the weak public 
discourse. As “stakeholders and operators (such as migrants’ associations and specialised 
NGOs) are left out of the dialogue about migration policies and legislation” (Avramopoulou 
et al., 2005, p. 1), there is more elbow room for illegal entries here, for which the 
geographical position serves ideal conditions (with some 6,000 big- and small-sized islands 
and 16,000 km long maritime borders), making the country in this sense one of the front-line 
gateways to the EU.
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As Greece was all but prepared for the growing inflows in recent times, attitudes towards 
immigration turned increasingly negative. The issue from the perspective of an average Greek 
citizen is today almost equivalent with unemployment or criminality (Zarafonitou, 2009). A 
survey conducted in the early 2000s demonstrated that 69% of the nationals viewed 
immigrants to be threatening for –or at least non-conforming to- the Greek way of life, 
placing the country in this category on top of all Member States: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
could be present at a particular location during the count. This statistical method ruled out automatically recently 
arrived immigrants with no permanent legal residence in Greece. In any case, as the Hellenic Statistical 
Authority has not released further details on immigration data, it would at this stage be premature to make 
comments on the course of immigration. 
165
 To the Greek Police, most illegal immigrants come by way of Albania, FYROM, Bulgaria and Turkey. 
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Table 20: Greek citizens regarding immigrants as a threat to their way of life (in percentages) 
Responses (options) Greece EU 15 
Totally agree 35 16 
Tend to agree 34 26 
Tend to disagree 21 30 
Totally disagree 7 18 
Don’t know 3 10 
Source: Special Eurobarometer Wave 60.1 
 
Since this tendency was also illustrative of the political elite’s position, the official response 
was for the most part search for ‘zero immigration’ policies, which indeed was firmly 
embraced until the end of the 1990s. Legislative action throughout this period aimed as a 
matter of course at measures such as “controlling external borders; restricting immigration of 
third-country nationals of non-Greek ethnic origin; safeguarding internal security; and 
ﬁghting illegal immigration” by “granting full responsibility for managing the status and 
rights of aliens to the Ministry of Public Order” (Mavrodi, 2007, p. 157). While there have 
since then been signs of liberalisation, in compliance with the EU harmonisation goals in this 
policy field, the extent of approximation has often remained limited with respect to the social, 
political and economic conjuncture in the country. 
 
5.1.3.1 Institutional structure 
(The Hellenic Republic of) Greece is a parliamentary democracy where the executive power 
is exercised by the elected government and the president at the highest official level. The 
president’s duties are largely ceremonial, leaving political power primarily in the hands of the 
prime minister. The legislative powers belong to the unicameral parliament, which from 
1967-1974 was controlled by the military junta. The current constitution regulating the 
political structure came into force in 1975, with the end of the junta period. The judiciary 
system is made up of three Supreme Courts (the Council of State, the Court of Cassation and 
the Court of Auditors), a number of administrative and civil courts (The Constitution of 
Greece, 2001). 
 
Politics of immigration as understood in conventional terms is to be secured by the judiciary 
power without being subject to public leverage (Soysal, 1994). The competences of the courts 
in the Greek case have however proved to be somewhat limited so far, when compared in 
particular to those of the executive. The socialist Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) 
and the conservative New Democracy (ND) as the mainstream political parties came to hold 
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deep-rooted powers, which became even more chronic following the junta constitution. It is 
indeed this long-lasting legacy that came to be decisive for the appointment of judiciary posts 
and recruitment of technocrats through political parties, not by means of civil service as in 
many democracies elsewhere. A cursory look at the administrative arrangements throughout 
the 1981-1989 and 1990-1992 periods reveals that many posts in the civil service structure 
became occupied on the basis of party loyalty (Sotiropoulos, 1993). 
 
While this system is reminiscent on one hand of a ‘cartel party’ model166 in which the 
authority of one-party prevails across the entire political spectrum (Katz & Mair, 1995), the 
Greek system fits in fact hardly to such a pronouncement, owing to bitter competition ruling 
party politics. Nevertheless, the prevailing party power over the post-dictatorship period 
helped detour challenges/obstacles before government bills quite straightforwardly. 
Regardless of the fact that a somewhat poor judicial configuration has left the executive rule 
often unchecked, a prominent character of the political scene in Greece has been ‘client 
politics’. This feature comes as a consequence of the political elite’s close affiliation with the 
private sector which often led to various corruption practices such as tax evasion and labour 
fraud (Inman, 2012). 
 
With this nature of domestic politics in order, the course of Greek immigration policies has in 
the general run of things introduced weak outcomes for the TCNs. Each time a government 
attempted to initiate reforms, the chronic attributes of the party system struck back, 
consolidating the already intermingled political class and business interests. In recent times, 
however, this status-quo appeared to inflict serious losses. The two electoral contests in 2012 
after five years of economic recession and political uncertainty brought about dormant 
cleavages between for instance the rural and the urban, the old and the young and the tax 
evaders and tax payers. The rising popular discontent with the recently announced austerity 
measures reinvigorated the formerly marginal anti-bailout parties to attain high scores. In the 
end, the traditional PASOK/New Democracy dominance appeared to be shattered by the 
remarkable success of minor parties.
167
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 The criteria for this model as offered by Pempel (1990) apply in particular to PASOK’s composition. 
167
 The major highlight of the May 2014 EP elections was SYRIZA, which as a coalition of the left-wing 
fractions took advantage of the deep fissures in the resigning PASOK government. A similar success was valid 
also for the Golden Dawn (of the right extremists) while the anti-European Communist Party (KKE) suffered big 
electoral losses. 
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5.1.3.2 Actors involved in immigration management 
According to Act 3386/2005, entry to Greek territory is subject to the authority of the 
Ministry of Interior and its departments, most notably the Hellenic Police. All entries through 
airports, sea ports and terrestrial checkpoints are coordinated primarily by the Ministries of 
Interior, Foreign Affairs, National Defense, Justice, Economy, Transport and Mercantile 
Marine.
168
 Conditions and procedures concerning all visas and entry clearances are 
determined by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
169
 While these are as a rule of thumb issued by 
the Greek Consular Offices in the countries of residence, passport control officers at entry 
gates are charged with similar duties. 
 
Issuance of work permits/allowance for financial activities in Greece is subject to the 
initiative of the Board of Labour Inspectors, which works under the Ministry of Employment 
and Social Protection. Application for residence permits (concerning both issuance and 
renewal) is made at the Prefectures/Municipalities of residence. Here, the administrative 
authorities make an initial analysis of the concerning application and extend it to the 
Foreigners and Immigration Service of the Regions,
170
 which has an option to invite the 
applicant for an interview prior to that of the Immigration Committee. Following the 
Immigration Committee’s decision, the Secretary General of the Region issues the residence 
permit. 
 
For asylum matters, the Presidential Decree 220/2007 defines the Hellenic Police as the 
responsible authority for processing asylum applications. The police units assigned 
specifically for this area are the Asylum Departments of the Aliens Police, the Security 
Departments of the State Airports and the Security Divisions and Sub-divisions of the Police 
Department. The main decision-maker for entitlement of asylum is the Director of the Aliens 
Division. Following that as a second authority is the Recourse Committee working under the 
Ministry of Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation. The Recourse Committee’s 
decision is up to the confirmation of the Minister of Interior, Administration and 
Decentralisation who may declare an accepted asylum application void, should the occasion 
arise. A final authority accountable for the granting of asylum is the Council of State. The so-
called Hospitality Centers reserved specifically for asylum-seekers work as part of the 
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 To these ministries, one can also add the Ministry of Public Order, which was abolished between 2007 and 
2009 to work under the Ministry of the Interior as a General Secretariat.  
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 Act 3386/2005, Article 6 (7). 
170
 The state structure is divided further into Regions and Prefectures. 
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Ministry of Health and Social Solidarity. Added to that, the Greek Council for the Refugees 
provides asylum-seekers and refugees with social services and consultation, to which the 
Greek Ombudsman may additionally advise for legal support. Much in the same context, the 
National Commission for Human Rights acts as a supervisory board to observe grey areas of 
legislation in terms of human rights and international law. 
 
Access to Greek citizenship starts by application at the residence community/municipality. 
With an attachment of important supplementary documentation including proof of identity, 
residence permit and criminal record, the concerning application is then forwarded to the 
Prefecture, which depending on the result of the examination may involve an interview, as a 
further step, to be taking place at the Ministry of Interior’s Naturalisation Committee.171 The 
last and absolute decision-maker in the Greek citizenship process is the Minister of the 
Interior. 
 
In view of lack of social research constituting a big gap in the poor management of 
immigration policies, the Greek state has for some time been funding and supervising a 
number of institutes such as IMEPO (Migration Policy Institute) and EKKE (the National 
Centre for Social Research), in quest of constructive/informative statistical data in this 
context. While IMEPO initiates on that score comparative research amongst the EU Member 
States as far as immigrants’ education, welfare and health levels or their participation at 
labour markets are concerned, EKKE provides in-depth analyses on national contribution to 
the European Social Survey by compiling research on legislation and stakeholders 
(Avramopoulou et al., 2005, p. 13). 
 
There are further than these a number of non-governmental national/international 
organisations taking part in immigration management. The Recourse Committee for instance 
informs the UNCHR about asylum cases. The UNCHR monitors here not only domestic 
applications in relation to asylum-seekers and refugees but also organises seminars for Greek 
institutions like the Police Authorities and provides financial support for the schools in this 
scheme. 
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 According to Act 3284/2004, the main requirements of Greek citizenship for a third-country national are 
being an adult, having legal residence in Greece for 10 years (or for 5 years if the applicant holds an officially 
recognised refugee status), not having a criminal record for more than one year and demonstrating adequate 
knowledge of Greek language, culture and history. 
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5.1.3.3 National immigration laws and policies in historical perspective 
As previously indicated, large waves of immigration to Greece in the late 1980s were 
illustrative of an untimely happening which caught the state officials unprepared. The first 
comprehensive Greek law on immigration matters was formulated in 1991. With its title ‘on 
the entry, exit, sojourn, employment, removal of aliens, procedure for the recognition of 
refugees and other measures’, this new law (1975/1991) sought in the first place to facilitate 
the removal of illegal entrants and stop economic immigration for the general purpose of 
‘zero immigration policy’. While the law focused fundamentally on prevention and settlement 
of undocumented immigration, it also aimed to align with the 1985 Schengen Treaty and the 
1990 Dublin Convention (ratified in the same year as Law 1996/1991). 
 
As the 1990s saw no major decline in the size and pace of illegal immigration, two 
presidential decrees (358/1997 and 359/1997) were introduced to make way for a 
regularisation programme.
172
 Upon weak success owing to state services’ organisational 
problems in coping with the reception and examination of an increasing number of 
applications –with almost 372,000 immigrants applying for the white card and 213,000 for the 
green card (Gropas & Triandafillidou, 2005, p. 35)- the second regularisation programme was 
presented in 2001 (in support of Law 2910/2001) aiming most notably at those excluded in 
the first programme. With its supplementary theme of ‘naturalisation and other measures’, the 
new law had a more liberal nature to cope with immigration issues in the long run. To this 
end, it contained provisions on legal immigration areas such as family reunion, education and 
employment, as well as conditions of asylum seeking, other than tightening border controls. 
Following that, shortly, some 362,000 immigrants applied for legal residence (Gropas & 
Triandafillidou, 2005, p. 36). As part of the same scheme, a three-year action plan (the Action 
Plan for the Social Integration of Immigrants) was introduced in the same year to take effect 
for the 2002-2005 period. Measures taken in this connection were mostly relating to 
immigrants’ access to labour markets and health services as well as xenophobic/racist 
tendencies against them. Since these provisions were not fully implemented (Cholezas & 
Tsakloglou, 2008), a supplementary act (Act 3202/2003) was launched upon consultations 
with the NGOs, trade unions and the Greek Ombudsman, in the first place, to introduce a 
series of amendments as of 2004. 
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 Within the framework of this first regularisation programme, the so-called white card (officially known as 
Temporary Residence Permit Card) and the green card, allowing a limited duration of residence, were 
introduced. 
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With its fairly intricate administrative procedure regulating most notably the areas of 
education and employment, the 2001 law is usually regarded as a turning point for the history 
of immigration policies in Greece. It was indeed the first comprehensive migration law 
initiated by the government on the basis of an action plan and backed up financially by the 
European Commission and the European Social Fund. That said, failure to manage 
particularly economic immigration and illegal entries soon gave rise to a new law (3386/2005) 
updating the former legal provisions and incorporating the EU Directives 2003/109/EC 
(relating to the status of long-term residents) and 2003/86/EC (concerning the right to family 
reunification) into the domestic law. With Act 3386/2005, third-country nationals’ entry, 
residence and social integration to the host society were further revised to introduce a number 
of changes such as putting an end to separate work/residence permits and increasing 
application costs from €150 up to €450 depending on the duration of stay.173 
 
The 2005 Law regulated also conditions of financial investment in Greece. To Articles 24-27, 
those investing a minimum amount of €300,000 in Greece would be granted an unlimited 
residence permit or a limited one in the case of €60,000 investment for independent financial 
activities. Added to that was the development in another important area, namely protection 
against human trafficking, the details of which were presented in Articles 46-52. Moving on, 
Articles 53-60 were covering the provisions on the right to family reunification and Articles 
67-69 regulating the status of long-term residents in conformity with the EU Directives 
2003/86/EC and 2003/109/EC. Accordingly, the main requirement for long-term residence 
was the basic knowledge of the Greek history, language and culture. 
 
The deportation procedure in Act 3386/2005 was defined in Article 76, while Article 84 
banned undocumented foreign nationals from access to social security and public services, 
with the exception of hospital services in emergency cases. Children of these non-nationals 
were exempted from any form of legal status through Law 2910/2001. While Act 3386/2005 
is today still in force, it has seen a number of amendments within the framework of Act 
3536/2007. Article 18 of this latter act introduced a small-scale regularisation programme on 
residence permits, modifying specifically conditions of renewal and waiver of application 
charges for under-age children. 
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 Following reactions by several NGOs, these costs became later inclusive of dependent family members. 
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For the regulation of asylum matters in particular, the legal origins date back again to Law 
1975/1991, which following several revisions such as the Presidential Decree 83/1993 took a 
final form and went into force in 1996 to accord domestic asylum policies with the 1990 
Dublin Convention and the Community legislation. Following this move, a number of other 
Presidential Decrees envisaged improvement of asylum matters, most importantly Presidential 
Decree 189/1998, which sought to grant the right to employment for refugees and asylum-
seekers, Presidential Decree 61/1999 on the ‘Procedure of Recognition of a foreign refugee, 
withdrawal of recognition and deportation, entry of family members and ways of cooperation 
with the Representative of the UN High Commission for the refugees in Greece’, Presidential 
Decree 220/2007 on the ‘Adaptation of the Hellenic Legislation to the provisions of Council 
Directive 2003/9/EC, regarding the minimum requirements for the reception of asylum-
seekers in member states’, Presidential Decree 96/2008 on the ‘Adaptation of the Hellenic 
Legislation to the provisions of the Council Directive 2004/83/ΕC for the establishment of 
minimal requirements for the recognition and the status of nationals of third countries or 
stateless as refugees or as persons that require international protection for other reasons’ and 
Presidential Decree 90/2008 on the ‘Adaptation of the Greek Legislation to the provisions of 
Council Directive 2005/85/EK with regard to the minimal specifications on the procedures 
under which the member states grant and recall the status of refugee’ (European Migration 
Network, 2008, pp. 15-16). 
 
With the entry into force of the Dublin II Regulation in 2003, Greece became accountable for 
processing asylum applications in the first country of entry into the EU. Bearing in mind that 
it was for asylum-seekers already a major gateway to the EU
174
, the Dublin II prompted a big 
rise of returned asylum-seekers in Greece. To reform the asylum system further, the Greek 
Parliament passed in 2011 a new law changing the location of refugees’ first contact from the 
police to civilian organisations and introducing a new appeals system. A first system of 
reception and decentralised offices was drawn up in this framework depending on the 
availability of financial resources. 
 
In 2011, a further immigration law was passed in the Greek Parliament. Besides significant 
reforms such as incorporation of the EU ‘Return Directive’ into the domestic legislation, the 
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 Council Regulation No 343/2003. 
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new law introduced biometric residence permits to align with the EC Regulations 1030/2002 
and 380/2008
175
 and replaced the Municipality Offices as the former places of application for 
non-EEA national permits with ‘One-Stop’ local administration centers. For the 
implementation of these provisions, the Greek Government cautioned that there might be 
possible delays, particularly in view of the newly launched national austerity plans, which had 
recently introduced a set of strict economic measures such as cutting down on government 
staff.  
 
5.1.3.4 Citizenship and naturalisation laws in Greece 
For most of the Greek nation-building history, most importantly as of the independence 
movements from the Ottoman Empire in the first half of the 19
th
 century, the nationality laws 
and policies largely followed ethnocentric lines. Granting citizenship rights since then almost 
exclusively to those with an ethnic descent, “the development of Greek institutions and legal 
norms has systematically privileged the interests of national unity often at the expense of the 
rights of individuals and minorities” (Anagnostou, 2011, p. 1). This frame of mind on the 
basis of a homogeneous nation-state was sustained in the post-WW II period during attempts 
to reinforce external borders and form new democratic institutions. Allocation of citizenship 
rights according to parental descent for instance continued up to the collapse of the junta 
regime in 1974, which despite large-scale political moves to restore democracy introduced no 
major changes as far as restrictions on minority rights were concerned (Howard, 2006). While 
there were reform packages concerning nationality laws and policies in the meantime (which 
apparently challenged the formerly restrictive policies), the main objectives these were 
seeking concerned ‘re-ethnicisation’ schemes, questing for mainly homogenes (those with 
Greek origins) but not allogenes (non-ethnic Greeks) of any kind, be they newly immigrated 
TCNs or minorities with long residential past in Greece. The state authorities aimed to lower 
in contrast the rising number of naturalisation applications in recent times, by way of for 
instance imposing application fees or lengthier residence requirements (Christopoulos, 2010). 
 
Since the 1990s, however, the Greek governments initiated a series of reforms abolishing first 
Article 19 of the Greek Nationality Code (as the major source of discrimination for TCNs’ 
naturalisation until then), which eventually paved the way for a new legal arrangement in 
2010 bringing forward far less restrictive policies in this context. With this new Law 
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 Those applying for residence permits with six years of age and above became now liable to submission of 
digital photographs and fingerprints. 
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3838/2010, the TCNs’ acquisition of citizenship on the basis of residence (jus domicili) and 
birth in Greece (jus soli) was granted for the first time in the history of Greek immigration. As 
a matter of fact, the roots of this reformation process can be traced to the 2001 Immigration 
Law and the 2004 Greek Nationality Code. Following the completion of an initial 
regularisation programme launched in 1997, the Law 2910/2001 law was the first concise 
immigration law to attach great importance to legal immigration (by proclaiming proper 
routes of entry for employment and family reunification) with its new regularisation 
programme (which particularly aimed at those excluded from the earlier programme). The 
government change bringing the Conservatives to the power in 2004 was conducive to the 
formulation of a new citizenship law, namely the Greek Nationality Code. As a follow-up to 
the former PASOK-iniated reform process, the ND Government introduced stateless persons 
acquisition of citizenship on the condition of birth to a Greek parent or birth in Greece. That 
said, access to naturalisation was for foreign nationals largely curbed, due to the long 
bureaucratic procedure required for entitlement, irrespective of their ownership of legal 
residence in the country. 
 
With the arrival of PASOK to power in the following term, a new citizenship law was passed. 
This Law 3838/2010 (of the ‘Contemporary provisions for Greek Citizenship and the political 
participation of coethnics and legally residing immigrants’) put an end to the historical 
allogenes-homogenes distinction. Introducing the maiden use of the jus soli principle, the new 
law provided naturalisation and citizenship acquisition for all TCN immigrants. Accordingly, 
a Greek-born child of at least one non-Greek parent with a five-year long residence permit 
could enjoy citizenship at birth. Acquisition of citizenship applied therewith also to TCNs’ 
children with minimum six grades of school attendance. Further, a seven-year (and 
uninterrupted) legal residence would now be the lowest benchmark for naturalisation 
application. 
 
While the former law’s vague requirement under ‘the moral quality and personality’ of the 
citizenship applicant was with Law 3838/2010 abolished, the new law put in place integration 
tests, with the specific aim to measure qualification for citizenhip on the basis of a ground-
level knowledge of Greek history and civilization, involvement in economic activity, 
familiarity with the domestic political institutions and participation in the organisational and 
political system as other Greek citizens (Law 3838/2010, Article 5A). Apart from this new 
regulation, which in fact was already in use in many other EU Member States, the formerly 
146 
declared naturalisation precondition of the EU long-term resident status became with the new 
law subject to certification of adequate Greek language and history, but not necessarily by 
way of attendance to state-run courses like in some Member States.
176
 A yet another gain non-
nationals made with the new law concerned political participation. Despite several 
prerequisites demanded to that end, such as holding a long-term residence permit and 
minimum five-year stay in the country, foreign nationals were now granted local voting rights 
in Greece (OECD, International Migration Outlook, 2012). 
 
Recently, nonetheless, the highest administrative court in Greece, i.e. the Council of the State 
(CoS), ruled that the newly introduced jus soli principle as well as the right to vote TCNs 
acquired for local elections were contravening the Greek Constitution. The ground for 
violation according to the CoS was that a naturalised third-country national would never be 
able to embody a strong attachment with the Greek nation, nor ‘Greek consciousness’ in its 
proper sense (Anagnostou, 2011, p. 28). 
 
5.1.4 Italy 
 
Table 21: Basic migration statistics 
Net migration (2009): 318,000 
TCN immigration (2008):   283,687 
Largest third countries of origin (2008):  Albania, Morocco, China 
TCN population (2009):  2,759,528 
TCN as part of population (2009):  4.60% 
Foreign born as part of population (2009):  6.50% 
Permits delivered for family (2009):  75,153 
Permits delivered for work (2009):  106,134 
Permits delivered for study (2009):  10,011 
Permits delivered for humanitarian reasons (2009):  1,431 
TCN employment rate (2009, change since 2006):  61.80%; -3.9% 
National employment rate (2009, change since 2006):  57.50%; -0.9% 
TCN unemployment rate (2009, change since 2006):  37.30%; +1.8% 
National unemployment rate (2009, change since 2006):  7.80%; +1% 
Nationality acquisitions (2008, change since 2004):  53,700; 41,766 
Source: MIPEX III. 
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 Initially, proof of adequate Greek knowledge did not comprise certificates from higher educational 
institutions like universities or state departments but was limited exclusively to accredited high-schools or 
special courses coordinated by the state. 
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Similar to the Greek case, the history of mass immigration in Italy is not so long. A notable 
expansion of immigrant size dates back here only to the end of the 1970s. This rise reached in 
recent times to all-time highs, making the country a yet another immigration hub in the entire 
European Union. 
 
From Resurgimento (the Italian unification) in 1861 to the 1970s, more than 26 million 
Italians lefts for the Americas, Australia and other European countries, with some two fifths 
of the outflow stemming from the southern regions of the country (Del Boca & Venturini, 
2003, p. 1). The chief reason behind this massive emigration was the countrywide poor 
economic conditions at the time. There were until the second quarter of the post-WW II 
period hardly any inflows. With the improvement of domestic economic conditions 
(particularly in the northern regions) and as a consequence of the above-mentioned lands’ 
closure of borders following the oil crisis in the 1970s, the route of migration from the Third 
World to Europe was diverted considerably to the south. What made Italy here additionally 
attractive was its relatively weak colonial connections -when compared for instance to the 
UK, the Netherlands, Belgium and France- which made somewhat better public image in the 
Third World (Veikou & Triandafyllidou, 2000). In any case, for one reason or another, Italy 
was soon a back door to many northern European lands turning from a sending country to one 
of the biggest receiving EU Member States at present (Calavita, 2004). 
 
The early inflows to Italy were characterised essentially by Eastern European, Latin 
American, Asian, Middle Eastern and North African migrants and asylum-seekers most of 
whom were escaping severe economic and political conditions in their countries of origin. 
Following this first wave, the 1980s saw the rise of undocumented migrants coming often 
illegally as “fishermen, carpenters, street-vendors or on the tomato harvest; women from 
Eritrea, Somalia and the Philippines; and Chinese entrepreneurs running restaurants or cottage 
industries and employing fellow-nationals of both sexes” (Zincone & Caponio, 2006, p. 2). 
The large extent of this undocumented flow, as confirmed officially by the 1981 census, was 
for modern Italy quite a new phenomenon. There was now a strong demand of informal 
labour in the newly flourishing urban areas, in particular, the industrial north. Two main 
structural characteristics accounted for flows to these places: the “large underground economy 
and a rigid segmentation of the labour market” (Veikou & Triandafyllidou, 2000, p. 4). 
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Despite recurrences of economic crisis which as a matter of course led to a significant decline 
in annual quotas, immigration to Italy is today still at high levels. To current OECD statistics 
(2012), waves of newcomers specifically from Eastern Europe (as a consequence of the Iron 
Curtain’s collapse) and the Southern Mediterranean space (of North African countries led 
particularly by Libya) have pushed stocks of foreign nationals to some 5 million in recent 
times, amounting steadily to 8% of the entire Italian population. 
 
Table 22: Stocks of foreign population in Italy 
of total 
population 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
in thousands 1,448 1,549 1,990 2,402 2,671 2,939 3,433 3,891 4,235 4,570 4,826 
in percentages 2.5 2.7 3.5 4.2 4.6 5.0 5.8 6.6 7.1 7.6 8.0 
All thousands are rounded off to the nearest value. 
Source: OECD (2011b). 
 
An inevitable consequence of these soaring figures was the negative image of immigrants in 
the country. Surveys seeing into recent senses of belonging/citizenship deliver that almost half 
of the Italians (48%) do not view immigrants to be contributing to their country significantly 
(Special Eurobarometer 60.1, 2004). Accordingly, those seeing them as a threat to their way 
of life constitute 38% of the population: 
 
Table 23: Italian citizens regarding immigrants as a threat to their way of life (in percentages) 
Responses (options) Italy EU 15 
Totally agree 11 16 
Tend to agree 27 26 
Tend to disagree 30 30 
Totally disagree 24 18 
Don’t know 8 10 
Source: Special Eurobarometer Wave 60.1 
 
With multiple factors lying behind such perceptions, from cultural to economic concerns in a 
wider global context, particularly in the last two decades, these figures are indeed important to 
understand the default position of public opinion in present-day Italy, which apparently has a 
largely anti-immigrant character. 
 
5.1.4.1 Institutional structure 
Modern day (Republic of) Italy is a parliamentary democracy. The executive power belongs 
to the government elected for five years under the rule of the Prime Minister, known also as 
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the President of the Council of the Ministers. The current multi-party composition came into 
being when the fascist rule ended in the early post-WWII period. The two main parties in this 
structure have so far been Partito della Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democratic Party) 
and Partito Comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party) ahead of several small but 
influential parties, such as the neo-fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano (Italian Social 
Movement) and the leftist Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party). 
 
All these parties have in fact seen a series of nominal/structural changes since the end of the 
Cold War. Following prosecutions concerning corruption of several party members, the 
Christian Democratic Party was replaced by Partito Popolare Italiano (Italian Popular Party), 
while a number of new parties such as Forza Italia alliance, Lega Nord (the Northern 
League),
177
 as a federalist movement in the north, and Alleanza Nazionale (the National 
Alliance), being a successor of the neofascist Italian Social Movement, rose to dominate the 
right and centre-right of the Italian political party system. The Partito Comunista Italiano 
(PCI) became in this same period Partito Democratico della Sinistra (Democratic Party of the 
Left), which turned later into Democratici di Sinistra (Democrats of the Left). With recent 
developments, the center-weight political scene became populated by many small parties. 
Following short-lived alliances like the House of Freedoms on the right wing and the leftist 
Ulivo (Olive Tree), Partito Democratico (the Democratic Party) came to the scene as a new 
centre-left party, after the Christian Democratic Party joined Margherita, as another centrist 
party. This urged Forza Italia to merge with Alleanza Nazionale for a new formation under 
Popolo della Libertà (People of Freedom). The centre-right alliance collapsed in 2010 when 
Alleanza Nazionale turned into Futuro e libertà per l’Italia as yet another centre-right party. 
 
The legislative power in Italy is exercised through a bicameral system. Accordingly, the 945 
elected members (parlamentari) of the Parliament (Parlamento Italiano) are distributed 
between two houses, 315 for the Senate (Senato della Repubblica) and 630 for the Chamber 
of Deputies (Camera dei Deputati). While these two chambers work for a maximum five 
years and all bills are subject to their approval before turning into laws, the President of the 
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 This was formerly a separatist party aspiring for an independent northern Italy, the so-called Padania. In time, 
however, it converted its ‘anti-southern’ programme into an ‘anti-immigration’ agenda. 
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former has privileges to act as the Head of State when there is need for a new President of the 
Republic.
178
 The Senate is thus regarded traditionally as the upper house of the legislature. 
 
The higher layer of the judicial power is constituted by the Supreme Law Council and the 
Constitutional Court. These two legal authorities observe, as vested by the Constitution of the 
Italian Republic, legitimacy of the government rule and mediate independently across the 
State’s power distribution. The main parts of the Constitution are Articles 1 to 12 introducing 
Principi Fondamentali (Fundamental Principles), Diritti e Doveri dei Cittadini (Rights and 
Duties of Citizens) as defined by Articles 13 to 54 and Ordinamento della Repubblica 
(Organisation of the Republic) by Articles 55–139 which are ultimately appended by a 
number of Disposizioni transitorie e finali (Transitory and Final Provisions). Besides its 
significance in marking the end of the fascist rule in the post-war era, the Constitution has 
today a conciliatory role to maintain a careful balance between the three main ideologies of 
party politics in Italy (known also as the ‘constitutional compromise’): the Roman Catholic-
rooted democratic solidarity, appreciation of socialist and/or communist principles to a certain 
extent and finally a liberal interpretation of the Italian society and politics (Smyth, 1948). 
 
5.1.4.2 Actors involved in immigration management 
The organisation of asylum and migration policies in Italy is managed at the ministry level 
essentially by the Ministry of Interior (Ministero Dell’Interno). The duties of the ministry 
cover a wide range from citizenship issues, entry, residence and integration of newcomers to 
irregular immigration. This broad authority was reduced recently, with the formation of a 
technical government in late 2011, when Ministry for International Cooperation and 
Integration was established to be in charge of migration and integration matters only. The job 
division between the two ministries is defined by the Central Directorate for Immigration and 
Asylum Policies, which assigns the main tasks upon a Coordinating and Monitoring 
Committee and a special Technical Working Group. Coordination at the sub-national level, as 
far as integration policies are concerned, is administered by way of the Territorial Councils 
for Immigration, consisting of representatives from all political parties at the local level 
(Cesarini et al., 2011, p. 5). 
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 Apart from his/her chief roles such as appointing the Prime Minister and judges for the Corte Costituzionale 
della Repubblica Italiana (Constitutional Court) as well as presiding over Consiglio Superiore della 
Magistratura (the Supreme Law Council), the President of the Republic has a symbolic meaning to represent 
national unity since the Resurgimento, the unification of city states in 1876. 
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The main departments of the Ministry of Interior are the Department for Civil Liberties and 
Immigration and the Department of Public Security. The Department for Civil Liberties and 
Immigration is structured around a number of sub-units such as Central Directorate for Civil 
Rights, Citizenship and Minorities, Central Directorate for Immigration and Asylum Policy 
and Central Directorate for Assistance to Immigrants and Asylum-seekers. Each of these 
directorates is accountable for coordinating and monitoring the acts of the Territorial Councils 
within the Prefectures and the management of irregular migration and asylum-seeking. The 
main functions of the Department of Public Security include on the other hand controlling 
external borders via National Police offices, i.e. the Questure, at the provincial level as well as 
issuing/extending residence permits through the Single Desk for Immigration, which works as 
the office of liaison for the Department. The Italian National Police, Polizia di Stato, serves 
also under the Department of Public Security to deal with matters relating to foreigners, most 
notably on issues concerning return procedures in the case of lack of legal status. 
 
Serving at the ministry level for management of immigration and asylum (other than the 
Ministry of Interior) are also Ministero degli Affari Esteri (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and 
Ministero del Lavoro e della Previdenza Sociale (Ministry of Labour and Social Security). 
While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs contributes in this framework mainly by issuing visas 
to non-EU citizens through its Diplomatic Missions abroad, the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Security is in charge of identifying needs for foreign manpower and developing policies to 
cover the social welfare interests of immigrants. 
 
At the implementation level on the other hand are the Prefettura (the Prefectures) which 
principally seek through the Territorial Councils to deal with legal aliens’ social cohesion by 
for instance coordinating initiatives formulated in the Provinces. A supplementary role within 
the prefectures is provided by the Single Desks which essentially observe the formality 
procedures non-EU citizens need to follow, such as their residence permits, entrance to the 
labour markets and family reunification. The main state institutions to consult in this context 
are the Local Police Headquarters which are in charge of issuing and renewing residence 
permits in the first place. For patrolling services, it is since 2002 the Central Directorate for 
Immigration and Border Police which has a superlative authority. The main area of 
responsibility is about guarding activities here. Working in coordination with the Italian 
Navy, police forces, Carabinieri (national military office) and harbour offices, the Directorate 
develops and adopts all relevant measures/initiatives to counter illegal immigration. 
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Besides stakeholders at the state level, there are a number of social partners that aim to protect 
the rights of immigrant workers in Italy. These include a broad range from trade unions and 
employers’ associations such as Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (Italian 
General Confederation of Labour), as the biggest trade union, Confederazione Italiana 
Sindacati Lavoratori (Italian Confederation of Trade Unions and Unione Italiana del Lavoro 
(the Italian Labour Union), Confindustria (Italian Employers’ Federation) to immigrant 
associations like Associazione Nazionale Oltre Le Frontiere  (The National Association 
Beyond Borders), as well as religious institutions, the most important of which are the 
Catholic Church, entrusted by the Vatican’s Pontifical Council (‘for the Pastoral Care of 
Migrants and Itinerant People’) to meet immigrants’ spiritual needs, Caritas Italiana, 
dedicated to helping immigrants integrate in the Italian society, and Fondazione Migrantes, 
which provides pastoral care not only to third-country nationals in Italy but also Italians 
abroad (Jonjic & Mavrodi, 2012). 
 
5.1.4.3 National immigration laws and policies in historical perspective 
Despite the fact that Italy has often performed ahead of many other Southern European EU 
members in making legal arrangements for immigration purposes, it was only in 1986 the first 
nation-wide law was here introduced to that effect. The relevant provisions were up to that 
moment restricted largely to foreign citizens’ legal stay in the country. To be fair, this narrow 
coverage was based on the far-reaching perception of immigrants, who were almost always 
associated with working illegally (Zincone & Caponio, 2006). With the enactment of Law 
943/1986, conditions for entrance, admission and residence of foreigners into Italy were 
regulated not only to meet interior security needs but also to provide equal rights for 
newcomers vis-à-vis Italian citizens. Given its deficits mainly in the legalisation of 
immigrants (in particular refugees), this early legal arrangement was replaced later with Law 
39/1990. The new law, also known as the Legge Martelli Law, came to be the first act to 
introduce visa requirements for many of the sending countries, to reform deportation 
procedures and to impose sanctions for those staying illegally and/or engaged in immigrant 
smuggling/trafficking. What’s more, with Law 39/1990, asylum-seeking procedure saw a 
certain measure of revision for the first time to ease applications made by those from non-EU 
countries (Sopemi, 1991). 
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The current legislation governing immigration matters in Italy is based on two chief legal 
texts: Law 40/1998 (‘Turco-Napolitano Law’) and Law 189/2002 (‘Bossi-Fini Law’). In fact, 
both laws came as a response to the political developments at the time, most notably in 
relation with developments across the former Republic of Yugoslavia, Albania and Somalia. 
The civil wars in these lands provoked a series of big-scale illegal immigration and asylum-
seeking flows destined for Italy, as a result of which it became urgent to revise domestic 
legislation concerning immigration.
179
 
 
In view of increasing illegal entry rates, the 1998 Turco-Napolitano Act was designed to take 
new measures the most important of which was probably establishment of detention centres. 
While the new law was committed to the improvement of conditions enjoyed by TCNs in 
Italy, such as easing conditions for working permits at the labour markets, it introduced a host 
of new quotas (through the introduction of the Decreto flussi, as a law decree brought in use 
to fix the number of newcomers coming by way of legal channels). These provisions were 
changed with the Bossi-Fini Act, which as a formulation of the centre-right coalition 
government took deeper consideration of security concerns. In effect, new policy tools like 
limiting legal entries and applying non-flexible procedures for residence permits were 
developed to combat undocumented entries in a more effective way. Further, with Law 
189/2002, temporary detention of irregular immigrants was extended to maximum 60 days. 
Meanwhile, a ‘sea landings-decree’ brought further authorisation to the Italian Navy for use in 
maritime traffic, in case of clandestine attempts in open sea (Rusconi, 2010). The Bossi-Fini 
Act did not modify social/family rights; however, it was alongside these amendments the 
largest extent of regularisation was managed on this matter in the recent history of European 
immigration history.
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There have more recently been additional legislative rearrangements in this framework. With 
the so-called ‘Security Package’ including Law 125/2008 and Law 94/2009, a series of 
changes were made on irregular immigrants’ detention and imprisonment, return of aliens, 
fees for citizenship application (of €200) and residence permits (€80-€200 during first issues 
and renewals) as well as a new host of family reunification regulations which became stricter 
in nature. Added to that, the ‘Integration Agreement’ in 2010 introduced two-year ‘points-
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 Indeed, being a signatory of the Schengen criteria as of the mid-1980s, Italy was already required to practise 
frequent border controls against uncontrolled immigration (Finotelli & Sciortino, 2009). 
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 During the right-wing government in this period, more than 600,000 people became subject to this process 
(Rusconi, 2010). 
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based’ stay applicable to foreigners (exclusively adults) in the context of residence permits. 
This arrangement brought in also compulsory language tests for the acquisition of long-term 
residence permits. What’s more, with the second security package launched in 2010, 
municipalities became authorised to monitor renewal of residence-permits. When provisions 
concerning the EU Directives 2004/38/EC and 2008/115/EC were in 2011 finally completed, 
a number of new provisions became applicable to financial resources, detention measures and 
return of EU citizens. And finally, on matters relating to highly qualified workers and 
employers hiring illegally staying TCNs, two more Council Directives were transposed in 
2012 (2009/50/EC and 2009/52/EC). 
 
5.1.4.4 Citizenship and naturalisation policies in Italy 
More than half of some 40,000 recent applications for Italian citizenship were based on 
residential status, followed closely by cases concerning family reunion (Jonjic & Mavrodi, 
2012, p. 101). Although the number of entries yielding naturalisation increased slightly in the 
last years, Italy ranked here lower than the EU average, due to the high rate of unfulfilled 
applications (European Migration Network, 2012b, p. 30). Indeed, a cursory look into the 
Italian law reveals that eligibility criteria in the context of citizenship are more restrictive than 
they are in many immigration countries across the EU. Current provisions are for the most 
part extensions of the 1992 Citizenship Act, Law 91/1992 (and regulations DPR 572/1993 and 
DPR 362/1994), with most of them grounded upon the principle of jus sanguinis. There is 
however room for jus soli as well, regulating the status of persons with birth on Italian soil 
“whose parents are unknown, Stateless or cannot pass on their citizenship to their child 
according to the laws of the State of which they are citizen” as well as “of unknown parentage 
found on Italian soil and whose natural citizenship is impossible to ascertain” (Ministero degli 
Affari Esteri, 2012). Three main applicant profiles stand out here: persons who have lost their 
citizenship and wish to reinstate it due to birth in Italy, those claiming citizenship as 
descendants of Italian citizens and foreign citizens applying for Italian citizenship.
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 Recently, in 2011, President Giorgio Napolitano started a debate by arguing that the relevant legal order in 
force was in need of revision, considering particularly the aging population in the country as well as the rise of 
immigrant children in recent times, who without citizenship rights appeared to experience serious challenges in 
their school life. A first area of debate following this argumentation was whether or not the principle of jus 
sanguinis should be switched entirely to jus soli. While the then Minister of Interior was in favour of the former, 
on the condition that a certain period of residence would be required of TCN parents, the Minister for 
International Cooperation and Integration came up with a proposal arguing for jus culturae, which would expand 
the eligibility criteria for citizenship also to minors provided they would study in Italy (European Migration 
Network, 2012b). 
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The basic requirement for automatic acquisition is the history of parentage in Italy (providing 
there are no stories of renouncement involved in the background). For acquisition by claim, 
official documentation is a prerequisite. Accordingly, “foreign or Stateless descendents (up to 
the second degree) of Italian citizens can claim citizenship” as long as they could provide the 
state department with a valid “birth certificate; certificate of Italian citizenship of mother or 
father or a direct ancestor up to the second degree; certificate of residence, where requested”. 
This rule does however not dismiss those without Italian descent. The primary document 
demanded from claimants born on Italian soil is “continuous legal residence in Italy up to 
legal age, and upon declaration of their desire to do so” (Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 2012). 
For naturalisation, knowledge of the Italian language and culture is a must. 
 
Third-country nationals are granted naturalisation rights on the condition that they have here a 
minimum ten-year-long legal and continuous residence. Access to citizenship is for refugees, 
stateless persons and those with co-ethnic backgrounds (for instance ethnic Italians from the 
former Yugoslavian Republic) much easier. To Article 9 of the 1992 Citizenship Act, 
refugees and stateless persons need to fulfill five years of continuous stay (it is for non-EU 
citizens ten years and for other EU citizens four years), while minimum period for 
naturalisation in the case of TCNs with Italian backgrounds is three years, with the exception 
of a must-have two years from minors (Zincone & Basili, 2013, p. 6). 
 
Although Il Popolo della Liberta and Partito Democratico tended to cooperate as the two 
major political parties to reduce TCNs’ minimum period from ten to five years in recent 
times, the entire process ended up with a new set of restrictive amendments. With the 2009 
Security Act, most importantly, TCNs marrying Italian citizens became subject to the 
requirement to possess two years of legal residence at least (which formerly was six months). 
Article 1 of Law 94/09 introduced additionally a payment of €200 fee to apply for citizenship. 
 
5.2 Data on MIPEX
182
 
Managed currently by the British Council and the Migration Policy Group
183
 and co-financed 
by the European Commission under the scheme of European Fund for Third-country 
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 The core source of reference used here was MIPEX’s interactive website (www.mipex.eu). 
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 Migration Policy Group is a Brussels-based think-tank which initiates research on migration related issues 
including equality, discrimination and integration. 
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Nationals, the MIPEX was first launched in 2004 as the European Civic Citizenship and 
Inclusion Index to measure the then EU-15 governments’ commitments to their immigration 
agenda comparatively. The ensuing MIPEX II was released in 2007 to add up policies 
concerning immigrants in the ten new EU Member States, as well as Canada, Norway and 
Switzerland. The third in the series, MIPEX III, was concluded in 2011 to bring Japan and 
Australia as the new countries in focus. With its final form, MIPEX III drew on a wide array 
of contributions from 37 NGOs, universities, research institutes, think-tanks and more than 
150 national experts in 31 countries across Europe and North America in seven main areas: 
labour markets, family reunion, education, political participation, long-term residence, access 
to nationality and anti-discrimination. 
 
To explore into immigrant matters, the MIPEX project uses policy indicators checking into 
the highest standards as pointed out by relevant EU legal texts and Council of Europe 
Conventions. Added to these are EU-wide policy recommendations in cases where a country’s 
performance remains at minimum standards. Policy indicators are formulated as questions 
targeting a particular component of one of the seven intended policy areas.
184
 Legal and 
policy materials informing these questions are entirely official. They are compiled by the 
Migration Policy Group to give the final form of the index. 
 
Answers to policy indicators are obtained out of three options. The highest standards of equal 
rights, duties and opportunities concerning TCNs are scored with 3 points, while 2 marks 
policies that are not mature yet, and 1 standing for default value to demonstrate gaps/deficits 
in national policies vis-à-vis EU legal texts. These scores receive an average value for each of 
the seven main areas of integration, representing the ‘dimension score’. The dimension scores 
are then averaged together to identify the overall score for a country. To make a thorough 
comparison here, the 1-2-3 scale used in the beginning is later calculated over the 0-50-100 
scale, according to which 100% marks the highest score. 
 
5.2.1 Germany 
5.2.1.1 Labour markets 
With its sixth post on the MIPEX III list, Germany is regarded as a ‘slightly favourable’ 
country when its labour market policies are viewed from the perspective of the third-country 
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 A full list of these indicators is available in Appendix II, as part of MIPEX III. 
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nationals. Non-EU workers enjoy here a limited degree of equal access and rights. Following 
the 2007 EU-Richtlinienumsetzungsgesetz, which quested for more participation in society, 
the CDU, CSU and FDP coalition government decided to reduce labour shortages for white-
collar positions such as doctors, scientists or engineers by way of qualified immigration from 
abroad. It seems, however, this move has so far proved less fruitful than intended. While local 
governments set their sights on an efficient public sector and try to include more TCNs, the 
basic procedures required for TCNs’ employment have been meeting bureaucratic hurdles 
between Länder and professional organisations. In effect, a significant portion of the 
newcomers are today employed below their genuine levels of qualification. What’s more, 
apart from cases of ‘urgent official needs’, they almost never have access to the public sector. 
 
Table 24: Conditions for TCNs at German labour markets 
Access  
 
Immediate access to employment 50 
Access to private sector 100 
Access to public sector 50 
Immediate access to self-employment 50 
Access to self-employment 100 
Access to general support 
 
Access to public employment services 100 
Equality of access to education and vocational training, including study grants 0 
Recognition of academic and professional qualifications acquired outside the EU 50 
Targeted support 
 
State facilitation of recognition of skills and qualifications obtained outside the EU 50 
Measures to further the integration of third-country nationals into the labour market 100 
Additional measures to further the integration of third-country nationals into the labour market 100 
Support to access public employment services 100 
Workers' rights 
 
Membership of and participation in trade unions associations and work-related negotiation bodies  100 
Equal access to social security 100 
Equal working conditions 100 
Active policy of information on rights of migrant workers by national level (or regional in federal states) 100 
  
Germany average 77 
EU average 57 
Based on MIPEX III. 
 
5.2.1.2 Family reunion 
TCN families residing in the EU are in ideal conditions subject to the same rights and 
responsibilities as families from Member States. In Germany, which ranks 17th on MIPEX, 
newcomers may upon arrival make applications for family reunification through a free and 
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brief procedure, to cover additionally their parents/grandparents, on condition that these are in 
need of family care. Unless they are fraudulent and/or threatening for the country’s security, 
these applications cannot be declined. For examinations required under the scheme of long-
term residence, Germany joins old immigration countries like the Netherlands, Denmark and 
France, which all demand language (and culture) tests from TCN spouses in their countries of 
origin. These tests are in the German case not free of charge. The length of time as required 
from the person applying for family union (sponsor) is changeable, depending on the degree 
of his/her affinity to the beneficiary. Refusal/withdrawal requires consent of both sides, 
leaving room for appeal. 
 
Table 25: TCNs’ family reunion conditions in Germany 
Eligibility 
 
Family reunion eligibility conditions (average) 50 
Eligibility conditions for partners other than spouses (average) 75 
Eligibility for minor children 50 
Eligibility for dependent relatives in the ascending line  50 
Eligibility for dependent adult children 50 
Conditions for acquisition of status 
 
Pre departure integration conditions  (average) 57 
Upon arrival integration conditions (average) 32 
Accommodation requirement 50 
Economic resources requirement 50 
Maximum length of application procedure 100 
Costs of application and/or issue of permit or renewal 50 
Security of status 
 
Duration of validity of permit 50 
Grounds for rejecting, withdrawing or refusing to renew status 0 
Before refusal or withdrawal, due account is taken of (regulated by law)  100 
Legal guarantees and redress in case of refusal or withdrawal 100 
Rights associated with status 
 
Right to autonomous residence permit for partners and children reaching age of majority 50 
Right to autonomous residence permit in case of widowhood, divorce, separation, death, or physical or emotional 
violence 
50 
Right to autonomous residence permit for other family members having joined the sponsor 0 
Access to education and training for adult family members 100 
Access to employment and self-employment 100 
Access to social security and social assistance, healthcare and housing 100 
  
Germany average 60 
EU average 60 
Based on MIPEX III. 
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5.2.1.3 Educational standards 
The educational standards third-country nationals enjoy in Germany rank 17th on MIPEX, 
particularly in view of the pupils/students with migration backgrounds who are not entirely 
integrated with the multilayer school system here. While this might also have to do with own 
migration experiences, there are obvious patterns indicating that most projects intended to 
encourage access to schools are reliant upon the financial resources and political will, which 
are restricted to a certain number of schools or a particular stage in educational career. 
Pupils/students may enrol at the Länder level in all types/tracks of schools, yet a mechanism 
allowing for healthy placement (to assess learning experiences of a pupil/student before 
arrival to Germany) is still missing. Additionally, while pupils of TCN origin can enjoy 
support and funding for being socially disadvantaged, equal opportunities do not apply to all 
cases, given that only five Länder provide them with legal service regardless of whether or 
not their parents are ‘undocumented’. Schools can obtain rich resources of performance data, 
thanks to for instance periodically arranged panels on national education. What’s more, 
immigrant languages are taught both in and outside classroom, with curricula fostering 
‘diversity’, though rather incompletely as these do not cover all immigrant cultures. 
Regardless of several language assessment tools such as those provided by ‘FörMig’, there 
are no official standards regarding language learning and/or teacher training, nor are there 
state-sponsored programmes targeting intercultural education. A recent development in this 
context demonstrates all the same a rising interest in many Länder as to encouragement of 
TCNs for study in educational sciences and/or become teachers. 
 
Table 26: Educational standards for TCNs in Germany 
Access 
 
Access and support to access pre-primary education 50 
Access to compulsory-age education 50 
The assessment in compulsory education of migrants' prior learning and language qualifications and learning 
obtained abroad 
0 
Support to access secondary education 50 
Access and support to access and participate in vocational training 50 
Access and support to access and participate in higher education 50 
Access to advice and guidance on system and choices at all levels of compulsory and non-compulsory education 50 
Targeting needs 
 
Requirement for provision in schools of intensive induction programmes for newcomer pupils and their families 
about the country and its education system 
0 
Provision of continuous and ongoing education support in language(s) of instruction for migrant pupils (average) 50 
Policy on pupil monitoring targets migrants 100 
Targeted policies to address educational situation of migrant groups 0 
Teacher training and professional development programmes include courses that address migrant pupils' learning 
needs, teachers' expectations of migrant pupils and specific teaching strategies to adress this 
0 
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New opportunities 
 
Provision of option to learn immigrant languages (average) 100 
Provision of option to learn immigrant cultures (average) 0 
Measures to promote social integration through school (average) 50 
Measures to support migrant parents and communities in the education of their children 50 
Intercultural education for all 
 
Inclusion of intercultural education and appreciation of cultural diversity in school curriculum 50 
State support for public information initiatives to promote the appreciation of cultural diversity throughout 
society 
50 
Possibility to modify school curricula and teaching materials to reflect changes in diversity of the school 
population 
0 
Adaptability of daily life at school based on cultural or religious needs to avoid exclusion of pupils 50 
Measures to support bringing migrants into the teacher workforce 100 
Inclusion of intercultural education and appreciation of cultural diversity for all in teacher training and 
professional development programmes  
50 
  
Germany average 43 
EU average 39 
Based on MIPEX III. 
 
5.2.1.4 Political participation 
Ranking eighth on the MIPEX scale and considered ‘slightly favourable’ as far as 
immigrants’ political participation are concerned, Germany provides its TCNs with certain 
privileges, such as freedom to join political parties (even if some of these may deny internal 
positions to non-nationals) and civil society organisations. Such services do not cover the 
basic rights given to nationals, like for instance voting (the revision of which requires a 
constitutional change but has so far been out of sight). Integration into the political system is 
to a certain extent encouraged by the Länder and municipalities so that TCNs could elect their 
own groups. At the national level, however, such representatives are appointed by national 
governments, which may provide funding in return for cooperation/consultation. 
 
Table 27: TCNs’ political participation in Germany 
Electoral rights 
 
Right to vote in national elections 0 
Right to vote in regional elections  0 
Right to vote in local elections 0 
Right to stand for elections at local level 0 
Political liberties 
 
Right to association 100 
Membership of and participation to political parties 100 
Right to create media  100 
Consultative bodies 
 
Implication of foreign residents at national level (average) 30 
Implication of foreign residents at regional level (average) 80 
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Implication of foreign residents at capital city level (average) 80 
Implication of foreign residents on local city level (average) 80 
Implementation policies 
 
Active policy of information by national level (or regional in federal states) 50 
Public funding or support of immigrant organisations on national level 100 
Public funding or support of immigrant organisations on regional level 100 
Public funding or support of immigrant organisations on local level in capital city 100 
Public funding or support of immigrant organisations on national level in city  100 
  
Germany average 64 
EU average 44 
Based on MIPEX III. 
 
5.2.1.5 Long-term residence 
As a major component of its integration policies, long-term residence is a fairly demanding 
procedure in Germany. To the 31-country MIPEX list, the current situation here deserves the 
24th place. Relevant conditions are almost comparable to those concerning full citizenship, as 
seemingly no other country stipulates as many requirements as Germany does for long-term 
residence. While many EU countries demand in this context basic documents such as legal 
incomes or language knowledge, the related process in the German case starts with a 
comprehensive integration test. For tertiary education, within the scheme of attracting 
international students, Germany‘s performance lags behind that of an average old immigration 
land like the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Austria or Sweden, for reasons of red 
tape/comprehensive paperwork. 
 
Table 28: Long-term residence conditions for TCNs in Germany 
Eligibility 
 
Eligibility conditions (average) 50 
Is time of residence as a pupil/student counted? 0 
Periods of absence allowed previous to granting of status 50 
Conditions for acquisition of status 
 
Integration conditions (average) 32 
Economic resources requirement 0 
Maximum length of application procedure  0 
Costs of application and/or issue of status 0 
Security of status 
 
Duration of validity of permit 100 
Renewable permit 100 
Periods of absence allowed after granting of status  0 
Grounds of rejecting, withdrawing or refusing to renew status 100 
Protection against expulsion. Due account taken of: 100 
Expulsion precluded  0 
162 
Legal guarantees and redress in case of refusal, non-renewal or withdrawal  100 
Rights associated with status 
 
Residence right after retirement 100 
Access to employment (with the only exception of activities involving the exercise of public authority), self-
employment and other economic activities, and working conditions 
100 
Access to social security, social assistance and healthcare, and housing 100 
Recognition of academic and professional qualifications 50 
  
Germany average 50 
EU average 59 
Based on MIPEX III. 
 
5.2.1.6 Access to nationality 
Third-country nationals enjoy naturalisation rights in Germany providing they hold permanent 
residence. While these were offered to the first generation via entitlement, the second 
generation could acquire citizenship by birth. Achievement of citizenship is here generally 
regarded as a stepping stone for better integration. In the absence of economic and linguistic 
integration, however, it is not possible to have access to this scheme thoroughly. While many 
EU members allow for dual-citizenship, Germany reduced it to EU nationals from 2007 to 
2013 during the CDU, CSU & FDP coalition government. The new CDU & SPD coalition in 
2014 expanded the scope, nevertheless, to include those born in Germany as well. 
 
Table 29: TCNs’ access to nationality in Germany 
Eligibility 
 
First generation immigrants  50 
Periods of absence allowed previous to acquisition of nationality 100 
Requirements for spouses, partners and cohabitees of nationals (average) 100 
Second generation immigrants (born in the country)  100 
Third generation immigrants (born in the country) 100 
Conditions for acquisition  
 
Language requirements and exemptions (average) 45 
Citizenship/integration requirements and exemptions (average) 83 
Economic resources requirement  0 
Criminal record requirement 0 
Good character clause 100 
Maximum length of application procedure  0 
Costs of application and/or issue of nationality title 0 
Security of status 
 
Additional grounds for refusing status 0 
Discretionary powers in refusal 100 
Additional elements taken into account before refusal 0 
Legal guarantees and redress in case of refusal  100 
Grounds for withdrawing status   100 
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Time limits for withdrawal  100 
Withdrawal that would lead to statelessness 50 
Dual nationality 
 
Requirement to renounce / lose foreign nationality upon naturalisation for first generation 50 
Dual nationality for second and/or third generation. 50 
  
Germany average 59 
EU average 44 
Based on MIPEX III. 
 
5.2.1.7 Anti-discrimination measures 
The German law provides more room than the EU’s minimum requirements for prohibition of 
ethnic, religious and racial discrimination in most areas. One might all the same encounter 
discrimination on the basis of nationality. Despite progress since 2008, NGOs in Germany do 
not have far-reaching roles, which is why the country ranks only 22nd on the MIPEX list. 
Those facing discrimination can enjoy the support service of the Federal Anti-discrimination 
Agency, whose powers are however quite limited. Compared to several EU members such as 
Sweden and the United Kingdom, which hold strong legislative mechanisms at the state level, 
Germany performs somewhat poorly on that score. 
 
Table 30: Anti-discrimination measures in Germany 
Definitions and concepts 
 
Definition of discrimination includes direct and indirect discrimination, harassment and instruction to 
discriminate 
50 
Definition of discrimination includes discrimination by association and on basis of assumed characteristics 0 
Anti-discrimination law applies to natural and legal persons 100 
Anti-discrimination law applies to the public sector 100 
Legal prohibitions in matters of discrimination 50 
Restriction of freedom of association, assembly and speech is permitted when impeding equal treatment  0 
Existence of specific rules covering multiple discrimination 50 
Fields of application 
 
Employment and vocational training 50 
Education (primary and secondary) 100 
Social protection, including social security 100 
Social advantages 100 
Access to and supply of goods and services available to the public, including housing 50 
Access to and supply of goods and services available to the public, including health 50 
Enforcement mechanisms 
 
Access for victims, irrespective of grounds of discrimination to judicial, criminal and administrative procedures 100 
Alternative dispute resolution procedures 50 
Grounds for access for victims 100 
Average length of procedures 50 
Shift in burden of proof 50 
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Acceptance by national legislation of courts  accepting  situation testing and statistical data as evidence 50 
Protection against victimisation 100 
State provides financial assistance to pursue complaint where victims do not have the necessary means and 
interpreter free of charge 
100 
Role of legal entities with a legitimate interest in defending principle of equality 0 
Range of legal actions 0 
Range of sanctions 0 
Discriminatory motivation treated as aggravated circumstance 0 
Equality policies 
 
Specialised Equality Agency has been established with a mandate to combat discrimination 50 
Specialised Agency has the powers to assist victims 50 
Specialised Agency acts as a quasi-judicial body 0 
Specialised Agency has the legal standing to engage in proceedings in name of the complainant 0 
Specialised Agency has the power to instigate proceedings in  own name, lead own investigation and enforce 
findings 
0 
State itself disseminates information and provides and ensures structured social dialogue on discrimination with 
civil society  
0 
Existence at national level of mechanisms to ensure compliance with anti-discrimination and equality law, and 
governmental/ministerial units working on these grounds 
0 
Obligation for public bodies to promote equality in their functions and ensure that their contract partners respect 
non-discrimination 
0 
Law provides for introduction of positive action measures and assesment of these measures 50 
  
Germany average 59 
EU average 48 
Based on MIPEX III. 
 
5.2.2 The UK 
5.2.2.1 Labour markets 
A TCN-oriented labour market revision has for the UK hardly been the case in recent times. 
The conditions TCNs enjoy here are ranked at the 16th place on MIPEX, due to their average 
standards relative to counterparts elsewhere in Europe. Qualification to the points system is in 
the UK of vital importance as only thereafter can TCNs achieve comparable rights to those of 
nationals. All job services are open to immigrants. For that, however, access to social security 
services are largely denied, which differs radically from what several old immigration 
destinations such as France and Germany offer in this context. Unlike those, say, in Germany, 
Denmark and Sweden, TCNs can in the UK enjoy little official support from the state. 
 
Table 31: Conditions for TCNs at British labour markets 
Access 
 
Immediate access to employment 50 
Access to private sector 100 
Access to public sector 100 
Immediate access to self-employment 50 
Access to self-employment 100 
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Access to general support 
 
Access to public employment services 100 
Equality of access to education and vocational training, including study grants 50 
Recognition of academic and professional qualifications acquired outside the EU 50 
Targeted support 
 
State facilitation of recognition of skills and qualifications obtained outside the EU 100 
Measures to further the integration of third-country nationals into the labour market 0 
Additional measures to further the integration of third-country nationals into the labour market 0 
Support to access public employment services 0 
Workers' rights  
Membership of and participation in trade unions associations and work-related negotiation bodies  100 
Equal access to social security 0 
Equal working conditions 100 
Active policy of information on rights of migrant workers by national level (or regional in federal states) 0 
  
UK average 55 
EU average 57 
Based on MIPEX III. 
 
5.2.2.2 Family reunion 
With a 20th place on MIPEX, policies regarding family reunion in the UK are not worthy of 
praise. The average performance has broadly to do with the TCNs’ weak societal integration 
here. While basic requirements for the married are quite similar to those in many immigration 
lands across Europe, TCN couples under 20 can enjoy no family reunification rights in the 
UK (these start for nationals at the age of 18). To be fair, this bias stems largely from 
intentions to discourage forced marriages, as observable in families with third-country 
national backgrounds. Access to public benefits is here not level with that of nationals, which 
makes the UK in this category one of the seven European MIPEX countries limiting non-EU 
citizens’ rights. 
 
Table 32: TCNs’ family reunion conditions in the UK 
Eligibility 
 
Family reunion eligibility conditions (average) 100 
Eligibility conditions for partners other than spouses (average) 50 
Eligibility for minor children 50 
Eligibility for dependent relatives in the ascending line  0 
Eligibility for dependent adult children 0 
Conditions for acquisition of status 
 
Pre departure integration conditions  (average) 100 
Upon arrival integration conditions (average) 100 
Accommodation requirement 50 
Economic resources requirement 50 
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Maximum length of application procedure 0 
Costs of application and/or issue of permit or renewal 50 
Security of status 
 
Duration of validity of permit 100 
Grounds for rejecting, withdrawing or refusing to renew status 0 
Before refusal or withdrawal, due account is taken of (regulated by law)  100 
Legal guarantees and redress in case of refusal or withdrawal 100 
Rights associated with status  
Right to autonomous residence permit for partners and children reaching age of majority 0 
Right to autonomous residence permit in case of widowhood, divorce, separation, death, or physical or emotional 
violence 
50 
Right to autonomous residence permit for other family members having joined the sponsor 0 
Access to education and training for adult family members 100 
Access to employment and self-employment 100 
Access to social security and social assistance, healthcare and housing 0 
  
UK average 54 
EU average 60 
Based on MIPEX III. 
 
5.2.2.3 Educational standards 
Thanks to policies providing migrant pupils with a decent support system in schools, the UK 
earns the seventh place on MIPEX in terms of educational standards. This quality is closely 
related to the priorities recent UK governments have been attaching with as far as the issue of 
‘diversity’ is concerned. Though criticised at times, British schools are known to promote a 
wide range of cultural, racial and religious services in line with the 2000 Race Relations 
Amendment Act. These services are since 2006 in place to help contribute to societal 
‘cohesion’, through most importantly ‘Citizenship Education’ (in particular with respect to its 
‘identity and diversity’ component). There is in the UK also an organised teacher 
training/development network laying special weight on candidates from ethnic minorities. To 
data on TCN pupils’ achievement and segregation in British schools, the UK’s education 
policies are ‘slightly favourable’. Migrant families can here hardly benefit from language 
orientation programmes or training opportunities. 
 
Table 33: Educational standards in the UK 
Access 
 
Access and support to access pre-primary education 50 
Access to compulsory-age education 50 
The assessment in compulsory education of migrants' prior learning and language qualifications and learning 
obtained abroad 
50 
Support to access secondary education 100 
Access and support to access and participate in vocational training 50 
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Access and support to access and participate in higher education 50 
Access to advice and guidance on system and choices at all levels of compulsory and non-compulsory education 50 
Targeting needs 
 
Requirement for provision in schools of intensive induction programmes for newcomer pupils and their families 
about the country and its education system 
0 
Provision of continuous and ongoing education support in language(s) of instruction for migrant pupils (average) 17 
Policy on pupil monitoring targets migrants 100 
Targeted policies to address educational situation of migrant groups 100 
Teacher training and professional development programmes include courses that address migrant pupils' learning 
needs, teachers' expectations of migrant pupils and specific teaching strategies to adress this 
100 
New opportunities  
Provision of option to learn immigrant languages (average) 25 
Provision of option to learn immigrant cultures (average) 0 
Measures to promote social integration through school (average) 50 
Measures to support migrant parents and communities in the education of their children 0 
Intercultural education for all 
 
Inclusion of intercultural education and appreciation of cultural diversity in school curriculum 100 
State support for public information initiatives to promote the appreciation of cultural diversity throughout 
society 
100 
Possibility to modify school curricula and teaching materials to reflect changes in diversity of the school 
population 
100 
Adaptability of daily life at school based on cultural or religious needs to avoid exclusion of pupils 100 
Measures to support bringing migrants into the teacher workforce 100 
Inclusion of intercultural education and appreciation of cultural diversity for all in teacher training and 
professional development programmes  
50 
  
UK average 58 
EU average 39 
Based on MIPEX III. 
 
5.2.2.4 Political participation 
TCNs’ political participation in the UK is viewed to deserve the 13th position by MIPEX 
standards. Despite being in one of the oldest immigration countries in Europe, TCNs are not 
allowed to vote in local/national elections here, with the exception of those holding 
Commonwealth citizenship. For that, however, all non-EU nationals are granted basic 
liberties to establish for instance their own political organisations. Nonetheless, contrary to 
recent trends in several EU Member States, the British state does not recognise them as 
consultative bodies. 
 
Table 34: TCNs’ political participation in the UK 
Electoral rights 
 
Right to vote in national elections 50 
Right to vote in regional elections  50 
Right to vote in local elections 50 
Right to stand for elections at local level 50 
Political liberties  
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Right to association 100 
Membership of and participation to political parties 100 
Right to create media  100 
Consultative bodies 
 
Implication of foreign residents at national level (average) 0 
Implication of foreign residents at regional level (average) 0 
Implication of foreign residents at capital city level (average) 0 
Implication of foreign residents on local city level (average) 0 
Implementation policies 
 
Active policy of information by national level (or regional in federal states) 100 
Public funding or support of immigrant organisations on national level 50 
Public funding or support of immigrant organisations on regional level 50 
Public funding or support of immigrant organisations on local level in capital city 50 
Public funding or support of immigrant organisations on national level in city  50 
  
UK average 53 
EU average 44 
Based on MIPEX III. 
 
5.2.2.5 Long-term residence 
Long-term residence in the UK is ranked on MIPEX at a dramatic 31st place, which amounts 
to the last post on the entire list. Contrary to EU citizens, non-EU nationals are here not 
granted the right to permanent residence automatically. There was in this vein a fairly 
demanding procedure called ‘indefinite leave to remain’ until recently, for which the TCNs 
were required to follow security coverages to qualify for a certain degree of basic rights. The 
2009 Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act did not promise much for third-country 
nationals in this context. For permanent residence, they became required with the entry into 
force of the new law to wait up to eight years, regardless of their legal status. Students and a 
segment of workers were excluded from this application as their cases would be dependent 
upon a period of three- to five-year-long probation, depriving them of public benefits. Further, 
with the new law, they became subject to limitations concerning for instance travelling 
outside the UK. 
 
Table 35: Long-term residence conditions for TCNs in the UK 
Eligibility 
 
Eligibility conditions (average) 0 
Is time of residence as a pupil/student counted? 0 
Periods of absence allowed previous to granting of status 0 
Conditions for acquisition of status 
 
Integration conditions (average) 68 
Economic resources requirement 0 
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Maximum length of application procedure  0 
Costs of application and/or issue of status 0 
Security of status 
 
Duration of validity of permit 0 
Renewable permit 0 
Periods of absence allowed after granting of status  0 
Grounds of rejecting, withdrawing or refusing to renew status 0 
Protection against expulsion. Due account taken of: 50 
Expulsion precluded  0 
Legal guarantees and redress in case of refusal, non-renewal or withdrawal  100 
Rights associated with status 
 
Residence right after retirement 100 
Access to employment (with the only exception of activities involving the exercise of public authority), self-
employment and other economic activities, and working conditions 
100 
Access to social security, social assistance and healthcare, and housing 100 
Recognition of academic and professional qualifications 50 
  
UK average 31 
EU average 59 
Based on MIPEX III. 
 
5.2.2.6 Access to nationality 
Ranked currently at the 11th place on MIPEX, the UK was until recently considered a 
working model in terms of its citizenship policies towards third-country nationals. The 2009 
Act introduced however complications in the naturalisation process. Unlike in several other 
immigration lands, such as France, Sweden or the Netherlands, the citizenship standards in 
the UK require now lengthier procedures chiefly because of the newly attached probation 
period. 
 
Table 36: TCNs’ access to nationality in the UK 
Eligibility 
 
First generation immigrants  50 
Periods of absence allowed previous to acquisition of nationality 0 
Requirements for spouses, partners and cohabitees of nationals (average) 75 
Second generation immigrants (born in the country)  100 
Third generation immigrants (born in the country) 100 
Conditions for acquisition  
 
Language requirements and exemptions (average) 65 
Citizenship/integration requirements and exemptions (average) 42 
Economic resources requirement  0 
Criminal record requirement 0 
Good character clause 0 
Maximum length of application procedure  100 
Costs of application and/or issue of nationality title 0 
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Security of status 
 
Additional grounds for refusing status 0 
Discretionary powers in refusal 0 
Additional elements taken into account before refusal 100 
Legal guarantees and redress in case of refusal  100 
Grounds for withdrawing status   0 
Time limits for withdrawal  100 
Withdrawal that would lead to statelessness 0 
Dual nationality 
 
Requirement to renounce / lose foreign nationality upon naturalisation for first generation 100 
Dual nationality for second and/or third generation. 100 
  
UK average 59 
EU average 44 
Based on MIPEX III. 
 
5.2.2.7 Anti-discrimination measures 
British laws and policies in the context of anti-discrimination prove according to latest 
MIPEX figures way above the average standards (second best in Europe, after Sweden). 
Although the 2006 Equality Act previously called for the establishment of the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission, to fight racial, ethnic and religious discrimination, the 
concerning plan was lacking enforcement mechanisms, giving for instance active roles to 
NGOs in court decisions (like in many other countries across Europe and North America). 
With the introduction of the 2010 Equality Act, TCNs are offered here legal protection in a 
wider range of policy issues, from age, gender, race, religion to disability, sexual orientation, 
maternity and marriage/civil partnership. 
 
Table 37: Anti-discrimination measures in the UK 
Definitions and concepts 
 
Definition of discrimination includes direct and indirect discrimination, harassment and instruction to 
discriminate 
100 
Definition of discrimination includes discrimination by association and on basis of assumed characteristics 100 
Anti-discrimination law applies to natural and legal persons 100 
Anti-discrimination law applies to the public sector 100 
Legal prohibitions in matters of discrimination 100 
Restriction of freedom of association, assembly and speech is permitted when impeding equal treatment  100 
Existence of specific rules covering multiple discrimination 100 
Fields of application  
Employment and vocational training 100 
Education (primary and secondary) 100 
Social protection, including social security 100 
Social advantages 100 
171 
Access to and supply of goods and services available to the public, including housing 100 
Access to and supply of goods and services available to the public, including health 100 
Enforcement mechanisms  
Access for victims, irrespective of grounds of discrimination to judicial, criminal and administrative procedures 100 
Alternative dispute resolution procedures 50 
Grounds for access for victims 100 
Average length of procedures 0 
Shift in burden of proof 100 
Acceptance by national legislation of courts  accepting  situation testing and statistical data as evidence 100 
Protection against victimisation 100 
State provides financial assistance to pursue complaint where victims do not have the necessary means and 
interpreter free of charge 
100 
Role of legal entities with a legitimate interest in defending principle of equality 0 
Range of legal actions 0 
Range of sanctions 50 
Discriminatory motivation treated as aggravated circumstance 100 
Equality policies  
Specialised Equality Agency has been established with a mandate to combat discrimination 100 
Specialised Agency has the powers to assist victims 100 
Specialised Agency acts as a quasi-judicial body 0 
Specialised Agency has the legal standing to engage in proceedings in name of the complainant 0 
Specialised Agency has the power to instigate proceedings in  own name, lead own investigation and enforce 
findings 
100 
State itself disseminates information and provides and ensures structured social dialogue on discrimination with 
civil society  
100 
Existence at national level of mechanisms to ensure compliance with anti-discrimination and equality law, and 
governmental/ministerial units working on these grounds 
100 
Obligation for public bodies to promote equality in their functions and ensure that their contract partners respect 
non-discrimination 
100 
Law provides for introduction of positive action measures and assesment of these measures 100 
  
UK average 86 
EU average 59 
Based on MIPEX III. 
 
5.2.3 Greece 
5.2.3.1 Labour markets 
The restrictions its TCNs face at labour markets offer Greece a moderate 19th place on 
MIPEX. This post is in fact worse than those of other immigration destinations in southern 
Europe, most notably Portugal and Spain, where third-country nationals are subject to 
restrictions neither in the public sector nor in self-employment. Obscured by weak legal 
prospects at labour markets, access to the public sector is not fostered equally here. Non-EU 
citizens must fight here a hampering red tape procedure to be able to start their own business, 
with no promises for social security, equal working conditions or general support from the 
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state. In brief, regardless of a number of recent improvements most notably in the area of 
family reunion, non-EU nationals’ access to employment remains to be ‘slightly 
unfavourable’ in Greece. 
 
Table 38: Conditions for TCNs at Greek labour markets 
Access  
 
Immediate access to employment 50 
Access to private sector 100 
Access to public sector 0 
Immediate access to self-employment 50 
Access to self-employment 0 
Access to general support 
 
Access to public employment services 100 
Equality of access to education and vocational training, including study grants 50 
Recognition of academic and professional qualifications acquired outside the EU 100 
Targeted support 
 
State facilitation of recognition of skills and qualifications obtained outside the EU 0 
Measures to further the integration of third-country nationals into the labour market 0 
Additional measures to further the integration of third-country nationals into the labour market 0 
Support to access public employment services 0 
Workers' rights 
 
Membership of and participation in trade unions associations and work-related negotiation bodies  100 
Equal access to social security 100 
Equal working conditions 100 
Active policy of information on rights of migrant workers by national level (or regional in federal states) 0 
  
Greece average 50 
EU average 57 
Based on MIPEX III. 
 
5.2.3.2 Family reunion 
With a fairly low 24th place on the MIPEX list, Greek performance concerning non-EU 
nationals’ family reunion ranks far below the average of many old/new immigration countries 
in Europe. Unlike in many EU Member States, sponsors are required here to fulfil extremely 
demanding conditions and bypass bureaucratic hurdles for eligibility, such as administrative 
delays applicable to permanent residence permits. Parents and adult children are excluded 
from the coverage in this framework. While families are granted better rights at present, 
thanks to Law 3801/2009 granting reunited family members full access to employment, 
security of status cannot go beyond the average. 
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Table 39: TCNs’ family reunion conditions in Greece 
Eligibility 
 
Family reunion eligibility conditions (average) 50 
Eligibility conditions for partners other than spouses (average) 50 
Eligibility for minor children 50 
Eligibility for dependent relatives in the ascending line  0 
Eligibility for dependent adult children 0 
Conditions for acquisition of status 
 
Pre departure integration conditions  (average) 100 
Upon arrival integration conditions (average) 100 
Accommodation requirement 50 
Economic resources requirement 0 
Maximum length of application procedure 50 
Costs of application and/or issue of permit or renewal 0 
Security of status 
 
Duration of validity of permit 100 
Grounds for rejecting, withdrawing or refusing to renew status 0 
Before refusal or withdrawal, due account is taken of (regulated by law)  50 
Legal guarantees and redress in case of refusal or withdrawal 50 
Rights associated with status 
 
Right to autonomous residence permit for partners and children reaching age of majority 50 
Right to autonomous residence permit in case of widowhood, divorce, separation, death, or physical or emotional 
violence 
50 
Right to autonomous residence permit for other family members having joined the sponsor 0 
Access to education and training for adult family members 100 
Access to employment and self-employment 100 
Access to social security and social assistance, healthcare and housing 100 
  
Greece average 49 
EU average 60 
Based on MIPEX III. 
 
5.2.3.3 Educational standards 
Policies concerning non-EU nationals’ education in Greece are ranked at an average 18th 
place on MIPEX. As in many other EU Member States, pupils with TCN origins are offered 
here access to all layers of the school system. Yet, the same pupils face barriers when it comes 
to language learning and ongoing support, which many old immigration countries have in 
recent times been effectively dealing with. Policies encouraging intercultural education 
thoroughly, like in Germany, Sweden, Spain and Portugal, are in Greece still out of sight. 
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Table 40: Educational standards for TCNs in Greece 
Access 
 
Access and support to access pre-primary education 50 
Access to compulsory-age education 100 
The assessment in compulsory education of migrants' prior learning and language qualifications and learning 
obtained abroad 
50 
Support to access secondary education 50 
Access and support to access and participate in vocational training 50 
Access and support to access and participate in higher education 50 
Access to advice and guidance on system and choices at all levels of compulsory and non-compulsory education 0 
Targeting needs 
 
Requirement for provision in schools of intensive induction programmes for newcomer pupils and their families 
about the country and its education system 
0 
Provision of continuous and ongoing education support in language(s) of instruction for migrant pupils (average) 67 
Policy on pupil monitoring targets migrants 0 
Targeted policies to address educational situation of migrant groups 0 
Teacher training and professional development programmes include courses that address migrant pupils' learning 
needs, teachers' expectations of migrant pupils and specific teaching strategies to adress this 
100 
New opportunities 
 
Provision of option to learn immigrant languages (average) 75 
Provision of option to learn immigrant cultures (average) 75 
Measures to promote social integration through school (average) 25 
Measures to support migrant parents and communities in the education of their children 0 
Intercultural education for all 
 
Inclusion of intercultural education and appreciation of cultural diversity in school curriculum 50 
State support for public information initiatives to promote the appreciation of cultural diversity throughout 
society 
0 
Possibility to modify school curricula and teaching materials to reflect changes in diversity of the school 
population 
100 
Adaptability of daily life at school based on cultural or religious needs to avoid exclusion of pupils 0 
Measures to support bringing migrants into the teacher workforce 0 
Inclusion of intercultural education and appreciation of cultural diversity for all in teacher training and 
professional development programmes  
100 
  
Greece average 42 
EU average 39 
Based on MIPEX III. 
 
5.2.3.4 Political participation 
Greece ranks 17th on MIPEX as far as the TCNs’ political participation in the country is 
concerned. Thanks to Law 3838/2010, there has here been significant progress in granting 
non-EU residents political rights like voting at local elections. New integration councils, 
regardless of their limited powers, seek to promote further democratic values at the national 
level. This might in medium- to long-term pave the way for representation of immigrants in 
the so-called National Commission for Migrants’ Integration. There is however no funding for 
TCN-established civil society organisations (as for instance in Portugal). 
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Table 41: TCNs’ political participation in Greece 
Electoral rights 
 
Right to vote in national elections 0 
Right to vote in regional elections  0 
Right to vote in local elections 50 
Right to stand for elections at local level 50 
Political liberties  
Right to association 100 
Membership of and participation to political parties 100 
Right to create media  100 
Consultative bodies 
 
Implication of foreign residents at national level (average) 0 
Implication of foreign residents at regional level (average) 0 
Implication of foreign residents at capital city level (average) 30 
Implication of foreign residents on local city level (average) 30 
Implementation policies 
 
Active policy of information by national level (or regional in federal states) 50 
Public funding or support of immigrant organisations on national level 0 
Public funding or support of immigrant organisations on regional level 0 
Public funding or support of immigrant organisations on local level in capital city 0 
Public funding or support of immigrant organisations on national level in city  0 
  
Greece average 40 
EU average 44 
Based on MIPEX III. 
 
5.2.3.5 Long-term residence 
TCNs fulfilling standard requirements for long-term residence can enjoy in Greece basic 
security options and rights as guaranteed by the EU law. This issue is however quite tricky, as 
the rate of successful applicants to benefit from that coverage is generally lowered by highly 
restrictive conditions such as application fees. Although Law 3838/2010 reduced the €900 
application to €600 recently, it still appears to be much higher than what many of the 31 
countries on MIPEX list demand. Added to that, while many EU Member States demand no 
more than a basic income and language knowledge for long-term residence, Greece asks its 
TCNs to document high income as well as integration course/test scores. To be able to attend 
state-sponsored classes on this latter score, there apply yearly quotas and long waiting lists. 
The Greek score in terms of long-term residence is in the end lower than the EU average. 
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Table 42: Long-term residence conditions for TCNs in Greece 
Eligibility 
 
Eligibility conditions (average) 75 
Is time of residence as a pupil/student counted? 50 
Periods of absence allowed previous to granting of status 50 
Conditions for acquisition of status 
 
Integration conditions (average) 39 
Economic resources requirement 0 
Maximum length of application procedure  50 
Costs of application and/or issue of status 0 
Security of status 
 
Duration of validity of permit 100 
Renewable permit 50 
Periods of absence allowed after granting of status  0 
Grounds of rejecting, withdrawing or refusing to renew status 100 
Protection against expulsion. Due account taken of: 50 
Expulsion precluded  0 
Legal guarantees and redress in case of refusal, non-renewal or withdrawal  100 
Rights associated with status 
 
Residence right after retirement 100 
Access to employment (with the only exception of activities involving the exercise of public authority), self-
employment and other economic activities, and working conditions 
50 
Access to social security, social assistance and healthcare, and housing 100 
Recognition of academic and professional qualifications 100 
  
Greece average 56 
EU average 59 
Based on MIPEX III. 
 
5.2.3.6 Access to nationality 
An average 14th position by 2010 MIPEX grading on this matter owes much to the newly 
adopted and relatively more liberal Greek citizenship. Following Law 3838/2010, TCNs’ 
eligibility for nationality has now become comparable to that in old immigration countries. In 
accordance, all non-EU nationals’ children can now enjoy Greek citizenship at birth or obtain 
dual citizenship automatically without having to face extra administrative hurdles as in the 
past. For naturalisation, however, the citizenship scheme seems to demand an exorbitant €700 
fee (despite reduction from €1,500). The new citizenship package does not guarantee 
constitutional protection, indicating applicants and new citizens hold here one of the most 
insecure (second worst) conditions amongst the 31 MIPEX countries. They can for instance 
be left ‘stateless’ on many grounds, regardless of the length of their Greek citizenship. 
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Table 43: TCNs’ access to nationality in Greece 
Eligibility 
 
First generation immigrants  100 
Periods of absence allowed previous to acquisition of nationality 100 
Requirements for spouses, partners and cohabitees of nationals (average) 25 
Second generation immigrants (born in the country)  50 
Third generation immigrants (born in the country) 100 
Conditions for acquisition  
 
Language requirements and exemptions (average) 40 
Citizenship/integration requirements and exemptions (average) 25 
Economic resources requirement  100 
Criminal record requirement 0 
Good character clause 100 
Maximum length of application procedure  50 
Costs of application and/or issue of nationality title 0 
Security of status 
 
Additional grounds for refusing status 0 
Discretionary powers in refusal 0 
Additional elements taken into account before refusal 0 
Legal guarantees and redress in case of refusal  50 
Grounds for withdrawing status   0 
Time limits for withdrawal  0 
Withdrawal that would lead to statelessness 0 
Dual nationality 
 
Requirement to renounce / lose foreign nationality upon naturalisation for first generation 100 
Dual nationality for second and/or third generation. 100 
  
Greece average 57 
EU average 44 
Based on MIPEX III. 
 
5.2.3.7 Anti-discrimination measures 
Ranking 20th on MIPEX, Greece’s anti-discrimination policies in relation to TCNs are below 
the MIPEX average. Unlike in many EU Member States, discrimination on the basis of 
nationality is not explicitly forbidden in the Greek law. Further, as there is no legal statement 
dismissing racial profiling categorically (like in the UK and France), non-EU nationals in 
Greece remain extremely vulnerable. They may benefit from assistance by the state or NGOs, 
only without direct access to equality bodies, not least because supervisions/investigations 
(most importantly by the Ombudsman) have no primary relevance to enforcement here. 
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Table 44: Anti-discrimination measures in Greece 
Definitions and concepts 
 
Definition of discrimination includes direct and indirect discrimination, harassment and instruction to 
discriminate 
50 
Definition of discrimination includes discrimination by association and on basis of assumed characteristics 50 
Anti-discrimination law applies to natural and legal persons 100 
Anti-discrimination law applies to the public sector 100 
Legal prohibitions in matters of discrimination 0 
Restriction of freedom of association, assembly and speech is permitted when impeding equal treatment  50 
Existence of specific rules covering multiple discrimination 0 
Fields of application 
 
Employment and vocational training 50 
Education (primary and secondary) 50 
Social protection, including social security 50 
Social advantages 50 
Access to and supply of goods and services available to the public, including housing 50 
Access to and supply of goods and services available to the public, including health 50 
Enforcement mechanisms 
 
Access for victims, irrespective of grounds of discrimination to judicial, criminal and administrative procedures 100 
Alternative dispute resolution procedures 0 
Grounds for access for victims 50 
Average length of procedures 0 
Shift in burden of proof 100 
Acceptance by national legislation of courts  accepting  situation testing and statistical data as evidence 0 
Protection against victimisation 100 
State provides financial assistance to pursue complaint where victims do not have the necessary means and 
interpreter free of charge 
100 
Role of legal entities with a legitimate interest in defending principle of equality 50 
Range of legal actions 0 
Range of sanctions 100 
Discriminatory motivation treated as aggravated circumstance 50 
Equality policies 
 
Specialised Equality Agency has been established with a mandate to combat discrimination 50 
Specialised Agency has the powers to assist victims 100 
Specialised Agency acts as a quasi-judicial body 0 
Specialised Agency has the legal standing to engage in proceedings in name of the complainant 100 
Specialised Agency has the power to instigate proceedings in  own name, lead own investigation and enforce 
findings 
0 
State itself disseminates information and provides and ensures structured social dialogue on discrimination 
with civil society  
100 
Existence at national level of mechanisms to ensure compliance with anti-discrimination and equality law, and 
governmental/ministerial units working on these grounds 
0 
Obligation for public bodies to promote equality in their functions and ensure that their contract partners 
respect non-discrimination 
0 
Law provides for introduction of positive action measures and assesment of these measures 50 
  
Greece average 50 
EU average 59 
Based on MIPEX III. 
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5.2.4 Italy 
5.2.4.1 Labour markets 
With a 10th place on MIPEX, the conditions Italy provides the third-country nationals at its 
labour markets are above the EU average. For integration of legal TCN workers into the 
Italian economy, there are no visible barriers put by the state. Nonetheless, the equal access 
and support provided here are counterbalanced by a poor skill/qualification assessment. 
Indeed, contrary to those in many old immigration lands, as well as in new ones like Portugal, 
public service in Italy does not seem to make full use of non-EU residents. This handicap 
stems mainly from the lack of ‘targeted support’, which eventually pushes TCNs outside the 
legal labour market. 
 
Table 45: Conditions for TCNs at Italian labour markets 
Access  
 
Immediate access to employment 100 
Access to private sector 100 
Access to public sector 0 
Immediate access to self-employment 100 
Access to self-employment 100 
Access to general support 
 
Access to public employment services 100 
Equality of access to education and vocational training, including study grants 100 
Recognition of academic and professional qualifications acquired outside the EU 50 
Targeted support 
 
State facilitation of recognition of skills and qualifications obtained outside the EU 50 
Measures to further the integration of third-country nationals into the labour market 50 
Additional measures to further the integration of third-country nationals into the labour market 0 
Support to access public employment services 0 
Workers' rights 
 
Membership of and participation in trade unions associations and work-related negotiation bodies  100 
Equal access to social security 100 
Equal working conditions 100 
Active policy of information on rights of migrant workers by national level (or regional in federal states) 50 
  
Italy average 69 
EU average 57 
Based on MIPEX III. 
 
5.2.4.2 Family reunion 
Reunification of families with a migration background is secured in Italy by relatively new 
laws and policies, which with a fairly decent sixth position appears as ‘slightly favourable’ by 
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MIPEX standards. Despite this relatively high ranking, one needs to be mindful of a number 
of basic and critical procedures which, as one gathers from recent data, may have been 
overlooked. The issue relates in particular the case of non-EU families who cannot enjoy 
rights to secure residence, work and study entirely here. Sponsors of non-EU national origins 
are required to meet extremely high standards for family reunion, concerning accommodation 
in the first place. What’s more, the 120/2008 decree does not allow TCNs’ elderlies to benefit 
from the right to family renion. 
 
Table 46: TCNs’ family reunion conditions in Italy 
Eligibility 
 
Family reunion eligibility conditions (average) 75 
Eligibility conditions for partners other than spouses (average) 50 
Eligibility for minor children 100 
Eligibility for dependent relatives in the ascending line  50 
Eligibility for dependent adult children 50 
Conditions for acquisition of status 
 
Pre departure integration conditions  (average) 100 
Upon arrival integration conditions (average) 100 
Accommodation requirement 0 
Economic resources requirement 50 
Maximum length of application procedure 50 
Costs of application and/or issue of permit or renewal 0 
Security of status 
 
Duration of validity of permit 100 
Grounds for rejecting, withdrawing or refusing to renew status 100 
Before refusal or withdrawal, due account is taken of (regulated by law) 50 
Legal guarantees and redress in case of refusal or withdrawal 100 
Rights associated with status 
 
Right to autonomous residence permit for partners and children reaching age of majority 100 
Right to autonomous residence permit in case of widowhood, divorce, separation, death, or physical or 
emotional violence 
50 
Right to autonomous residence permit for other family members having joined the sponsor 100 
Access to education and training for adult family members 100 
Access to employment and self-employment 100 
Access to social security and social assistance, healthcare and housing 100 
  
Italy average 74 
EU average 60 
Based on MIPEX III. 
 
5.2.4.3 Educational standards 
There is today an obvious need in all EU Member States to make educational standards meet 
the growing ‘diversity’ demands in their host societies. The situation in Italy does not seem to 
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be promising on this matter. Considering the schools which are far from giving priorities to 
teaching ‘life in harmony’, one can argue that pupils with a migration background are here 
often underprivileged. While TCNs under 18 have irrespective of their status access to school 
systems and may enjoy general support for the disadvantaged, there exist no clear tools 
enabling placement of newcomers at the right level. Compared to those in many other EU 
Member States, Italian school curricula do not lay much emphasis on immigrant languages, 
overlooking intercultural education right from the start. 
 
Table 47: Educational standards for TCNs in Italy 
Access 
 
Access and support to access pre-primary education 50 
Access to compulsory-age education 100 
The assessment in compulsory education of migrants' prior learning and language qualifications and learning 
obtained abroad 
0 
Support to access secondary education 0 
Access and support to access and participate in vocational training 50 
Access and support to access and participate in higher education 0 
Access to advice and guidance on system and choices at all levels of compulsory and non-compulsory 
education 
50 
Targeting needs 
 
Requirement for provision in schools of intensive induction programmes for newcomer pupils and their 
families about the country and its education system 
0 
Provision of continuous and ongoing education support in language(s) of instruction for migrant pupils 
(average) 
50 
Policy on pupil monitoring targets migrants 100 
Targeted policies to address educational situation of migrant groups 50 
Teacher training and professional development programmes include courses that address migrant pupils' 
learning needs, teachers' expectations of migrant pupils and specific teaching strategies to adress this 
100 
New opportunities 
 
Provision of option to learn immigrant languages (average) 0 
Provision of option to learn immigrant cultures (average) 0 
Measures to promote social integration through school (average) 50 
Measures to support migrant parents and communities in the education of their children 50 
Intercultural education for all 
 
Inclusion of intercultural education and appreciation of cultural diversity in school curriculum 100 
State support for public information initiatives to promote the appreciation of cultural diversity throughout 
society 
0 
Possibility to modify school curricula and teaching materials to reflect changes in diversity of the school 
population 
0 
Adaptability of daily life at school based on cultural or religious needs to avoid exclusion of pupils 50 
Measures to support bringing migrants into the teacher workforce 0 
Inclusion of intercultural education and appreciation of cultural diversity for all in teacher training and 
professional development programmes  
100 
  
Italy average 41 
EU average 39 
Based on MIPEX III. 
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5.2.4.4 Political participation 
Ranking 14th on MIPEX, political opportunities offered to TCNs in Italy are below the EU 
average. Non-EU nationals are here not granted voting rights for local elections and it seems 
the necessary constitutional change to that end will not take off the ground in near future. 
Apart from rare practices like in Rome’s town council whereby non-EU nationals are 
currently allowed to elect Adjunct Counsellors, consultative bodies in Italy are not 
encouraged. To be fair, basic political liberties are respected here in some measure and there 
is funding allocated for third-country nationals. Yet, these remain largely superficial by 
comparison to the challenges the latter face. To illustrate, non-EU nationals wishing to 
own/publish newspapers here are allowed to do so only when they have native co-propriators. 
 
Table 48: TCNs’ political participation in Italy 
Electoral rights 
 
Right to vote in national elections 0 
Right to vote in regional elections  0 
Right to vote in local elections 0 
Right to stand for elections at local level 0 
Political liberties  
Right to association 100 
Membership of and participation to political parties 100 
Right to create media  0 
Consultative bodies 
 
Implication of foreign residents at national level (average) 30 
Implication of foreign residents at regional level (average) 40 
Implication of foreign residents at capital city level (average) 100 
Implication of foreign residents on local city level (average) 40 
Implementation policies 
 
Active policy of information by national level (or regional in federal states) 0 
Public funding or support of immigrant organisations on national level 100 
Public funding or support of immigrant organisations on regional level 100 
Public funding or support of immigrant organisations on local level in capital city 100 
Public funding or support of immigrant organisations on national level in city  100 
  
Italy average 50 
EU average 44 
Based on MIPEX III. 
 
5.2.4.5 Long-term residence 
Non-EU residents in Italy enjoy a certain degree of security until they obtain long-term 
residence. Compared to several EU Member States such as Austria, Belgium, Spain and 
Portugal which currently extend long-term residence also to students, Italian laws and policies 
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are somewhat less liberal, not least because long-term residence is here not entirely 
standardised with legal immigration. It is all the same possible to argue that requirements in 
this category are relatively less demanding than those applicable to family reunion and 
naturalisation. With the 2009 Security Act, language and integration rose to be the main 
requirements for long-term residence qualifications. 
 
Table 49: TCNs’ long-term residence in Italy 
Eligibility 
 
Eligibility conditions (average) 25 
Is time of residence as a pupil/student counted? 0 
Periods of absence allowed previous to granting of status 50 
Conditions for acquisition of status 
 
Integration conditions (average) 43 
Economic resources requirement 100 
Maximum length of application procedure  100 
Costs of application and/or issue of status 50 
Security of status 
 
Duration of validity of permit 100 
Renewable permit 100 
Periods of absence allowed after granting of status  0 
Grounds of rejecting, withdrawing or refusing to renew status 50 
Protection against expulsion. Due account taken of: 50 
Expulsion precluded  50 
Legal guarantees and redress in case of refusal, non-renewal or withdrawal  100 
Rights associated with status 
 
Residence right after retirement 100 
Access to employment (with the only exception of activities involving the exercise of public authority), self-
employment and other economic activities, and working conditions 
100 
Access to social security, social assistance and healthcare, and housing 100 
Recognition of academic and professional qualifications 100 
  
Italy average 66 
EU average 59 
Based on MIPEX III. 
 
5.2.4.6 Access to nationality 
As Italy turned from a ‘sending’ country to one of immigration, its eligibility criteria for 
nationality became highly restrictive. Unlike in many other cases, citizenship is here not 
granted automatically to second/third generations. The residence requirements are together 
with those in Spain the most demanding in Europe. Non-EU nationals appear to be excluded 
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from many areas of life regardless of their birth in the country. Italy holds all the same a 
seventh place by MIPEX standards on this matter thanks to the basic conditions for equal 
citizenship which third-country nationals have for some time been enjoying. In light of its big 
diaspora in many countries and the rise of sojourners lately, the Italian law permits now dual 
citizenship as a general rule, which it formerly denied in the case of a further citizenship. 
 
Table 50: TCNs’ access to nationality in Italy 
Eligibility 
 
First generation immigrants  0 
Periods of absence allowed previous to acquisition of nationality 0 
Requirements for spouses, partners and cohabitees of nationals (average) 50 
Second generation immigrants (born in the country)  50 
Third generation immigrants (born in the country) 50 
Conditions for acquisition  
 
Language requirements and exemptions (average) 100 
Citizenship/integration requirements and exemptions (average) 100 
Economic resources requirement 0 
Criminal record requirement 0 
Good character clause 100 
Maximum length of application procedure  50 
Costs of application and/or issue of nationality title 0 
Security of status 
 
Additional grounds for refusing status 100 
Discretionary powers in refusal 0 
Additional elements taken into account before refusal 0 
Legal guarantees and redress in case of refusal  100 
Grounds for withdrawing status   100 
Time limits for withdrawal  100 
Withdrawal that would lead to statelessness 100 
Dual nationality 
 
Requirement to renounce / lose foreign nationality upon naturalisation for first generation 100 
Dual nationality for second and/or third generation. 100 
  
Italy average 63 
EU average 44 
Based on MIPEX III. 
 
5.2.4.7 Anti-discrimination measures 
Italy ranks 15th on MIPEX in terms of its anti-discrimination policies towards third-country 
nationals. Despite improvements, in particular following the European Commission’s general 
call to make legal revisions in this category, the weakest equality policies in the EU are 
ascribed to Italy. Its Office for Racial Discrimination in particular is largely ineffective 
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(second worst in Europe after that of Spain). In the event of racial, religious or ethnic 
discrimination, it is primarily the EU law that provides legal source of reference. A diversity 
charter concerning the business sector has already been adopted; however, promotion of 
equality is far from being a priority goal here. 
 
Table 51: Anti-discrimination measures in Italy 
Definitions and concepts 
 
Definition of discrimination includes direct and indirect discrimination, harassment and instruction to 
discriminate 
100 
Definition of discrimination includes discrimination by association and on basis of assumed characteristics 0 
Anti-discrimination law applies to natural and legal persons 100 
Anti-discrimination law applies to the public sector 100 
Legal prohibitions in matters of discrimination 50 
Restriction of freedom of association, assembly and speech is permitted when impeding equal treatment  100 
Existence of specific rules covering multiple discrimination 0 
Fields of application 
 
Employment and vocational training 100 
Education (primary and secondary) 100 
Social protection, including social security 100 
Social advantages 100 
Access to and supply of goods and services available to the public, including housing 100 
Access to and supply of goods and services available to the public, including health 100 
Enforcement mechanisms 
 
Access for victims, irrespective of grounds of discrimination to judicial, criminal and administrative procedures 100 
Alternative dispute resolution procedures 50 
Grounds for access for victims 100 
Average length of procedures 0 
Shift in burden of proof 50 
Acceptance by national legislation of courts  accepting  situation testing and statistical data as evidence 50 
Protection against victimisation 100 
State provides financial assistance to pursue complaint where victims do not have the necessary means and 
interpreter free of charge 
100 
Role of legal entities with a legitimate interest in defending principle of equality 100 
Range of legal actions 0 
Range of sanctions 100 
Discriminatory motivation treated as aggravated circumstance 100 
Equality policies 
 
Specialised Equality Agency has been established with a mandate to combat discrimination 0 
Specialised Agency has the powers to assist victims 50 
Specialised Agency acts as a quasi-judicial body 0 
Specialised Agency has the legal standing to engage in proceedings in name of the complainant 0 
Specialised Agency has the power to instigate proceedings in  own name, lead own investigation and enforce 
findings 
0 
State itself disseminates information and provides and ensures structured social dialogue on discrimination 
with civil society  
50 
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Existence at national level of mechanisms to ensure compliance with anti-discrimination and equality law, and 
governmental/ministerial units working on these grounds 
0 
Obligation for public bodies to promote equality in their functions and ensure that their contract partners 
respect non-discrimination 
0 
Law provides for introduction of positive action measures and assesment of these measures 0 
  
Italy average 62 
EU average 59 
Based on MIPEX III. 
 
5.3 Symmetry between national and supranational policies 
To check into the extent of harmony between the EU and national policy-making levels, the 
study consults at this point the Commission’s annual assessment reports, adopting a rather 
top-down perspective, that is, without being mindful of where the EU law drew its origins 
from before diffusing into the national law. The analysis made to that end, in quest of the 
selected cases’ breach of EU immigration law during the period of analysis, covers 
transposition and implementation of twenty-eight legal texts, which were all issued in the 
form of directives/regulations, and for this reason have binding effects on national 
legal/political orders. The breakdown of these documents across the three main immigration 
areas, i.e. labour/legal immigration, irregular/illegal immigration and asylum-seeking issues, 
is as follows: 
 
Table 52: EU legal texts on labour migration 
Text 
Date of 
release 
Transposition 
deadline 
Council Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification 22/09/2003 03/10/2005 
Council Directive 2003/109/EC on TCNs who are long-term residents  25/11/2003 23/01/2006 
Council Directive 2004/114/EC on TCNs’ admission for study or training purposes  13/12/2004 12/01/2007 
Council Directive 2005/71/EC on TCNs’ admission for scientific research  12/10/2005 12/10/2007 
Council Directive 2009/50/EC Blue Cards Directive (on highly qualified TCN workers) 25/05/2009 19/06/2011 
Regulation (EC) 1030/2002 defining a uniform format for residence permits 13/06/2002 13/06/2002 
 
Table 53: EU legal texts on irregular immigration 
Text Date of 
release 
Transposition 
deadline 
Council Directive 2001/40/EC on the mutual recognition of decisions concerning TCNs’ 
expulsion 28/05/2001 02/12/2002 
Council Directive 2001/51/EC supplementing the Schengen Agreement 28/06/2001 11/02/2003 
Council Directive 2002/90/EC on unauthorised entry, transit and residence 28/11/2002 04/12/2004 
Council Directive 2004/81/EC on TCNs’ residence permits in the cases of trafficking or 
other actions illegal immigration 
29/04/2004 06/08/2006 
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Council Directive 2004/82/EC on the obligation of carriers to communicate passenger data 29/04/2004 05/09/2006 
Council Directive 2008/114/EC on the identification and designation of European critical 
infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection 
8/12/2008 12/01/2011 
Council Directive 2008/115/EC -the Return Directive- on common standards and procedures 
for returning illegally staying TCNs 
16/12/2008 
24/12/2010 
&24/12/2011 (for 
Article 13(4)) 
Council Directive 2009/52/EC on minimum standards on sanctions and measures against 
employers of illegally staying TCNs 
18/06/2009 20/07/2011 
Directive 2011/36/EC on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and 
protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA 
05/04/2011 06/04/2013 
Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 establishing the FRONTEX, European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the 
European Union 
26/10/2004 26/10/2004 
Regulation (EC) 2725/2000 concerning the Establishment of 'EURODAC' for the 
Comparison of Fingerprints for the Effective Application of the Dublin Convention 
11/12/2000 11/12/2000 
Regulation (EC) 539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession 
of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that 
requirement 
15/03/2001 15/03/2001 
Regulation (EC) 2252/2004 on standards for security features and biometrics in passports 
and travel documents issued by Member States 
13/12/2004 13/12/2004 
Regulation (EC) 562/2006 establishing the Schengen Borders Code on the rules governing 
the movement of persons across borders 
15/03/2006 15/03/2006 
Regulation (EC) 1931/2006 laying down rules on local border traffic at Member States’ 
external land borders and amending the provisions of the Schengen Convention 
20/12/2006 20/12/2006 
Regulation (EC) 767/2008 concerning the Visa Information System (VIS) and the exchange 
of data between Member States on short-stay visas 
09/07/2008 09/07/2008 
 
Table 54: EU legal texts on asylum issues 
Text 
Date of 
release 
Transposition 
deadline 
Council Directive 2001/55/EC on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the 
event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on relevant measures 
20/07/2001 31/12/2002 
Council Directive 2003/9/EC -the Reception Conditions Directive- on laying down 
minimum standards for the reception of asylum-seekers 
27/01/2003 06/02/2005 
Council Directive 2004/83/EC on minimum standards for the qualification and status of 
TCNs or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international 
protection 
29/04/2004 10/10/2006 
Council Directive 2005/85/EC on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for 
granting and withdrawing refugee status 
01/12/2005 
01/12/2007&01/12/20
08 (for Article 15) 
Regulation (EC) 343/2003 defining criteria and mechanisms on the determination of the 
Member State responsible in asylum applications 
18/02/2003 18/02/2003 
Regulation (EC) 439/2010 establishing the European Asylum Support Office 19/05/2010 19/05/2010 
 
As formerly explained, the breach of EU law here is decided in accordance with a twofold 
legal procedure exercised by the EU Commission and European Court of Justice. As 
guaranteed by Article 258 of TFEU and 106a of the Euratom Treaty, Member States are 
responsible before the Commission for the timely transposition and thorough implementation 
of the EU law. If a Member State somehow fails to do so (that is, if it commits an act of ‘non-
compliance’), the Commission starts the ‘pre-litigation’ procedure to conduct investigation 
over the matter, sending a letter of ‘formal notice’ to the Member State and demanding a 
‘reasoned opinion’ from it, if the breach of law persists. Should non-compliance remain, the 
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infringement case is finally referred to the European Court of Justice, which runs the 
‘litigation’ procedure in order to impose a fitting sanction. 
 
5.3.1 Germany 
Based on the Commission’s annual assessment reports (drawn up by the Directorate-General 
of the Home Affairs Department) on the Community law’s implementation in Member States, 
the EU legal documents which Germany infringed upon between 2005 and 2012 and the legal 
actions processed in response are as follows: 
 
Table 55: Germany’s infringements of EU Home Affairs Law 
Year Area of law Infringement of Actions taken 
Number of 
infringements 
2005 
Labour migration 2003/86/EC on family reunification formal notice 
5 
Irregular migration 
2002/90/EC on unauthorised entry, transit and 
residence 
formal notice and 
reasoned opinion 
Asylum 2003/9/EC on reception of asylum-seekers 
formal notice and 
reasoned opinion 
2006 
Labour migration 
2003/86/EC on family reunification; 
2003/109/EC on long-term residence 
 
reasoned opinion; 
formal notice and 
reasoned opinion 
8 Irregular migration 
2004/81/EC on residence in illegal cases; 
2004/82/EC on carriers’ communication of 
passenger data; 
2002/90/EC on unauthorised entry, transit and 
residence 
formal notice; 
formal notice; 
referred to ECJ 
Asylum 
2003/9/EC on reception of asylum-seekers; 
2004/83/EC on minimum standards for 
stateless persons 
referred to ECJ; 
formal notice 
2007 
Labour migration - - 
2 
Irregular migration 2004/81/EC on residence in illegal cases reasoned opinion 
Asylum 
2004/83/EC on minimum standards for 
stateless persons 
reasoned opinion 
2008 
Labour migration - - 
0 Irregular migration - - 
Asylum - - 
2009 
Labour migration - - 
0 Irregular migration - - 
Asylum - - 
2010 
Labour migration - - 
0 Irregular migration - - 
Asylum - - 
2011 
Labour migration 2009/50/EC on highly qualified workers 
formal notice and 
reasoned opinion 
4 
Irregular migration 
2008/115/EC on common standards and 
procedures for returning illegal entries/stays 
formal notice and 
reasoned opinion 
Asylum - - 
2012 
Labour migration 2003/86/EC on family reunification formal notice 
1 Irregular migration - - 
Asylum - - 
Total  
20 for  
28 texts in total 
 
For the 28 EU legal texts Germany was throughout the selected assessment period 
supranationally bound by, there were 20 occurrences of law breach. The distribution of 
infringements across the three areas of immigration was fairly symmetrical, making it hard to 
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declare that documents in one area were violated more frequently than those in others. 
Considering the traditional patterns of immigration policy-making in Germany, one could all 
the same draw a number of inferences, in coming to terms with what may have been 
conducive to this effect. 
 
A cursory look at the German governmental agencies delivers a set of special supranational 
units (‘task forces’) representing the EU. With the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 
1993, the legislative structure appointed here a special committee to be responsible for 
relations with the EU. The ‘Committee of European Union Affairs’ which became legally 
attached to the Grundgesetz at the time operates currently as the back stage of the German 
Parliament’s policy-making on European issues. Different from its equivalents elsewhere, this 
particular committee can issue binding opinions besides those released by the federal 
government. Apart from its active participation in many supranational policy areas ranging 
from the EU’s institutional reform packages or enlargement to cooperation with the European 
Parliament or amendment of EU Treaties, the Committee of European Union Affairs is as a 
matter of course also involved in the blueprint of national legislation. Partly because of this 
active collaboration, and partly not, a common tendency observed thus far in the decision-
making of immigration is a country-wide compromise, particularly as far as border and 
asylum issues are concerned (Geddes, 2003). To illustrate, in the initial stages, the Tampere 
Council’s decision to promote cooperation amongst Member States found hardly any 
challenge in the German Parliament. Trends of communitarisation remained largely intact 
over years during many coalition governments, which saw support on the side of oppositional 
parties as well. 
 
The main law regulating immigration matters in present day Germany is the 2005 
Immigration Act. The ratification of the act came after a long negotiation process and 
occasional foot-dragging at the Landtags (state parliaments), coming finally into force as 
capable of bridging the European Commission’s proposals with the national legislation on 
immigration. In cases of a lack of compromise between political parties, special hearings of 
experts or committees were held. To illustrate, following the CDU’s demand for a revision of 
the Council Proposal on Minimum Standards on Procedures in Member States for Granting 
and Withdrawing Refugee Status (COM (2002) 326 final) arguing “the German airport 
protocol, the safe country principle and the principle of unfounded appeal were endangered”, 
the government established a hearing of experts, which eventually approved of the proposal. 
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Similarly, the Council Directive 2004/83/EC (‘on Minimum Standards for the Qualification 
and Status of Third-country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who 
Otherwise Need International Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted’), which 
gave rise to a friction between the governing SPD & Greens and the oppositional CDU & 
CSU, was adopted only after the Committee on Human Rights recommended its acceptance. 
Despite such challenges, however, there was by no means tendency towards a denial of 
communitarisation efforts, if not for a number of compromises made to keep immigration 
within reasonable limits at the most. What often became a matter of intensive debates were 
policy instruments concerning the ‘safe third-country’ status. In any case, “the so-called 
‘escape to Europe’ itself has never been questioned by any political party” (Prümm & 
Alscher, 2007, p. 80). 
 
As formerly argued, the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty was a milestone for the incorporation of 
supranational immigration policies into the national context. When the Treaty transferred 
some of the competences covered as part of the third pillar of Justice and Home Affairs 
previously to the first pillar/Community Method, many aspects of migration -from asylum to 
visa regimes- became subject to communitarisation. Regardless of the fact that Germany was 
already an ‘agenda-setter’ for the handling/formulation of former Treaties, Amsterdam was 
surely a turning point for German immigration and asylum policy. Yet, its formerly 
supporting attitude towards introduction of the QMV at the Maastricht Summit acquired in the 
aftermath of Amsterdam initially an oppositional character, in particular on matters relating to 
asylum and refugee issues. This turn reasoned from the Länder’s rising concerns about loss of 
political leverage in the event that they would need to share their competences with other 
lands in relevant policy areas (Hellmann et al., 2005). 
 
The follow-up 1999 Tampere European Council was clearly a projection of Amsterdam as it 
brought forward many directives and regulations on Europeanisation of immigration policies, 
such as the launch of a joint framework on asylum and illegal migration. While Germany 
appeared to back these communitarisation attempts, its major focus remained rather on 
undocumented aspects of migration (Santel & Weber, 2000). Following Tampere, the 
Summits at Laeken (2001), Seville (2002) and Thessaloniki (2003) all underscored the 
priority areas voiced at Amsterdam, like measures against human trafﬁcking, smuggling and 
all types of illegal migration including the issue of illegal residence. Adaptation of 
supranational political instruments such as regulations and directives into German legislation 
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has not always followed the same path. Since incorporation of directives into the national 
legislation allowed for ‘fine-tuning’, there arose complications leading delays such as on the 
expansion of refugees’ entitlement rights. Except for the ‘safe third-country’ case, however, 
there were for the German policy framework no major areas of misﬁt in this context. 
 
Before the Treaty of Amsterdam came into force, the coalition between CDU/CSU and FDP 
drew to a close after some sixteen-year-long service. As one of their first policy changes, the 
new coalition of SPD and the Greens sought to upgrade the existing immigration policy (Bade 
& Bommes, 2000). From a supranational perspective, this was a natural consequence of the 
recent EU regulation which required screening individual cases of asylum, despite the former 
coalition’s so-called ‘asylum compromise’ enabling public access. Indeed, this policy 
commitment helped the political elite recognise for the first time that Germany was an 
immigration country. Regardless of that, however, the new immigration policy was largely 
restrictive, not least because it introduced further prerequisites for legal residence in 
Germany. 
 
Despite the apparent paradigm shift in Germany’s ofﬁcial immigration discourse, there were 
signs of reluctance to this effect. To illustrate, during the Convention drawing up the EU 
Constitution in 2003, both government and opposition parties stressed the need for veto 
powers on matters concerning asylum and refugee policy. The then Foreign Minister Joschka 
Fischer’s letter, prepared in collaboration with the SPD and CDU delegates, to the Convention 
President Valery Giscard d'Estaing voiced German concerns about switch to qualified 
majority voting in the area of immigration, seeing that the issues on that score concerned the 
internal policy’s ‘most sensitive’ component (Mahony, 2003). As a clear reflection of interior 
concerns, this rather ‘conservative’ demand came at a time when the Interior Minister Otto 
Schily was trying to pass a controversial law on immigration, which was found ‘too soft’ by 
the CDU, as the main opposition party holding a majority in the Bundesrat. 
 
It is possible to argue in retrospect that many supranational measures did not have a major 
influence on the routine course of action in German immigration policy. To illustrate, the 
proposal for Council Directive 2003/9/EC laying down minimum standards for the reception 
of asylum-seekers (which was calling Member States to prevent successive migratory 
movements by limiting asylum-seekers’ right to move, but at the same time providing them 
with reasonable standards of living by way of for instance health care) had already been 
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pronounced in the German national law in reference to the social beneﬁts for asylum 
applicants (Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz). 
 
Indeed, the intended prevention of ‘asylum shopping’ as part of ‘burden-sharing’ was surely 
welcome by Germany, as a top destination for asylum-seekers in Europe. In this context, 
however, the approval of the Council Directive 2001/55/EC (‘on minimum standards for 
giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on 
measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons 
and bearing the consequences thereof’) the same year appeared to modify the concerning 
rights in view of the fact that asylum-seekers’ access to the German labour market and 
possible demands for family reunification were previously out of the question. 
Implementation of this directive was suggesting that the German state would not have a full 
grip on asylum/refugee matters in its own territory. Observing similar concerns from other 
Member States, the Commission issued soon another proposal (COM/2001/510) for a 
directive which the Council approved of in 2004 with an amendment declaring Member States 
can deny the protection of asylum-seekers as long as this can be secured by other parties or 
international organisations (Council Directive 2004/83/EC). Placing improvement of 
subsidiary protection into the asylum/refugee context (which was secured under the 1951 
Geneva Convention), this directive expanded the main scope of the German asylum policy. A 
forum of debates started in this connection on the concept of state persecution as a 
prerequisite for minimum residence, which previously produced no positive outcomes for the 
protection of stateless people. In consequence, the 2005 Immigration Act made room for the 
implementation of non-state persecution as part of the Aufenthaltsgesetz (Residence Act).
185
 
 
For asylum procedures, the Commission’s proposal –via COM (2000) 578 ﬁnal- sought in 
particular to build a joint framework of appeal provisions amongst the newly acceding 
member states. This attempt was however also an opportunity for the old Member States to 
make adjustments in their own standards, which were obviously much higher than those of the 
former. In accordance, issues concerning safe countries of origin and safe third countries 
became subject to EU implementation. More on that, the Council’s acceptance of a revised 
proposal in 2004 granted additionally the right to legal advice in case of denial and the right to 
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 The Immigration Act is composed of the Residence Act (Aufenthaltsgesetz), the Act on the General Freedom 
of Movement for EU Citizens (Freedom of Movement Act-EU) and amendments to additional legislation 
(Federal Ministry of the Interior, 2005). 
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appeal at the ECtHR. This rather top-down application appeared to threaten initially Article 
16a of the German Basic Law, which came to deny refugees the right to reassessment of 
individual cases. 
 
Despite this contradiction with the Basic Law, the new regulation did not pose a major threat 
in practical terms, as Germany had following the latest enlargement waves become 
surrounded by states which -with the exception of Switzerland- had already signed the 2003 
Dublin II Convention.
186
 Similar to the Dublin II Convention, the Council Directive 
2004/83/EC sought to come up with effective methods to disable secondary migration. Much 
in the same vein, the Commission’s 1999, 2000 and 2002 proposals raised the issue of 
children’s age to qualify for family reuniﬁcation. The importance of the issue lay in 
identification of an upper age limit above which residence and entry clearance would have to 
fall in another framework (than that of family reunification). Following a hot debate during 
the negotiations of the 2005 Immigration Act, it was agreed that those above 16 years of age 
could not benefit from this option in Germany (BAMF, Bundesamt für Migration und 
Flüchtlinge, 2004). 
 
For the issue of undocumented migration, the objectives as set forth by the Council Directives 
2001/40/EC and 2001/51/EC (concerning mutual recognition of expulsion and harmonisation 
of financial sanctions against carriers (vehicles) engaged in activities such as clandestine 
transportation
187
, respectively) were incorporated into the 2005 Immigration Act.
188
 Following 
the 2005 Immigration Act, the EU Directives Implementation Act 
(Richtlinienumsetzungsgesetz) exposed German asylum and immigration law to a number of 
important changes. While the Immigration Act enabled amongst others harmonisation of the 
refugees’ right of residence –provided their status would be acknowledged under the 1951 
Geneva Convention- and the involvement of non-state actors in persecution upon entitlement 
to asylum initially under Article 16a of the German Basic Law, the Directives Implementation 
Act transposed a total number of eleven EU directives (which were concerning the issue of 
protection in the same context) into the national law. Accordingly, changes in the Basic Law, 
which became communitarised in close reference to the humanitarian framework, would 
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 Regulation (EC) 343/2003. Accordingly, as stipulated by Regulation (EC) 2725/2000, states where asylum 
applications were made became responsible for entrance to the EU providing it would for this purpose use a so-
called EURODAC fingerprint system. The safe third state became in this way no more a critical issue for the 
German asylum policy, which traditionally perceived the matter as ‘normative’ (Hailbronner, 2006). 
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 This provision was already envisaged by the Schengen Agreement (Article 26). 
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 §58(2) and (3) and §63 AufenthG, respectively. 
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apply specifically to the granting of residence for temporary protection (§24, AufenthG), 
residence for persons enjoying refugee status on the basis of the Geneva Convention (§25, 
Paragraph 2, AufenthG), residence for persons entitled to subsidiary protection (§25, 
Paragraph 3, AufenthG) and victims of human trafficking (§25, Paragraph 4 a, AufenthG). 
 
For the areas concerning fight against illegal immigration and enhancement of security, 
Regulation 539/2001 issued a list of countries (in compliance with the 1985 Schengen 
Agreement and the 1990 Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement) whose 
nationals were subject to visas. As part of combatting illegal immigration, a European visa 
policy was drawn up to envisage a uniform set of criteria on visa applications, including 
agreements on the facilitation of visa agreements with the third countries. For short-term stays 
of not more than 90 days (out of an entire period of six months) as well as for the issuing of 
transit visas using the Schengen area, the statutory basis of the European law was constituted 
by Regulation 810/2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas. 
 
5.3.2 The UK 
To the Commission’s annual reports on breach of the Community law, the legal texts the UK 
infringed between 2005 and 2012 in two of the three main areas of immigration (given that 
the UKcame to enjoy like Ireland and Denmark an opt-out clause from Amsterdam’s labour 
immigration component
189
) and the legal actions administered by the Commission in response 
are as follows: 
 
Table 56: The UK’s infringements of EU Home Affairs Law 
Year Area of law Infringement of Actions taken 
Number of 
infringements 
2005 
Labour migration - - 
1 Irregular migration - - 
Asylum 2003/9/EC on reception of asylum-seekers formal notice 
2006 
Labour migration - - 
1 
Irregular migration - - 
Asylum 
2004/83/EC on minimum standards for 
stateless persons 
formal notice 
2007 
Labour migration - - 
1 Irregular migration - - 
Asylum 
2004/83/EC on minimum standards for 
stateless persons 
reasoned opinion 
2008 
Labour migration - - 
1 
Irregular migration - - 
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 However, this option allowed the UK Government to enjoy a three-month period in case it would want to 
change its position to cooperate in this area. 
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Asylum 
2004/83/EC on minimum standards for 
stateless persons 
referred to ECJ 
2009 
Labour migration - - 
0 
Irregular migration - - 
Asylum - - 
2010 
Labour migration - - 
0 Irregular migration - - 
Asylum - - 
2011 
Labour migration - - 
1 Irregular migration 
2008/114/EC on critical infrastructures and 
their assessment 
formal notice 
Asylum - - 
2012 
Labour migration - - 
0 Irregular migration - - 
Asylum - - 
Total  
5 for 
22 texts in total 
 
It seemed, accordingly, for the 22 EU legal texts the UK was throughout the assessment 
period accountable for, there were 5 occurrences of law breach in total. Since the UK had an 
opt-out clause from the EU legal texts concerning labour immigration and most law 
infringements took place within the context of asylum, it is hard to speak of a symmetrical 
distribution of violations across the three areas of immigration. 
 
To put it as a backdrop, the UK’s accession to the EC in 1973 did not bring a radical turn in 
its traditional immigration politics. The ruling governments led often by the Conservatives 
and the Labour Party adopted in principle almost always a ‘gatekeeping’ role, sticking to the 
main principles of immigration policy-making (regardless of their restrictive consequences for 
the course of supranationalisation). As Bulmer & Burch (1998; 2004) observed, such a 
cautious strategy was founded on systemic markers like the centralised, sovereignty-based 
and majoritarian governing structure of the British political system, which more often than not 
denied policy dispositions calling for alignment with the EU’s modus operandi. 
 
Policy-making in immigration matters has broadly been managed by the Home Ofﬁce so far. 
For most of its history, the decision-making method the Home Office adopted to that effect 
was intergovernmental. One can however observe an increase of commitments to the EU’s 
multi-level/coalition-building for some time. In the absence of a constitutional basis 
supporting supranationalisation of immigration in proper terms, such moves of approximation 
remained somewhat limited. With its long established praxis of common law, the British legal 
system was indeed far from catching up with the EU’s supranational dispositions which came 
to be traditionally informed by the Roman law (Allen, 2005). While the domestic legal 
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structures were for instance following the 1998 Human Rights Act
190
 geared to a certain 
extent towards the European model, adaptation of the Community law to the 
domestic/national legislation remained low, around fifteen percent at most (Page, 1998). 
What’s more, despite a seemingly radical change for the national government system, as it 
normally would suggest a considerable shift of political weight from the executive to the 
judiciary level, the ECHR’s incorporation into the domestic legal system did not make major 
implications for the legislative sovereignty, mainly because of the British courts failing to 
urge the UK Parliament -at times of incompatibility with the ECtHR decisions- into adopting 
the legislation of the latter (Flinders, 2005). Harmonisation at low levels did in the end not 
amount to high levels of Europeanisation. 
 
A major relevant case concerned here detention of foreign nationals for an uncertain period 
(on suspicion of terrorist activities), which appeared to cause controversy between the 
provisions of the 2001 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act and the ECHR. In this respect, 
the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary, as the predecessor of the current Supreme Court of the UK, 
issued a ‘declaration of incompatibility’, resulting ultimately in the change of the legislation, 
albeit with its minor effects on the case of detainees. A more recent clash in the same context 
arose again between the ECtHR and the Supreme Court of the UK in 2011 over the use of 
‘hearsay evidence’, i.e. evidence from victims and witnesses who do not show at the 
courtyards. While challenging the testimony of a witness was to the ECtHR contingent upon 
attendance to court hearing, the Supreme Court commented otherwise. Following objections 
from British lawyers, the grand chamber of the ECtHR refined its position to back the UK 
court. This was however not a vindication for the British cause entirely, as the ECtHR found 
in a follow-up case conviction of an appellant by the British government unfair and ordered 
the UK to pay him financial recompensation for costs and damages (Bowcott, 2011). 
 
Apart from signs of misfit as far as the judicial system is concerned, another source of friction 
between the British and European politics of immigration relates to domestic interest groups. 
The interest group system which is based on “pluralism and the normal policy style in the UK 
is one of ‘bureaucratic accommodation’ and the ‘logic of negotiation’” (Ette & Gerdes, 2007, 
p. 105). Jordan & Richardson (1982) point at several prominent groups and departments of 
government which make up this system through “bargaining rather than imposition”, 
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 The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) was incorporated into the British national law with the 
1998 Human Rights Act. 
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suggesting a good number of policy proposals the Home Ofﬁce puts forward on immigration 
issues are designed in consultation with such stakeholders (Ette & Gerdes, 2007), despite 
studies arguing for only marginal effects in this sense (Castles & Kosack, 1985; Freeman, 
1979; Schönwälder, 2001). 
 
Whether or not these groups have been ‘Europeanised’ to a certain extent is closely related to 
their place in a broader European network, where they could voice their political positions to 
a larger audience. For that, one can refer to several British NGOs which by their research 
findings contend that national and international NGOs like Britain’s Immigration Law 
Practitioners’ Association, the Refugee Council and the Amnesty International have already 
been engaged in multi-level activities with the hope to bring various components into the 
European polity (Gray & Statham, 2005). This strategy has proved fruitful in policy areas like 
environmental policies; however, there is less optimism for far-reaching effects in the field of 
immigration (Ette & Gerdes, 2007). Such a sceptical outlook is indeed grounded upon the 
long-established roots of policy-making in immigration. With that in mind, it would be hard 
to argue that involvement at an EU-level immigration management has to date generated 
remarkable changes in the UK’s national politics of immigration. With the exception of some 
measure of incorporation from the ECHR into the British legal structure, the status quo on 
that score has seemingly been maintained for the most part. 
 
British governments have historically taken a positive approach towards a certain level of 
cooperation for communitarisation of national immigration policies. This support was mostly 
limited to bilateral and intergovernmental forums between Member States (Ette & Gerdes, 
2007, p. 96). At the bilateral level, cooperation on immigration matters has since the 1991 
Sangatte Protocol increased in particular with France, in pursuit of a system of cross-border 
controls.
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 The broader intergovernmental level of cooperation started much earlier with the 
1967 Naples Convention, which was the earliest political initiative concerning TCNs’ 
migration in Europe (Geddes, 2000). Added to this is also the Trevi Group
192
 where the UK 
became a participant in 1975. The Council Presidency in the 1980s leading to the 
establishment of an AdHoc Group on immigration as well as the signing of the Dublin 
Convention, the London Resolution (concerning applications for asylum) and the drafting of 
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 Under this scheme, the British immigration officers could now carry out pre-boarding controls at Eurostar 
stations, including ports in France. 
192
 The Trevi Group was originally meant to be an initiative on terrorism but expanded later on to include 
immigration issues. 
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EURODAC/European Fingerprint Database in the 1990s are other examples worth 
mentioning in this context (Ette & Gerdes, 2007). 
 
Compared to a certain degree of harmonisation, brought about through such initiatives up to 
the end of the 1990s, the aftermath of Amsterdam Treaty saw marginal developments in terms 
of British immigration policies’ approximation to their counterparts as part of the 
supranational framework in Europe. One can in light of these proceedings argue that the mode 
of Europeanisation prior to Amsterdam was informed primarily by policy learning on the 
British part. However, with Amsterdam’s “substantial provisions concerning the development 
of a common European immigration policy…over a ﬁve-year period [and] new institutional 
and procedural regulations [transferring] central immigration matters from the third pillar to 
Title IV in the ﬁrst pillar”, decision-making in immigration became no more dependent on an 
intergovernmental approach, but instead on “‘intensive transgovernmentalism’” (Ette & 
Gerdes, 2007, p. 97). 
 
While the UK opted out from Amsterdam’s Title IV, it maintained an option to revert with a 
legislation proposal, provided the Council would be informed about it three months in 
advance. The committee in charge of EU affairs in the House of Lords advised in several 
occasions that opting in to the Family Reunification Directive (2003/86/EC) and the Long-
term Residents Directive (2003/109/EC) for instance would be in the UK’s interests, for they 
would strengthen the rights of the economic migrants here as in the rest of the EU. 
Accordingly, while with the entry into force of the Directive 2003/109/EC, third-country 
national workers in the UK (including those with five year-long residence permits) would not 
be able to benefit from the provisions offered in other Member States, such a restriction 
would be “neither in their interests nor in the United Kingdom’s. Moreover, assimilating the 
position of long-term third-country nationals’ rights to that of migrant citizens of the Union, 
including by enabling participation in the political life of the country” would not just be “a 
matter of improving their living and working conditions” but “also a matter of fostering their 
harmonious integration into society” (House of Lords, European Union Committee, 2005, p. 
43). 
 
Transposition of EU legislation concerning immigration and asylum policies into the UK law 
started essentially under the Tampere Programme. Of legal texts adapted into the national law 
were most notably Council Directive 2003/9/EC on ‘Minimum Standards for the Reception of 
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Asylum-seekers’ (as a synthesis between pre-existing legislation), changes to the Immigration 
Rules and the follow-up 2005 Asylum Seekers/Reception Conditions Regulations together 
with the 2005 Asylum Support (Amendment) Regulations, the Qualification Directive 
(2004/83/EC), which was enshrined by combining the 2006 Qualification Regulations on the 
‘Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection’ and changes to the Immigration Rules 
(HC 395, as amended) as well as the Procedures Directive (2005/85/EC) and the 2007 
Asylum (Procedures) Regulations. The two major directives the EU issued under the ensuing 
Hague Programme (2005-2010), the joint European Parliament and Council Directive ‘on 
Common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-
country nationals’, also known as the Return/Removals Directive (2008/115/EC) and the 
Council Directive adopted in 2009 ‘on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country 
nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment’, also known as the Blue Card 
Directive (2009/50/EC) were not adopted by the UK. 
 
To the UK government, as far as the Return/Removals Directive was concerned, such 
provisions would make the issue of returning even “more difficult and more bureaucratic -by 
introducing restrictions on detention, obligations to provide legal aid to irregular migrants, 
and increasing the possibilities for challenging the return decision- over and above the strong 
protections already in place in EU law” (EP, Press Release, 2008). Indeed, in reference to the 
EU Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) in general, the UK Government’s guiding document 
stresses that the domestic approach as regulated further by the 2009 Lisbon Treaty’s JHA 
Opt-in Protocol is “of significant political importance. Policy leads of all departments should 
be alert to any elements of JHA policy in their dossiers (such as migration, civil, criminal 
judicial and police cooperation, as set out under Title V of the TFEU) in order that the opt-in 
remains protected” (HM Government, Transposition Guidance, 2011, p. 21). Put differently, 
in transposing European initiatives, be they directives or regulations, a common tendency the 
UK governments came to hold is to ensure that provisions of supranational texts are 
transposable to the extent that these would be cost-effective, i.e. serving to the domestic needs 
and interests in the long run. 
 
5.3.3 Greece 
To the Commission’s appraisal reports, the EU legal texts Greece violated as of 2005 and the 
legal actions taken in response are as follows: 
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Table 57: Greece’s infringements of EU Home Affairs Law 
Year Area of law Infringement of Actions taken 
Number of 
infringements 
2005 
Labour migration 
2003/86/EC on family reunification 
 
formal notice 
6 
Irregular migration 
2002/90/EC on unauthorised entry, transit and 
residence 
formal notice and 
reasoned opinion 
Asylum 
2001/55/EC on minimum standards for 
displaced persons’ temporary protection; 
2003/9/EC on reception of asylum-seekers 
referred to ECJ; 
formal notice and 
reasoned opinion 
2006 
Labour migration 
2003/86/EC on family reunification; 
2003/109/EC on long-term residence; 
2004/82/EC on carriers’ communication of 
passenger data 
reasoned opinion; 
formal notice and 
reasoned opinion; 
formal notice 
7 
Irregular migration - - 
Asylum 
2003/9/EC on reception of asylum-seekers; 
2004/83/EC on minimum standards for 
stateless persons; 
Reg343/2003 on Member States responsible 
for asylum applications 
referred to ECJ 
 formal notice; 
formal notice 
2007 
Labour migration 
2004/82/EC on carriers’ communication of 
passenger data; 2004/114/EC on admission for 
study or training purposes; 
2005/71/EC on admission for scientific 
research 
reasoned opinion; formal 
notice; formal notice 
6 
Irregular migration - - 
Asylum 
2003/9/EC on reception of asylum-seekers; 
Reg343/2003 on Member States responsible 
for asylum applications; 2004/83/EC on 
minimum standards for stateless persons 
formal notice; reasoned 
opinion; reasoned 
opinion 
2008 
Labour migration 
2004/114/EC on admission for study or 
training purposes;  
2005/71/EC on admission for scientific 
research 
reasoned opinion; 
reasoned opinion 
3 
Irregular migration - - 
Asylum 
Reg343/2003 on Member States responsible 
for asylum applications 
referred to ECJ 
2009 
Labour migration 2003/109/EC on long-term residence formal notice 
2 
Irregular migration - - 
Asylum 
2005/85/EC on minimum standards for 
granting and withdrawing refugee status 
formal notice 
2010 
Labour migration 2003/109/EC on long-term residence 
complementary formal 
notice 
2 Irregular migration - - 
Asylum 
2005/85/EC on minimum standards for 
granting and withdrawing refugee status 
complementary formal 
notice 
2011 
Labour migration 2009/50/EC on highly qualified workers formal notice 
3 Irregular migration 
2008/114/EC on critical infrastructures and 
their assessment; 2008/115/EC on common 
standards and procedures for returning illegal 
entries/stays 
formal notice; formal 
notice 
Asylum - - 
2012 
Labour migration 2009/50/EC on highly qualified workers reasoned opinion 
1 Irregular migration - - 
Asylum - - 
Total  
30 for  
28 texts in total 
 
For the 28 EU legal texts Greece was over the 2004-2012 period in supranational terms bound 
by, there were 30 instances of law breach. When viewed in terms of their distribution across 
the three main immigration areas, incidents falling in labour migration and asylum matters 
outnumber that of irregular migration. This result could obviously be attributed to the national 
sensitivities concerning labour market privileges in Greece, specifically in light of the rising 
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number of asylum-applicants in recent times. Yet, seen in historical terms, one could come 
across other defining markers of immigration policy-making in Greece. 
 
For one, a traditionally strong executive layer in the political system is commonly the main 
reason why supranational policy-making has often been treated in marginal terms in Greece 
(Mavrodi, 2007, p. 170). Unlike on other issues which have often captured “the headlines of 
the press …or…a central issue in Greek politics”, the two mainstream parties, PASOK and 
ND, have so far tended to act in harmony when it came to migration policies (Triandafyllidou, 
Maroufof, & Nikolova, 2009, p. 60). Policy-making powers and practices
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 have in this field 
been characterised largely by ministerial decisions and presidential decrees through which 
immigration policy remained largely untouched by parliamentary scrutiny (Mavrodi, 2010, p. 
10). 
 
In seeking to implement EU norms throughout the 1990s, Greece’s compliances did not have 
a significant value for non-binding policy instruments/principles agreed at the EU Councils 
(for instance those concerning expansion of rights to immigrants). The 1996 Council 
Resolution on the status of long-term residents was to this effect not given the green light for 
almost a decade (until it became an EU Directive and was adopted in 2005 as 2003/109/EC) 
on the grounds that similar provisions were already in force within the framework of the 1991 
Immigration Act. A major factor to bear in mind here is the institutional legacy of the 
Ministry of Public Order, which in areas concerning security issues saw it almost always a 
taboo to take supranational steps. The communitarisation attempts were for this reason limited 
at most to policy import from other Member States, most notably traditional immigration 
destinations like France and Germany. 
 
Despite the 2001 Immigration Act, which transferred competences in many immigration 
matters (most importantly on legal immigration) from the Ministry of Public Order to the 
Ministry of Interior, the latter had a poor institutional background. Nonetheless, the new 
ministry moved to initiate closer cooperation at the EU-level, by for instance adopting the 
Council Directives on family unification and long-term residence. A series of internal-level 
institutionalisation took place in this sense to lead to the foundation of the Immigration Policy 
Institute (IMEPO), which would be operating as the government’s consultancy service on 
immigration matters. 
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For Greece, transposition of binding EU norms in the form of directives were not an easy task 
at the time, as there were no legal grounds in national law to grant a comprehensive collection 
of rights to foreign nationals (Mavrodi, 2010, p. 16). Full incorporation of the concerning 
directives into the domestic legal order could realise only in 2007, alongside a recently 
launched Immigration Act (Law 3386/2005) and relevant domestic legislation (Ministry of 
Interior, 2005). The executive’s lack of experience in EU affairs was counterbalanced in this 
period through IMEPO, thanks to the alternative procedures it offered in implementing 
legislation on family reunification and long term-residence, upon cross-examination of policy 
frameworks in the Netherlands, the UK, France, Spain, Italy and Germany (IMEPO, 2005; 
2006). One can in this sense argue that it was only through fragmentation of the governmental 
structure (in the form of subdivisions like IMEPO) that a more positive response to EU-level 
policy-making appeared to rise. 
 
Against a background of the PASOK- and ND-led governments throughout the 1990s up to 
the mid-2000s, which had little friction over immigration policies (despite deviations in their 
traditional policy-making preferences), the left-wing NGOs and the newly emerging migrant 
organisations lobbied extensively to bring immigration matters to the fore. Here, the Greek 
Orthodox Church was quite ineffective compared to for instance the Catholic Church in Italy 
and Spain (Triandafyllidou, Maroufof, & Nikolova, 2009). Though not so willingly, the 
political elites started to acknowledge gradually immigrants’ presence, for instance by making 
them more room in the party structures. 
 
Besides these pro-immigration winds, PASOK’s initiative for the naturalisation and schooling 
of TCNs’ children, their voting rights in local elections as well as a number of social and 
employment rights found support in other left-wing parties like the Coalition of the 
Democratic Left (SYRIZA) and the Communist Party of Greece (KKE). The conservative ND 
on the other hand did not voice many policy plans of similar nature. While the ND issued a 
series of draft legislations leading finally to the declaration of the National Migration Policy 
plan (Naftemporiki, 2008), these were generally informed by concerns about possible loss of 
votes to particularly the extreme right-wing parties like the Popular Orthodox Rally, LAOS 
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and the Chrysi Avgi, i.e. the Golden Dawn
194
 (Triandafyllidou, Maroufof, & Nikolova, 2009, 
p. 63). 
 
Compared to the political parties which were usually reluctant to integrate immigrants into 
Greek politics, trade unions emerged to take more active roles. The main platform for trade 
unions, the General Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE) and the Hellenic Forum of 
Migrants as the chief federation of migrant organisations have since the 1990s underscored on 
many platforms the bureaucratic and legal hurdles before immigrants’ political integration. A 
most notable action worth mentioning in this context was the participation of the GSEE and 
the Hellenic Forum of Migrants in a recent EU-funded programme (called EQUAL) for the 
general purpose of integrating immigrants and refugees into the European labour markets. 
There was for this purpose no considerable contribution from the employers’ unions such as 
the SEB (Federation of Greek Industry), the Union of Greek Industries or the GSEVEE 
(General Federation of Professionals, Small Manufacturers and Merchants of Greece) 
(Triandafyllidou, Maroufof, & Nikolova, 2009, p. 65). 
 
The latest EU enlargement suggested in many ways that cooperation at the supranational level 
would bring about restrictions on national immigration policies (Mavrodi, 2007, p. 162). The 
1985 Schengen Agreement demanded that Greece -as the newest Member State at the time- 
adopt policies within the context of visa regulations, unlawful immigration and border 
controls as required for participation in the EU’s relevant institutional network. From this 
perspective, one could argue that communitarisation of immigration policies started in Greece 
as a consequence of the ‘conditionality principle’, which manifested itself clearly through the 
release of the Immigration Act in 1991. The parliamentary meetings at the time witnessed 
indeed frequent references to compliance with the European treaties to that effect (Greek 
Parliament Plenary Sessions, 1991). 
 
The EC law’s incorporation to the domestic legal order came out however only after the 
Amsterdam Treaty’s entry into force in 1999. The main reasons for instance why the Council 
Directive 2004/83/EC did not promptly lead to legislative transformation in the Greek asylum 
policies had to do with either a minimum extent of ‘misﬁt’ between European and national 
asylum frameworks or, in the case of big degrees of ‘misﬁt’, the Greek government’s 
                                                     
194
 The Golden Dawn’s election campaign was mainly based on unemployment and anti-immigration rhetoric 
which helped gain a large electorate support during the 2012 elections. 
204 
purposeful strategy to bypass major action in the initial stages (Papagianni & Naskou-Perraki, 
2004, p. 146). One can in this context also name the role of Greek bureaucracy in relation to 
better standards for asylum-seekers’ reception, temporary protection and procedures 
concerning judicial appeal (Mavrodi, 2007, p. 164). To illustrate, although a presidential 
decree declared the transposition of the Council Directive 2001/55/EC on temporary 
protection and burden-sharing into the domestic legal order, there was no official adaptation 
to be introduced by a ministerial decision for long (Skordas & Sitaropoulos, 2004, p. 38). 
 
Such delays of government action in the Greek case had obviously major implications for 
TCNs’ basic accommodation and social welfare needs, which initially had no legal grounds in 
the Greek law and required urgent action upon replacement of the 1990 Dublin Convention. 
More recently, it became quite evident that the Dublin II Convention put an increasing burden 
on countries like Greece, which are located at Europe's external borders. About three quarters 
of more than 100,000 irregular migrants that entered the EU in 2009 by way of Greece rose in 
early 2010 by 80% (Human Rights Watch, 2010). Its commitments to Regulation 343/2003 
have recently obliged Greece to accept the return of more than 10,000 asylum-seekers from 
other EU Member States. The presidential decree to introduce a full-scale emergency reform 
in this context was postponed as a consequence of the recent economic crisis and the 
government change in 2012. 
 
There were aside from the principle of conditionality other factors that characterised the basic 
patterns of Greek immigration policy-making. For instance, despite lack of obligation 
concerning the EU’s non-binding legislation such as on recognition of refugee status, the 
Presidential Decree 61/1999 declared incorporation of this Community law into the domestic 
legal order.
195
 In a similar vein, the 2001 legal amendments concerning family reuniﬁcation 
did not come as a consequence of some external pressure, either. In either way, the then ruling 
government was watching “a balance between speciﬁc, Greek domestic interests and the 
country’s international, mostly EU, obligations” (Mavrodi, 2007, pp. 165-166). What’s more, 
bearing in mind that the 2001 Immigration Act’s introduction dated before the transposition of 
relevant EU norms, it would not be fair to consider the formation of the domestic law to be a 
direct outcome of the Community legislation. In response to the oppositional pressure to 
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further approximate to EU legislation on family reunification, the Greek government moved 
to attach its priorities with illegal residence, for the new act was serving well with the EU 
framework (Ministry of Interior, 2001). The ensuing 2005 Immigration Act drew on the other 
hand more inspiration from the EU law. The former act’s provisions on the improvement of 
conditions for family reunification and the status of long-term residents were in essence 
informed by obligations to liberalise the national immigration legislation (Ministry of Interior, 
2005). 
 
The role of the judiciary throughout the policy adaptation process deserves also particular 
mention. According to Articles 2, 5 and 28 of the 1975 Greek Constitution, the domestic legal 
order had to be in conformity with the provisions of the ratified international treaties (Skouris 
& Venizelos, 1985). In this sense, the EU Treaties and European Convention of Human 
Rights as well as the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) emerged as providers of international norms into the Greek 
law. That said, there was over a long period (1990-2005) no major impact of the ECtHR and 
ECJ on the immigration law. From the ECJ’s perspective, the rules Amsterdam introduced as 
part of the Justice and Home Affairs required Greek courts’ compliance to a certain extent. 
However, the latter made in this period no major reference to TCNs’ rights to entry, residence 
and labour, contrary to their for instance Dutch, German or British counterparts (Mavrodi, 
2010, p. 24). Similarly, the eight cases for which Greece was a defendant at the ECtHR 
between 1993 and 2007 ended with a verdict against it, that is to say, Greece was found to 
have violated the European Convention of Human Rights. 
 
5.3.4 Italy 
Based on the Commission’s annual assessment reports for the selected period of analysis, 
Italy’s infringements of the EU legal texts and the legal actions taken in response are as 
follows: 
 
Table 58: Italy’s infringements of EU Home Affairs Law 
Year Area of law Infringement of Actions taken 
Number of 
infringements 
2005 
Labour migration 2003/86/EC on family reunification formal notice 
3 
Irregular migration - - 
Asylum 2003/9/EC on reception of asylum-seekers 
formal notice and 
reasoned opinion 
2006 Labour migration 
2003/86/EC on family reunification; 
2003/109/EC on long-term residence; 
Regulation (EC) 1030/2002 on uniform 
residence permits 
reasoned opinion; 
formal notice and 
reasoned opinion; 
formal notice 
7 
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Irregular migration 
2004/81/EC on residence in illegal cases; 
2004/82/EC on carriers’ communication of 
passenger data 
formal notice; 
formal notice 
Asylum 
2004/83/EC on minimum standards for 
stateless persons 
formal notice 
2007 
Labour migration 
2003/86/EC on family reunification; 
2003/109/EC on long-term residence; 
2004/114/EC on admission for study or 
training; 
2005/71/EC on admission for scientific 
research 
referred to ECJ;  
referred to ECJ; 
formal notice; 
formal notice 
4 
Irregular migration - - 
Asylum - - 
2008 
Labour migration -  
1 
Irregular migration -  
Asylum 
2005/85/EC on minimum standards for 
granting and withdrawing refugee status 
formal notice 
2009 
Labour migration 
Regulation (EC) 1030/2002 on uniform 
residence permits 
referred to ECJ 
1 
Irregular migration - - 
Asylum - - 
2010 
Labour migration - - 
0 Irregular migration - - 
Asylum - - 
2011 
Labour migration 
2003/109/EC on long-term residence; 
2009/50/EC on highly qualified workers 
formal notice; 
formal notice and 
reasoned opinion 
5 
Irregular migration 
2008/114/EC on critical infrastructures and 
their assessment; 
2008/115/EC on common standards and 
procedures for returning illegal entries/stays 
formal notice; 
formal notice 
Asylum - - 
2012 
Labour migration 
2003/109/EC 
on long-term residence 
complementary formal 
notice 
 
5 
Irregular migration - - 
Asylum 
2003/9/EC 
on minimum standards for reception of 
asylum-seekers; 
2004/83/EC on minimum standards for 
stateless persons; 
2005/85/EC on minimum standards for 
granting and withdrawing refugee status; 
Regulation (EC) 343/2003on Member States 
responsible for asylum applications 
formal notice; 
formal notice; 
formal notice; 
formal notice 
Total  
26 for  
28 texts in total 
 
The 28 EU legal texts Italy was in this period supranationally liable to saw, as it appeared, 26 
instances of law breach in total. To the above-given distribution, these infringements seem to 
have taken place mostly within the context of labour migration and asylum matters. This 
breakdown might to a certain extent suggest how sensitive labour market management in Italy 
recently became specifically in the face of rising numbers of asylum-seekers. Based on 
patterns of immigration in historical terms, one could still identify other dynamics shaping the 
course of action here. 
 
For all the delays and flaws in moving towards communitarisation of national policies, 
immigration matters in Italy have generally tended to align with the EU standards. To 
generalise that for the entire political domain would however not really be well founded. 
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Initially, in the 1980s, a host of interest groups led by the Catholic Church and trade unions 
played a vital role for the public perception of immigration (Sciortino, 1999). To them, the 
core issue was easy to grasp if approached from labour market perspectives, and stressed the 
need for strict control over its links to irregularities (Magnani, 2012). This was indeed a rather 
security outlook informed largely by the position of business circles at the time, which would 
soon inspire the formulation of the Martelli Law. 
 
As of the 1990s, immigration became gradually a major political battleground between the 
left and right-wing parties. While those on the right denied as a rule the structural demands of 
the immigration agenda, there appeared gradually a growth of declarations acknowledging 
both the EU and national dimensions of the matter. To illustrate, the 2007 Carta dei Valori 
(Chart of Values) assigned specific roles onto the mass media for the encouragement of 
cultural pluralism and fight against xenophobia, as it was aspired in other Member States. 
Although there was alongside these calls direct implications for the rise of religious and 
cultural diversity in the country, it was to some the old societal traditions or the fundamental 
values of Italians that were emphasised in the first place (Peres, Coux & Motard, 2009). 
 
Following the early 1990s, when Italy had to face large-scale immigration waves mainly from 
Albania and the former Yugoslavian Republic, immigration management started to undergo a 
process of politicisation change, based for the most part on center-left discourses. Parties like 
the Movimento Sociale Italiano (the Italian Social Movement) and Partito Repubblicano 
Italiano (the Republican Party) were in particular determined to replace the elite discourses by 
locating immigration at the center of their electoral campaigns. Indeed, with a new 
understanding of solidarity which sought to mediate between values characteristic of the 
Catholic tradition and the non-conservative tendencies, these parties played an active role in 
introducing immigration matters to a broader segment of the society. 
 
A milestone for the change of the elite discourse proved to be the coalition governments in the 
1990s. The Ulivo coalition of the Christian Democrats, the Italian Socialist Party and a 
number of small centrist parties led by Romano Prodi made a clear difference to that effect. 
To ease concerns during reform debates on illegal immigration, for which the extreme leftists 
in the coalition offered an ‘equality discourse’ seeing immigrants as holders of the same legal 
rights as nationals, Prodi proposed to be mindful of the complexities involved, hinting 
specifically at the illegal dimension. Much in the same way, the Minister of Social Affairs 
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Livia Turco explained to the Italian daily the Repubblica that “clandestines, who have never 
looked the State in the face, and irregulars who contribute to our society and try to put 
themselves in order” could not be seen alike (as cited in Magnani, 2012, p. 655). 
 
Following this frame of mind in its core, the 1998 Turco–Napolitano Law reduced application 
of immediate ‘forced expulsion’ mainly to undocumented immigrants (Einaudi, 2007). While 
the Ulivo coalition was seeking a more effective way to manage labour migration, that is, 
showing the right way or ‘the front door’ to enter the country (Zincone, 2006), it was offering 
reconstruction of Italian identity as a core component of European identity at the same time 
(Pasquino, 2003). Indeed, compared to the rhetoric used by many centre-right governments in 
the past, there was under the centre-left rule less emphasis on national interests. 
 
To be sure, the shift in perceptions of national identity and the ensuing legal rearrangements 
were characterised to a great extent by Italy’s efforts to comply with the Schengen agreement. 
As the then Interior Minister Napolitano put it, there were reservations “that Italy would not 
be admitted because Italian borders are not trustable, because Italy is a colander and the soft 
belly of Europe” (as cited in Magnani, 2012, p. 652). Locating the EU context at the center of 
immigration debate by this means had indeed a direct influence on the traditional 
understanding of immigration control. The rise of a new discourse conforming to 
supranational goals across many EU Member States was now ruling Italian immigration 
politics as well. With this new paradigm, immigration management began to be seen as part of 
a structural problem which was ‘natural’ and had to be grasped in light of the unfavorable 
economic and political conditions in sending countries. 
 
The 2002 Bossi–Fini Act (following the 1998 Turco-Napolitano Law) did not introduce a new 
legal order until 2009. There were times the governments arranged ‘quick’ legislative 
packages in this period. To illustrate, the centre-left government passed in 2007 an emergency 
decree allowing for deportation of EU citizens and their family members (in response to the 
rape and murder of an Italian citizen by a non-national at the time). This was in fact quite 
momentary for the history of the right-left immigration discourses, as the radical left criticised 
the decree for holding fascist tones, whereas it was for the governing Democratic Party rather 
a question of rights and a security matter to the Italian citizens (Finotelli & Sciortino, 2009). 
The securitisation logic pervading over the early 2000s was preserved by the ensuing 
Berlusconi government in 2009, which as an alliance between the Forza Italia, the Northern 
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League and the National Alliance passed Law 94/2009 to reinforce fight against irregular 
migration, as it was linked in the new law to auxiliary issues such as organised crimes and 
urban security (Merlino, 2009). Such rather conservative tendencies (which replaced the 
leftist narratives in the 1990s) aimed, as a member of the extreme right National Alliance 
party put it, “to improve the quality of immigration by promoting initiatives of vocational 
training and pre-emptive screening in the countries of origin” (as cited in Magnani, 2012, p. 
657). Accordingly, Italy could profit from the unremitting flows of immigrants only if they 
would bring skilled labour and could undergo cultural and/or social assimilation (Magnani, 
2012).  
 
It would be fair to argue that that the EU law has been a major source of influence upon 
Italy’s legal documents on immigration. That said, policies in this scope were until the 1998 
Turco-Napolitano Law chiefly driven by regularisation attempts, which in principle sought to 
ease undocumented migration and heavy pressure on borders (Campani, 2007). One should at 
this point remember that Italy did not take part in the formulation of the Schengen Treaty. To 
some, this absence reasoned essentially from the lack of a concise immigration framework at 
the time (Pastore, 2008). To help remove EC-wide concerns for the proper functioning of 
Schengen, a new act via Law 943/1986 was put into force. With the 1990 Martelli Law, early 
provisions in the 1986 law were enhanced further in light of the Schengen’s conditionality, 
which eventually made way for Italy’s official entry to the border-free zone. Then, a further 
set of legal arrangements came with the Turco-Napolitano law, which consolidated Schengen 
as part of the EU law, following the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty. 
 
While these initial moves appear to be parts of a whole making the impression that Italy was 
harmonising its immigration policies with those of major EU members, there was scepticism 
given the “discrepancy between the law ‘on the books’ and the law ‘in action’” (Calavita, 
2004, p. 369). To illustrate, decision-makers on illegal immigration made initially minor 
references to migrants’ rights (despite Amsterdam’s provisions contrariwise), but instead to 
mass regularisation policies, as the country was then grappling with huge migrant flows in 
particular from North Africa (Brick, 2011). 
 
The EU Council’s Directive 2008/115/EC evokes obligations in this context, especially with 
respect to the right to seek asylum (under both the European Convention on Human Rights 
and the Geneva Convention). Accordingly, Italy's recent practices of for instance sending 
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boats carrying asylum-seekers in the absence of a screening procedure away have been acts of 
denial of asylum-seeking rights. This issue was raised clearly in a report by the Council of 
Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CPT), which blamed the Italian authorities for having “knowingly pushed back 
particularly vulnerable persons and perhaps also persons who could attest to their status as 
refugees” (Council of Europe, 2010). Italy on the other side pointed out the bilateral 
agreements it signed with North African countries, according to which it preserved the right to 
stop those from disembarking on the Italian soil and lodging asylum claims.
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referred 2008 European Pact on Immigration and Asylum was indeed consenting to the 
signing of such bilateral agreements with these countries; however, as the criticism went, 
Italy’s main responsibility in such cases was checking into the political and human rights 
conditions in North Africa than seeking ways to justify the readmission negotiations. 
 
At the time this research was being carried out, a number of EU legal texts were still not 
entirely transposed in the Italian legal/political order. A most notable amongst them was the 
Council Directive 2004/114/EC, whose transposition deadline dated back to 2007. According 
to the Commission reports, basic requirements for TCN students’ admission for study 
purposes and training or voluntary service were in Italy not properly transferred into the 
domestic law (European Commission, 2011d). Much in a similar vein, Council Directives 
2003/109/EC (on long-term residence) and Directive 2003/86/EC (on family reunification) 
could be transferred to the national order with long delays. Despite its transposition, the 
implementation of the Directive 2003/109/EC in particular was not accommodated to the EC 
standards. The problem here stemmed from the fact that the status of legally resident TCNs in 
Italy was often treated as ‘temporary’, irrespective of their overall duration of stay. What’s 
more, periods of lawful and continuous residence as part of the framework regarding long-
term residence status were not really observed. As a matter of fact, leaving all these aside, one 
could argue according to the recent Commission reports (2011c) that Italy violated in many 
occasions even EU citizens’ intra-EU mobility rights, by subjecting them to annual 
immigration quotas or imposing restrictions on their employment in public service. 
 
It is today common to hear Italian officials making references to the Directive 2001/55/EC 
(‘on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of 
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displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in 
receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof’) to call attention that the EU 
should use more initiatives on ‘burden sharing’, raise the competences of FRONTEX for 
more effective border controls and take active roles in creating and managing centers across 
the Union. Within this same context of crisis management, there was also official reference to 
the need for an amount of minimum 100 million Euros in the initial stages (European 
Migration Network, 2012b). 
 
As formerly mentioned, the Italian governments have so far volunteered in many occasions to 
abide by the EU norms and standards, particularly since the country’s bid for accession to the 
Schengen Area in the 1980s, and transpose relevant supranational texts into the national law. 
Nevertheless, the unceasing clandestine/irregular influxes specifically from North Africa have 
for long been posing enormous challenges vis-à-vis implementation of the adopted EU 
directives and regulations in the national law. To bring the national legal order in conformity 
with the Council’s Returns Directive (Directive 2008/115/EC) and standardise procedures in 
coping with undocumented migration, the Italian Parliament ratified in 2011 a decree law. A 
fundamental aim of the new regulation under this Law 89/2011 was to restore an immediate 
procedure in the event of compulsory expulsion for reasons of threat to public order and 
security. What’s more, with this new provision, the maximum length of administrative 
detention in the Centri di Accoglienza and Centri di Permanenza Temporanea e Assistenza 
(Centres for Identification and Expulsion) was extended from six to eighteen months (Jonjic 
& Mavrodi, 2012, p. 106). 
 
5.4 Summary 
5.4.1 Germany 
The early decades following the end of WW II saw in Germany a period of dynamic economy 
encouraging full employment and therewith a relatively easygoing relationship between the 
‘newcomers’ and the host society. Three main factors informed this alliance. First, the jobs 
offered to immigrant workers were generally not those the indigenous were interested to take. 
Second, the initial concerns that the trade unions had in cases where newcomers took better-
paid positions -as this would possibly cause the wages to go down- were allayed by the ruling 
governments, which promised equal terms/conditions between foreign and domestic workers. 
And third, a great majority of immigrants came under the ‘guest-worker’ programmes and 
there was widespread conviction that their stay would be ‘temporary’. 
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To be fair, this harmonious setting coincided with a period of EC integration which found far-
reaching approval amongst Germans, of the elite and the ordinary alike. One could on that 
score argue that Europeanisation of national policies did not meet major political barriers in 
the initial stages. As of the 1970s, however, with signs of a stagnant economy spreading out 
largely from the global oil crisis at the time, the initial ‘permissive consensus’ started to 
change into a ‘constraining dissensus’ across the EU lands (Hooghe & Marks, 2006). The 
impacts of this turn are today still thick on the ground, in particular with regard to public 
impressions about immigrants/immigration. 
 
A series of Eurobarometer surveys carried out over the last decade checked into public 
opinions with the aim to find out whether or not immigration was a main concern for the EU 
citizens. The results in the German case demonstrated: 
 
Table 59: Immigration as the main concern in Germany (in percentages) 
Country 
Year of analysis 
2003 2008 2012 
Germany 5 6 8 
EU 15/27 13 11 8 
Based on Standard EBs 59 (2003), 69 (2008) and 78 (2012). 
 
While figures in Germany tended to rank much lower than the EU average, it appeared, there 
was a steady rise in public impressions regarding immigration as more serious a matter than it 
formerly was. Indeed, this picture gives grounds for the findings of another survey, where one 
tested item on matters concerning immigration was EU citizens’ opinions on whether or not 
“Immigrants are a threat to [our] way of life” (Special Eurobarometer 60.1). The results for 
the German context revealed a considerable 39% who believed in one way or another that 
immigrants were threatening their ways of life. 
 
Turning to the supranational context in light of these disillusioned thoughts, one could 
perhaps find more relevance in why the process of EU Directives’ implementation in national 
legal/political orders of Germany sought delays and/or incorporation into the national law 
with certain trade-offs. To talk in specific, transposition of ‘subsidiary protection’ as the main 
scheme of 2004/83/EC Qualification Directive (on minimum standards for the qualification 
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and status of third-country nationals or stateless persons as refugees) was for a long time far 
from being in full force and effect. In effect, its eventual transferral with a rough form (at 
minimum standards) caused the Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht) to 
contend with the European Court of Justice (Amnesty International, 2007). While the Council 
Directive 2005/85/EC (on minimum standards about refugee status) and the replacement of 
the 1990 Dublin Convention through the Dublin II via Regulation (EC) 343/2003 did not 
cause major conflicts between national and supranational frameworks (thanks to similar 
domestic provisions which were at the time already in force), the Council Directives 
2002/90/EC, 2004/81/EC, 2004/82/EC, 2003/9/EC and 2008/115/EC took a relatively lengthy 
period to get transposed into the domestic law, mainly because of their implications for a 
radical change of the relevant national order. A most recent case related in this sense to the 
2009 Blue Card Directive (2009/50/EC). Despite the EU regulation prescribing that holders of 
Blue Cards should be paid higher than the average rate in a Member State, the coalition 
government at the time attempted to defy it by lowering the benchmark to an earlier tariff and 
raising time limits for acquisition of these cards to a maximum (Deutsche Welle, 2012). 
Following a long process of parliamentary debates, however, a policy plan was adopted in a 
law package called Berufsqualifikationsfeststellungsgesetz, BQFG (the Professional 
Qualifications Assessment Act). 
 
For matters concerning irregular migration in Germany, the use of EU-formulated 
arrangements came in quite handy for the restoration of national legal/political order. Indeed, 
this method of ‘venue-shopping’ or ‘escape to Europe’ was in the German case quite 
reasonable in particular when it became obvious that making a domestic reform, for instance 
in the area of asylum, would be much more demanding than adopting an EU legislation (in 
view of the matter’s ties to the German Constitution). Either way, the German legal order 
presented in the face of the community law often low levels of ‘misfit’. That is to say, despite 
occasional political controversy, most EC directives and regulations were adopted into the 
national law without being exposed to radical changes. In the end, the direction of policy 
adaptation for German immigration often vacillated between ‘inertia’ and ‘absorption’. 
 
Looking into the legal aspects of immigration by way of MIPEX data, one could conclude 
that conditions applying to TCNs in Germany showed significant signs of improvement. Yet, 
these could still be interpreted as ‘halfway favourable’ when compared to many other 
established immigration lands in the EU: 
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Figure 8: Conditions for TCNs in Germany 
 
Based on MIPEX II & III. 
 
To illustrate, Germany was classified on the 31-country MIPEX list as an ‘average’ country in 
terms of the educational opportunities and family reunion prospects its TCNs enjoyed. 
Conditions for anti-discrimination and permanent residence appeared here even lower than the 
EU average. The 2007 EU-Richtlinienumsetzungsgesetz rose to be promising in many ways to 
that end. Yet, the recently adopted integration tests posed considerable setbacks, in particular 
due to the additional red-tape they involved. Thanks to better consultancy services at the 
Länder level, one can all the same mention signs of improvement. 
 
5.4.2 The UK 
The ‘guest-worker’ schemes in the German case, which led to the initial impression that 
immigration would not necessarily translate into permanent stay, do not apply much to the 
British case. An earlier instance of politicisation and a progressive development of 
institutional frameworks as far as immigration management was concerned took place here in 
the absence of recruitment programmes. That being the case, to revamp the war-stricken 
economic state at the time and partly because of the will to restore the blemished imperial 
image, the Labour-led British governments were in the early post-WW II period generally in 
favour of immigration, specifically from the country’s former colonies. The Conservative-led 
right-wing foregrounded in response domestic concerns about international labour. Added to 
that, the ongoing imperialist sentiments had the capacity to promote counter-immigration 
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feelings further, not least because there was widespread discrimination all around. Indeed, a 
long trail of these convictions stretches into present times. 
 
Recent Eurobarometer surveys held amongst others to look into immigration as the main 
concern in the EU Member States revealed in this sense supportive evidence: 
 
Table 60: Immigration as the main concern in the UK (in percentages) 
Country 
Year of analysis 
2003 2008 2012 
UK 32 35 24 
EU 15/27 13 11 8 
Based on Standard EBs 59 (2003), 69 (2008) and 78 (2012). 
 
It appreaed, accordingly, tackling unwanted immigration signified for the British respondents 
a matter of greater urgency than it was for those from other EU nations. These findings testify 
indeed to the outcomes of another survey which looked into whether or not immigration could 
be perceived by the EU citizens as a ‘threat’ to their ways or life (Special Eurobarometer 
Wave 60.1). A remarkable 54% of the British respondents returned with ‘yes’, suggesting 
they believed immigrants were one way or another a source of threat to them. 
 
When seen in a European context, the late accession of the UK to the EC in 1973 (following 
two failed attempts in 1963 and 1967) could be interpreted as a natural consequence of the 
country’s skeptical thoughts concerning the EU integration. And yet, even after its entry into 
the EC, the supranational policy formulations did not really hint at radical changes for the 
UK’s legal/political order. It is however important to note that minimal adaptations required 
in the British context hardly covered the legal/labour area, but instead came as an outcome of 
the largely security-based agenda of the two other areas –irregular immigration and asylum 
matters- for which the country volunteered to adopt supranational initiatives selectively. Put 
more precisely, of all the 45 EU initiatives falling in the area of immigration and asylum 
(these were made up of 13 directives, 17 regulations and 15 decisions), the British ‘opt-in’ 
was applicable to 27 texts, marking 60% participation in the policy field (Ette & Gerdes, 
2007, p. 98). While such a rate seemed fairly reasonable (given the traditional ‘British 
exceptionalism’ towards supranational ends), in fact, a largely selective strategy was ruling 
this cooperation, insofar as the UK declared to opt-out from entitlements within the area of 
labour migration. 
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Seen from this latter perspective, the relatively smooth transposition/implementation of EU 
the texts concerning asylum-seeking so far was not as impressive as it initially appeared. 
Indeed, since becoming Europe’s biggest recipient of asylum-seekers in the early 2000s, 
adaptation of the EU legislations into the national order was in the UK relatively effortless, 
yielding a somewhat uncomplicated transposition of the Council Directives 2001/55/EC (on 
temporary protection to displaced persons), 2003/9/EC (on minimum standards for the 
reception of asylum-seekers), 2004/83/EC (on minimum standards for the qualification and 
status of third-country nationals or stateless persons as refugees), 2005/85/EC (on minimum 
standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status) and 
Regulations such as 343/2003 (defining asylum criteria) and 439/2010 (establishing a 
European Asylum Support Office). The other area where the UK cooperated within the 
framework of supranationalisation of immigration policies was irregular migration, for which 
it transposed most importantly 2001/51/EC (supplementing the Schengen Agreement), 
2002/90/EC (on unauthorised entry, transit and residence), 2011/36/EC (on human-
trafficking), 2001/40/EC (on the expulsion of third-country nationals) as well as Regulations 
(EC) 2007/2004 (establishing FRONTEX) and 2725/2000 (on EURODAC) into its national 
legal order. 
 
The conditions the UK offered its TCN residents in the selected period of analysis appeared in 
broad terms ‘slightly less favourable’ (MIPEX III). Recent concerns about non-EU nationals’ 
costs vs. benefits vis-à-vis labour markets, in particular following the 2004 EU enlargement, 
were worked out in 2008 to present a points-based system which introduced limitations to 
TCNs’ labour market access. While this move indicated a change of paradigm in that labour 
policies were now to be qualification-based (not purely seeking ‘control’), the highly 
demanding conditions required from third-country nationals illustrated a largely restrictionist 
frame of mind. 
 
The strength of British immigration policies in terms of third-country nationals’ integration 
related very much to the state’s effective anti-discrimination measures so far. Conditions 
which were of relevance to political participation, family reunion and labour market in the 
first place indicated average values; those concerning long-term residence suggested however 
lower standards compared to the 2007 data: 
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Figure 9: Conditions for TCNs in the UK 
 
Based on MIPEX II & III. 
 
5.4.3 Greece 
Given its entire migration history in the 20
th
 century, Greece proved to be a case in point for 
an emigration country. The sporadic inflows in the first decades of the post-WW II period 
were featuring broadly those of ‘return’ to a predominantly agricultural land where the 
economy and relevant institutional structures were not mature enough to attract large-scale 
foreign labour force. The big unemployment rates at the time encouraged sizeable emigration 
to industrialised lands in Europe, North America and Australia. To speak of immigration here, 
in its proper sense, one needs to refer to the 1980s when many in the country’s immediate 
neighbourhood came in search of better political/economic prospects. 
 
Judging by a series of Eurobarometer surveys conducted over the last decade, one catches the 
impression that immigration was here not necessarily viewed as a ‘main concern’: 
 
Table 61: Immigration as the main concern in Greece (in percentages) 
Country 
Year of analysis 
2003 2008 2012 
Greece 6 4 7 
EU 15/27 13 11 8 
Based on Standard EBs 59 (2003), 69 (2008) and 78 (2012). 
 
By comparison to the EU averages these rates were relatively low. Yet, seeing to another 
survey held in the same period, it is possible to argue that the growing influxes in the country 
in fact gave rise to progressively negative attitudes towards immigration (Special 
Eurobarometer Wave 60.1). Of several policy matters used to check into the public opinion 
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here, the immigration bit included a straightforward question inquiring about whether 
immigrants were causing a threat to the EU citizens’ way of life. In the Greek case, a striking 
69% returned with agreement. This meant in plain text that a big majority of nationals in 
Greece believed immigrants were threatening their lives. 
 
While such reflections might be interpreted as voices against a supranational framework of 
immigration in Greece today, the country’s early EU history was characterised largely by 
requirements for EU membership and accession to the Schengen Zone. Incorporation of 
relevant EU texts into the national order indicated a diverse range of policy adaptation in that 
context. The process of supranationalisation was showing here its different ‘faces’, including 
voluntary incorporation, conditionality and formal obligation (Mavrodi, 2007, p. 172). Many 
supranational texts were either ‘absorbed’ or ‘transformed’, amounting in the end to various 
degrees of change in the existing political/legal order. These outcomes were initially 
attributed to the country’s little experience in immigration/asylum policy-making and the 
inadequate institutional structure. The legacy of these handicaps, as one may refer to them, is 
all too evident at present.
197
 
 
Further to the conditionality principle, which demanded by definition the alignment of the 
Greek immigration management with the European norms/regulations, there were in the early 
2000s instances of voluntary cooperation, specifically in relation to asylum matters. Indeed, in 
view of the rising numbers of asylum applications at the time, cooperation within the EU’s 
broad protective security framework would be to the national interests of Greece. A number 
of supranational measures were drawn up on that score, such as 2001/55/EC (on minimum 
standards for temporary protection), 2003/9/EC (on minimum standards for the reception of 
asylum-seekers) and 2004/83/EC (on minimum standards for international protection). 
Transposition of these texts into the Greek order did not run smoothly, not least because of the 
bureaucratic hurdles in the state structure. A further aspect to note at this last point was the 
role of ‘client politics’ in Greece, which in fact was rooted in its faulty party system. 
 
A last major issue to bear in mind within the context of ‘downloading’ EU norms into the 
institutional structure of Greece concerned the role of the judiciary system. While the Greek 
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 The EU Commission decided recently to provide Greece with counselling service on training and 
administration for immigration matters (European Commission, Staff Working Paper, 2010).  
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courts appeared in general to be safeguarding TCN rights, there were times they did not 
observe the jurisprudence of the ECJ/ECtHR on that account. To illustrate, communitarisation 
efforts concerning immigration and asylum matters were during the transposition of EU 
legislations paralysed occasionally by the Greek courts’ deferrals, reminding as a matter of 
fact the executive’s default position (seeking as a rule to ‘upload’ national preferences to the 
supranational institutions in the first place). 
 
The general conditions the TCNs enjoy in Greece are to recent data of ‘average’ value. 
 
Figure 10: Conditions for TCNs in Greece 
 
Based on MIPEX II & III. 
 
There were in recent times signs of improvement across long-term residence, political 
participation, access to nationality and anti-discrimination, when seen by MIPEX standards. 
One needs to note here however that it was the ‘minimum standards’ that counted in most 
cases, particularly on matters concerning family reunion, permanent residence and anti-
discrimination. Nevertheless, amongst a total of 31 countries on MIPEX, Greece was 
observed to have made the most considerable progress to that effect.
198
 
 
5.4.4 Italy 
Similar to Greece, Italy lacked until about a couple of decades ago basic legal provisions with 
regard to the area of immigration. Incorporation of EU legal arrangements to the Italian order 
generally vouched for patterns of ‘absorption’ and ‘transformation’, depending on the extent 
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of proximity between the national and supranational frameworks. Like in all other Member 
States, accommodation to supranational texts (on immigration) underwent phases of foot-
dragging here. Despite eventual transposition, their full implementation across the national 
legal/political order was not really the case. 
 
As formerly stated, mass immigration is in Italy a late phenomenon of the 1970s, when the 
former emigrant population started to return in growing measures, and more importantly in 
the early 1980s with the industrial growth in the north. It comes in this sense as no surprise 
the launch of the first comprehensive immigration law in Italy dates back only to 1986. To be 
fair, a major determinant behind this relatively new phenomenon for the country was the entry 
restrictions introduced by the established destinations in northern Europe. The tighter the 
borders became in the latter, in other words, the more popular Italy became as a destination 
country for migrants. 
 
It is particularly important to note that a significant share of the hitherto flows to Italy were 
made up of asylum-seekers. The number of entry attempts by way of deadly boat trips grew to 
alarming rates in recent times. Those managing to reach the nearest destinations, most notably 
the islands of Lampedusa, Sicily and Sardinia, were usually sent back to their countries of 
origin. There were certainly cases of transferral to the so-called identification and detention 
centres. Still, the rate of expulsion has been generally high so far.
199
 
 
In case of criticism following in this thread that Italy’s practices of interception and/or 
forcible return were not compatible with the EU’s legal provisions, most importantly the 
Council Directive 2008/115/EC (on common standards and procedures for returning illegal 
entries/stays), the Italian officials often claimed that the area of ‘operation’ was the high seas 
(Human Rights Watch, 2009).
200
 After all, as the argument went, the Council Directive 
2001/55/EC was allowing Italy to implement the concerning EU norms only with ‘minimum’ 
requirements. 
 
In reading the rationale behind Italy’s immigration management until recent times, one could 
refer to the changing public attitudes towards ‘newcomers’ in the country. A series of 
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 Those who could make it to the Italian territory were not always welcome by warm feelings. The 2010 riots in 
Rosarno, a town in Reggio Calabria, was a clear evidence of locals’ negative reaction their arrivals. 
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 Or else (if in Italian waters), they would have enjoyed the non-refoulement principle. 
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Eurobarometer surveys carried out amongst EU citizens in 2003, 2008 and 2012 sought 
amongst others to identify whether or not respondents would be locating immigration as a 
main concern their countries were facing at the time. The results gathered from the Italian 
participants showed: 
 
Table 62: Immigration as the main concern in Italy (in percentages) 
Country 
Year of analysis 
2003 2008 2012 
Italy 13 7 2 
EU average 13 11 8 
Based on Standard EBs 59 (2003), 69 (2008) and 78 (2012). 
 
These lower rates, as compared to those reported in many other EU countries, could imply 
that issues concerning immigration were not in need of urgent treatment for Italians. Another 
survey carried out in a similar context revealed, however, a fairly different outcome. To the 
Eurobarometer survey checking into the EU citizens’ attitudes towards immigrants as “a 
threat to [our] way of life”, 38% of the Italian respondents agreed to the question (Special 
Eurobarometer 60.1). This meant a considerable number of Italians were at the time thinking 
that immigrants in their country were somehow threatening their ways of life. 
 
Despite a wide range of limitations, such as working quotas, the economic recession hitting 
the job markets in the country to a worrying level and the ‘push-back’ policies to North Africa 
in recent times, the conditions third-country nationals enjoyed in Italy were by MIPEX 
standards of the best in Europe. 
 
Figure 11: Conditions for TCNs in Italy 
 
Based on MIPEX II & III. 
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It seemed standards for family reunion and long-term residence were here particulary high, 
though measures concerning the latter issue deteriorated lately, owing much to the new 
security law which made integration conditions ‘slightly less favourable’. While it turned to 
be way above the EU average, the situation concerning third-country nationals’ labour market 
conditions in Italy did not show signs of improvement. What’s more, there were during the 
selected period of analysis neither active voting rights nor citizenship reforms in sight. 
Although the anti-discrimination regulations got slightly better lately, they were still in need 
of refinement, when for instance compared to those in other major immigration destinations 
across Europe. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
Based on the findings in Chapter 5, the study rounds off its investigation here to the degree 
that the selected cases are representative of the entire research area. Three steps will be 
followed for that purpose. First, to provide definitive answers to the research questions, the 
findings as to the changing patterns of immigration policies in Germany, the UK, Greece and 
Italy are encapsulated to give an overall account of the extent of their Europeanisation and 
similarities/differences in this context. These results are reviewed later in light of the research 
hypotheses to reconsider, specifically, the latter’s explanatory capacity for the former. And 
finally, an overall summary is provided in the third step to speak a last word on what the 
gathered research outcomes might signify for future studies in this area. 
 
Assessment 
Studying the selected cases in line with the bottom-up research model involves, as formerly 
explained, an analysis at all levels, assuming that the so-called supranational rules, 
regulations, practices and ideological factors rise originally at the national level, then evolve 
into Community standards to finally have collective impacts back upon the national level, 
traversing the EU’s wider scope of diffusion. Such premises entail necessarily a historical 
investigation of the key events/turning points for the management of immigration policies. 
 
The principles of the top-down perspective, as one of the two mainstream methods used in 
Europeanisation research, are taken in this study to be in the stock of its rival bottom-up 
model already. Accordingly, the latter holds the capacity to offer two main directions as to 
influence upon domestic policy changes. The first and fundamental one comprises the 
‘uploading’ potential of Member States as far as the making of supranational policies is 
concerned. To this end, for the production of an overarching policy-making structure, 
Member States can simulate (or interact with) one another, or even other countries outside the 
EU. The second direction of influence is in contrast one of ‘downloading’ to the degree that 
policy-making is rooted first and foremost in supranational origins. 
 
The prefatory ‘uploading’ leg of the inquiry has been fulfilled by exploration of the selected 
cases’ histories of immigration, their institutional frameworks together with key policy 
indicators in recent times as provided by the Migration Integration Policy Index. To bring this 
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task to an end, the target Member States’ legal performances were studied in relation to the 
Community law, regarding these as the key markers for the ‘downloading’ nature of policy 
diffusion in the entire process of Europeanisation. 
 
Research question one: Europeanisation of immigration policies 
The ‘uploading’ investigation of institutional frameworks starting from case-specific factors 
at the national level, including the selected Member States’ immigration histories, 
political/legislative structures and principal actors in immigration management delivered that 
the relatively recent advent of influxes and precarious political systems in Greece and Italy 
held back robust institutional frameworks in this category. Although policy adaptations 
guided by supranational objectives ran across measures of deliberation in all four cases, the 
extent of mistrust in Germany proved lower than in others, not only because of the former’s 
comprehensive institutional arrangement but also due to the far-reaching political consensus 
on the ‘EU project’ in the country. Regardless of its similarly strong institutional layout, the 
UK stands out here as a chronic case of ‘Euroscepticism’. Indeed, the entire history of 
supranationalism abounds with British reservations, irrespective of their relevance to 
immigration. That being the case, the far-reaching immigration experiences, legal tools and 
measures it developed for management on that score as well as a mature democracy and 
political culture it characteristically had to its name gave way for a strong institutional 
framework, similar to that in the German case, and yet, unlike those in Greece and Italy: 
Table 63: Overview of historical, legal, political and institutional characteristics 
Cases Basic features 
Earliest 
comprehensive 
law packages 
Main political features 
Strength of 
institutional 
frameworks 
Germany 
relatively longer experiences in the 
immigration field; a largely receiving country 
of labour immigrants (as of the end of WW II) 
relatively old: 
1965 and 1991 
Alien Acts 
deep-rooted party-system; 
consensus on supranational 
goals 
strong 
UK 
longest experiences in the immigration field 
due to a long colonial background; a largely 
receiving country of labour immigrants (as of 
the early 20th century 
old: 
1914 and 1948 
Nationality Acts 
deep-rooted party-system; 
scepticism about 
supranational goals 
strong 
Greece 
limited/recent experiences in the immigration 
field; a largely sending country of labour 
emigrants (until the 1980s) 
relatively new:  
Act 1975/1991; 
Act 2910/2001 
unstable party-system, 
‘client politics’; scepticism 
about supranational goals 
weak 
Italy 
limited/recent experiences in the immigration 
field; a largely sending country of labour 
emigrants (until the 1970s) 
relatively new:  
Law 943/1986; 
Law 39/1990 and 
Law 40/1998 
unstable party-system, 
electoral success of 
xenophobic parties; 
scepticism about 
supranational goals 
weak 
 
Following an ‘uploading’ reading of the selected cases’ institutional frameworks, in terms of 
their impact upon the extent of Europeanisation in immigration matters at present, the 
‘downloading’ analysis was carried out in light of the selected cases’ performances vis-à-vis 
the EU law. A probe into the annual reports the Commission has been drawing up since the 
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Amsterdam Treaty revealed a list of instances where Germany, the UK, Greece and Italy 
breached the EU law’s immigration framework and became subject to legal action. 
Accordingly, with its 30 infringement acts for the 28 EU legal texts it was supranationally 
liable to from 2004 to 2012 (the selected period of analysis), Greece outweighed all other 
selected cases. Italy came here second with its 26 violations, ahead of Germany and the UK 
with 20 and 5 instances of EU law breach, respectively. While this picture does not offer a 
symmetrical distribution across the three areas of immigration, issues concerning labour 
immigration came in all cases to the fore, given the policy areas where the EU law was 
violated at most, as was seen in the German, Greek and Italian cases, or taking into account 
national sensitivities, as demonstrated typically by the UK, which thanks to its ‘labour-
exempt’ supranational engagement was bound by a total 22 EU legal texts instead of the 28 
directives and regulations Germany, Greece and Italy were each accountable for. 
 
Table 64: Overview of EU law infringements and legal actions 
 
In light of these two main sets of data covering country-specific attributes in relation to 
institutional frameworks and the selected cases’ infringements of the Community law 
226 
concerning immigration issues, one could conclude that the extent of Europeanisation in 
Germany and the UK amounted during the selected period of analysis to ‘absorption’ at most, 
given their low-to-moderate needs for policy-change vis-à-vis supranational norms. To the 
same frame of analysis, the depth/breadth of the need for domestic policy change on this 
matter denoted in Greece and Italy further beyond the ‘absorption’ state. In view of multiple 
occasions demanding radical institutional rearrangements in both countries -owing very much 
to their weak frameworks at the time the requisite EU legal texts had to be transposed into the 
national legal/political orders- it is possible to argue that the extent of Europeanisation as to 
immigration policies in Greece and Italy was much higher than in Germany and the UK. 
 
Table 65: Extent of Europeanisation in the selected cases’ immigration policies 
Cases Need for policy change Extent of Europeanisation 
Germany low-to-moderate inertia-absorption 
UK low-to-moderate intertia-absorption 
Greece high absorption-transformation 
Italy high absorption-transformation 
 
Research question two: similarities/differences between immigration policies 
The aforementioned outcomes, as derived from the selected cases’ institutional frameworks 
and records of infringement in relation to the EU law, suggest that incorporation of EU’s 
immigration norms/standards/regulations into the national legal/political order has taken place 
similarly, with varying adaptational measures and lengths of delay depending on the 
regulatory capacity of the concerning Member State. To be fair, the course of conduct was 
here largely moulded by the Council, as it consented to Member States’ incorporation and 
implementation of the EU procedures only with ‘minimum standards’, for an otherwise 
application aiming at uniformity across the entire Union could risk the administrative 
capabilities in some Member States, whose institutions were not yet sophisticated to that 
effect. Regardless of the Council’s precautionary measures, there was already solid evidence 
for a protectionist logic in particular with respect to labour immigration, the regulation of 
which was violated by the selected Member States more frequently than in relation to other 
policy-making areas. While this pattern could not be confirmed in the British case 
straightforwardly, for it enjoyed an opt-out status as far as supranational liabilities to labour 
immigration law were concerned, the very decision to stay out of cooperation in this policy 
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field as a rule was in fact an evidence for the UK’s apprehension when it came to transferring 
competences to supranational institutions in the immigration context. 
 
Over and above such similarities, there appeared remarkable differences between the selected 
cases, given their management and/or policy-making of immigration matters so far. A most 
salient divide concerned here the Community law’s incorporation, which for the German and 
British norms generally suggested lower degrees of incompatibility than it was the case for 
those in Greece and Italy. This split grew for the most part as a consequence of varying levels 
of ‘misfit’ between the national and supranational levels as far as the selected cases’ legal and 
political institutional networks were concerned. The EU legal texts’ hitherto transposition and 
implementation across national orders provided in this sense grounds for a ‘south vs. north’ 
split, as illustrated by Greece and Italy in the south on one hand versus Germany and the UK 
in the north on the other. With their comparatively longer experiences in the immigration 
field, the legal adaptations whereby EC directives and regulations were adopted into the 
national law without having to undergo ‘transformational’ changes were in the German and 
British cases more recurrent than in Greece and Italy. Since the latter two belonged until 
recent times rather to the ‘sending’ countries and neither of them was fully prepared for large-
scale migration flows as of the 1980s, the introduction of comprehensive approaches to the 
handling of immigration policy framework came here only recently. 
 
While such developments appeared at first sight to be indicative of idiosyncrasies specific to 
Greece and Italy, the lax control systems in these lands vis-à-vis the provisions of the 
Schengen Treaty made alarming implications for the EU’s control policies. Such undertones 
were in fact verifiable in light of recent tendencies suggesting both Greece and Italy had for 
some time been serving as the main ports of undocumented and/or transit migration towards 
Northern Europe. Regardless of whether it was justifiable in proper terms or not, a somewhat 
weak exposure to immigration matters at the official level together with a lack of thorough 
legal framework to absorb such pressure indeed came to be the chief handicaps concerning 
the Greek and Italian cases. 
 
Although hostile feelings towards immigration stood out a mile in all selected Member States, 
the extent of animosity in Italy soared to record levels when xenophobic parties like Lega 
Nord achieved electoral success to become part of the coalition governments in the 2000s. To 
be fair, this last point could be regarded as a further sign of the south-north dichotomy, in that 
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the political system in Italy and Greece differed broadly from those in Germany and the UK. 
Next to many alliances, coalitions and transformations of party structures on the Italian scene, 
which came following a number of corruption scandals lately, the Greek case was illustrative 
of a ‘cartel-party’ model working in tandem with a system of ‘client politics’ for most of the 
modern-day Greek political history. In all honesty, the legacy of this period which became 
increasingly complex with the junta regime and its constitution during the 1970s is still in 
place. Indeed, many take to blame this recent past for the unresolved political landscape in 
today’s Greece. As it were, particularly in terms of Greece-EU relations, the reform attempts 
to revive the incapacitated institutional structures and initiate a certain level of 
Europeanisation (of immigration policies) were hijacked in many occasions because of such 
flaws in the political system. 
 
On similarities/differences across national immigration policies, other than the two sources of 
data concerning country-specific institutional frameworks and infringements of the EU law, 
the study consulted the MIPEX to investigate the conditions the third-country nationals had 
lately been enjoying in the selected cases. A browse through the policy indicators examining 
seven areas in this respect -conditions applying to labour market needs, family reunion, 
educational standards, political participation, long-term residence, access to nationality and 
anti-discrimination measures- came to an end with the following comparative overview: 
 
Figure 12: Conditions for TCNs in the selected cases 
 
Accordingly, to the extent that labour market policies across the Union were concerned, 
Germany –followed closely by Italy- offered the most favourable conditions for non-EU 
nationals. While far from being ideal to world standards, another area where TCNs appeared 
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to enjoy relatively better conditions in Germany was political participation, for which the UK 
offered the second best. For family reunion, long-term residence and access to nationality, 
Italy provided its TCNs with the friendliest environment, ahead of Germany, Greece and the 
UK, in the order of fulfilment on these matters. While education was a barren area for TCNs 
in all EU lands, by comparison to the situation in old immigration lands such as Canada and 
Australia, the UK rose to be the only case that remained above the average here. Another area 
the UK scored relatively by agreeable standards was anti-discrimination, which was where it 
led Italy as the second case way ahead, according to MIPEX. 
 
Relevance of research hypotheses 
The first research hypothesis of the study was premised on the mutual relationship between 
the extent of Europeanisation for Member States’ immigration policies and the development 
of institutional frameworks in this area. Given the selected cases’ migration backgrounds, it is 
indeed possible to argue that the course of immigration policy-making correlates significantly 
with the strength of institutional capacity in this area. A detailed look into the historical 
patterns -be they of political/legislative structures, actors involved in immigration 
management/law-making or policies concerning citizenship/naturalisation- suggested that the 
relatively more established/settled immigration management in the German and British cases 
promoted a cohesive link between their legal and political frameworks and the EU 
norms/standards. For Greece and Italy, on the other hand, the state of administrative 
mechanisms regarding immigration management was up to the 1980s rather underdeveloped. 
The policy-making framework in these lands came to be largely security-based, with special 
emphasis laid on tightening the extremely porous borders in the first place. Yet, such efforts 
were usually free from systematic action plans, as for instance prescribed in the EU directives 
and regulations like 2008/114/EC on critical infrastructures and their assessment. In the end, a 
compatible national immigration policy framework with the EU norms/standards required for 
both Greek and Italian institutional structures to undergo paradigmatic changes in the face of 
the Community law, which eventually led to ‘transformation’ of the relevant regulations in 
the national domain. In Germany and the UK, on the other side, the legal/political orders 
concerning immigration in the selected period of analysis proved to be more full-fledged, 
suggesting that policy-adaptation vis-à-vis the EU norms/standards measured here to 
‘absorption’ at the most. 
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As for the second research hypothesis, associating the extent of Europeanisation with the 
nature of public attitudes towards immigration in host societies, one could draw a number of 
inferences in light of findings from the first two sources of research data, namely historical 
analysis of national institutional frameworks and assessment of policies in terms of the seven 
key areas of immigration, as explored by the MIPEX. First, regardless of the breadth of 
immigration experiences and relevant management in this field, the average attitude, 
disposition or frame of mind towards immigration was far from being positive. A cursory look 
into the selected cases’ immigration histories suggested that migration flows in the form of 
‘guest-worker schemes’ or asylum-seeking did not remain temporary as initially appeared. As 
many of such arrivals developed gradually into permanent stays in these countries, the 
conviction that immigrants would serve to cover shortages at labour markets for a limited 
period became in the public eye largely far-fetched. Perhaps more importantly, the fact that 
most immigrants brought along their cultures and lifestyles into these lands signified cultural 
diversity as an embedded feature of migration experience. A common reference often used in 
the German-speaking world to remember the immigration context of the 1960s is as a matter 
of fact still valid today: it is after all ‘people’ that come, not ‘workers’ per se.201 
 
In fact, one could refer in this vein to a number of recent opinion polls which investigated 
public attitudes towards immigration in the EU lands. Accordingly, the rate of respondents 
(amongst EU citizens) who saw immigration as the main concern in their countries 
corresponded to: 
 
Table 66: Immigration as the main concern in all selected cases (in percentages) 
Cases 
Years of analysis 
2003 2008 2012 
Germany 5 6 8 
UK 32 35 24 
Greece 6 4 7 
Italy 13 7 2 
EU 15/27 13 11 8 
Based on Standard EBs 59 (2003), 69 (2008) and 78 (2012). 
 
Factors which guided changing thoughts in this context ran presumably parallel to the 
financial/economic crises over the last decade. As the economic disparities between Member 
States became more obvious –those like Germany and the Netherlands sustained their 
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 The quote belongs to the late Swiss author Max Frisch, who originally said “Wir riefen Arbeitskräfte, und es 
kamen Menschen”, when referring in particular to the Italian workers in Switzerland at the time (Hefty, 2011). 
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stability, whereas others like Greece, Spain and Italy showed signs of faltering- many 
Europeans manifested their disenchantment with the EU, finding faults amongst others in 
immigrants. Of many questions asked as part of such surveys inquiring for instance if 
respondents would agree to “People from other ethnic groups enrich the cultural life of (our 
country)”, “The presence of people from other ethnic groups is a cause of insecurity”, “The 
presence of people from other ethnic groups increases unemployment in (our country)”, “We 
need immigrants to work in certain sectors of our economy”, “The arrival of immigrants in 
Europe can be effective in solving the problem of Europe’s ageing population”, “Immigrants 
can play an important role in developing greater understanding and tolerance with the rest of 
the world”, “Immigrants contribute more in taxes than they benefit from health and welfare 
services” or “Legal immigrants contribute more in taxes than they benefit from health and 
welfare services”, a most straightforward query was “Immigrants are a threat to [our] way of 
life”.202 
 
The chief opinion poll featuring this very last question was the 2003 Special Eurobarometer, 
with ‘citizenship and sense of belonging’ as its main focus. The percentages of respondents in 
the selected cases who believed that immigrants were one way or another threatening their 
ways of life read as follows: 
 
Table 67: EU citizens who believe immigrants are a threat to their ways of life (in percentages) 
Responses (options) 
Countries 
Germany UK Greece Italy EU 15 
Totally agree 12 28 35 11 16 
Tend to agree 27 26 34 27 26 
Tend to disagree 34 24 21 30 30 
Totally disagree 15 13 7 24 18 
Don’t know 12 9 3 8 10 
Based on Special Eurobarometer Wave 60.1 (2003). 
 
Greece ranked here at the top with 69% of its citizens holding negative opinions about 
immigrants -and this being the highest rate amongst all 15 Member States at the time the 
survey was carried out- followed by the UK, where more than half of the respondents (54%) 
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 In reading through these polls, one needs to bear in mind that the responses may have reflected a diverse 
range of political debates at the time surveys were conducted. Given that each country has its own multicultural 
setting, and that capturing various perceptions of life is here not an easy task for researchers, chances are 
interpretations of the survey questions may have included a large collection, which in the end had the potential to 
lead to bias in their categorisation. Regardless of this key factor to bear in mind, most importantly that cultural 
differences may lead to various understandings of a social phenomenon in everyday life, there are at present 
distinct anti- immigration patterns in all selected cases. 
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tended to have similar dissenting thoughts concerning ‘newcomers’. The figures in Germany 
(39) and Italy (38) did not seem to exceed that of the EU average (42%). Yet, one can hardly 
deny that these were indeed fairly high scores, specifically for Germany, which did not 
experience a severe economic downturn in the last decades, by comparison with other 
selected cases.  
 
While most of the jobs the ‘newcomers’ were coming to take, as part of the recruitment 
programmes, were not aspired by the natives, there were serious concerns that the new 
developments at the labour markets would put a downward pressure on wages, as voiced by 
the trade unions at the time (Hansen, 2003). Following a period of such worries which were 
later on dispelled at the state level through promises for equal conditions, policy-making in 
many of these countries imposed progressively an order of tighter control over the size of 
non-EU residents. Given data from the Migration Integration Policy Index, one could address 
strict management policies, which actually were in force for a long time to affect TCNs’ 
family reunion, political participation, long-term residence and access to nationality in the 
destination countries. The launch and implementation of many citizenship/naturalisation laws 
were indeed informed widely by public opinions, to the extent that these responded in most 
cases to the multicultural configuration of the society. Perceiving this latter as a key stimulus, 
the political parties in power, as well as those in opposition, promoted equality and diversity 
programmes in close relationship with the size of immigrant population. 
 
It follows from this latter argument that the economic perspective may not suffice to come to 
grips with the mainspring of European immigration. A labour market-driven approach would 
in fact suit well to account for the bulk of flows to Germany and the UK, and to a certain 
extent Italy. Yet, the same reasoning does not really apply to the Greek immigration. Here, 
low population density and the lack of heavy industry, despite the sustained economic 
development from the 1950s to 1973, suggested that the primary reason why Greece became a 
major point of attraction in recent times was first and foremost its geographical convenience 
for being a transit land to the main immigration destinations in northern Europe. 
 
Bearing in mind that many other factors might have played decisive roles in the pace, extent 
and direction of immigration in all selected Member States, it would perhaps be more fitting 
to expand the rationale behind Europeanisation of national immigration policies. As already 
hinted, the MIPEX policy indicators on immigrants’ integration to the labour markets 
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suggested that the growing size of minority groups in Member States was by the majority-
groups treated with mistrust not only for economic reasons (as both groups competed for the 
same scarce conditions and/or welfare state resources) but also for political and cultural 
orientations, as the traditions the former practised did not seem to be in compliance with those 
of the latter. To the same sources of data, in other words, it might have well been the case that 
those with other cultural/ethnic backgrounds were taken to be ‘free riders’, in view of their 
potential to for instance establish ‘parallel societies’, deriving benefit from the citizenship and 
democratic culture of the country they lived in. And such perceptions of threat, which in time 
became embedded in the selected cases’ cultural arrangements, lead to the conclusion that the 
larger the cultural diversity gets in a host society, the more the pressure will be on the 
economic, cultural, and political room immigrants could enjoy here. 
 
Last word 
As the entry points became increasingly tighter in Northern/Western European countries such 
as Germany and the UK, migrant flows to the south gained momentum, in particular when the 
formerly sending countries like Greece and Italy started to receive decent shares from the 
TCN supply in Europe. Due to lack of adequate experiences, legal frameworks and public 
administration systems, however, the latter countries were often to serve as “the weak 
underbelly of the EU” (Finotelli & Sciortino, 2009, p. 120), which is why they are today 
considered to be little more than entry ports and transit routes to the former more established 
immigration countries in the north/west. 
 
With a wide range of socio-economic and political factors in the background, the political 
climate across the entire European Union is at present anything but favourable to encourage 
arrival/residence of further foreign nationals. The EU Member States tend to lay more 
emphasis on restrictive goals rather than what Brussels prescribes as integrative solutions in 
broad/supranational terms. When seen in hindsight, such patterns of skepticism or ‘foot-
dragging’ are traceable to the early days of EU integration (Bendel, 2007 -as cited in Ette & 
Faist, 2007). 
 
From the 1957 Treaty of Rome to the 1986 Single European Act (SEA), Community norms 
were treated amongst Member States with a high degree of reluctance. As immigration 
management was at the time exclusively state-oriented, the attempts the Commission sought 
to expand cooperation at the Community level were challenged by the Council’s 
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intergovernmental dispositions. The Schengen Treaty in 1985 came in this sense as a moment 
to mellow the Council’s rigid outlook to supranational goals in particular as far as free 
movement of people was concerned. A most proximate effect in this context was the 
commencement of a new period, specifically with the ensuing Single European Act (SEA), 
whose security implications urged further cooperation/collaboration on immigration policies. 
Yet, the establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group in accordance with the SEA’s security 
provisions on free movement soon disclosed amongst Member States similar signs of cold 
shoulder towards supranationalism, through what could be defined as ‘informal 
intergovernmentalism’ (Ette & Faist, 2007). The 1993 Maastricht Treaty marked in this sense 
a new frame shifting cooperation to ‘formal intergovernmentalism’, when it became obvious 
that coordination of immigration would be a key asset to the EU’s future supranational 
decision-making. The follow-up Amsterdam Treaty’s entry into force in 1999 introduced an 
unprecedented era insofar as it kindled a reform process encouraging expansion of 
supranational competences in the area of immigration policy-making. Nevertheless, the multi-
annual (five-year) programmes of Tampere and the Hague -which were launched to monitor 
the functioning of EU-wide immigration policies post Amsterdam- demonstrated that 
commitments to EU norms were at the national level not so high. 
 
The 2009 Lisbon Treaty emerged to be more progressive than its antecedents, yet a 
standardised implementation of immigration policies was (at the time this thesis was being 
written) still out of sight. A big promise made at the outset concerned the Community’s 
legislative measures relating to immigration matters, which following Lisbon would become 
tied to a new procedure.
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 Aligning the Parliament’s decision-making power with that of the 
Council (subject to a qualified majority vote) and expanding for instance entitlement of 
persons to subsidiary protection (which went further beyond the former requisite of minimum 
standards), Lisbon appeared to open indeed a new phase in the history of European 
immigration. Nonetheless, considering its intention to adopt “certain sensitive measures 
relating to policies which remain at the core of national sovereignty” (Commission of the 
European Union, 2004, pp. 3-4), one would still have serious doubts about the intended 
supranational commitments here. The chief reference for such reservations is data from 
current trends in international migration, suggesting that a generous share of the global 
immigration trends is today received by the EU Member States, where the increase of inflow 
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 Viewing it as the key legislative process for the Community's decision-making system, Article 294 of the 
TFEU defined the co-decision procedure after a parity principle, according to which the European Parliament 
and the Council were to adopt legislation jointly. 
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rates is more than twofold (International Organisation for Migration, 2003). A direct 
consequence of this evident pressure is the rise of extremely conservative thoughts and 
nationalistic impulses in these lands, which in immigration terms would amount to further 
resistance towards supranational policy-making. 
 
Antagonistic feelings towards immigrants are obviously mixed, ranging from economic and 
political concerns to social and cultural considerations including prejudice and/or overdose of 
nationalistic sentiments. The root indicator stems here usually from the average national on 
the street observing that non-nationals have cultural traits and lifestyles which somehow 
appear to challenge his/hers. And the main question here is whether or not the whole would be 
greater than the sum of its parts, or put more precisely, whether or not what starts as an 
individual observation/thought/reaction on the street could swell into big political campaigns, 
movements, or even parties at some point in the future. As it recently came out in the cases of 
the AfD (Alternativ für Deutschland-Alternative for Germany), the UKIP (UK Independence 
Party), the Lega Nord of Italy and the Greek Golden Dawn, the winners are usually the far-
right political parties.
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 This suggests in plain English that the more ungrounded the 
politicians’ promises are, as if to downplay immigration like a power switch one can turn on 
and off at his/her own will, the more likely it will be that they end up drawing water to 
somebody else’s mill, in this case those who are racist by their nature.205 And should anti-
immigration sentiments be treated in the way many zealots, partisans and tabloids practise, 
immigrants are bound to face discrimination, regardless of where they are. 
 
The post 9/11 security/terrorism discourse as well as global economic/financial crises in the 
2000s rose to remind in this context the risks and pitfalls before an overarching immigration 
policy framework for the entire EU. Much in the same context, an additionally important 
factor putting Europeanisation of Member States’ immigration policies to a test for some time 
is the political transformation in North Africa and the Middle East. Indeed, recent political 
developments in the immediate neighbourhood of Europe are particularly tectonic for the 
southern EU lands, which are economically and politically in close proximity with this 
turbulent region, so much so that some of them even sought to revert to pre-Schengen 
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 While the question of how far to the right the UKIP and AfD lie was still debatable in the UK and Germany, 
the slogans they came to use before making significant gains in national elections were based on Euroscepticism 
and aiming at those who do not prefer to live in a centralised European state. 
205
 In venting their anger at the immigration policies of the country, those attracted to recent far-right populist 
movements such as the PEGIDA (Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes-Patriotic 
Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident) in Germany appeared to draw on racist discourses. 
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conditions. Despite the 2003 Dublin II Regulation which ordered that the EU country where 
asylum-seekers enter first should be responsible for processing their asylum claims, Italian 
governments, for instance, lately declared their reluctance to do so, pointing out that Italy was 
already overwhelmed by tens of thousands seeking asylum (Hawitt, 2011). And when some 
8,000 of these applicants were issued six-month residence permits in a fairly short period 
(which would allow them to head probably to France because a big majority of them were 
Francophones), Italy’s political problem became suddenly one of France’s. The French 
bureaucracy moved quickly to fortify the porous borders with Italy through checkpoints, on 
the basis of what Schengen describes as a ‘grave threat to public order or internal security’. In 
the end, a joint letter was issued by the two countries petitioning the suspension of Schengen 
at the face of big refugee influxes.
206
 
 
For such reasons or others, fears of new ‘exodi’ knocking at the gates of Europe provide at 
present a big reservoir of pretexts for anti-immigrant lobbies and populist parties. Recently, 
some European ‘Tea Party’ movements such as the Dutch Freedom Party and the French 
National Front polled around a remarkable 20 percent in elections after spending many years 
as the ultra-nationalists on the fringe. The principal factors to consider in this context are the 
influences of demographic variables and social security systems in Western Europe. Recent 
statistics indicate a faster increase in the number of non-nationals than of citizens in many 
immigration lands, which to a significant extent is caused by the latter’s aging population and 
poor fertility levels (European Commission, 2008a). Further, it is common to hear within the 
context of the welfare state-model practised in many old EU members that ‘newcomers’ are a 
burden on the host system because they “only receive and do not contribute” (Lucassen, 2005, 
p. 15). In view of a political climate whereby many far-right political parties play the 
conservative card, hinting at climbing unemployment rates and provoking loud voices against 
‘multiculturalism’ (European Commission, 2011a), it comes no surprise that every second EU 
citizen regards immigration at present as less of an opportunity than a threat (German 
Marshall Fund of the United States, 2008). 
 
While it goes without saying that collaboration/cooperation on migration matters is for 
Member States a sine qua non –as long as they all aspire to an economically and politically 
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 Amidst tensions over these migrant influxes, Denmark similarly expressed its intention to revert to the old 
geographical borders with Sweden and Germany, in view of about 40,000 asylum-seekers who fled from Tunisia 
and Libya over to the nearby Lampedusa in the first five months of 2011, to be moving later possibly towards 
northern Europe (Macqueen, 2011). 
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more interdependent Union- a ‘one size fits all solution’ is for them still out of reach. Many in 
these countries hold to the traditional understanding that shifting decision-making in the area 
of immigration policy to the EU-level would be “an ‘invasion’ of one of the most sacred areas 
of national jurisdiction” (Bertozzi, 2007, p. 7). That Europeanisation of immigration has so far 
almost always been subject to intergovernmental manoeuvres, which are characterised largely 
by public concerns or ‘feelings’ of threat or challenge, is in this sense more understandable 
than shocking. 
 
It remains against this background to be seen how long-lasting political commitments like the 
EU’s new and reinforced ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ -based principally on the ‘co-
decision’ between the Parliament and the Council- will persist in situations where the old 
immigration countries have traditionally been challenging the Commission’s proposals. Given 
that a paradigmatic policy change has to date been far from a reality on that account, chances 
are a sheer communitarisation/Europeanisation of national immigration policies will not be 
likely in the near future, for this would amount to a decisive power shift from the Council 
over to the Commission. 
 
In the end, it is meaningful to assume that future research into Europeanisation of Member 
States’ national immigration policies will continue to keep an eye on perceptions of 
citizenship and multiculturalism in these countries. And yet, still and all, the major weight 
will most likely be -as it has always been- on the state of equilibrium concerning the twofold 
dialectical structure of policy-making here: ‘supranationalism versus intergovernmentalism’ 
or ‘rights versus control’. 
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Appendices 
 
 
1. Glossary
207
 
 
Acculturation: The process in which norms, values or behavioural patterns of one culture are 
progressively adopted by the ethnic group(s) of another. The extent of adaptation is 
determined by the degree of interaction between the two sides depending generally on social 
and economic interests. 
Alien/non-national/foreigner: A person who is officially not recognised as the national of a 
particular state. 
Assimilation: A further process ahead of acculturation in which an ethnic or social group 
adapts to another. This adaptation is a switch of belonging through absorption of the majority 
group’s cultural values in particular its traditions and language. 
Asylum: A form of territorial protection given by a state based on the principle of non-
refoulement and a set of refugee rights such as access to employment, social welfare and 
health care. It is granted to a person who is unable or unwilling to seek protection in his/her 
country of citizenship and/or residence for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership 
of a particular social group or political opinion. If used in the context of ‘diplomatic asylum’, 
however, it takes the form of seeking refuge whereby a state grants protection to an individual 
providing relief from the authority of the country of origin which presses for his/her 
persecution or custody. There exists in international law no obligation for diplomatic asylum. 
It is typically asked at places such as aircrafts, warships, diplomatic missions and private 
residences belonging to the heads of mission. 
Circular migration: Temporary or long-term movement of people between countries which 
promises benefits to all involved, if it happens on a voluntary basis as part of the labour needs 
of countries of origin and destination. 
Clandestine migration/irregular migration/undocumented migration: The type of 
migration that eludes the official recording of a state in reference to the legal restrictions 
about border-crossing as well as the legal principles regulating access to its labour market. 
                                                     
207
 The sources consulted for this compilation include the glossary of the European Commission, Justice and 
Home Affairs; International Labour Organisation’s International Migration Statistics, 1997, Annex: Labour 
Migration Statistics Questionnaire’s Terms and Concepts and the United Nation’s (UN) 1998 Recommendations 
on Statistics of International Migration, Revision 1, Glossary. Latest entry to all web links: 24 November 2012. 
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Deportation/expulsion: A state’s act of expelling an alien from its territory to eliminate the 
detriments or illegality his/her presence causes. 
Displaced person: Based on Council Directive 2011/55/EC, the EU Commission defines 
displaced persons as non-EU nationals or stateless persons who have had to leave or been 
evacuated from their country or region of origin (in response to an appeal by international 
organisations) to which they are unable to return in safe and durable conditions because of the 
situation prevailing in that country. The case of displaced persons is generally covered in 
Article 1A of the Geneva Convention as well as a number of other international or national 
instruments giving international protection to persons who have fled areas of armed conflict 
or endemic violence and are at serious risk of, or who have been the victims of, violations of 
human rights. 
Documented migration/regular migration: The type of migration in which a person moves 
to a country with the intention to remain there, observing its compulsory regulations on entry 
and stay. 
Economic migration: The type of migration that occurs when a person takes up residence in 
a new country other than that of origin to improve his/her quality of life. While the term may 
apply to the act of leaving the country of origin over a previously declared agricultural season, 
for employment through seasonal working, or the act of moving into the destination country 
with no valid entry permit and/or by means of asylum procedures lacking bona fide causes, it 
is often used to address its dissimilar connotations from those of ‘refuge’. 
Emigration: The act of moving from the country of origin with the purpose to settle in 
another country. According to the basic norms of international law, only in rare circumstances 
is a state entitled to impose restrictions on exit in this context, suggesting all persons may as a 
rule of thumb enjoy freedom to leave their countries of birth. 
Expulsion: To the European Commission, expulsion means sending away a non-EU national 
on account of his/her perceived threat to public order or national security in a Member State. 
Decision of expulsion is generally taken in the following cases: conviction of a non-EU 
national by the issuing EU State for an offence involving deprivation of liberty of at least one 
year; the existence of serious grounds for believing that a non-EU national has committed 
serious criminal offences or the existence of solid evidence of his/her intention to commit 
such offences within the territory of an EU State and a non-EU national subject to an 
expulsion decision based on failure to comply with national rules on the entry or residence of 
aliens. 
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Family reunification/family reunion: Based on the Council Directive 2003/86/EC, the 
Commission defines this term as the entry into and residence of a non-EU national’s family 
members to reside lawfully in an EU State (the so-called ‘sponsor’ state) on the grounds of 
preserving the family unit. 
Highly qualified migrant: To the EU Commission, this term refers to a person who moved 
to a country for employment purposes on the basis of his/her managerial, executive or similar 
professional qualifications. 
Host country/receiving country: While the term refers usually to the country of destination, 
it may also be the country of origin in cases of return or repatriation. This amounts for the EU 
case to a Member State in which a non-EU national takes up legal residence. 
Humanitarian principles: These include ethical standards grounded upon international 
human rights/law aiming to protect the integrity of all humanitarian actors. The first reference 
to humanitarian principles was made in the 1965 ‘Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross 
and Red Crescent’. 
Illegal migration: While the term may be used interchangeably with irregular migration, it 
also connotes to trafficking of migrants. 
Immigration: Based on the 1998 UN Recommendations (on Statistics of International 
Migration, Revision 1), the EU defines immigration as the action by which a person 
establishes his/her usual residence in the territory of an EU State for a period that is, or is 
expected to be, of at least 12 months, having previously been resident in another EU State or a 
non-EU country. 
Integration: The term is used to describe the entire process whereby migrants’ acceptance to 
a host society –both as individuals or groups- depends principally on whether or not they 
fulfill the specific conditions stipulated by the host country they live in. 
International migration: A person’s crossing the borders of his/her country of residence or 
origin with the goal to settle down in another country on a temporary or permanent basis. 
Irregular migration: Immigration of a person to a new place of residence using irregular or 
illegal means, i.e. without valid documents. 
Jus sanguinis: A Latin-derived term which is used to indicate that a child’s nationality does 
not rest on the place of his/her birth but on the nationality of his/her parents. 
Jus soli: A Latin-derived term which is used to indicate that a child’s nationality rests on the 
place of his/her birth but not on the nationality of his/her parents. 
Labour migration: This type of migration to the European Commission describes the 
movement of a person from one state to another, or within his/her own country of residence, 
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for the purpose of employment. While it is in national laws usually treated to address labour at 
domestic markets, some states expand its usage across national borders to provide 
opportunities for their nationals also abroad. 
Long-term migration/permanent settlement: Movement of a person from his/her country 
of residence or origin to another for minimum one year. For the EU, this issue is covered 
under Directive 2003/109/EC. 
Migration: The process of a person’s short or long-term movement within or across the 
borders of a state, regardless of the form and driving forces lying behind it. It is in the EU 
context used as a broader term of immigration/emigration to describe the action by which a 
person ceases to have his/her usual residence in an EU State for minimum twelve months. 
Migrant: A broader-term of immigrant/emigrant, referring to a person who leaves one 
country (or a location in a country) to settle in another often in search of better life conditions. 
Naturalisation: The entire process in which a state eventually grants nationality to a non-
national following his/her formal application. Despite lack of explicit rules thereof, the 
authority of states to naturalize aliens (non-nationals) is recognised by international law. 
Net migration: The difference between emigration from and immigration to a given area in 
one year. It is important to note here that many countries often lack precision to that effect, 
which suggests net immigration figures are often estimated values. 
Non-refoulement: A principle of expulsion or return in international law (codified in Article 
33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention) which restrains states from expelling a person to a 
country where (s)he will possibly face torture or persecution except that “there are reasonable 
grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which [s]he is, or who, 
having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger 
to the community of that country” (Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention). 
Receiving country: The term is often used to refer to the country of destination or a third-
country (excluding the cases of return and repatriation in which it could also be the country of 
origin) which has principally accepted to receive a certain number of refugees and migrants 
by a presidential, ministerial or parliamentary decision. 
Refoulement: A state’s declining or expelling a person usually by way of deportation, 
extradition or rejection at its borders into the territorial borders of another state where (s)he is 
likely to face torture or persecution. 
Refugee: A person who “owing to well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, is outside 
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself 
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of the protection of that country” (Article 1 A(2) of the 1951 Geneva Convention which was 
modified by the 1967 Protocol concerning the Status of Refugees). 
Regular migration: Migration that occurs by way of lawful channels. 
Regularisation: The process whereby a non-national is granted legal status in a country 
following a certain period of his/her irregular residence in there. A most common means to 
this end is the granting of a form of amnesty. 
Remittance: The financial transfer made by a migrant to his/her beneficiaries in his/her 
country of origin. 
Repatriation: The right given to a refugee or a prisoner of war personally by a number of 
international law instruments such as the 1907 Fourth Hague Convention regulating the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land or the 1949 Geneva Convention (and 1977 Protocols) to return 
to the country of origin under specific conditions. It is binding both on the detaining country 
and the country of origin which are obliged to release all eligible persons regardless they are 
civilians, soldiers, diplomatic envoys or international officials and are bound to admit to their 
return, respectively. 
Safe country of origin: A country from which an asylum-seeker originates is considered safe 
if it does not typically serve as a source to this end in historical terms. Receiving countries 
may use the concept of safe country of origin as a basis for rejecting summarily (without 
examination of the merits) particular groups or categories of asylum applicants. According to 
Directive 2005/85/EC, a ‘safe country of origin’ is a country where it can be shown that there 
is generally and consistently no persecution as defined in Directive 2004/83/EC, no torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and no threat by reason of indiscriminate 
violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict. The key reference here is the 
extent of protection against persecution or mistreatment by the relevant laws and regulations 
of the country and the way they are applied; observance of the rights and freedoms laid down 
in the European Convention on Human Rights and/or the International Covenant for Civil and 
Political Rights and/or the Convention against Torture, in particular the rights from which 
derogation cannot be made under Article 15(2) of the said European Convention; the non-
refoulement principle according to the Geneva Convention and provision for a system of 
effective remedies against violations of these rights and freedoms. 
Seasonal worker: A worker with a migration background who works on seasonal terms 
applicable solely to part of the year (Article 2(2)(b) of the 1990 International Convention on 
the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families). 
296 
Secondary migration: Any further migration of a person from/within a country other than 
his/her first leave from the country of domicile. 
Sending country: The country from which migration originates. 
Short-term migrant: A person who leaves his/her country of residence or origin to another 
for a period between minimum three and maximum twelve months excluding long term trips 
of business, medical treatment, holiday, recreation or visits to family members or friends. 
Skilled migrant: A worker with a migration background who during admission to a host 
country is subject to fewer restrictions on employment, family reunification and length of stay 
thanks to his/her training/job skills.  
Stateless person: A person who is not considered as the national of a state under the 
operation of its law. 
Third-country: Any country other than the country of origin. In the EU context, the term is 
almost always synonymous with a non-EU country which is where a person without the 
nationality of an EU state comes from. 
Trafficking/human trafficking: An intermediary act of diverse forms which persons exploit 
others usually economically (described as ab initio) while helping them move to countries 
other than those of residence or origin. Article 3(a) of the 2000 UN Protocol Supplementing 
the UN Convention Against Organised Crime to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children limits it to “The recruitment, transportation, 
transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms 
of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of 
vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a 
person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation”. 
Transit country/transit state: Any country through which a person passes during his/her 
journey to the country of destination. Article 6(c) of the 1990 International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families limits it to 
the country travelled on one’s way to where the place of employment is or from this place to 
the state of residence or origin. 
Undocumented migration: Type of migration which takes place when workers or members 
of workers’ families enter, stay or work in a state although they are not authorised to do so. 
Voluntary return: Assisted or independent return to the country of origin, transit or third-
country based on the free will of the returnee. 
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2. MIPEX Policy Indicators (2010) 
 
 
Labour Markets       Scores according to options 
Access 100 50 0 
1 Immediate access to employment All of them Not c or certain categories of b Only a 
 What categories of third country national residents have equal access to employment as nationals?    
 a. Long-term residents    
 b. Residents on temporary work permits (excluding seasonal)    
 c. Residents on family reunion permits (same as sponsor)    
     
2 Access to private sector: Yes; there are no Other limiting conditions that Certain sectors and 
 Are TCN residents able to accept any private-sector employment under equal conditions as EU nationals? additional restrictions apply to all TCN residents, activities solely for 
  than those based on e.g. linguistic testing nationals/EU nationals 
  type of permit   
  mentioned in 1   
     
3 Access to public sector (activities serving the needs of the public. Not restricted to certain types of employment Yes; only restriction is Other restrictions Only for nationals/EU 
 or private or public law): exercise of public  nationals 
 Are TCN residents able to accept any public-sector employment (excluding exercise of public authority) under authority and safeguard   
 equal conditions as EU nationals? general state interest   
     
4 Immediate access to self-employment All of them Not c or certain categories of b Only a 
 What categories of third country national residents have equal access to self-employment as nationals?    
 a. Long-term residents    
 b. Residents on temporary work permits (excluding seasonal)    
 c. Residents on family reunion permits (same as sponsor)    
     
5 Access to self-employment Yes; there are no Other limiting conditions (such Certain sectors and 
 Are TCN residents able to take up self-employed activity under equal conditions as EU nationals? additional restrictions as linguistic testing) activities solely for 
  than those based on  nationals/EU nationals 
  type of permit   
  mentioned in 4   
Access to general support 100 50 0 
6 Access to public employment services Equal treatment with Certain restrictions No equal treatment 
 Do TCN residents have access to placement and public employment services, under equal conditions as EU nationals   
 nationals?    
     
7 Equality of access to education and vocational training, including study grants All of them Not c or certain categories of b Only a 
 What categories of TCN residents have equal access?    
 a. Long-term residents    
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 b. Residents on temporary work permits (excluding seasonal)    
 c. Residents on family reunion permits (same as sponsor)    
     
8 Recognition of academic and professional qualifications acquired outside the EU Same procedures as for Different procedure as for No recognition of titles or 
  EU/EEA nationals EU/EEA nationals possible down-grading of 
    qualifications 
     
Targeted Support 100 50 0 
      
9 State facilitation of recognition of skills and qualifications obtained outside the EU: b and (a or c) a or c None 
 a) existence of state agencies/information centres that promote the recognition of skills and qualifications    
 b) national guidelines on fair procedures, timelines and fees for assessments by professional, governmental, and    
 non-governmental organisations    
 c) provision of information on conversion courses/profession-based language courses and on procedures for    
 assessment of skills and qualifications (regardless of whether assessments are conducted by governmental or    
 non-governmental organisations)    
     
10 Measures to further the integration of third-country nationals into the labour market All elements Any of these elements (or No elements 
 a. National policy targets to reduce unemployment of third country nationals  other) but not all  
 b. National policy targets to promote vocational training for third country nationals;    
 c. National policy targets to improve employability through language acquisition    
 Programmes    
     
11 Measures to further the integration of third-country nationals into the labour market Both One of these Neither of these 
 a. National policy targets to address labour market situation of migrant youth    
 b. National policy targets to address labour market situation of migrant women    
     
12 Support to access public employment services Both One None; only through 
 a) Right to resource person, mentor, coach linked to public employment service is part of integration policy for   voluntary initiatives or 
 Newcomers   projects 
 b) Training required of public employment service staff on specific needs of migrants    
     
Workers`rights 100 50 0 
13 Membership of and participation in trade union associations and work-related negotiation bodies Equal access with Restricted access to elected Other restrictions apply 
  nationals positions  
     
14 Equal access to social security Equal treatment with No equal treatment in at least No equal treatment in 
 Do TCNs have equal access to social security in the following areas? (unemployment benefits, old age pension, nationals in all areas one area more than one area 
 invalidity benefits, maternity leave, family benefits, social assistance)    
     
15 Equal working conditions Equal treatment with No equal treatment in at least No equal treatment in 
 Do TCNs have guaranteed equal working conditions? (safe and healthy working conditions, treatment in case of nationals in all areas one area more than one area 
 job termination or dismissal, payment/wages, taxation)    
     
16 Active policy of information on rights of migrant workers by national level (or regional in federal states) Policy of information by Ad hoc information campaigns No active policy of 
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  state targeted at towards migrant workers information 
  migrant workers and/or and/or employers (or only  
  employers on individual individual campaigns in certain  
  basis regions)  
      
Family reunion    
Eligibility 100 50 0 
17a Eligibility for ordinary legal residents ≤ 1 year of legal > 1 year of legal residence ≥ 2 years of legal 
  residence and/or and/or holding a permit for > 1 residence and/or holding 
  holding a residence year a permit for ≥ 2 years 
  permit for ≤ 1 year   
     
17b Documents taken into account to be eligible for family reunion Any residence permit Certain residence permits Permanent residence 
   excluded permit 
     
18a Eligibility for partners other than spouses: Both Only one or only for some Neither; only spouses 
 a. Stable long-term relationship  types of partners (ex.  
 b. Registered partnership  homosexuals)  
     
18b Age limits for sponsors and spouses ≤ Age of majority in > 18 ≤ 21 years with > 21 years OR > 18 years 
  country (18 years) exemptions without exemptions 
     
19 Eligibility for minor children (<18 years) All three Only a and b A and b but with 
 a. Minor children   limitations 
 b. Adopted children    
 c. Children for whom custody is shared    
     
20 Eligibility for dependent relatives in the ascending line Allowed Certain conditions (other than Not allowed 
   dependency) apply  
     
21 Eligibility for dependent adult children Allowed Certain conditions (other than Not allowed 
   dependency) apply  
     
     
Conditions for acquisition of status 100 50 0 
22a Form of pre-departure language measure for family member abroad (if no measure, leave blank) No requirement OR Requirement to take a Requirement includes 
  voluntary language course language test/assessment 
  course/information   
     
22b Level of language requirement (if no measure, leave blank) (not weighted) A1 or less set as A2 set as standard B1 or higher set as 
  standard  standard OR no 
 Note: Can be test, interview, completion of course or other forms of assessments.   standards, based on 
    administrative discretion 
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22c Form of pre-departure integration measure for family member abroad, ex. not language, but social/cultural (if no None OR voluntary Requirement to take an Requirement to pass an 
 measure, leave blank) information/course integration course integration 
    test/assessment 
     
22d Pre-departure requirement exemptions (if no measure, leave blank) Both of these One of these Neither of these 
 a. Takes into account individual abilities ex. educational qualifications    
 b. Exemptions for vulnerable groups ex. age, illiteracy, mental/physical disability    
     
22e Conductor of pre-departure requirement  (if no measure, leave blank) a and b, ex. language a but not b, ex. citizenship/ Neither a nor b, ex. police, 
 a. Language or education specialists or education institutes integration unit in government foreigners' service, 
 b. Independent of government (ex. not directly subcontracted by or part of a government department)   general consultant 
     
22f Cost of pre-departure requirement  (if no measure, leave blank) No or nominal costs Normal costs Higher costs 
     
22g Support to pass pre-departure requirement (if no measure, leave blank) a and b a or b Neither a nor b 
 a. Assessment based on publicly available list of questions or study guide    
 b. Assessment based on publicly available course    
     
22h Cost of support (if no measure or support, leave blank) No or nominal costs Normal costs Higher costs 
     
23a Form of language requirement for sponsor and/or family member after arrival on territory  (if no measure, leave No requirement OR Requirement to take a Requirement includes 
 blank) voluntary language course language test/assessment 
  course/information   
 Note: Can be test, interview, completion of course, or other forms of assessments.    
     
23b Level of language requirement, (if no measure, leave blank) (not weighted) A1 or less set as A2 set as standard B1 or higher set as 
  standard  standard OR no 
 Note: Can be test, interview, completion of course, or other forms of assessments.   standards, based on 
    administrative discretion 
     
23c Form of integration requirement for sponsor and/or family member after arrival on territory ex. not language, but No requirement OR Requirement to take an Requirement includes 
 social/cultural voluntary integration course integration 
  course/information  test/assessment 
     
23d Language/integration requirement exemptions (if no measure, leave blank) Both of these One of these Neither of these 
 a. Takes into account individual abilities ex. educational qualifications    
 b. Exemptions for vulnerable groups ex. age, illiteracy, mental/physical disability    
     
23e Conductor of language/integration requirement  (if no measure, leave blank) a and b, ex. language a but not b, ex. integration unit Neither a nor b, ex. police, 
 a. Language or education specialists or education institutes in government foreigners' service, 
 b. Independent of government (ex. not directly subcontracted by or part of a government department)   general consultant 
     
23f Cost of language/integration requirement (if no measure, leave blank) No or nominal costs Normal costs Higher costs 
     
23g Support to language/integration requirement (if no measure, leave blank) a and b a or b Neither a nor b 
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 a. Assessment based on publicly available list of questions or study guide    
 b. Assessment based on publicly available course    
     
23h Cost of support (if no measure or support, leave blank) No or nominal costs Normal costs  ex. if provided Higher costs 
   by state, same as regular  
   administrative fees; if provided  
   by private sector, same as  
   market price in countries  
     
24 Accommodation requirement None Appropriate accommodation Further requirements 
   meeting the general health  
   and safety standards  
     
25 Economic resources requirement None or at/below level Higher than social assistance Linked to employment/no 
  of social assistance and but source is not linked with social assistance 
  no income is excluded employment  
     
26 Maximum length of application procedure ≤ 6 months defined by > 6 months but the maximum No regulation on 
  law is defined by law maximum length 
     
27 Costs of application and/or issue of status None Same as regular Higher costs 
   administrative fees and duties  
   in the country  
     
Security of status 100 50 0 
28 Duration of validity of permit Equal to sponsor’s Not equal to sponsor’s < 1 year renewable permit 
  residence permit and residence permit but ≥ 1 year or new application 
  renewable renewable permit necessary 
     
29 Grounds for rejecting, withdrawing or refusing to renew status: No other than a-b Grounds include c All grounds and others 
 a. Actual and serious threat to public policy or national security,   than those included on 
 b. Proven fraud in the acquisition of permit (inexistent relationship or misleading information).   the list, such as d and 
 c. Break-up of family relationship (before three years)   others 
 d. Original conditions are no longer satisfied (ex. unemployment or economic resources)    
     
30 Before refusal or withdrawal, due account is taken of (regulated by law) : All elements Elements include any of these No elements 
 a. Solidity of sponsor’s family relationship  (or other) but not all  
 b. Duration of sponsor’s residence in MS    
 c. Existing links with country of origin    
 d. Physical or emotional violence    
     
31 Legal guarantees and redress in case of refusal or withdrawal All rights At least a and b One or both of a and b 
 a. reasoned decision   are not guaranteed 
 b. right to appeal    
 c. representation before an independent administrative authority and/or a court    
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Rights associated with status 100 50 0 
     
32 Right to autonomous residence permit for partners and children reaching age of majority After ≤ 3 years After > 3 ≤ 5 years After > 5 years or upon 
    certain conditions (e.g. 
    normal procedure for 
    permanent residence) 
     
33 Right to autonomous residence permit in case of widowhood, divorce, separation, death, or physical or emotional Yes automatically Yes but only on limited None 
 violence  grounds or under certain  
   conditions (ex. fixed period of  
   prior residence or marriage)  
     
34 Right to autonomous residence permit for other family members having joined the sponsor After ≤ 3 years After > 3 years or upon certain None 
   conditions (e.g. normal  
   procedure for permanent  
   residence)  
     
35 Access to education and training for adult family members In the same way as the Other conditions apply None 
  sponsor   
     
36 Access to employment and self-employment In the same way as the Other conditions apply None 
  sponsor   
     
37 Access to social security and social assistance, healthcare and housing In the same way as the Other conditions apply None 
  sponsor   
     
Education    
Access 100 50 0 
38 Access and support to access pre-primary education: a. All categories of migrants have Both of these One of these Neither; restrictions in 
 same access in law as nationals, regardless of their residence status (includes undocumented);   law on access for some 
 b. State-supported targeted measures (e.g. financial support, campaigns and other means) to increase participation of migrant   categories of migrants 
 pupils (can also be to increase parental engagement).   AND migrants only benefit 
    from general support for 
 Note: Use definition of pre-primary in your country .   all students (and targeted 
    non-governmental 
    initiatives where 
    provided) 
     
39 Access to compulsory-age education: Explicit obligation in law Implicit obligation for all Restrictions in law on 
 Access is a legal right for all compulsory-age children in the country, regardless of their residence status for all categories of children (no impediment to access for some 
 (includes undocumented). migrants to have  same equal access in law. e.g. no categories of migrants 
  access as nationals link between compulsory  
 Note: Use definition of compulsory-age in your country  education and residence, or  
   no category of migrant  
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   excluded)  
     
40 The assessment in compulsory education of migrants' prior learning and language qualifications and learning Both of these One of these Case-by-case 
 obtained abroad:   assessment by school 
 a. Assessment with standardised quality criteria and tools;   staff without standardised 
 b. Requirement to use trained staff.   criteria or training 
     
41 Support to access secondary education: Both of these One of these Neither 
 a. Targeted measures to increase migrant pupils' successful participation in secondary education;    
 b. Targeted measures to increase migrant pupils' access to academic routes that lead to higher education.    
 Note: This includes extra tuition, monitoring, and learning opportunities and assessments. Depending on the    
 school system, this may also include movement between school routes and structures (e.g. academic and    
 technical).    
     
42 Access and support to access and participate in vocational training: Two or more of these, At least one of these None of these 
 Training through apprenticeships or other work-based learning, with state support and/or screening and quality including a  Restrictions in law on 
 control measures.   access for some 
 a. All categories of migrants have same legal access as nationals, regardless of their residence status (includes   categories of migrants 
 undocumented);   AND migrants only benefit 
 b.  Measures to specifically increase migrant pupil participation in such schemes, e.g. incentives;   from general support. If 
 c. Measures to increase employers' supply of such schemes to migrant pupils, e.g. campaigns, support and   there is targeted support 
 guidance.   for migrants, it is only 
    through non-governmental 
    initiatives. 
     
43 Access and support to access and participate in higher education: Both of these One of these Neither. Restrictions in 
 a. All categories of migrants have same access in law as nationals, regardless of their residence status (includes   law on access for some 
 undocumented);   categories of migrants 
 b. Targeted measures to increase acceptance and successful participation of migrant pupils, e.g. admission   AND migrants only benefit 
 targets, additional targeted language support, mentoring, campaigns, measures to address drop-outs.   from general support. If 
    there is targeted support 
 Note: This indicator does not include international students migrating specifically for higher education   for migrants, it is only 
    through non-governmental 
    initiatives 
     
44 Access to advice and guidance on system and choices at all levels of compulsory and non-compulsory All three of these One or two of these Migrants only benefit from 
 education (pre-primary to higher):   general support. If there is 
 a. Written information on educational system in migrant languages of origin;   targeted support for 
 b. Provision of resource persons/centres for orientation of migrant pupils;   migrants, it is only through 
 c. Provision of interpretation services for families of migrant pupils for general educational advice and guidance   non-governmental 
 at all levels.   initiatives. 
     
Targeting needs 100 50 0 
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45 Requirement for provision in schools of intensive induction programmes for newcomer pupils and their families Both of these Only a No requirement 
 about the country and its education system:    
 a. Existence of induction programme;    
 b. Inclusion of parents.    
 Note: This does not refer to language induction courses.    
     
46a Provision of continuous and on-going education support in language(s) of instruction for migrant pupils: Both of these One of these No provision. Only 
 a. In compulsory education (both primary and secondary);   through private or 
 b. In pre-primary education.   community initiatives. 
 Note: Migrant pupils may be placed in the mainstream classroom or a separate classroom for a transitional    
 phase. This question relates to language support in either case.    
     
46b If you answered Option 3 to 46a, skip this question: Both of these Only one of these Level/goals not specified 
 Provision includes:   or defined 
 a. Communicative literacy (general fluency in reading, writing, and communicating in the language);    
 b. Academic literacy (fluency in studying, researching, and communicating in the language in the school    
 academic setting).    
     
46c If you answered Option 3 to 46a, skip this question: Provision includes quality measures: Two or more of these At least one of these None of these elements 
 a. Requirement for courses to use established second-language learning standards;    
 b. Requirement for teachers to be specialised and certified in these standards;    
 c. Curriculum standards are monitored by a state body.    
     
47 Policy on pupil monitoring targets migrants. System disaggregates System monitors migrants as None. Migrants are only 
  migrants into various a single aggregated group included in  general 
  sub-groups, ex. gender,  categories for monitoring 
  country of origin  that apply to all students. 
     
48 Targeted policies to address educational situation of migrant groups: Both of these One of these None. Migrants only 
 a. Systematic provision of guidance  (e.g. teaching assistance, homework support);   benefit from general 
 b. Systematic provision of financial resources.   support. If there is 
    targeted support for 
    migrants, it is only through 
    voluntary initiatives. 
     
49 Teacher training and professional development programmes include courses that address migrant pupils' Both of these One of these None 
 learning needs, teachers' expectations of migrant pupils, and specific teaching strategies to address this:    
 a. Pre-service training required in order to qualify as a teacher;    
 b. In-service professional development training.    
     
New opportunities 100 50 0 
50a Provision of option (in or outside school) to learn immigrant languages. State regulations / Bilateral agreements or No provision; only 
  recommendations schemes financed by another through private or 
   country community initiatives 
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50b If you answered Option 3 to 50a, skip this question: Two or more of these One of these No delivery in school or 
 Option on immigrant languages is delivered:   funding by state 
 a. In the regular school day (may involve missing other subjects);    
 b. As an adaptation of foreign-language courses in school, which may be open to all students (equal status as    
 other languages);    
 c. Outside school, with some state funding.    
     
51a Provision of option (in or outside school) to learn about migrant pupils' cultures and their / their parents' country State regulations / Bilateral agreements or No provision. Only 
 of origin. recommendations schemes financed by another through private or 
   country. community initiatives. 
     
51b If you answered Option 3 to 51a, skip this question: Two or more of these One of these No delivery in school or 
 Option on cultures of origin is delivered:   funding by state 
 a. In the regular school day (may involve missing other subjects);    
 b. Integrated into the school curriculum, which may be open to all students;    
 c. Outside school, with some state funding.    
     
52a Monitoring segregation between educational institutions: Both of these One of these None. Migrants are only 
 a. Requirement to monitor segregation of migrant pupils into different educational institutions at all levels;   included in general 
 b. This requirement includes special needs education.   categories that apply to all 
    students. 
     
52b Measures to promote societal integration: Both of these One of these None. Only general 
 a. Measures to encourage schools with few migrant pupils to attract more migrant pupils and schools with many   measures . 
 to attract more non-migrant pupils;    
 b. Measures to link schools with few migrant pupils and many migrant pupils (curricular or extra-curricular).    
     
53 Measures to support migrant parents and communities in the education of their children: Two or more of these One of these  None. Migrant parents 
 a. Requirement for community-level support for parental involvement in their children's learning (e.g. community   and communities are only 
 outreach workers);   included in  general 
 b. Requirement for school-level support to link migrant students and their schools (e.g. school liaison workers);   categories that apply to 
 c. Measures to encourage migrant parents to be involved in school governance.   all. 
Intercultural education for all 100 50 0 
54 The official aims of intercultural education include the appreciation of cultural diversity, and is delivered: Both of these One of these Intercultural education not 
 a. As a stand-alone curriculum subject;   included in curriculum, or 
 b. Integrated throughout the curriculum.   intercultural education 
    does not include 
    appreciation of cultural 
    diversity. 
     
55 State support for public information initiatives to promote the appreciation of cultural diversity throughout society. Initiatives part of Initiatives part of state budget Neither 
  mandate of state- line for ad hoc funding.  
  subsidised body   
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56 The school curricula and teaching materials can be modified to reflect changes in the diversity of the school Both of these Only a None 
 population:    
 a. State guidance on curricular change to reflect both national and local population variations;    
 b. Inspection, evaluation and monitoring of implementation of (a).    
     
57 Daily life at school can be adapted based on cultural or religious needs in order to avoid exclusion of pupils. State regulations or Law allows for local or school- No specific adaptation 
 Such adaptations might include one or a few of the following: Changes to the existing school timetable and guidelines concerning level discretion foreseen in law 
 religious holidays; educational activities; dress codes and clothing; school menus. local adaptation   
     
58 Measures (i.e. campaigns, incentives, support) to support bringing migrants into the teacher workforce: Both of these One of these None 
 a. To encourage more migrants to study and qualify as teachers;    
 b. To encourage more migrants to enter the teacher workforce.    
     
59 Teacher training and professional development programmes include intercultural education and the appreciation Both of these One of these Training on intercultural 
 of cultural diversity for all teachers:   education not provided, or 
 a. Pre-service training required in order to qualify as a teacher;   intercultural education 
 b. In-service professional development training.   does not include 
    appreciation of cultural 
    diversity. 
Political participation    
 Electoral rights 100 50 0 
60 Right to vote in national elections Equal rights as Reciprocity or other special No right 
  nationals after certain conditions for certain  
  period of residence nationalities  
     
61 Right to vote in regional elections (blank if not applicable) Equal rights as nationals Requirement of more than five No right 
  or requirement of less than years of residence, reciprocity,  
  or equal to five years of other special conditions or  
  residence special registration procedure  
   or only in certain regions  
     
62 Right to vote in local elections Equal rights as EU- Requirement of more than five No right 
  nationals or years of residence, reciprocity,  
  requirement of less than other special conditions or  
  or equal to five years of special registration procedure,  
  residence or only in certain municipalities  
     
63 Right to stand for elections at local level Unrestricted (as for EU- Restricted to certain posts, No right / other 
  nationals) reciprocity or special restrictions apply 
   requirements  
     
Political liberties 100 50 0 
64 Right to association No restrictions on A minimal number of national No right 
  creation of associations citizens should be on board,  
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  by foreigners, no other restrictions apply (i.e.  
  restrictions regarding with regard to creation of  
  the composition of the political organisations or  
  board of such parties)  
  associations   
     
65 Membership of and participation in political parties Equal access with Restricted access to internal Other restrictions apply 
  nationals (no elected positions  
  restrictions imposed by   
  government)   
     
66 Right to create media (newspaper, radio, television, etc.) No restrictions on Other restrictions than those No right 
  creation of media by for non-immigrant media apply  
  foreigners apply (or   
  similar restrictions as   
  for non-immigrant   
  media)   
     
Consultative bodies 100 50 0 
67a Consultation of foreign residents on national level Structural consultation Ad hoc consultation No consultation 
67b Composition of consultative body of foreign residents on national level members elected by members elected by foreign members of consultation 
  foreign residents or residents or members body are selected and 
  members appointed by appointed by associations of appointed by the state 
  associations of foreign foreign residents but with only 
  residents without special state intervention  
  special state   
  intervention   
     
67c Leadership of consultative body (repeat for each consultative body) Chaired by participant Co-chaired by participant and Chaired by national 
  (foreign resident or national authority authority 
  association)   
     
67d Institutionalisation (as either right or duty of body in law) Both guaranteed in One guaranteed in None guaranteed in 
 Beyond consultation on policies affecting foreign residents, the Body has: law/statutes law/statutes law/statutes 
 a. Right of initiative to make its own reports or recommendations, even when not consulted.    
 b. Right to a response from the national authority to the its advice or recommendations.    
     
67e Representativeness Both required in One required in law No criteria in law/statutes 
 Existence of selection criteria to ensure representativeness. Participants or organisations must include: law/statutes   
 a. Both genders    
 b. All nationalities/ethnic groups    
     
68a Consultation of foreign residents on regional level (blank if not applicable) Structural consultation Ad hoc consultation or No consultation 
   structural consultation only  
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   present in some regional  
   entities  
     
68b Composition of consultative body of foreign residents on regional level (blank if not applicable) Members elected by Members elected by foreign Members of consultation 
  foreign residents or residents or members body are selected and 
  members appointed by appointed by associations of appointed by the state 
  associations of foreign foreign residents but with only 
  residents without special state intervention  
  special state   
  intervention   
     
68c Leadership of consultative body (repeat for each consultative body) Chaired by participant Co-chaired by participant and Chaired by national 
  (foreign resident or national authority authority 
  association)   
     
68d Institutionalisation (as either right or duty of body in law) Both guaranteed in One guaranteed in None guaranteed in 
 Beyond consultation on policies affecting foreign residents, the Body has: law/statutes law/statutes law/statutes 
 a. Right of initiative to make its own reports or recommendations, even when not consulted.    
 b. Right to a response from the national authority to the its advice or recommendations.    
     
68e Representativeness Both required in One required in law No criteria in law/statutes 
 Existence of selection criteria to ensure representativeness. Participants or organisations must include: law/statutes   
 a. Both genders    
 b. All nationalities/ethnic groups    
     
69a Consultation of foreign residents on local level in capital city Structural consultation Ad hoc consultation No consultation 
     
69b Composition of consultative body of foreign residents on local level in capital city Members elected by Members elected by foreign Members of consultation 
  foreign residents or residents or members body are selected and 
  members appointed by appointed by associations of appointed by the state 
  associations of foreign foreign residents but with only 
  residents without special state intervention  
  special state   
  intervention   
     
69c Leadership of consultative body (repeat for each consultative body) Chaired by participant Co-chaired by participant and Chaired by national 
  (foreign resident or national authority authority 
  association)   
     
69d Institutionalisation (as either right or duty of body in law) Both guaranteed in One guaranteed in None guaranteed in 
 Beyond consultation on policies affecting foreign residents, the body has: law/statutes law/statutes law/statutes 
 a. Right of initiative to make its own reports or recommendations, even when not consulted.    
 b. Right to a response from the national authority to the its advice or recommendations.    
     
69e Representativeness Both required in One required in law No criteria in law/statutes 
  
3
0
9 
 Existence of selection criteria to ensure representativeness. Participants or organisations must include: law/statutes   
 a. Both genders    
 b. All nationalities/ethnic groups    
     
70a Consultation of foreign residents on local level in city (other than capital) with highest proportion of foreign Structural consultation Ad hoc consultation No consultation 
 residents    
     
70b Composition of consultative body of foreign residents on local level in city (other than capital) with highest Members elected by Members elected by foreign Members of consultation 
 proportion of foreign residents foreign residents or residents or members body are selected and 
  members appointed by appointed by associations of appointed by the state 
  associations of foreign foreign residents but with only 
  residents without special state intervention  
  special state   
  intervention   
     
70c Leadership of consultative body (repeat for each consultative body) Chaired by participant Co-chaired by participant and Chaired by national 
  (foreign resident or national authority authority 
  association)   
     
70d Institutionalisation (as either right or duty of body in law) Both guaranteed in One guaranteed in None guaranteed in 
 Beyond consultation on policies affecting foreign residents, the Body has: law/statutes law/statutes law/statutes 
 a. Right of initiative to make its own reports or recommendations, even when not consulted.    
 b. Right to a response from the national authority to the its advice or recommendations.    
     
70e Representativeness Both required in One required in law No criteria in law/statutes 
 Existence of selection criteria to ensure representativeness. Participants or organisations must include: law/statutes   
 a. Both genders    
 b. All nationalities/ethnic groups    
     
Implementation policies 100 50 0 
71 Active policy of information by national level (or regional in federal states) Policy of information by Information campaigns (on a No active policy of 
  state targeted at foreign non-individual basis) towards information (or no political 
  residents (or targeted at foreign residents(or only rights at any level to be 
  all) on individual basis individual campaigns in certain informed about) 
   regions)  
     
72 Public funding or support of immigrant organisations on national level Funding or support (in Funding or support (in kind) No support or funding 
  kind) for immigrant dependent on criteria set by  
  organisations involved the state (beyond being a  
  in consultation and partner in consultation and  
  advice at national level different than for non-  
  without further immigrant groups)  
  conditions than being a   
  partner in talks (or   
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  similar conditions as for   
  non-immigrant   
  organisations)   
     
73 Public funding or support of immigrant organisations on regional level Funding or support (in Funding or support (in kind) No support or funding 
  kind) for immigrant dependent on criteria set by  
  organisations involved the state (beyond being a  
  in consultation and partner in consultation and  
  advice at regional level different than for non-  
  without further immigrant groups) or not in all  
  conditions than being a regions  
  partner in talks (or   
  similar conditions as for   
  non-immigrant   
  organisations)   
     
74 Public funding or support of immigrant organisations on local level in capital city Funding or support (in Funding or support (in kind) No support or funding 
  kind) for immigrant dependent on criteria set by  
  organisations involved the state (beyond being a  
  in consultation and partner in consultation and  
  advice at local level different than for non-  
  without further immigrant groups)  
  conditions than being a   
  partner in talks (or   
  similar conditions as for   
  non-immigrant   
  organisations)   
     
75 Public funding or support of immigrant organisations at local level in city (other than capital) with highest Funding or support (in Funding or support (in kind) No support or funding 
 proportion of foreign residents kind) for immigrant dependent on criteria set by  
  organisations involved the state (beyond being a  
  in consultation and partner in consultation and  
  advice at local level different than for non-  
  without further immigrant groups)  
  conditions than being a   
  partner in talks (or   
  similar conditions as for   
  non-immigrant   
  organisations)   
      
 Long-term residence    
Eligibility 100 50 0 
76a Required time of habitual residence < 5 years 5 years > 5 years 
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76b Documents taken into account to be eligible for long-term residence Any residence permit Seasonal workers, au pairs Additional temporary 
   and posted workers excluded residence permits 
    excluded 
     
77 Is time of residence as a pupil/student counted? Yes, all Yes, with some conditions No 
   (limited number of years or  
   type of study)  
     
78 Periods of absence allowed before granting of status Longer periods Up to 10 non-consecutive Shorter periods 
   months and/or 6 consecutive  
   months  
     
Conditions for acquisition of status 100 50 0 
79a Form of language requirement (if no measure, leave blank) No requirement OR Requirement to take a Requirement includes 
  voluntary language course language test/assessment 
  course/information   
     
79b Level of language requirement (if no measure, leave blank) (not weighted) A1 or less set as A2 set as standard B1 or higher set as 
  standard  standard OR no 
 Note: Can be test, interview, completion of course, or other forms of assessments.   standards, based on 
    administrative discretion. 
     
79c Form of integration requirement ex. not language, but social/cultural No requirement OR Requirement to take an Requirement includes 
  voluntary integration course integration 
  course/information  test/assessment 
     
79d Language/integration requirement exemptions (if no measure, leave blank) Both of these One of these Neither of these 
 a. Takes into account individual abilities ex. educational qualifications    
 b. Exemptions for vulnerable groups ex. age, illiteracy, mental/physical disability    
     
79e Conductor of language/integration requirement  (if no measure, leave blank) a and b, ex. language a but not b, ex. integration unit Neither a nor b, ex. police, 
 a. Language or education specialists or education institutes in government foreigners' service, 
 b. Independent of government (ex. not directly subcontracted by or part of a government department)   general consultant 
     
79f Cost of language/integration requirement (if no measure, leave blank) No or nominal costs Normal costs  ex. if provided Higher costs 
   by state, same as regular  
   administrative fees; if provided  
   by private sector, same as  
   market price in countries  
     
79g Support to pass language/integration requirement (if no measure, leave blank) a and b a or b Neither a nor b 
 a. Assessment based on publicly available list of questions or study guide    
 b. Assessment based on publicly available course    
     
79h Cost of support (if no measure or support, leave blank) No or nominal costs Normal costs  ex. if provided Higher costs 
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   by state, same as regular  
   administrative fees; if provided  
   by private sector, same as  
   market price in countries  
     
80 Economic resources requirement None or at/below level Higher than social assistance Linked to employment/no 
  of social assistance and but source is not linked with social assistance 
  no income is excluded employment  
     
81 Maximum length of application procedure ≤ 6 months defined by > 6 months but the maximum No regulation on 
  law is defined by law maximum length 
     
82 Costs of application and/or issue of status No or nominal costs Normal costs  ex. same as Higher costs 
   regular administrative fees in  
   the country  
     
Security of status 100 50 0 
83 Duration of validity of permit ≥ 5 < 5 ≥ 3 < 3 
     
84 Renewable permit Automatically Upon application Provided original 
    requirements are still met 
     
85 Periods of absence allowed for renewal, after granting of status (continuous or cumulative) ≥ 3 years < 3 > 1 ≤ 1 
     
86 Grounds for rejecting, withdrawing, or refusing to renew status: No other than a and/or Includes c or d Includes c and d and/or 
 a. proven fraud in the acquisition of permit b  additional grounds 
 b. actual and serious threat to public policy or national security,    
 c. sentence for serious crimes,    
 d. Original conditions are no longer satisfied (ex. unemployment or economic resources)    
     
87 Protection against expulsion. Due account taken of: All elements At least b, c, d and e One or more of  b, c, d or 
 a. personal behaviour   e are not taken into 
 b. age of resident,   account 
 c. duration of residence,    
 d. consequences for both the resident and his or her family,    
 e. existing links to the Member State concerned    
 f. (non-)existing links to the resident’s country of origin (including problems of re-entry for political or citizenship    
 reasons), and    
 g. alternative measures (downgrading to limited residence permit etc.)    
     
88 Expulsion precluded: In all three cases At least one case None 
 a. after 20 years of residence as a long-term residence permit holder,    
 b. in case of minors, and    
 c. residents born in the Member State concerned or admitted before they were 10 once they have reached the    
 age of 18    
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89 Legal guarantees and redress in case of refusal, non-renewal, or withdrawal: All rights At least a and b One or both of a and b 
 a. reasoned decision   are not guaranteed 
 b. right to appeal    
 c. representation before an independent administrative authority and/or a court    
     
Rights associated with status Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
90 Residence right after retirement Maintained Maintained with less Not maintained 
   entitlements  
     
91 Access to employment (with the only exception of activities involving the exercise of public authority), self- employment and  Equal access with Priority to nationals/ EEA Other limiting conditions 
 other economic activities, and working conditions nationals and equal citizens apply 
  working conditions   
     
92 Access to social security, social assistance, health care and housing Equal access with Priority to nationals/ EEA Other limiting conditions 
  nationals citizens apply 
     
93 Recognition of academic and professional qualifications Same procedures as for Different procedure to EEA No recognition of titles 
  EEA nationals nationals  
     
Access to nationality    
Eligibility 100 50 0 
94 First generation After ≤ 5 years of total After > 5 < 10 years of total After ≥ 10 years of total 
  residence residence residence 
 Note: "Residence" is defined as the whole period of lawful and habitual stay since entry. For instance, if the    
 requirement is 5 years with a permanent residence, which itself can only be obtained after 5 years' residence,    
 please select "After ≥ 10 years"    
     
95 Periods of absence allowed previous to acquisition of nationality Longer periods Up to 10 non-consecutive Shorter periods (includes 
   months and/or 6 consecutive uninterrupted residence or 
   months where absence not 
    regulated by law and left 
    to administrative 
    discretion) 
     
96a Spouses of nationals After ≤ 3 years of After > 3 ≤ 5 years of After > 5 years of 
  residence and/ or residence and/or marriage residence and/ or 
 Note: "Residence" is defined as the whole period of lawful and habitual stay since entry. If there is a required marriage  marriage 
 period of marriage that is less than the residence/waiting period, please answer according to the most favourable    
 option. For instance, if spouses may apply after 3 years of marriage OR 4 years of residence, please select    
 Option 3.    
     
96b Residence requirement for partners/co-habitees of nationals Same as for spouse of Longer than for spouses, but Same as for ordinary 
  national shorter than for ordinary TCNs TCNs 
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97 Second generation Automatically at birth Upon simple application or Naturalisation procedure 
  (may be conditional declaration after birth (facilitated or not) 
 Note: Second generation are born in the country to non-national parents upon parents' status)   
     
98 Third generation Automatically at birth Upon simple application or Naturalisation procedure 
  (may be conditional declaration after birth (facilitated or not) 
 Note: Third generation are born in the country to non-national parents, at least one of whom was born in the upon parents' status)   
 country.    
     
Conditions for acquisition 100 50 0 
99a Language requirement No assessment OR A1 A2 set as standard B1 or higher set as 
  or less set as standard  standard OR no 
 Note: Can be test, interview, completion of course, or other forms of assessments.   standards, based on 
    administrative discretion. 
     
99b Language requirement exemptions (Blank if no assessment) Both of these One of these Neither of these 
 a. Takes into account individual abilities ex. educational qualifications    
 b. Exemptions for vulnerable groups ex. age, illiteracy, mental/physical disability    
     
99c Conductor of language requirement (if no measure, leave blank) a and b, ex. language a but not b, ex. language unit Neither a nor b, ex. police, 
 a. Language-learning specialists institutes in government foreigners' service, 
 b. Independent of government (ex. not part of a government department)   general consultant 
     
99d Cost of language requirement (Blank if no assessment) No or nominal costs Normal costs  ex. if provided Higher costs 
   by state, same as regular  
   administrative fees; if provided  
   by private sector, same as  
   market price  
     
99e Support to pass language requirement (if no measure, leave blank) a and b a or b Neither a nor b 
 a. Assessment based on publicly available list of questions or study guide    
 b. Assessment based on publicly available course    
     
99f Cost of language support (Blank if no language assessment or support) No or nominal costs Normal costs  ex. if provided Higher costs 
   by state, same as regular  
   administrative fees; if provided  
   by private sector, same as  
   market price  
     
100 Citizenship/integration requirement No requirement OR Requirement to take an Requirement includes 
a  voluntary integration course integration 
  course/information  test/assessment 
 Note: Can be test, interview, or other forms of assessments.    
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100 Citizenship/integration requirement exemptions (Blank if no assessment) Both of these One of these Neither of these 
b a. Takes into account individual abilities ex. educational qualifications    
 b. Exemptions for vulnerable groups ex. age, illiteracy, mental/physical disability    
     
100 Conductor of citizenship/integration requirement (if no measure, leave blank) a and b, ex. educational a but not b, ex. citizenship/ Neither a nor b, ex. police, 
c a. Education specialists institutes integration unit in government foreigners' service, 
 b. Independent of government (ex. not part of a government department)   general consultant 
     
 Cost of citizenship/integration requirement (Blank if no assessment) No or nominal costs Normal costs  ex. if provided Higher costs 
   by state, same as regular  
   administrative fees; if provided  
   by private sector, same as  
   market price  
     
100 Support to pass citizenship/integration requirement (if no assessment, leave blank) a and b a or b Neither a nor b 
e a. Assessment based on publicly available list of questions or study guide    
 b. Assessment based on publicly available course    
     
100f Cost of citizenship/integration requirement (Blank if no assessment) No or nominal costs Normal costs  ex. if provided Higher costs 
   by state, same as regular  
   administrative fees; if provided  
   by private sector, same as  
   market price  
     
101 Economic resources requirement None Minimum income (ex. Additional requirements 
   acknowledged level of poverty (ex. employment, stable 
   threshold) and sufficient resources, 
    higher levels of income) 
     
102 Criminal record requirement Crimes with sentences Crimes with sentences of For other offences (ex. 
  of imprisonment for ≥ 5 imprisonment for < 5 years misdemeanours, minor 
 Note: Ground for rejection or application of a qualifying period (not rejection, but longer residence period) years OR Use of  offenses, pending criminal 
  qualifying period  procedure) 
  instead of refusal   
     
103 Good character' clause (different from criminal record requirement) None A basic good character Higher good character 
   required (commonly used, i.e. requirement (i.e. than for 
   also for nationals) nationals) or vague 
    definition 
     
104 Maximum length of application procedure ≤ 6 months > 6 months but the maximum No regulation on 
   is defined by law maximum length 
     
105 Costs of application and/or issue of nationality title No or nominal costs Normal costs  ex. same as Higher costs 
   regular administrative fees  
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Security of status 100 50 0 
106 Additional grounds for refusing status: No other than a No other than a-b Other than a-b 
 a. Proven fraud (ex. provision of false information) in the acquisition of citizenship    
 b. Actual and serious threat to public policy or national security.    
     
107 Discretionary powers in refusal Explicit entitlement for Discretion only on limited Discretionary procedure 
  applicants that meet the elements  
  conditions and grounds   
  in law   
     
108 Before refusal, due account is taken of (regulated by law): All elements At least b, c, d, e and f One or more of  b, c, d, e 
 a. personal behaviour of resident   or f are not taken into 
 b. age of resident,   account 
 c. duration of residence and holding of nationality,    
 d. consequences for both the resident and his or her family,    
 e. existing links to the Member State concerned    
 f. (non-)existing links to the resident’s country of origin (including problems of re-entry for political or citizenship    
 reasons), and    
 g. alternative measures (downgrading to residence permit etc.)    
     
109 Legal guarantees and redress in case of refusal: All guarantees At least a and b One or both of a and b 
 a. reasoned decision   are not guaranteed 
 b. right to appeal    
 c. representation before an independent administrative authority and/or a court    
     
110 Grounds for withdrawing status: No other than a No other than a-b Other than a-b 
 a. Proven fraud (ex. provision of false information) in the acquisition of citizenship    
 b. Actual and serious threat to public policy or national security.    
     
111 Time limits for withdrawal (including other means of ceasing nationality by authority's decision) ≤ 5 years after > 5 years after acquisition No time limits in law 
  acquisition   
     
112 Withdrawal (including other means of ceasing nationality by authority's decision) that would lead to statelessness Explicitly prohibited in Discretionary, Taken into Not addressed in law 
  law account in decision  
     
Dual nationality 100 50 0 
113 Requirement to renounce / lose foreign nationality upon naturalisation for first generation None. Dual nationality Requirement exists, but with Requirement exists 
  is allowed exceptions (when country of  
   origin does not allow  
   renunciation of citizenship or  
   sets unreasonably high fees  
   for renunciation)  
     
114 Dual nationality for second and/or third generation. Allowed at birth Subject to conditions such as Dual nationality is not 
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   for those born in wedlock or allowed 
   those with dual nationality if  
   acquired by jus soli  
     
Anti-discrimination    
Definitions and concepts 100 50 0 
115 Definition of discrimination includes direct and indirect discrimination, harassment and instruction to discriminate All three grounds Two grounds Ground a, none, or only 
 on grounds of:   based on international 
 a) race and ethnicity   standards or constitution, 
 b) religion and belief   subject to judicial 
 c) nationality   interpretation 
     
116 Definition of discrimination includes discrimination by association and on basis of assumed characteristics All three grounds Two grounds Ground a, none, or only 
 covering:   based on international 
 a) race and ethnicity   standards or constitution, 
 b) religion and belief   subject to judicial 
 c) nationality   interpretation 
     
117 Anti-discrimination law applies to natural and legal persons: a and b a or b None 
 a) In the private sector    
 b) Including private sector carrying out public sector activities    
     
118 Anti-discrimination law applies to the public sector, including: a and b a or b None 
 a) Public bodies    
 b) Police force    
     
119 The law prohibits: All a, b and c Two of these or less 
 a) Public incitement to violence, hatred or discrimination on basis of race/ethnicity; religion/belief/nationality    
 b) Racially/religiously motivated public insults, threats or defamation    
 c) Instigating, aiding, abetting or attempting to commit such offences    
 d) Racial profiling    
     
120 Restriction of freedom of association, assembly and speech is permitted when impeding equal treatment in All three grounds Two grounds Ground a, none or subject 
 respect of:   to judicial interpretation 
 a) race and ethnicity    
 b) religion and belief    
 c) nationality    
     
121 Are there any specific rules covering multiple discrimination? Yes, and victim has the Yes but the victim has no No 
  choice of the main choice on the main ground to  
  ground to invoke in invoke in courts  
  courts   
     
Fields of application 100 50 0 
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122 Anti-discrimination law covers employment and vocational training: All three grounds Two grounds Ground a, none, or only based  
 a) race and ethnicity   on international standards or 
 b) religion and belief   constitution, subject to  
 c) nationality   judicial interpretation 
     
123 Anti-discrimination law covers education (primary and secondary level): All three grounds Two grounds Ground a, none, or only 
 a) race and ethnicity   based on international 
 b) religion and belief   standards or constitution, 
 c) nationality   subject to judicial 
    interpretation 
     
124 Anti-discrimination law covers social protection, including social security: All three grounds Two grounds Ground a, none, or only 
 a) race and ethnicity   based on international 
 b) religion and belief   standards or constitution, 
 c) nationality   subject to judicial 
    interpretation 
     
125 Anti-discrimination law covers social advantages: a) race and ethnicity All three grounds Two grounds Ground a, none, or only 
 b) religion and belief   based on international 
 c) nationality   standards or constitution, 
    subject to judicial 
    Interpretation 
     
126 Anti-discrimination law covers access to and supply of goods and services available to the public, including All three grounds Two grounds Ground a, none, or only 
 housing:   based on international 
 a) race and ethnicity   standards or constitution, 
 b) religion and belief   subject to judicial 
 c) nationality   interpretation 
     
127 Anti-discrimination law covers access to supply of goods and services available to the public, including health: All three grounds Two grounds Ground a, none, or only 
 a) race and ethnicity   based on international 
 b) religion and belief   standards or constitution, 
 c) nationality   subject to judicial 
    interpretation 
     
Enforcement mechanisms 100 50 0 
128 Access for victims, irrespective of grounds of discrimination, to: All three Two of these Only one of these 
 a) judicial civil procedures    
 b) criminal procedures    
 c) administrative procedures    
129 Alternative dispute resolution procedures a and b a or b None 
 a) decisions are binding    
 b) appeal of rulings possible    
 Note: Alternative dispute resolution covers procedures like mediation. It does not include the normal judicial system or    
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 quasi-judicial bodies    
     
130 Access for victims includes:  All grounds Two grounds Ground a 
 a) race and ethnicity    
 b) religion and belief    
 c) nationality    
     
131 Average length of both judicial civil and administrative procedures does not exceed: ≤ 6 months ≤ 1 year > 1 year 
     
132 a) shift in burden of proof in judicial civil procedures a and b only a none 
 b) shift in burden of proof in administrative procedures    
     
133 Does national legislation allow courts to accept the following evidence: a and b a or b Neither of these 
 a) situation testing    
 b) statistical data    
     
134 Protection against victimisation in: In all areas a and b a or none 
 a) employment    
 b) vocational training    
 c) education    
 d) services    
 e) goods    
     
135 a) state provides financial assistance or free court-appointed lawyer to pursue complaint before courts where a and b a or b None 
 victims do not have the necessary means    
 b) where necessary an interpreter is provided free of charge    
     
136 Legal entities with a legitimate interest in defending the principle of equality: All possibilities Only a or b Only b 
 a) may engage in proceedings on behalf of victims    
 b) may engage in proceedings in support of victims    
 c) can bring cases even if no specific victim is referred to (in which case the consent of a victim is not required)    
     
137 Legal actions include: All three Only two of these One or none 
 a) individual action    
 b) class action (court claim where one or more named claimants pursue a case for themselves and the defined    
 class against one or more defendants)    
 c) Actio popularis (Action to obtain remedy by a person or a group in the name of the collective interest)    
     
138 Sanctions include: At least 5 At least c, e and h At least 2 
 a) financial compensation to victims for material damages    
 b) financial compensation to victims for moral damages/ damages for injuries to feelings    
 c) restitution of rights lost due to discrimination/ damages in lieu    
 d) imposing positive measures on discrimination    
 e) imposing negative measures to stop offending    
 f) imposing negative measures to prevent repeat offending    
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 g) specific sanctions authorising publication of the offence (in a non-judicial publication, i.e. not in court documents    
 h) specific sanctions for legal persons    
     
139 Discriminatory motivation on the grounds of race/religion/nationality treated as aggravating circumstance Yes for 3 grounds Only race or religion Race only or subject to 
    judicial interpretation 
     
Equality policies 100 50 0 
140 Specialised Equality Agency has been established with a mandate to combat discrimination on the grounds of: All three grounds Two grounds Ground a 
 a) race and ethnicity    
 b) religion and belief    
 c) nationality    
     
141 Specialised Agency has the powers to assist victims by way of All Only one None 
 a) independent legal advice to victims on their case    
 b) independent investigation of the facts of the case    
     
142 If the specialised Agency acts as a quasi-judicial body: All Only one of these Neither of these 
 a) its decisions are binding    
 b) an appeal of these decisions is possible    
     
143 Specialised agency has the legal standing to engage in: a and b a b or none 
 a) judicial proceedings on behalf of a complainant    
 b) administrative proceedings on behalf of the complainant    
     
144 Specialised agency has the power to: a and b b None 
 a) instigate proceedings in own name    
 b) lead own investigation and enforce findings    
     
145 Law provides that the State itself (rather than the specialised agency): All three At least one of these None 
 a) disseminates information    
 b) ensures social dialogue around issues of discrimination    
 c) provides for structured dialogue with civil society    
     
146 On the national level there are: Both of these Only one of these Neither of these 
 a) Mechanism for current and future mainstream legislation to ensure compliance with anti-discrimination and equality law    
 b) Unit in government/ministries directly working on anti-discrimination/equality on these grounds    
     
147 Law provides for: Both of these Only one of these Neither of these 
 a) obligation for public bodies to promote equality in carrying out their functions    
 b) obligation for public bodies to ensure that parties to whom they award benefits like loans or grants respect non-discrimination    
     
148 Law provides for: Both of these Only a None of these 
 a) introduction of positive action measures    
 b) assessment of these measures (ex. research, statistics)    
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